The R2P in Geneva

As argued above some states are reluctant to debate and work for the integration of the R2P in Geneva, and the discussion was entirely absent in the HRC item 6 debate among states.

This can in part be explained by the issue that the R2P is still seen by many as a subject to be dealt with under the UN’s Peace and Security Pillar (based in New York), and not the UN’s Human Rights Pillar (based in Geneva). A Representative of the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland argued that it is a challenge that many states see the R2P as a coercive tool after the Libya development in 2011. The Libya developments in 2011 heavily influenced the debate on the R2P and strengthened the widespread misunderstandings on the R2P. The Swiss Representative further argued that this challenge can only be dealt with by enhancing knowledge and understanding of the concept among states and other actors.¹⁹¹ According to Hegarty, the R2P is only partly considered in Geneva in the context of special procedures in the form of country mandates and special sessions, and not in the UPR.¹⁹² In contrast to this, a Representative of a WEOG state Foreign Ministry argued that it was his impression that the R2P discussions in Geneva had actually been more fruitful than discussions in New York, particularly because the focus in Geneva can only be on prevention efforts as opposed to

188 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Programme manager at UPR-info Hegarty, supra note 149.

189 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Deputy Executive Director for GCR2P Pawnday, supra note 168.

190 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Programme manager at UPR-info Hegarty, supra note 149.

191 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Representative of the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland, supra note 149.

192 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Programme manager at UPR-info Hegarty, supra note 149.

intervention and sanctions.¹⁹³ The Representative of the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland interviewed agreed that when we talk about the R2P in the UPR, we talk about pillar one and two.¹⁹⁴

In November 2015 The Group of Friends of the R2P in Geneva was formally established, which has been highlighted in several interviews as creating a momentum for working with the R2P in Geneva.¹⁹⁵ The Group has 50 members; 49 states from all regions of the world¹⁹⁶ and the EU. An equivalent Group of Friends of the R2P exists at the UN in New York. The establishment of the Group can initially be interpreted as a positive step towards furthering states work to mainstream the R2P in Geneva, but interview persons working in Geneva suggest that the current functioning of the group is challenged. At the outset the Geneva-based group planned to mainstream the R2P in Geneva through all HRC resolutions and instruments including the UPR, but currently states see activities and membership of the group as a burden.¹⁹⁷ The Group was very active the first year, but many members of the group have become very passive, and are expecting the Group’s co-chair states Rwanda and the Netherlands to take the lead.¹⁹⁸ The Group has been challenged since it initiated a move from conceptual to more substantial discussions on how to operationalize the R2P, and in practice, the group has been unable to agree on joint statements on specific cases.¹⁹⁹ The EEAS Official highlighted the example that the group was unable to agree on a joint statement on the situation in Sudan after which many members asked: “if we are not able to talk about that horrendous situation then what is this groups?”.²⁰⁰ The Group has not met in Geneva since the fall of 2016 according to an EEAS Official and a Representative of Switzerland’s Foreign Ministry.²⁰¹ The EEAS Official further shared that the Group, in the

193 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Representative of WEOG state Foreign Ministry, supra note 144.

194 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Representative of the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland, supra note 149.

195 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Representative of WEOG state Foreign Ministry, supra note 144; Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview EEAS Official, supra note 162; Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview

Representative of the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland, supra note 149, and Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Professor and Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the R2P Bellamy, supra note 175.

196 *The Group of Friends of R2P’s members: Netherlands, Rwanda, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Japan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States.

197 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview EEAS Official, supra note 162.

198 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview with Geneva-based diplomat.

199 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview with Geneva-based diplomat.

200 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview EEAS Official, supra note 162.

