& Bazerman, 1985; Neal & Bazerman, 1983). On the contrary, it could be a
simplifying interpretation of perspective information involving both sides, by
using heuristic rules as suggested by Karniol & Shomroni (1999). The study
of Karniol & Shomroni (1999) demonstrated that people use heuristic rules to
predict how others would think and feel by searching similar experiences
stored in their memory. In addition, as suggested by the research of Thompson & Hastie (1990), people enter the situation of bilateral negotiation with the expectation that the two parties are in opposing positions. It follows that negotiators heuristically transform this expectation into his understanding of the negotiation situation.
Therefore, offering the expected value of the commodity of uncertainty, as found by Bazerman & Neal, 1985) is not necessarily due to ignoring the perspective of the other side. It could be because the buyer interprets the negotiation situation as two opposing perspectives and takes the perspective of the other side in a naïve way such that expected value is the strategy of compromising between the two.
According to the normative hypothesis or the perspective ignorance hypothesis, people either take the perspective of the other side in a normative way, or totally ignore it. Nevertheless, there might a third possibility: people are considering the perspective of the other side in a simplifying way, not totally ignore it.
The simplified multiple perspective-taking hypothesis proposes that when the buyer has high incentive to obtain the commodity, he will give in more to the position to the seller such that he will offer higher prices. On the other hand, when the buyer is aware of risks, he will come back towards to the position of the buyer.
If the representation of the negotiation situation is two opposing sides on the dimension of value, then when the buyer has more incentive to obtain the negotiated commodity, the buyer will be more willing to give in to the position of the seller.
Therefore, the buyer will be willing to offer higher prices to buy the commodity. On the contrary, the perspective ignorance hypothesis asserts that the buyer would totally ignore the perspective of the other side and decides the offered price based on the expected value from the perspective of the buyer.
Based on the simplified multiple perspective taking hypothesis, people understand the negotiation situation in a naïve way, which is neither perfectly rational, nor totally ignorant. That is, in the understanding of negotiators, different perspectives are represented in a simplifying, intuitive manner. Similar to the perspective ignorance hypothesis, the simplified multiple perspective taking hypothesis also assumes that simplifying strategies play an important role in the process of decision making. The difference between these two hypotheses is the content of the simplifying strategy. The simplified multiple perspective-taking hypothesis assumes that people are still maintaining different perspectives in their representation of the bilateral negotiation situation, whereas the perspective ignorance hypothesis proposed that perspective information is totally ignored. The results in this paper support the simplified multiple perspective taking hypothesis by showing that people swing between the different positions of the seller and the buyer.
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