AMIRAJADOON
US Military Academy at West Point DURSUN PEKSEN
University of Memphis
TAEHEEWHANG
Yonsei University
The purpose of this essay is three-fold: to review how current sanctions scholarship defines and measures the success of sanctions; to discuss factors that contribute to explaining outcomes of sanctions; and, finally, to outline potential research avenues that can improve our understanding of sanctions success.
How Do We Measure Sanctions Success?
Despite ongoing debates about their effectiveness, economic sanctions remain a popular instrument of coercion among policy-makers in pursuit of a wide variety of foreign policy objectives. Measuring the utility of sanctions, more generally or in specific cases, entails drawing upon a clear definition and measurement of sanc-tions success. The scholarly literature on the effectiveness of economic sancsanc-tions generally agrees that success involves some degree of concessions from the target state, in line with the sender’s demand. Yet, an increasingly richer and more nu-anced literature on the motivations, outcomes, and unintended consequences of economic sanctions often complicates the meaning of success and failure of sanc-tioning efforts. In order to better navigate the landscape of factors associated with sanctions effectiveness, we briefly discuss the traditional measurements of sanctions success and review other factors that may or may not be considered a part of the definition.
In identifying the components of successful outcomes of sanctions, there are sev-eral dimensions to consider. First, the diversity of goals that users of economic sanc-tions seek to attain, from restraining nuclear proliferation to encouraging demo-cratic reforms to containing violent nonstate entities can make it difficult to devise
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a general definition of success. In some cases, contribution or progress toward a senders’ ultimate goal could be considered as partial success of a sanctioning effort;
this requires careful consideration of the lines between contributions toward a goal verses a sanctions’ outcome. Secondly, the availability of more nuanced data on a sanctions episode (Morgan et al. 2009), which includes two distinct stages of a sanc-tioning effort (the threat stage and the sanctions imposition stage), means that a sanctions regime can attain success at two different points: when a sender state first issues a threat to a target state and when a sender state imposes a sanction. The tran-sition from one stage to another does not necessarily imply failure of the sanction-ing episode as a whole. Third, a large body of literature on economic sanctions has identified a number of counterproductive effects associated with sanctions, such as increased state repression (Peksen 2009) or women’s economic and political rights abuses (Drury and Peksen 2014). While such negative externalities are undesirable and may have long-term adverse effects, from a sender’s perspective, such effects do not directly factor into measurements of success or failure. Finally, sender states may use sanctions symbolically, to express disapproval toward a policy of the target state (or to dissuade others from adopting similar policies) rather than elicit policy con-cessions (e.g.,Galtung 1967;Eland 1995). This raises questions about whether we can apply the traditional definitions of sanctions success in the context of symbolic sanctions.
Defining Success
The definition of sanctions success is tied to the underlying logic of using sanc-tions as a tool of statecraft. Sender states impose economic sancsanc-tions to inflict costs upon a target state, with the intention to make the target state’s objectionable policy too costly to sustain. In essence, a sender state imposes economic costs on another country to induce change in their behavior. Although outcomes in dis-tinct sanctioning cases, such as security versus trade disputes, are unique in qualita-tive terms, much of the literature on economic sanctions views a sanctions episode as successful where the outcome includes (a) complete compliance by the target state, (b) a partial concession by the target state, or (c) a negotiated settlement between the sender and target states. Bapat et al. (2013) have argued that this measure of success captures the majority view among sanctions scholars with re-gards to the conceptualization of success. However, it is possible to take a more stringent view of success by excluding negotiated settlements as a favorable out-come from the sender’s perspective—depending on the gravity of the matter. For example, can it be considered a successful outcome if a target state alters its pol-icy of providing a safe haven to only some terrorist groups on its soil? Addition-ally, given that not all negotiated settlements are equal, it may be prudent to include an indicator of the number of concessions given by either party to cap-ture whether the sender or the target gained more from a negotiated settlement outcome.
Succeeding at Different Stages
Senders can experience sanction success at the stage of issuing threats of sanctions, or at the imposition stage. Several scholars have argued that sanctions threats are a critical part of sanctioning episodes (e.g.,Drezner 2003;Krustev 2010); restricting success as an outcome to only imposed sanctions introduces selection bias issues since doing so overlooks cases where threats of sanctions triggered favorable changes in targets’ policies. In order to examine the success of a sanctions case holistically and perhaps more accurately, it is valuable to account for both the threat and imposition stage. The introduction of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) introduced byMorgan et al. (2009)allows researchers
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to
examine outcomes of sanctions at both stages. Viewed as a negotiating pro-cess between two parties, distinguishing between the two stages of the sanctioning episode can help understand how the determinants of success vary at different phases of the bargaining process.
