Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework of Sharp Power
3.2 Spheres of Influence
role in Asia and the world means for its neighbors and partners.” Money for this initiative came from CUSEF which is a Hong Kong based nonprofit, but money comes from a high ranking Chinese government official with ties to UFWD.84 The Centre for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) is a military-linked research institution having and influence on foreign policymaking as CIIS and CICIR.85 The External Propaganda Bureau (EPB) as it is apparent this CCP organization aims to promote CCP's narrative to the world.86 The China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC) a Hong Kong registered NGO presenting itself as a think tank. It is a subsidiary to CEFC China Energy Co., Ltd which is a company promoting CCP's narrative in the world. This fund claiming to have partnerships with several Chinese universities as well as to Hanban promotes Taiwanese reunification via sponsored content.87 Cole presents these main ones as well as points out to others working worldwide whose names often include variations on the theme of “peaceful reunification”
– a tell-tale sign of political efforts aimed at Taiwan. Cole adds that many of these organizations have dual activities, that means that one part is legal belonging to standard public diplomacy sphere but the second part is in the sharp power area, but to find out the reach of these institutions and their connection could be accomplished only by government-funded intelligence institution.88
3.2 Spheres of Influence
The effect of sharp power is to limit free expression abroad, manipulate people in a favorable direction to Beijing, and to distort the political environment. All of it is done by various means of intervention into democratic structures using the asymmetry of openness. PRC is trying to
“infiltrate” Australian political and foreign affairs circles as well as in New Zealand. Walker points
84 ALLEN-EBRAHIMIAN, Bethany. This Beijing-Linked Billionaire Is Funding Policy Research at Washington’s Most Influential Institutions. [online]. Foreign Policy, 2017. Retrieved from:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/28/this-beijing-linked-billionaire-is-funding-policy-research-at-washingtons-most-influential-institutions-china-dc/. [visited: 23.2.2020].
85 SCOBELL, Andrew. Civil-Military Change in China. [online]. Strategic Studies Institute, 2004. Retrieved from:
https://books.google.com.tw/books?id=uSPtntAP0ucC&pg=PA282&lpg=PA282&dq=Centre+for+Peace+and+Deve lopment+Studies+CPDS+china&source=bl&ots=QXdk9VVECc&sig=ACfU3U1BVplsqkj4RyJzIiOPbcU4knJcFg&
hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj436GwuefnAhVvwosBHYPXCogQ6AEwDHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false.
[visited: 23.2.2020]. Page 282.
86 SHAMBAUGH, David. China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy. [online]. The China Journal, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20066240. [visited: 23.2.2020]. Page 47.
87 COLE, J. Michael. Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan. [online]. The National Interest, 2015.
Retrieved from: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/unstoppable-chinas-secret-plan-subvert-taiwan-12463. [visited:
23.2.2020].
88 COLE, J. Michael. The Hard Edge of Sharp Power: Understanding China's Influence Operations Abroad. [online].
Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication, 2018. Retrieved from:
https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/20181022_MLI_China%27s_Influence_(Cole)_PAPER_WebreadyF.pdf.
[visited: 23.2.2020].
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out efforts to gain influence over the Chinese population living in these two countries as well as in the USA is constantly growing. Moreover, the Chinese state is creating institutions that are posing as independent but in reality are working on behalf of the Chinese communist party, undermining independent civil society institutions. PRC is trying to present itself as a benign power, therefore, initiates people to people exchanges, creates academic institutions such as Confucius Institutes, conducts state-fund research while at the same time the same government is tightly controlling media, civil society, and political discourse at home while in many cases its foreign partners have no idea about it.89
Walker points out that in democratic countries culture, academia, media, and publishing (CAMP) is open to everyone and that is what makes them an easy target for Chinese sharp power.90 A great example of PRC's efforts to influence culture and academia is its Confucius Institutes (CI). The first one was established in 2004 and since then expanded rapidly on every continent.91 They are overseen by Hanban (Office of Chinese Language Council International) which is under the Chinese Ministry of Education. CIs are established in co-operation with local universities and colleges and their financing is split between Hanban and that particular university. Even though their goal is to promote the Chinese language, sport, culture as well as serving as facilitators of cultural exchange CIs are under a lot of scrutiny because of their operations.92
3.2.1 Culture
Unquestionably, Chinese culture has a long-lasting tradition being one of the oldest civilizations that enriched the world in many ways. Promoting one's culture is a traditional way of building a soft power as Nye puts it, but he adds that culture does not belong to the state, which creates something else than a soft power from Chinese promotion of culture.93
The first International Forum on Confucianism in Argentina, 2016 presents an example of how the traditional aspect of Chinese culture – Confucianism can be twisted for the normalization of the
89 WALKER, Christopher. What is “Sharp Power”? [online]. Journal of Democracy, Volume 29, Number 3, July 2018. Retrieved from: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/698914/pdf. [visited: 28.12.2019]. Page 12.
