Literature Review on the Accountability of PSB

A brief definition of “what public service broadcasting is” can be found in the Broadcasting Research Unit (BRU) pamphlet presented in 1985. In the document, BRU provided eight principles that PSB should follow regardless of whatever system they are in. The eight principles are (BRU, 1985; cited from Brown, 1996a):

(1) universal accessibility (geographic);

(2) directly funded by the viewing and listening audience;

(3) independence from government vested interests;

(4) universal appeal (general tastes and interests);

(5) particular attention to minorities;

(6) contribution to sense of national identity and community;

(7) competition in good programming rather than for numbers; and (8) guidelines that liberate rather than restrict program makers.

The first three items reflect the relationship between the government, the audience, and the broadcaster; the rest items indicate the philosophy of program production. Follow those principles, Tracey (1998, p. 26-32) provides the similar viewpoints suggesting PSB should operate independently and distant from the government’s intervention.

Syvertsen (2003) illustrates three key characteristics describing PSB in terms of structure: first, PSB are certain companies or institutions entrusted with a set of privileges to insulate them to some degree from the market factors, these privileges may be of an economic (public funding) or technology nature; second, PSB are obligated to fulfill certain obligations (universal coverage, high-quality programming, national culture identity protection, and so on) in return for the privileges; third, PSB are subjected to certain forms of governance which is set to assess the performance of the privileged institution and ensure that obligations are interpreted in accordance with the general consensus.

Although there are guidelines suggesting what a public broadcasting should be, the forms of PSB vary from country to country and also from time to time. For example, in the U.S. the public broadcasters are outlets for the programs the commercial broadcasters will not pursue. In contrast, the public broadcasters in the European countries are considered as public service akin to public education and public spaces (Nordicity Group Ltd, 2006). Harrison & Woods (2001) reviewed the European Community (EC) documentations concerning the merit of PSB and found that the documents show some degree of consensus about the importance of PSB, but no legal standards or practical guidelines exist which could allow a coherent

definition of PSB in EC. For example, the 1997 Amsterdam Protocol states that it is up to national governments to determine the funding and mandate of public service broadcasting institutions in their respective countries (Harrison & Wood, 2001;

Syvertsen, 2003).

In addition to the disagreements of PSB merit among countries, the shift of PSB is also observed in the evolution of television (Jakubowicz, 2003). All the arguments

provided above ascertain the dynamic nature of the role of PSB. In fact, the real problem in defining PSB is not how to improve the list of public service principles, but rather HOW to apply the principles (Raboy, 1995). In other words, to prevent the PSB from suffering the “identity crisis”, it is necessary for PSB to return to even more fundamental value regarding broadcasting and its role in society. Strange enough, however, many critics tend to define PSB from the perspective what it should NOT be.

As Croteau & Hoynes (2001) describe:

If media industry is different, in most respects, from other industries, the underlying conceptual reason is that media outlets have a distinctive relationship with the public. Rather than simply supplying consumer goods in a free market context, media in a democratic society are expected to serve the public interest. It is no small task to define what public interest means or how our mass media can serve in this capacity.

In fact, critics often find it easier to identify what is not in the public interest—too much violence in television or news that is too focus on the crime, for example—than to explain what serving the public interest entails (p.33).

The dynamic nature of public service broadcasting is also reflected in the amendment of Public Broadcasting Act in Taiwan. The draft of the Amendment brought up by PTS shows a tendency to broaden the definition of public service broadcasting (Government Information Office, 2005). The current Act for PTS defines that public service TV is to serve as a compensation for the insufficiencies of commercial television (Act of PTS, 2004). This kind of definition regards PTS is at best a supplement filling the gaps disdained by profit-making broadcasters and, from the viewpoint of PTS, is not comprehensive enough to capture the full mandate of PSB. As a consequence, PTS suggests an amendment of this article that broadens the subject of regulation from PTS to PSB, and redefines that PSB is to form a balanced media environment.

