Chapter IV: Korea and the Nascent Regionalism in East Asia
5.1. Precedents for Multilateral Regional Cooperation in NEA
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
155
Chapter V: Korea in the Emerging Institutionalization of Northeast Asia
Complex geopolitics have historically made regional cooperation and integration an almost impossible endeavor in Northeast Asia (NEA) as a sub-region of East Asia.
Only in the late 90's, and having the AFC fresh in the memory, the three main regional players of NEA and biggest economies - China, South Korea and Japan - started for the first time to look for institutional ways to channel closer cooperation, although initially in the context of the APT mechanism.
It was in the historical informal breakfast held on the sides of the 1999 APT summit in Manila, when the three leaders - Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and Korean President Kim Dae-jung - met in a trilateral manner for the first time in modern history. Since then, this trilateral summit has evolved and become more institutionalized in the form of the Trilateral Cooperation Meetings, holding meetings on a regular basis and achieving cooperation in a wide range of functional areas among the so called CKJ group. This chapter will revise this process and its prospects for regional institutionalization in NEA, paying special attention to the role of South Korea as a middle power, managing and bridging within the delicate trilateral relationship that includes the two regional great powers, in order to advance this emerging process of regionalism.
Indeed, with President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-08) the emphasis in regional institutionalization shifted back to Seoul’s immediate neighborhood in NEA. Due to the particularities of this sub-region, it is appropriate to revise briefly some important efforts made previously to the consolidation of the Trilateral Cooperation mechanism among the CKJ countries. Although not comprehensive forms of regionalism, as these other forms of regional cooperation in NEA had a very specific focus and objective, nevertheless they serve as important precedents to highlight the relevance of building an institutional framework among the Northeast Asian countries that until recently was not existent.
5.1. Precedents for Multilateral Regional Cooperation in NEA
Northeast Asia has been engulfed in a unique geopolitical situation for most part of the last century, making it hard for the countries in the area to trust each other. As a result,
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
156
the forms of regional cooperation that initially emerged in the 90's - only allowed by a post Cold War context - where mainly concerned with the most pressing issue of ensuring security and stability in the Korean peninsula, in the manner of specialized groupings for the managing of North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The two most notorious - albeit failed - mechanisms that tried to find ways to promote cooperation in order to solve this security threat for NEA were the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the so called Six Party Talks dialogue (SPT).
Choong-hee Hahn is the current Director General of the Cultural Affairs Bureau at the Korean MOFAT, however, this experienced Korean diplomat was one of the ROK's representatives at these two mechanism mentioned above (KEDO and SPT).55
Ambassador Hahn recounts how the KEDO process was quite unique since "it was a consortium of countries to support the building of a Light Water Reactor in North Korea. The three original executive members on its board were South Korea, Japan and the US, and later the EU joined. They provided the financial support for this organization, which was created after a framework agreement in 1994 between the US and North Korea, to handle the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue; and the secretariat was in New York City. I was working for that secretariat for about three years, between 2003 to 2005, and I had to visit North Korea several times." Indeed, the official website of KEDO specifies that in October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an Agreed Framework under which the DPRK agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear program, looking for a comprehensive solution to the issues arising from Pyongyang's nuclear program. In return the US and other members agreed to:
1. Finance and construct in the DPRK two light-water reactors of the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant model and, in so doing;
2. provide the DPRK with an alternative source of energy in the form of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil each year for heating and electricity production until the first of those reactors is completed.
3. Conduct its activities in a manner that meets or exceeds international standards of nuclear safety and environmental protection; and
4. provide for the implementation of any other measures deemed necessary to accomplish the foregoing or otherwise to carry out the objective of the Agreed Framework.56
55 Interview with Hahn, Choong-hee. Korean former ambassador and experienced diplomat. Currently the Director General of the Cultural Affairs Bureau in the Korean MOFAT, he was previously involved in regional mechanisms within Northeast Asia, particularly the KEDO process and the Six Party Talks.