The definition of sanctions success discussed above has been typically applied to outcomes of imposed sanctions and can be reasonably extended to threats out-comes as well. However, some distinctions are noteworthy. While imposed sanctions intend to result in success by inflicting actual costs upon target states, in compari-son, targets are likely to concede at the threat stage if they can anticipate the costs of imminent sanctions and/or perceive the seriousness of the senders resolve prior to imposition. Moreover, while threats are considered to fail if they do not elicit a change in the target’s behavior, a sender’s progression from the threat stage to the imposition of sanctions does not mean a failure of the entire sanctioning episode, especially if the imposed sanctions result in the target’s acquiescence. Target states fail to learn anything new about the sender’s credibility from sanctions threats while they believe that sender states will actually carry out their threats by imposing sanc-tions (i.e., sancsanc-tions threats are credible but not informative) (Whang, Mclean, and Kuberski 2013). Success of a sanctioning effort, defined as a target’s complete or partial compliance, or a negotiated settlement, can take place at either the threat or the imposition stage.
Other Considerations
An important strand in the economic sanctions literature has identified a series of negative consequences associated with sanctioning efforts. For example, sanctions might adversely affect targets’ human rights policies (Wood 2008; Peksen 2009), public health (Peksen 2011; Allen and Lektzian 2013), democracy (Peksen and Drury 2010), and women’s rights (Drury and Peksen 2014). Yet, from a sender’s perspective, while such externalities may indirectly contribute to the target’s be-havior in the medium- or long-term, they do not constitute success or failure of sanctioning efforts.
Many scholars of sanctions attribute the popularity of the instrument, at least par-tially, to the symbolic role of sanctions (e.g.,Galtung 1967;Eland 1995) rather than its instrumental use. This view is rooted in the idea that economic sanctions are pub-lic acts of reprobation against target states, observable by the broader international community. While expressing disapproval is a feasible explanation of the motiva-tions of some sancmotiva-tions, difficulty in operationalizing the symbolic utility means that success can be difficult to measure. Defining success in symbolic sanctioning efforts requires adopting measures, which transcend the traditional concepts of sanctions success and failure (Whang 2011).
When Do Sanctions Work?
Sanctions Threats
There is considerable evidence in the literature that sanctions episodes that end at the threat stage tend to have a higher success rate than imposed sanctions (Drezner 2003; Peterson 2013; Whang, McLean, and Kuberski 2013). Sanctions threats are more effective than the actual imposition because target regimes that are willing to concede to external pressure are more likely to do so when they face threats of sanctions to prevent economic and other costs of the imposition of sanc-tions. In explaining the conditions associated with a higher likelihood of successful threats, scholars find that targets that are economically dependent on sender coun-tries, anticipate significant costs from sanctions imposition, or have relatively weak
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capabilities are more prone to compliance prior to the imposition of sanctions.
Further, the lack of strong strategic and alliance ties between targets and senders increases the prospects for success at the threat stage. The absence of close ties en-courages targets to accept their senders’ demands at the threat stage because of the anticipation that senders are likely to follow-up their threats with actual sanctions if they resist (Whang, McLean, and Kuberski 2013). Targets are also more likely to withstand sanctions threats issued by senders that have recently backed down against other targets resisting their sanctions threats (Peterson 2013). That is, a re-cent history of capitulation by senders at the threat stage undermines the credibility of their future sanctions threats.
International Cooperation
International cooperation is considered a key condition in explaining imposed sanctions success. Studies find that multilateral sanctions, especially the ones led by international institutions, are more effective than unilateral sanctions (Martin 1992;Drezner 2000;Bapat and Morgan 2009;Early and Spice 2015). The enforcement of sanctions under the auspices of international institutions is con-sidered relatively easier as institutionalized coalitions suffer less from free-riding and defections issues. International institutions might specifically create commit-tees and other mechanisms to monitor the enforcement of sanctions and publicly name and shame the sender partners that fall short of enforcing the sanctions.