201 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview EEAS Official, supra note 162 and Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Representative of the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland, supra note 149.

beginning, consulted with different relevant agencies in Geneva; the OHCHR and directors of the ICRC to ask how the Group could support their work but received the negative response;

“We don’t want to have anything to do with you – you divide people”. The EEAS Official acknowledged that access to conflict zones is pivotal for the OHCHR and ICRC, and the R2P is politicized to the degree that their involvement with the Group of Friends could jeopardize their status as impartial.²⁰² Many NGOs react in a similar way when the R2P is brought up;

they too perceive it as a politicised and controversial concept, that does not belong in human rights debates.²⁰³

Limon went as far as to state that the R2P is dead in Geneva, but the remaining interviewees underlined that the integration of the R2P in Geneva and the UPR is a very new agenda which it will take a long time to implement.²⁰⁴ Bellamy highlighted that there have been small improvements in the Geneva context, for instance suggesting that the appointment of Ivan Šimonović as the Special Advisor on the R2P to the UNSG has had a positive effect.

Šimonović is a well-known and respected figure in the UN Human Rights system, as he served as Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights between 2010 and 2016.²⁰⁵ The Representative of Switzerland’s Foreign Ministry interviewed also argued that the general focus on prevention, presented by UNSG Guterres, is high on the agenda in Geneva, which has created a window of opportunity for strengthening the atrocity prevention agenda too.²⁰⁶

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4.2.6. Interim Conclusion

The analysis shows that there is a significant difference between state acceptance of integrating R2P into UPR. The account of the 2017 Interactive Dialogue on the R2P shows that there is a group of persistent objectors to the integration of the R2P into the UPR, these objector states also voted against the adoption of the R2P onto the formal agenda of the UNGA. Meanwhile, a large group of states expressed support for the integration of the R2P into the UPR during the Interactive Dialogue. These states argued that the UPR is well-placed

202 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview EEAS Official, supra note 162.

203 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Representative of the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland, supra note 149.

204 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Representative of WEOG state Foreign Ministry, supra note 144; Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Executive Director for URG Limon, supra note 138; Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Geneva-based diplomat, and Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Deputy Executive Director for GCR2P Pawnday, supra notes 168.

205 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Professor and Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the R2P Bellamy, supra note 175.

206 Silke KMH and Marie SC, Interview Representative of the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland, supra note 149.

to support atrocity prevention efforts. The majority of 113 states voting for the adoption of the R2P onto the formal agenda of the UNGA also shows that there is still broad support for the doctrine.

The HRC item 6 debate on the UPR contributes with the interesting finding that no states referred to atrocity prevention in their statements, which could be interpreted as a reflection of the sensitivity surrounding the R2P or a lack of awareness of the potential of using the UPR for atrocity prevention. Different groups of states used statements to focus on the non-politicized character of the UPR, calling for the better implementation of the recommendations and underlining the importance of civil society organization’s contributions to the UPR. Despite the absence of reference to atrocity prevention in the statements it was highlighted in the interviews that it is the peer-to-peer nature of the UPR, which makes it valuable for atrocity prevention. Hence the characteristics of the UPR that states highlighted in statements is also what makes it useful for atrocity prevention. The many statements given by civil society organizations focusing on atrocity crimes show that these organizations acknowledge and push for the use of the UPR for atrocity prevention. Meanwhile, the finding that NGOs do not address atrocity prevention issues at the UPR-info’s Pre-sessions counters this argument. It can be concluded that it is a challenge that there is a limited presence of NGOs working with the R2P in Geneva.

The last section of the analysis assessed the Group of Friends of the R2P. Interviews have shown that the group at the outset had momentum and good discussions on the conceptual aspects of the R2P. But as they tried to include substantial content and operationalize the R2P and make statements on specific country situations the group has been challenged.

In all the following sub-analyses, we have chosen to include examples of recommendations made by different types of states, also the ones that are critical towards integrating the R2P into the UPR, based on the assumption that these states also make recommendations that are implicitly contributing to atrocity prevention. In the following sub-analysis it will be explored how the different levels of state acceptance of integrating the R2P and atrocity prevention into the UPR are reflected in current state practice of making UPR recommendations referencing R2P language and the specific atrocity crimes.^xxvii