Performance of WP-DSR

In this section, we evaluate the performance WP-DSR by ns-2. We assume random topologies of square size from 450*450m, 900*900m and 1500*1500m, and with 15, 30 and 50 regular nodes respectively. The transmission rages are 75m, 150m and 250m. The locations of two collusive wormhole nodes are randomly selected.

Each variable is performed 100 times and averaged to avoid statistical bias.

Figure 4.4 shows the wormhole detection rate under different topologies. We can observe that WP-DSR can achieve on average over 90% detection rate under almost all scenarios. The detection rate of tunnel length 2 hops is inferior to other tunnel length. This can be explained by that short tunnel length means less traverse time, and leads more contaminated links to pass the detection mechanism.

31

Figure 4.4: WP-DSR detection rate

Figure 4.5: WP-DSR detection accuracy

32

Figure 4.5 displays the detection rate accuracy of WP-DSR. It shows that WP-DSR can attain over 90% detection accuracy rate under most situation. The reason of that tunnel length of 2 hops has little accuracy rate is similar to that of the detection rate. In addition, the reason of tunnel length over 8 hops shows little accuracy is that a longer tunnel length can spoil only fewer contaminated links than a reasonable shorter tunnel length. Thus, a single false positive may cause more impact on detection accuracy rate while the tunnel length is longer.

33

Chapter 5 Conclusion

In this thesis, we proposed a new on-demand routing protocol, Wormhole-Proof Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (WP-DSR), to detect wormhole attacks for wireless mobile ad-hoc networks. WP-DSR uses time limiting approach to detect wormhole attacks. It measures every hop-to-hop traverse time during route discovery phase. If any of these is larger than a reasonable threshold, the discovered route is contaminated by wormhole attacks. We have compared the routing overhead to original DSR, and simulated the detecting performance of our method. The results show that WP-DSR has a high detection rate and a low false positive rate, while requiring only a few overhead to DSR.

34

References

[1] A. D. Wood and J.A. Stankovic, “Denial of service in sensor networks,” IEEE Computer, vol. 35, no.10, pp. 54-62, 2002.

[2] J. F. Raymond, “Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues and Open Problems,” Proceedings of Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability Workshop, pp. 7-26, Berkeley, California, USA, 2000.

[3] K. Sanzgiri, B. Dahill, B. N. Levine, C. Shields, and E. M. Belding-Royer, “A secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks,” Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), pp. 78-87, Paris, France, 2002.

[4] Y. C. Hu and A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks,” Proceedings of ACM International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom), pp. 12-23, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 2002.

[5] Y. C. Hu and A. Perrig, “A survey of secure wireless ad hoc routing,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 2, issue 3, pp. 28-39, 2004.

[6] H. Yang, H. Luo, F. Ye, S. Lu, and L. Zhang, “Security in mobile ad hoc networks: challenges and solutions,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol.1, issue 1, pp. 38-47, 2004.

[7] P. G. Argyroudis, and D. O'Mahony, “Secure routing for mobile ad hoc networks,”

35

IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,” vol.7, no.3, pp. 2 – 21, 2005.

[8] T. Clausen and P. Jacquet, “Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR), ” IETF MANET Working Group, Internet Draft 2003.

[9] D. Johnson, D. Maltz, and U. Hu, “The dynamic source routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks,” IETF MANET Working Group, Internet Draft 2003.

[10] C. Perkins, E. Belding-Royer and S. Das, “Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing,” IETF MANET Working Group, Internet Draft 2003.

[11] L. Lazos, R. Poovendran, C. Meadows, P. Syverson, and L. W. Chang,

“Preventing wormhole attacks on wireless ad hoc networks: a graph theoretic approach,” Proceedings of IEEE Wireless Communications & Networking Conference (WCNC), vol. 2, pp. 1193-1199, New Orleans, USA, 2005.

[12] M. Khabbazian, H. Mercier, and V. K. Bhargava, “Wormhole attack in wireless ad hoc networks: analysis and countermeasure,” Proceedings of IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), San Francisco, California, 2006.

[13]Y. C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Wormhole attacks in wireless networks,”

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 370-380, 2006.

[14] S. Capkun, L. Buttyan, and J-P Hubaux, “SECTOR: secure tracking of node encounters in multi-hop wireless networks,” Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, pp. 21-32, 2003.

[15] N. Sastry, U. Shankar, and D. Wagner, “Secure verification of location claims,”

Proceedings of ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), pp. 1-10, San Diego, California ,USA, 2003.

[16] J. Eriksson, S. V. Krishnamurthy, and M. Faloutsos, “Truelink: a practical countermeasure to the wormhole attack in wireless networks,” Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), pp. 75-84, Santa

36

Barbara, California, USA, 2006.

[17] H. S. Chiu and K. S. Lui, “DelPHI: wormhole detection mechanism for ad hoc wireless networks,” Proceedings of International Symposium on Wireless Pervasive Computing, Phuket, Thailand, 2006.

[18] F. Na¨ıt-Abdesselam, B. Bensaou, and J.Yoo, “Detecting and avoiding wormhole attacks in optimized link state routing protocol,” Proceedings of IEEE Wireless Communications & Networking Conference (WCNC), Hong Kong, 2007.

[19] W. Wang and B. Bhargava, “Visualization of wormholes in sensor networks,”

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), pp. 51–60, Philadelphia Pennsylvania, 2004.

[20] R. Maheshwari, J. Gao, and Samir R. Das, "Detecting wormhole attacks in wireless networks using connectivity information,'' Proceedings of IEEE Infocom, Anchorage, Alaska, USA, 2007.

[21] L. Hu and D. Evans, “Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole attacks,”

Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), pp. 131-141, San Diego, California, Baltimore, Maryland. 2004.

[22] I. Khalil, S. Bagchi, and N. B. Shroff, “MOBIWORP: mitigation of the wormhole attack in mobile multihop wireless networks,” Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm), 2006.

[23] I. Khalil, S. Bagchi, and N. B. Shroff, “LITEWORP: a lightweight countermeasure for the wormhole attack in multihop wireless networks,”

Proccedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), Yokohama, Japan, pp. 612-621, 2005.

[24] ns-2. [Online]. Available: http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/ .