2.1.2 Reaction: Media Accountability

The trend of redefining PSB also sheds new lights on the awareness of pursuing

“accountability” in PSB management. Media accountability has gained considerable

attention over the last decade. Bardoel & D’Haenens (2004) proposed four

accountability mechanisms: political, market, professional and public accountability, and examined how the accountability mechanisms have been taken into practice in Western Europe. Public service broadcasting, with the very name of “public”, has already suggested the strong emphasis on public accountability. Public accountability places emphasis on the need to maintain a more direct relationship with the citizen, in addition to the relationship with the state and the market (Bardoel & D’Haenens, 2004). In other words, PSB should get rid of the “paternalism” mindset ignoring the citizen’s popular taste and culture, and show their willingness to be measured and evaluated instead.

Measuring the public service broadcasting is never easy considering the complexities of consumer benefits. Hastings (2004) proposed that measuring the consumer benefits is directly aligned to the perception of value attained by the viewing experience, and such a benefit also indicates the extent to which a consumer surplus is delivered by the public service broadcasting. The most often quoted terms used for the measurements of audience are reach and share. Compared with reach which addresses the fundamental tenets of PSB—universality, share seems to be a less appreciate measure while it allows the comparison of popularity with commercial sectors. Whatever term is used, they both capture neither the quality of the program nor the enjoyment of the viewers.

To carry out a measurement that captures the value or enjoyment of programs, some PSB conduct quality surveys inquiring audience’s attitude regarding the quality of the programs, and their enjoyment and satisfaction on the programs. TvQ adopted by PBS, AI (Appreciation Index) by BBC, EI (Enjoyment Index) by CBC, and the Program Appreciation Index by RTHK are all examples of attitudinal-based measurements. All the measurements are used to counterbalance the PSB’s over leaning on rating.

Hastings (2004) proposed an input-output-outcome model illustrating the consumer benefits:

Figure 1: Illustration-- tracking consumer benefits

Source: “Discussion of performance measures in public service broadcasting,”

by C. Hastings, 2004, Aslib Proceedings, 56(5), 307

As is shown in Figure 1, consumer benefits of PSB can be measured by both outputs and outcomes which rely less on capturing the quantity but more on the audience perception of quality and perception. WTP, as one of the outcome measures, can help illustrate the consumer surplus in PSB. In this regard, the estimation of WTP is not only meaningful to the outcome, but also indicative of efficiency and

effectiveness of input. In a democratic society, the usage of public fund should under scrutiny so that the effectiveness of the public organization is ensured.

2.1.3 Forms of Public Fund

Public funding can be achieved via many options. According to the Legal Department of European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the different sources of funding includes the license fee paid by the viewer, the concession fee paid by commercial operators, allocations from the government budget, advertising, sponsorship, subscriptions fee for pay services, and some other revenues from program sales, teleshopping, merchandising and so on. Most European countries adopt the mixed funding to prevent the over-reliance of one particular source of funding which might run the risk of undermining the independence of PSB. Another reason supporting the

Input to process outcome/ behavioral change (in case of license fee)

mixed funding is that a mixed system is more robust in a rapidly changing environment (EBU, 2000).

2.1.4 Is Direct Grant Appropriate?

Most countries adopt either the license fee or the government grant as the main funding mechanism for the PSB, seldom do the two mechanisms coexist in a single country. It consequently leads to some discussions regarding the appropriateness of the two funding options. Graham & Davis (1992) propose four considerations suggesting that the public funding should not take the form of a direct grant from government. With the considerations that PSB should keep at arm’s length from the government and should be able to count on a predicable/secure source, Graham &

Davis (1992, p.198-9) recommended that the adoption of the special tax, especially the license fee, is the most proper way of funding.

The consideration of the relationship between the government and media prevails not only in broadcasting but also in the press industry. Columbia Journalism Review, one of the leading quality publications, convened a panel of top editors and a media investor to discuss the future of newspapers in early 2007. In the panel, the discussion of whether press should be supported by government is presented, and the worry of government intervention is also expressed. But the conclusion made in the panel is optimistic, and believe that the benefit from the government support still have the possibility to outweighs the harm from government influence (Nordenson, 2007).