90 Ibid, [visited: 29.12.2019]. Page 13.
91 ZHOU Ying, LUK Sabrina. Establishing Confucius Institutes: a tool for promoting China’s soft power? [online].
Journal of Contemporary China. 2016. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132961. [visited:
28.12.2019]. Page 629.
92 MATTIS, Peter. Reexamining the Confucius Institutes. [online]. The Diplomat, 2012. Retrieved from:
https://thediplomat.com/2012/08/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/. [visited: 29.12.2019].
93 NYE, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. [visited: 17.12.2019]. Page 11.
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authoritarian regime of CCP. Confucianism is presented as an essence of the economic success of PRC and the world should learn from it. Confucianism is presented also as a set of virtues that are in a competition with western values which hides the oppressive and authoritarian methods of CCP as Lausent-Hererra who attended this conference puts it.94
Another big part of Chinese culture is the celebrations of Chinese New Year. Cardenal presents an example of how the Chinese embassy took over the celebrations in Buenos Aires which at first were organized as a grass-roots event by dominantly Taiwanese community and de facto transformed it into a public event centered around the PRC.95
3.2.2 Academia
Confucius Institutes have been defending their operations by stating that their goal and mission is similar to Alliance française and Goethe-Institut because they also receive governmental funding and serve as promoters of culture and language. The difference is that CIs operate directly on the university campuses therefore they gain and exercise influence on academic freedoms together with pushing CCP's narratives on topics like Tibet, Taiwan, and the Tiananmen massacre.96 Another issue is the financing of Confucius Institutes. Because in general CIs are not transparent at all it is very difficult to know how much money is certain universities receiving thus it is very hard to assess what influence they have over CI's curriculum because those contracts are confidential.97
The case in Slovakia is a good example where CI served as a barer of CCP's narrative about Tibet.
Slovak president Andrej Kiska met with Dalai Lama in 2016, which was criticized by the Chinese government. Afterward, CI hosted by Slovak University of Technology together with Chinese embassy sponsored an exhibition called “A Chinese Story: Chinese Tibet, that was focusing on promoting China's territorial claims over Tibet98
94 WALKER Ch., LUDWIG J., CARDENAL J. P., KUCHARCZYK J., MASEZNIKOV G., PLESCHOVA G. Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence: New Forum Report. [visited: 29.12.2019]. Page 53.
95 Ibid, [visited: 29.12.2019]. Page 16.
96 YANG, Alan. Confucius Institutes and the Question of China's Soft Power Diplomacy. [online]. The James Town Foundation, 2012. Retrieved from: https://jamestown.org/program/confucius-institutes-and-the-question-of-chinas-soft-power-diplomacy/#.Uc4timLVBIE. [visited: 29.12.2019].
97 WALKER, Christopher. What is “Sharp Power”? [visited: 29.12.2019]. Page 13.
98 WALKER Ch., LUDWIG J., CARDENAL J. P., KUCHARCZYK J., MASEZNIKOV G., PLESCHOVA G. Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence: New Forum Report. [visited: 29.12.2019]. Page 16.
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These “protest” actions organized either by the Confucius Institute or the Chinese embassy are nothing new. They are well known especially in countries where there are a lot of Chinese students attending local universities such as in the USA, Australia, or Canada. In 2018 just over 662,000 Chinese students were studying at foreign universities all around the world.99 This huge amount of students, if mobilized, serve as great leverage to influence what is happening in foreign universities. In 2017 at the University of California, San Diego Chinese students together with Chinese Students and Scholars Association were objecting over the invitation of Dalai Lama to give a keynote speech.100 In other instances in Australia where Chinese students protested the question in a class quiz which was suggesting criticism towards CCP's officials. The teacher of that particular class was later suspended.101
Because Chinese students bring money to the universities in a form of tuition together with ensuring that the Western campuses could operate in China as well as access to PRC for western academics who would like to conduct fieldwork there, China-sensitive topics are avoided and self-censorship is imposed at US universities as the study conducted through more than 100 interviews.102
3.2.3 Publishing
Another sphere penetrated by Chinese sharp power and methods of self-censorship is publishing.