(Nov. 2nd, 2012)
56 From KEDO's official website. (http://www.kedo.org/Index.asp)
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
157
In support of these goals, KEDO was established in March 1995, when Japan, South Korea, and the US expressed their common desire to implement the key provisions of the Agreed Framework. These were KEDO's founding members and constituted its Executive Board. However, KEDO's participation was not restricted uniquely to countries involved directly in NEA, and its charter allowed for additional states and international organizations to join and support the purposes of the organization.57 In this process, South Korea played a significant role, although not in its capacity as a middle power. To be sure, Seoul did not display any kind of behavior as catalyst, facilitator, nor manager; but it did provide large financial support in the construction attempts of the Light Water Reactor in North Korea, which was the main objective of KEDO to encourage the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear facilities. Ambassador Hahn explain that "in fact almost over 90 percent of the costs of building the reactor were assumed by South Korea and Japan, and out of that I would say 70 percent came from South Korea. So the construction itself - of this light water reactor - was majorly financed by us, and partially by Japan; while the US - also within the framework of KEDO - focused more on the oil supply to North Korea, as part of the original agreement." (Choong-hee Hahn, interview)
The reasons why Seoul was so keen in investing so much efforts and resources in the KEDO process are once more a reflection of its security dilemma. As it has been noted, these same reasons have ultimately served to lay the foundations for South Korea's activism in regional cooperation, which add to the economic implications that are as well an important part of Seoul's calculations in the region. Unfortunately the KEDO process did not succeed in its goals. It ran until 2005, even after the 2002 North Korean nuclear crisis, when Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program was unveiled.
Finally the Executive Board of KEDO decided in 2006 to terminate the Light Water Reactor project. This decision was taken based on the continued and extended failure of North Korea to perform the steps that were required in the original agreement.58 According to the expert consulted, "the process also failed due to the absence of China and Russia, in addition to the consequences of North Korean behavior, of course."
(Choong-hee Hahn, interview)
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
158
To be sure, KEDO first appeared as a functional kind of mechanism for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, which is why the importance to highlight this process as a precedent. Many expected KEDO would lead North Korea to other forms of engagements with its neighboring countries, also pointing to the strategic interests South Korea had in the organization. The serious violations of the agreement from Pyongyang meant that the KEDO did not live up to the expectations of its founders. "I still think KEDO was a remarkable effort, that could serve as precedent for future attempts, as an organization with a working secretariat focused on trying to solve the particular issue of nuclear ambitions of North Korea while providing an energy strategy for the whole peninsula. This project had very important political implications for the region, unfortunately it was terminated and what came after - that is the Six Party Talks, as we know - was also not able to resolve the stalemate regarding these issues." (Choong-hee Hahn, interview)
Indeed, although they did include China and Russia, the SPT failed in its objective of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, largely due to North Korean constant violations of treaties and deceiving behavior. These talks came into being as a result of North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, in the aftermath that also meant the halt of financial and energy cooperation provided under the KEDO framework. The talks included the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia as its six members, and the last round of meetings was held in 2009.
At the time of writing this dissertation - and a few months after one of the most tense periods of provocations coming from Pyongyang in early 2013 - the prospects for resuming the SPT were growing again, as many members have signaled their commitment with reigniting the process, particularly China who is frustrated with Pyongyang and has showed a much tougher stance towards its new leader Kim Jung-un, while North Korea itself has hinted to be willing to reengage in talks, presumably desperate for aid and economic assistance.
For years, however, the SPT served as the only instance for multilateral dialogue in security related issues in Northeast Asia, and its many rounds of talks area significant in the sense that it meant that all the major players in the region sat at a roundtable to discuss and listen each other, albeit its very specific and limited scope.
Five rounds of talks from 2003 to 2007 produced little progress, until the third phase of the fifth round of talks, when North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the United
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
159
States and Japan. In September 2005, however, an agreement was reached to set up all the principles for the process regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, establishing working groups. According to Choong-hee Hahn, who - after KEDO - became involved in the SPT process through one of those working groups "the SPT could be considered as a de facto security concerned consultative regional process or regime for Northeast Asia. It is true that it was specifically focused on the North Korean nuclear issue, but this has being the only regional dialogue with a security focus involving all the regional powers, and eventually other issues were on the table, like economic and energy cooperation."