Collective sanctions are considered more effective also because the involvement of multiple countries is likely to increase the extent of the harm on the target econ-omy to induce compliance. Further, targets under multilateral sanctions face more difficulties in mitigating the cost of the coercion to remain defiant as it becomes harder to find alternative trade partners and markets to replace their senders.
Economic Severity of Sanctions and Domestic Interest Groups in Target
Studies also find that sanctions that inflict major economic costs on the target econ-omy are more likely to induce concessions, especially when targets feel the eco-nomic pain immediately after the imposition of sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007;
Dizaji and van Bergeijk 2013). Major economic damage caused by sanctions might create more incentives for target leaders to comply with the external demands to cease the economic suffering and return to presanctions conditions. Building on the cost arguments, others analyze whether it matters which segments of the target society bear the costs of sanctions (Kirshner 1997;Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988;
Lektzian and Patterson 2015). According to the public choice approach (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988), sanctions are more likely to elicit concessions if powerful political and economic interest groups that support the government’s objection-able policy significantly suffer from the coercion. Growing economic pressure on powerful groups would incentivize them to lobby their government to seek a reso-lution with senders regarding the issue under dispute rather than continue to defy sanctions.
Political Regime Type and Domestic Political Dynamics
There is substantial evidence in the literature that autocracies are less likely to con-cede to sanctions than democratic targets (Brooks 2002;Allen 2008;Lektzian and Souva 2007; Grauvogel and von Soest 2014). Autocratic regimes, with the excep-tion of personalist regimes (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010;Peksen 2019), are less vulnerable to foreign pressure as they are usually able to develop effective poli-cies to withstand the pressure. They might be able to survive sanctions by provid-ing selective incentives and rewards, such as access to scarce luxury goods, to their
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relatively small support base in exchange for their allegiance to the regime. Auto-cratic regimes might also use repression to oppress dissent and growing opposition in the shadow of sanctions. Democratic targets, on the other hand, are unlikely to provide selective inducements to help their supporters given their large support base that includes the entire electorate or a significant portion of it. Because demo-cratic governments are restricted by the rule of law and other institutional mecha-nisms, they are also unlikely to use repressive means to eliminate the growing op-position. They are, therefore, more inclined to capitulate in return for the lifting of sanctions. Removal of sanctions would subsequently stop the economic suffering and help governments avoid losing more public support essential for their political survival.
Strategic Ties and Alliances
Studies show that alliances and strategic ties between sender and target coun-tries might affect the outcome of imposed sanctions. Targeted allies tend to be more compliant with the external demands for change compared to targeted rivals (Hufbauer et al. 2007;Drezner 1998). Target countries that have strong strategic ties with sender countries might have more incentives to acquiesce to de-escalate a crisis and thus avoid harming their shared interests. On the contrary, future conflict expectations and likely negative reputational impacts of concessions would prompt targets with a history of rivalry with sender countries to remain defiant against sanctions.
Issue Type and Significance
Scholars also note that ambitious policy objectives such as political regime change and military impairment are harder to achieve with sanctions than modest ones such as releasing a political prisoner and resolving a trade or environment-related dispute (Hufbauer et al. 2007).
Targeted Sanctions
Other research analyzes the effectiveness of targeted or smart sanctions. Targeted sanctions have become the most popular coercive instruments used by the United States and United Nations in the post–Cold War era. Targeted sanctions include such measures as asset freezes, financial restrictions on international banking ac-tivity, denial of luxury good sales, sector-specific sanctions, and travel restrictions.
Given that targeted sanctions attempt to put direct pressure on specific individu-als or economic sectors, the expectation has been that, in addition to being more effective than conventional sanctions, they would also avoid major adverse effects on the target public in general. There is, however, no major evidence that targeted sanctions are significantly more potent tools than traditional sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2002;Drezner 2011;Biersteker et al. 2016;Rosenberg et al. 2016). For example, UN targeted sanctions since 1991 have worked in only 19 percent of all cases (Biersteker et al. 2016). Financial sanctions initiated by the US appear to be the most effective type of targeted sanctions. Specifically, US financial sanctions that involve asset freezes and denial of access to global banking activity were effective in 40 percent of the cases since 2001 (Rosenberg et al. 2016).
What Should We Do to Improve Our Understanding of Sanctions Success?
In this section, we suggest two areas of research based on actors and outcomes of sanctions, which can help us improve our understanding of sanctions success and bridge the gap between academic researchers and policy-makers.
