Social Resource

Social resources are resources accessed through an individual’s social connections (Campbell and Marsden 1986). Researchers of social resources argued that the features of a personal network include opportunities to promote that one’s self-interests (Lin 2001), affect the outcome of job searches (Granovetter 1995;

Marsden and Hurlbert 1988), and gather information. Resources have different values in human groups or communities (Sewell 1992; Lin 2001). Lin (2001) proposed “the community promotes its self-interest by conferring relatively higher statuses on individuals who possess valued resources.”

In social networks, researchers argue that fluidity characterizes the occupants, positions, resources, and procedures (Lin 2001) Social resource research typically asks how the characteristics of the contacts that provided information or the nature of the contact tie affected outcomes (Marsden and Hurlbert 1988; Lin, Ensel and Vaughn 1981; Lin 2001). For example, Burt (1992) proposed a concept of structural holes (i.e., being connected to many actors who are themselves unconnected) and verified that structural holes can enhance career opportunities for workers who are competing for

promotions. Network locations will create competitive advantages by linking activated ties to outcomes (Burt 1992).

2.2.2.1. Relational Properties of PSNs

Measurements on the ties among actors are relational and differ from standard social science data. The level at which network data are studied is referred to as a modeling unit. Network ties, created through social relationships, consist of behaviors of receiving and reciprocating. Network analysts often collect network data by observing, interviewing, or questioning individual actors about the ties they have with other actors. The dyad is the common unit of observation (Wasserman & Fraust 1994, pp. 43). Number of contact ties, network density, and tie strength affect the effectiveness of informal personalization.

The pattern of ties and the relationships built on them are the foundations of social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1999). In turn, social capital facilitates exchange (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1999). Socioeconomic statuses are positively related to network size (Compbell, Marsden, & Hurlbert 1986) and contact resources (Lin 1988). The number of acquisition ties is significantly related to knowledge workers’ performance ratings (Cross & Cummings, 2004). Frank, Zhao, and Borman (2004) have further proven that informal accesses to expertise are manifestations of social capital that can facilitate the implementation of innovation.

Network density is another common measurement of informal personalization. It is calculated by counting the number of ties that connect alters and then dividing the sum by the number of pairs (Wasserman & Faust 1994). Burt (1992) has indicated that people with a low density of ties have fewer constraints and perform better. On the other hand, a dense relationship can result in secure relationships, which would further facilitate cooperative intention (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998; Jameson, et al., 2006), high trust (Buskens, 1998) and assist in solving problems (Sparrowe et. al.

2001).

Tie strength has been measured in various ways and frequency of contact was one popular indicator. Strong ties indicate frequent contacts that almost invariably are affective and reciprocal (Granovetter 1973). While strong ties are for solidarity, weaker contacts, that is, infrequent contacts, are sources of new information and are important for the dispersion of information (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973). Strong ties are bridges of information pertaining to the interest of a group and/or its individual members (Lai and Wong 2004) and are negatively associated with knowledge innovation (Teigland & Wasko, 2000). Weak ties tend to be bridges to different social circles and are embedded resources that are both heterogeneous and useful (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 1982; Montgomery, 1992), which facilitate personal status attainment (Lin, 2001).

2.2.2.2. Centrality

Degree centrality is commonly used to indicate positive recipients and positional advantages (Knoke & Burt, 1983; Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). An individual with a significant degree of direct contacts or an individual who is adjacent to many other correlates is considered a major channel of relational information (Wasserman &

Fraust, 1994) and has prestige. Prestigious persons attract followers seeking long-term relations (Knoke & Burt, 1983, Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). Prestigious indices measure the directional relations because prestige is regarded as social status (Lin, 2001) and becomes salient, especially if the positive choices are not reciprocated (Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2005).

2.2.2.3. Brokerage

Researchers of social networks have defined a broker as a manipulator of people and information who provides the benefits of linking persons who would not otherwise be in communication (Burt, 1992). Brokers have opportunities to bridge

critical resources and have network effects on individual’s bargaining power and influence in dyadic exchanges (Burt, 1992; Fernandez & Gould, 1994). Gould and Fernandez had proposed that exchanges between some actors may have a different meaning or function from exchanges between other actors. They proposed that

“brokerage should distinguish communication of resource flows within groups from flows between groups.” They proposed five structurally distinct types of brokers that follow from a partitioning of actors into non-overlapping subgroups (Gould &

Fernandez 1989).

Figure 2.1 Five types of Relational Brokerages

Although Gould and Fernandez’ theory (1989, 1994) of brokerage focused on the study of inter-organizational relations, the model provided a general, rigorous formulation of brokerage behavior: A “coordinator” brokers the resources with correlates within the same group (Fernandez & Gould, 1994). A second type of broker acts as a “gatekeeper” for a group and decides whether or not to grant access to an outsider. The third type of broker acts as a “representative” for a fellow group and attempts to establish contact with an outsider. A “consultant” is in a different group and acts as an itinerant broker for two correlates of the same subgroup. Finally, a

“liaison” is an outsider who links distinct groups without having prior allegiance to either (see Figure 2.1).

2.2.2.4. Structural Holes

Burt (1992) coined the term “structural holes” to refer to the positional advantage/disadvantage of individuals resulting from how they are embedded in

neighborhoods. In the (a) network of Figure 2.2, ego has an advantageous position as a direct result of the structural hole between actors A and B. That is, the ego is a strategic player and responsible for information benefits. He builds an efficient effective network and maintains the bridge tie (Burt 1992). The effective size of the network is given by the number of alters that the ego has minus the average number of ties that each alter has with other alters. Hence, the effective size of the ego of network (a) is greater than that of the ego of network (b).

Figure 2.2 Example of a Triad

However, the network (b) of Figure 2.2 is more cohesive though the ego has a weaker integration advantage. That is, the connection between ego and ‘B’ is redundant because he can reach ‘B’ through ‘A’. A more cohesive network has more constraints for the person in the middle position (Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2005, Wasserman & Faust, 1994).