2.1.5 Public Funding Mechanism in Taiwan: A Comparison

Early in 1998 when PTS came to exist, media critics have been aware of the difficulties and potential challenges that PTS might confronted with. Kwan (1998) pointed out that the financial facet would be one of the most bothersome problems.

Other problems would rise due to the unclear identity and poor knowledge and supports from the general public to the public TV service. Kwan analyzed possible financial resources and proposed charging the radio-wave tax to subsidize the PTS, realizing concept of using public goods (radio wave) to serve the public good (public interest) (Kwan, 1998).

The funding practice in Taiwan is much similar to the U.S. where most of the funding comes from the government grant and relay on audience’s donation as well.

PTS receives the annual government grant of NT 900 million dollars as the primary income, other revenues include donation, product sales, rentals, grant from the Cable Radio & Television Development Fund, and so on (PTS, 2007a). The amount of government’s grant constitutes 66 % of total revenue, but is far from satisfaction if it is compared with the expenditure.

Another problem for the government fund is that it is not subject to regular review, thus lead to the inflexible of the fund. Such a financial difficult goes from bad to worse when PTS incorporated CTS to form TBS. CTS, as a government-owned broadcaster, relies heavily on the advertising income. The reliance remains since there is no funding mechanism designed to react to the broadening of the PSB system.

The funding in Taiwan is poor not only in the mechanism but also in quantity. A calculation of per capita funding level shows that Taiwan’s public investment in PSB is 39 NTD per person. Compared with the amount in Japan (1427 NTD) and Korea (389 NTD), the public find for broadcasting in Taiwan is relatively poor (PTS, 2007b).

The international comparison incorporating the funding facts in Europe and Asia is provided in Appendix 1as a comparison.

PTS also recognize the crucial influence of public fund on their operation. In the draft of the Amendment brought up by PTS (Government Information Office, 2005), PTS advocates the need to ensure the current funding level from the government and the amount of funding should subject to a regular review taking the price index and annual projects into account, with the attempt to enable the funding policy “flexible”

to respond to the dynamic media environment.

2.1.6 Funding Policy Corresponding to the Social Need

However, without robust evidence suggesting the value of the public

broadcasting service, the debate of funding cannot but remains a “political issue”

(O’Hagan & Jennings, 2003). That is the reason why Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) asked Nordicity Group Ltd to examine the financial sources provided by governments to public broadcasters in western countries. The result indicates that poor funding does not always lead to poor performance: while Canada appears to derive a significant benefit from public broadcasting, the PSB in Canada receives substantially less support than it does in most other countries (Nordicity,

2006).

Whatever form of public funding is adopted, there are some criteria that a proper funding should meet. The former president of EBU, Albert Schart, suggests four funding principles deserve ongoing discussion are (Schart, 1999: p.4-5):

(1) stability: the need for a stable funding framework;

(2) independence: safeguards against political and economic pressure;

(3) proportionality: funding corresponding to the need; and (4) transparency: open procedures and public accountability.

The third principle “proportionality” implies that the amount of fund granted to PSB should be sufficient to ensure them to carry out their missions but should not go beyond what is necessary. Nonetheless, how to justify whether a certain amount is sufficient or not leaves room for debate.

It is also the reason why researchers from the discipline of economic adopted the methodology of contingent valuation (CV) to investigate the performance of PSB.

CVM, although developed for estimating environment goods and public goods, is also employed to access the benefit of cultural projects for they share certain properties with environmental products (Noonan, 2003). Public service broadcasting, as the name suggests, serves as a public good in the society and can not be traded in the market. Besides, with the externalities that it brought to culture, democracy,

community, empowerment and so on, it is also being regarded as a cultural good. As a result, many countries conduct the CVM through the expression of citizen’s

willingness to pay for PSB to examine their funding policy and to justify the

legitimacy of their PSB. The introduction of the methodology and its applications in public service broadcasting are provided and illustrated in the following section.