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Actors
Typically, sanctions studies assume two unitary actors, the sender and the target. In particular, current scholarship has focused on the sender country that is democratic, which is not surprising because the primary sender in the data is the United States, and the target country as a unitary actor. However, there is a growing tendency in re-cent episodes of sanctions that new types of sender and target states have emerged, and there is a lack of studies on the conditions of success of sanctions in these cases.
First, recent sanctions against North Korea and Russia show that sender countries target nonstate actors directly whether or not they are located within the territory of target countries. For example, President Obama issued Executive Order 13722 on March 15, 2016, to impose sanctions against private companies and banks out-side of North Korea, which had been accused of aiding Pyongyang’s efforts to de-velop nuclear weapons. This executive order, known by the name of extraterritorial sanctions or secondary boycott, is constructed to enforce North Korea Sanctions Enhancement Act, which was passed by the US Congress a month before, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2270, which was adopted about 10 days before. Most targets are nonstate actors doing business in third-party countries such as China. There are concerns about violating sovereignty of the third-party coun-tries because the US government seeks to punish private businesses that are within their territory. At the same time, the secondary measures have been considered to be more effective in deterring third-party countries from pursuing sanction-busting behaviors as well as aiming at the target regime’s sources of finance more directly without affecting people of the target country. Earlier examples of sanctions that re-strict economic exchanges targeting specific private entities include the Cuban Lib-erty and Democratic Act of 1996 and the Iran/Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. While there are some pioneering studies of extraterritorial sanctions (Graves 1997;Clark 2004;Meyer 2008;Rosenberg et al. 2016), more systematic studies are needed in the academia given their frequent use and importance as an effective measure to coerce the target.
Second, current data sets of Hufbauer et al. (2007) and Morgan et al. (2014) show that it is the United States that uses sanctions most frequently. As shown in the previous section, many studies have sought to explain how democracy or a variety of characteristics of democracy affect the success of sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988;Lektzian and Souva 2007;McLean and Whang 2014). How-ever, recent cases show that sanctions are also imposed or counterimposed by nondemocratic countries, notably by China and Russia (Harrell, Rosenberg, and Saravalle 2018). What are the implications for these authoritarian sanctions in terms of their success? For example, China imposed sanctions against South Ko-rea over the issue of Terminal High Altitude AKo-rea Defense (THAAD), which was agreed to be deployed in 2016 between the United States and South Korea. The ways in which China uses economic instruments are demonstrably different from those of the United States in many respects. Russia also used countersanctions in 2014 against the United States’ and European Union’s food exporters as a response to Crimea sanctions. Although the frequency of sanctions and sanctions threats by nondemocratic states is smaller relative to democratic senders, these cases are gaining more attention in the policy area. However, partly due to a lack of data, there are few studies that analyze the circumstances and factors, which contribute to the success or failure of sanctions when the sender country is not a full-fledged democracy. There is limited information accumulated to gain a systematic under-standing of nondemocratic senders’ behaviors, but it may be in the interest of
Second, current data sets of Hufbauer et al. (2007) and Morgan et al. (2014) show that it is the United States that uses sanctions most frequently. As shown in the previous section, many studies have sought to explain how democracy or a variety of characteristics of democracy affect the success of sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988;Lektzian and Souva 2007;McLean and Whang 2014). How-ever, recent cases show that sanctions are also imposed or counterimposed by nondemocratic countries, notably by China and Russia (Harrell, Rosenberg, and Saravalle 2018). What are the implications for these authoritarian sanctions in terms of their success? For example, China imposed sanctions against South Ko-rea over the issue of Terminal High Altitude AKo-rea Defense (THAAD), which was agreed to be deployed in 2016 between the United States and South Korea. The ways in which China uses economic instruments are demonstrably different from those of the United States in many respects. Russia also used countersanctions in 2014 against the United States’ and European Union’s food exporters as a response to Crimea sanctions. Although the frequency of sanctions and sanctions threats by nondemocratic states is smaller relative to democratic senders, these cases are gaining more attention in the policy area. However, partly due to a lack of data, there are few studies that analyze the circumstances and factors, which contribute to the success or failure of sanctions when the sender country is not a full-fledged democracy. There is limited information accumulated to gain a systematic under-standing of nondemocratic senders’ behaviors, but it may be in the interest of