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4. T
HEP
ROS ANDC
ONS OFP
ROFESSIONALM
ANAGERS ANDO
THERP
EOPLE’
SM
ONEY: F
INALT
HOUGHTSAlthough investing in production, distribution, and management is helpful to exploit economies of scale and scope, it could also bring in serious agency problems. First, when the conflicts of interest between the owners and the professional managers occur, delegating control over capital to professional managers would lead to an other people’s money problem: professional managers will sacrifice firm performance for private benefits. Second, in contrast to widely held firms in the U.S., family controllers of large business groups in other countries could raise fund without diminishing their control rights through control-enhancing mechanisms (e.g.
Pyramid ownership structure or cross-shareholdings). This mode of corporate governance is the other origin of other people’s money problems which might exacerbate conflicts of interest between inside shareholders and outside shareholders.
According to Jensen and Meckling’s seminal work, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, agency costs are caused by the conflicts of interest between the agent and the principal and risk could made such conflicts worse. First, the manager of a firm cannot reduce the riskiness of return through diversification like the owner. Second, the manager doesn’t have the incentive to devote significant effort to manage or learn new technologies. Third, it’s even harder for the owner to monitor complex or creative activities. Therefore, in high-risk context, other people’s money problems will overwhelm the benefits of investing in professional management for family firms. Similarly, in the
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principal-principal agency relationships, since family controllers are generally more risk averse than outside shareholders, family controllers will have the incentive to exploit outside shareholders rather than invest in innovation or production in industries where technologies are complex and become obsolete quickly.
The findings of this thesis demonstrate that other people’s money problems occur when family firms engage in electric industries or innovative activities. First, the recruitment of professional management will decrease firm performance in electric industries. In contrast, the recruitment of professional management will increase firm performance in traditional industries. Similarly, in electric industries, the large the level of divergence between control rights and ownership are, the worse the performance of family firms are. In contrast, in traditional industries, the large the level of divergence between control rights and ownership are, the better the performance of family firms are. In sum, family firms face two kinds of other people’s problems when engaging in industries where technologies are complex and become obsolete quickly.
In addition, in terms of innovative investments, such as patents, owner managers with abilities and incentives to monitor will improve firm’s innovativeness. By contrast, when the level of divergence between control rights and ownership is high, controlling shareholders could disperse risk to other shareholders, which give controlling shareholders the incentives to invest more in innovative investments.
However, since family controllers are risk averse, the involvement of family members in business will negatively moderate the positive effects of the two mode of corporate governance discussed above on innovation.
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Lastly, this thesis also refers to the issue of family preference. On the one hand, family firms are more conservative in risk investment for preserving family socio-emotional wealth. On the other hand, if family firms have longer time horizon than non-family firms, family should invest in in innovation since which is helpful for firm’s long-term competitiveness. To resolve this puzzle, family firm’s investment strategies are further investigated by separating firms’ patents into explorative and exploitative innovations. This analysis demonstrate that family firms invest less in innovations but have higher ratio of explorative innovation to exploitative innovation than non-family firms, which suggests that family have longer time horizon and more explorative than non-family firms.
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T
ABLESTABLE 3-1TIME INVARIANT TEST FOR CONTROL RIGHTS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Excess holdings rate overall 0.158608 0.139207 -0.8184 0.7825 N = 3752
between 0.137423 -0.2107 0.7657 n = 902
within 0.053509 -0.45693 0.572248 T-bar = 4.15965
Divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights
overall 0.364764 0.273757 -0.5395 0.9967 N = 3752
between 0.264185 -0.5395 0.99355 n = 902
within 0.083355 -0.03652 0.694264 T-bar = 4.15965
Dual control overall 0.52532 0.499425 0 1 N = 3752
between 0.461965 0 1 n = 902
within 0.198356 -0.30801 1.358653 T-bar = 4.15965
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TABLE 3-2DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS CORRELATIONS
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Innovation 3999 5.704676 38.21065 0 991
Family 3999 0.653914 0.475781 0 1
Layer 3999 1.140285 0.400194 0 5
Horizon 3999 0.875219 0.330512 0 1
Cashflow rate 3999 0.241731 0.169272 0 0.9145 Divergence
between voting rights and cash flow rights
3999 0.371418 0.269863 -0.5395 0.9967
Dual control 3999 0.494624 0.500034 0 1
Sales to affiliates 3999 0.164527 0.20449 0 1.198906 Procurements