Ultimately, the DPRK pulled out of the talks in April 2009 and announced it would resume its nuclear enrichment program in order to boost its nuclear deterrent; as a response to the United Nations Security Council statement that condemned a North Korean failed satellite launch thought to be disguise as missiles testing. This kind of behavior that often characterizes Pyongyang makes it difficult to build an institutional framework centered around the notion of engaging with North Korea in the hope to create a security architecture in Northeast Asia. Again, similar to KEDO but this time including China and Russia, which are considered to be North Korea's only allies, and by engaging in talks directly with Pyongyang, the SPT did not live up to the expectations of its members. "We hoped that during this process the behavior of North Korea could be controlled. At the same time we hoped this process could develop in the long term into a kind of NEA Peace Mechanism." (Choong-hee Hahn, interview) In fact, this Korean official from the MOFAT emphasizes that one of the several working groups within the SPT had the specific objective of transforming the whole process into more solid and institutionalized consultative security process for this sub-region.
"Those were our intentions, particularly from South Korea, the US and Japan, but shared by all members. That particular working group dubbed Northeast Asia Peace Mechanism, was actually headed by Russia, and each country had to propose certain principles to based the eventual spillover effects we were hoping for, to create a more institutionalized security framework in Northeast Asia. On our side, we were very active in trying to enhance this particular aspect of the SPT. I think we could have achieved a lot under this working group especially since we don't have any substantial multilateral mechanism in NEA." Another important example within the SPT highlighted by this Korean source involved in the process was the working group for economic cooperation which was headed by South Korea, "where we made great
‧
ambitions." (Choong-hee Hahn, interview) These examples are relevant as precedents for this study, since they show the impetus of South Korea in trying to build regional institutional and multilateral frameworks to maintain stability in NEA.Nevertheless, South Korea did not display a middle power role within the SPT and it is widely acknowledged that it was China the country which performed as a clear leader in terms of facilitating and managing the process, in its position as North Korea's closest 'friend'. Ning Mao, a Chinese official interviewed for this research who was also involved in the SPT prior to become the Deputy Secretary General representing China at the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat for the CKJ cooperation mechanism explains why in this particular instance a more activist kind of behavior would have become issue. Thus, China tried to play such a coordinator and facilitator role during the process, and from our point of view, we could display that more objective position which allowed us to play such role. That is what we tried to do, for other parties or from the outside looking I know the perception must have been different because of the kind of special relationship between China and North Korea, but that certainly is, I believe, the way China felt to be so motivated to play that chair role for the Six Party Talks and to act as the facilitator and coordinator of this multilateral dialogue." (Ning Mao, interview)59
For his part, the Korean source consulted argues that during the last decade the voice and role of the ROK has increased significantly. "I would said the financial support provided by South Korea under KEDO was a significant precedent in the 90's. Korea now possesses both the willingness and also the capabilities to play a more important and active role. We have raised our voice in those processes I became part of that I just mentioned to you and this indeed made other parties - like the US and Japan within KEDO or others in Six Party Talks - realize the importance of South Korea's role in all
59 Interview with Mao, Ning, Chinese diplomat. She is now the Deputy Secretary General, representing China at the TCS in Seoul She has vast experience in the Chinese Foreign Minister particularly in regional cooperation frameworks like the ARF, ASEAN+1 (China) and APT. Before the TCS she was involved in the Six Party Talks, which gave her a more NEA focus. She helped to provide a Chinese point of view to this study. (Oct. 31st, 2012)
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
161
these multilateral frameworks." (Choong-hee Hahn, interview) Indeed, the issues of willingness and capabilities mentioned by Ambassador Hahn are very important, as he stresses, in that after KEDO and during the SPT - that is within the last 10 to 15 years - Korea has gained more confidence. These experiences ultimately helped to make other regional actors more accepting of an active South Korea.
5.2. Korea's Changing Strategy for Regional Cooperation: The Last Two