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6. Appendix

Appendix 1Ď

•  1. Two dubious assumptions and a working hypothesis

•  First, body ownership is uniquely determined by introspection.

•  Second, the Wittgenstein-Shoemaker (1968) question is absurd—“there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have tooth-ache. To ask ‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ would be nonsensical.”

4 4

First Dubious Assumption

•  E.G. Brewer (1995): “…how we experience our body as ours. Clearly this is not, and cannot be, an external perceptual

phenomenon. For when we perceive it from the outside, our body has no indelible stamp of ownership. It appears just as one object among many...”

5 5

Problem with First Dubious Assumption

•  Although the “indelible stamp of ownership” is more likely associated with introspection than with external perception, this is contingent.

•  What we introspect can feel alien, or fail to be represented as belonging to self: e.g.

depersonalization in florid schizophrenic episodes.

•  When we perceive others experiencing mental states, those states can be

represented as belonging to self: e.g. vision-touch synesthesia.

6 6

在文檔中自我與現象意識 (頁 130-137)