from affiliates 3999 0.157211 0.217699 -0.00192 1.01756 Loan to affiliates 3999 0.008261 0.045051 0 1.427099 Debts from
affiliates 3999 0.004768 0.042355 0 1.575781
RD square 3999 0.028547 0.039959 0 0.5928
Employee 3999 5.924907 1.119194 1.791759 9.886951 Firm size 3999 8.248246 1.279268 5.463832 13.13733 Affiliates equity 3999 7019.943 22499.75 -11638 445630 Groups equity 3999 32120.84 100749.9 -45183 1465194
ROA 3999 0.060357 0.111882 -0.9319 0.7472
Firm Age 3999 22.49987 11.79977 2 59
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innovation family layer horizon Cashflow rate
square Employee Firm size Affiliates equity
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TABLE 3-3ZINB MODELS FOR THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY, BUSINESS GROUP STRUCTURES, AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES ON GROUP-AFFILIATED FIRM INNOVATION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Innovation Innovation Innovation Innovation
Family -1.216** 0.279 -0.533** 0.778*
Family * Cashflow rate -2.102**
(-2.643)
Family * Dual control -0.060
(-0.323)
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TABLE 3-4HAUSMAN-TAYLOR MODEL FOR THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY ON SHARE OF EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN INNOVATION
Share of patents based on different levels of existing firm knowledge
≦10 ≦20 ≦40 ≧40 ≧60 ≧80 ≧90 =100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Family 0.083 0.083 0.116* -0.106+ -0.079* -0.038 -0.029 -0.012
(1.055) (1.170) (2.229) (-1.936) (-1.963) (-1.207) (-1.325) (-0.745) Cashflow rate
Divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights Dual control
_cons 1.220** 1.139** 1.096** -0.079 -0.057 -0.022 0.012 -0.018
(9.823) (10.103) (13.194) (-0.907) (-0.882) (-0.439) (0.357) (-0.748)
Industry + + + + + + + +
Year + + + + + + + +
N 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 970
t statistics in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
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TABLE 3-4HAUSMAN-TAYLOR MODEL FOR THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY ON EXPLORATORY AND EXPLOITIVE INNOVATIONS (CONT’D)
Share of patents based on different levels of existing firm knowledge
≦10 ≦20 ≦40 ≧40 ≧60 ≧80 ≧90 =100
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Family 0.112 0.107 0.133* -0.125* -0.085* -0.040 -0.031 -0.016
(1.372) (1.440) (2.416) (-2.191) (-2.018) (-1.206) (-1.391) (-0.993)
Cashflow rate -0.184 -0.131 -0.141 0.121 0.081 0.067 0.050 0.051
(-1.002) (-0.814) (-1.209) (0.981) (0.911) (0.936) (0.913) (1.081)
Divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights
0.122+ 0.105+ 0.018 -0.051 -0.000 0.015 0.014 -0.002
(1.683) (1.663) (0.388) (-1.045) (-0.003) (0.552) (0.666) (-0.108)
Dual control -0.028 -0.047 -0.026 0.025 0.034* 0.036** 0.021* 0.015+
(-0.814) (-1.556) (-1.204) (1.067) (2.061) (2.687) (2.004) (1.712)
_cons 1.393** 1.285** 1.191** -0.180 -0.122 -0.071 -0.019 -0.052
(8.630) (8.841) (11.099) (-1.607) (-1.485) (-1.101) (-0.429) (-1.559)
Industry + + + + + + + +
Year + + + + + + + +
N 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 970
t statistics in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
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TABLE 3-5HAUSMAN-TAYLOR MODEL FOR THE EFFECT OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES ON EXPLORATORY AND EXPLOITATIVE INNOVATIONS IN NON-FAMILY GROUP AFFILIATED FIRMS
Share of patents based on different levels of existing firm knowledge
≦10 ≦20 ≦40 ≧40 ≧60 ≧80 ≧90 =100
(1) (2 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Family
Cashflow rate 0.079 0.231 -0.019 0.081 -0.026 0.059 0.034 0.016
(0.358) (1.143) (-0.125) (0.517) (-0.236) (0.816) (0.523) (0.265) Divergence between
voting rights and cash flow rights
0.021 0.019 -0.057 0.091+ 0.042 0.032 0.027 0.014
(0.263) (0.260) (-1.108) (1.656) (1.091) (1.278) (1.115) (0.638)
Dual control -0.020 -0.040 -0.033 0.036 0.027 0.027* 0.018 0.011
(-0.498) (-1.064) (-1.220) (1.238) (1.350) (2.026) (1.482) (0.960)
_cons 1.260** 1.079** 1.103** -0.130 -0.086 -0.066 -0.043 -0.029
(8.075) (7.712) (9.498) (-1.085) (-1.139) (-1.266) (-1.087) (-0.835)
Industry + + + + + + + +
Year + + + + + + + +
N 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442
t statistics in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
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TABLE 3-6HAUSMAN-TAYLOR MODEL FOR THE EFFECT OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES ON EXPLORATORY AND EXPLOITATIVE INNOVATIONS IN FAMILY GROUP AFFILIATED FIRMS
Share of patents based on different levels of existing firm knowledge
≦10 ≦20 ≦40 ≧40 ≧60 ≧80 ≧90 =100
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Family
Cashflow rate -0.247 -0.319 -0.157 0.041 0.104 0.022 0.024 0.044
(-0.922) (-1.372) (-0.926) (0.229) (0.793) (0.199) (0.299) (0.688) Divergence between
voting rights and cash flow rights
0.281* 0.227* 0.096 -0.199* -0.053 -0.017 0.000 -0.019
(2.342) (2.200) (1.268) (-2.474) (-0.917) (-0.333) (0.013) (-0.630)
Dual control -0.039 -0.051 -0.028 0.024 0.047+ 0.049* 0.025 0.019
(-0.754) (-1.145) (-0.840) (0.699) (1.873) (2.236) (1.574) (1.475)
_cons 1.875** 1.779** 1.492** -0.444* -0.265+ -0.137 -0.037 -0.089
(6.386) (6.704) (8.115) (-2.322) (-1.738) (-1.097) (-0.465) (-1.485)
Industry + + + + + + + +
Year + + + + + + + +
N 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528
t statistics in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
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