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concepts such as reconciliation. “This is because reconciliation, which involves ‘the restoration of trust in an interpersonal relationship through mutually trustworthy behaviors, is not a prerequisite for forgiveness’” (McCullough, Bono, and Root 395).
That is, reconciliation aims at continuation of relationships, forgiveness may not necessarily encompass that. Approaching the end of the novel, I think what Singer and Franz want are not continuations of relationships, so the word “reconciliation” and other seemingly replaceable words are not that appropriate. I would stick to the word
“forgiveness” then.
3.2 Revenge-oriented Aspect of Forgiveness in Religion
There is no denying that religion provides models, such as saints, for forgiving others and also promotes forgiveness. There is an old saying that “to err is human, to forgive divine.” Forgiving has been thought of as a territory beyond human’s
perceptive experience. That’s why Julia Kristeva and Ruth Kluger recognize that forgiveness is itself essentially religious. However, there is a side of religion that also supports a certain degree of retribution, for example “an eye for any eye” and “a tooth for a tooth” in Judaic Old Testament and the doctrine of karma in Buddhism and Hinduism. The examples above elucidate that God will conduct justice for the victims or allows criminals to be punished in a just world. Those who are seeking vengeance are actively motivated by religious beliefs that will justify their vengeful stance (McCullough 399). In other words, religion doesn’t obviate the possibility of getting vengeance. Justice is also an important concern, apart from forgiveness. In this respect, we can easily detect the function of religion in the human society. The harmony of civilization needs justice so that the rule of the world will be set and be followed. As a rock behind the just world, religion finds itself unable to get rid of the necessity of punishment and retribution. Hence, in our discussion of forgiveness,
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whether it is the forgiveness that Franz had been seeking or the forgiveness Singer needs, forgiveness in either way comes after some ordeals.
As they investigate the act of seeking forgiveness, critics define “seeking forgiveness as ‘a motivation to accept moral responsibility and to attempt
interpersonal reparation following relational injury in which one is morally culpable’”
(McCullough 400). Accepting moral responsibility is to accept the consequences after transgressions. Ruth Kluger therein suggests, “It would seem that some retribution, some “buying back,” has to take place before forgiveness can set in” (312). In
addition, in an interview of Julia Kristeva, Alison Rice records that Kristeva “makes it clear with respect to the Holocaust that criminals can be forgiven, but only after they have made reparations, expressed remorse, and indicated a desire to transform themselves and begin again” (279). For Franz, he never asks Singer and her grandmother to forgive him. He simply doesn’t think it an option considering so heinous a crime Nazi and his brother did to them. On account of knowing the fact that any reparation would be a fantasy, Franz is already expressing remorse and definitely tries to “buy back” what he did by giving up his own life as a form of redemption.
Therefore, only after Franz’s death does the discourse of forgiving Franz begins to develop.
However, another question aroused by the vengeance stance of religion is that whether Singer’s revenge toward Franz is appropriate or not. Does she need to feel guilty? A certain degree of revenge is necessary, and it needs to be done by a trustworthy authority. However, hovering over the question of whether Singer is authorized or not is doomed to meet an impasse. My main concern is what exactly vengeance itself brings to humans. History tells us personal vengeance will not bring peace. It brings more hatred and confusions. Namely, vengeance does not level and
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valorize tensions between victims and perpetrators. Vengeance instead reverses the stances of victims and perpetrators in the case of Singer. The act of vengeance hardens the relationships with enemies in an unconscious manner. It is therefore far from closure, but a reopening of endless quest for closure. In fact, the emotion behind the vengeance—ressentiment—has been related to repetition compulsion. Ressentiment
“is not unlike Freud’s account of the repetition compulsion in traumatic neuroses where the neurotic patient continuously reenacts the painful experience in his attempts to bring the trauma under the mastery of the pleasure principle” (Minkkinen 527). As Freud describes this painful repetition compulsion:
the compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences that include no possibility of pleasure, which could not have provided satisfaction to instinctual impulses even if they had since been repressed. . . . Neurotics now repeat in the transference all these unwanted situations and painful emotions and revive them with great skill. (qtd. in Minkkinen 527)
The victim perpetuates his own suffering in a way beyond the pleasure principle. He returns to the traumatic site where he is not able to forget and begin anew.
“Ressentiment is, then, an expression of the death instinct and, consequently, a symptom of the victim’s original trauma” (Minkkinen 527). Nevertheless,
ressentiment brings out victims’ long-lost dignities and gives them a sense of power, as if ressentiment is an enormous force for human beings. “[R]essentiment represents the victim’s subjective efforts to purge himself, to turn back time in order to undo the suffering that he has endured. Resenting is neither retaliating nor forgiving, but for the victim it has a cathartic potential” (Minkkinen 525) in that pain of losing something has finally found a way to spew without hurting one’s pride. In order to save the pride, the “survivor frequently resists mourning” (Herman188). The survivor may
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“consciously refuse to grieve as a way of denying victory to the perpetrator” (ibid). In fact, Judith Herman further explains,
The revenge fantasy is one form of the wish for catharsis. The victim imagines that she can get rid of the terror, shame, and pain of the trauma by retaliating against the perpetrator. In her humiliated fury, the victim imagines that revenge is the only way to restore her own sense of power.
(189)
Her sense of power doesn’t lead her to appease the lost one. Instead, the revenge
fantasy “exacerbate[s] the victim’s feelings of horror and degrade her image of herself”
(Herman 189). This seemingly absurd cathartic potential may be the main reason for victims like Singer to seek revenge. Gradually, as time goes past, they will find that ressentiment brings them back to the traumatic past. As Herman says, “Though the traumatized person imagines that revenge will bring relief, repetitive revenge
fantasies actually increase her torment. . . [R]evenge can never change or compensate for the harm that was done” (Hertman 189). I think it is why forgiveness germinates under people’s despairing cry for relief—a true release from the leash of traumatic structures tied up by perpetrators and victims themselves. However, we should be careful of the use forgiveness here, since Herman holds a reserved attitude toward forgiveness. Herman reminds us of a fantasy of forgiveness when forgiveness is brought up without careful investigations:
Like revenge, the fantasy of forgiveness often becomes a cruel torture, because it remains out of reach for most ordinary human beings. . . True forgiveness cannot be granted until the perpetrator has sought and earned it through confession, repentance, and restitution.(Hertman 190)
The fantasy of forgiveness also empowers the victim’s helpless ego. The victim
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forsakes becoming a criminal aligning with the perpetrator and tries to free herself from the immurement of the revenge fantasy. By the act of forgiving, the victim can purposefully forgets and lets go of the past, although forgetting is not necessarily a detrimental way when it comes to dealing with trauma. I am afraid the forgetting will become a disguise of repression. This forgetting is not like what we say about
reforming memories and getting rid of details that is not necessary for our lives. This forgetting is an act of avoidance. This kind of avoidance is still not the true
forgiveness I have brought up. The victim, as Herman states, “imagines that she can transcend her rage and erase the impact of trauma through a willed, defiant act of love.
But it is not possible to exorcise the trauma, through either hatred or love” (189-90).
For Herman, true forgiveness exists, but it still remains out of reach by human beings.
Kristeva also seconds Herman’s understanding of forgiveness that there are conditions for forgiveness, such as confession, repentance, and restitution (Herman190). As Herman so adamantly contends, the fantasy of revenge and that of forgiveness are both “impediment to mourning” (190).