In 2017 Cambridge university decided to remove over 300 articles related to China-sensitive topics, from a Chinese website hosting the China Quarterly because CUP was threatened by PRC's General Administration of Press and Publications if CUP decides not to cooperate all its articles will be taken down in China. CUP agreed but after a huge backlash from western academic and public community protest they decided to reverse the decision.103 The second example of Chinese
99 SHUO, Zhou. Chinese Students Studying Abroad up 8.83%. [online] China Daily, 2019. Retrieved from:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/28/WS5c9c355da3104842260b30eb.html. [visited: 29.12.2019].
100 RILLEY, Katie. Why the Dalai Lama's University of California Commencement Address is Controversial. [online].
Time, 2017. Retrieved from: https://time.com/4821653/dalai-lama-university-california-san-diego-commencement-address/. [visited: 29.12.2019]
101 NEEDHAM, Kristie. China's Internet Erupts over Monash University's Drunk Officials Quiz Question. [online].
The Sunday Morning Herald, 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.smh.com.au/world/chinas-internet-errupts-over-monash-universitys-drunken-quiz-question-20170522-gwaazl.html. [visited: 29.12.2019].
102 FISH, Isaac. Why are America's Elite Universities Censoring themselves on China? [online]. The New Republic, 2018. Retrieved from: https://newrepublic.com/article/150476/american-elite-universities-selfcensorship-china.
[visited: 29.12.2019].
103 KENNEDY M. and PHILLIPS T. Cambridge University Press Backs down over China Censorship. [online]. The Guardian, 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/aug/21/cambridge-university-press-to-back-down-over-china-censorship. [visited: 29.12.2019].
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influencing foreign publishers happened also in 2017 in Australia. Due to the fear of only potential retaliation from PRC, the book called Silent Invasion: How China is Turning Australia into a Puppet State by Clive Hamilton was shelved by its publisher. It is believed to be the first instance when publishing was suspended in a Western market because of China. The book was later published by an independent Australian publisher.104
3.2.4 Media
China also invested billions to establish a big international media presence. Acquisitions of foreign media houses and their Chinese language sections were made to control what is being written about PRC as well as to control Chinese diasporas living all over the world. In 2014 the international arm of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) announced a deal with the Shanghai Media Group backed by PRC. Some vied it as a great opportunity to reach viewers in a heavily controlled Chinese environment. But the opposite was true. ABC had to compromise and bounded itself that it will eliminate any news that Beijing might find problematic in its Mandarin-language service not only in PRC but in Australia and overseas as well.105 Another instance in the acquisition of South China Morning Post in 2016 by retail conglomerate Alibaba whose founder Jack Ma is a member of the Chinese Communist Party. Rising suspicion that CCP might influence freedom of the press in Hong Kong was intensified in 2018 when three members of Chinese foreign ministry were present at an editorial meeting.106
PRC is not only buying already existing media. In some cases, shares are enough to pressure the editorial board. In 2018, South African journalist Azad Essa's column was ended in Independent Online (OIL). According to the OIL spokesman, it was due to the necessary redesign of the newspaper. But the fact that 20% of OIL's shares are controlled by China-Africa Private Development Fund (CADFUND) and China International Television Corporation (CITVC) this
104 PEARLMAN, Jonathan. “Fearful” Australian Publisher Allen & Unwin Drops Book about China, Claims Author.
[online]. The Telegraph, 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/13/fearful-australian-publisher-allen-unwin-drops-book-china/. [visited: 29.12.2019].
105 WALKER, Christopher. What is “Sharp Power”? [visited: 29.12.2019]. Page 9.
106WEN, Yuqing. Chinese Officials Attend Editorial Meeting of Hong Kong Newspaper. [online]. Radio Free Asia, 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/newspaper-09052018110721.html. [visited 29.12.2019].
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Various acquisitions of foreign media houses and promotion of Chinese one is not only serving to limit English language information about PRC as was said before but also to control Chinese language media because they are not only read by Chinese citizens going for holidays or Chinese students but also by Chinese diaspora living all over the world, and since Xi Jinping took power Chinese diaspora was called upon at many occasions in order to help build the Chinese dream and achieve Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.108
The CCP proclaims that all Chinese people are “sons and daughters of the Yellow Emperor” and because CCP proclaims itself as a sole representative of the Chinese nation therefore all Chinese people somehow owe their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party.109 A very similar line of reasoning from PRC's side was described by Eric Chan who is a China/Korea strategist for the U.S. Air Force’s Checkmate office. In 2019 at a Chinese welcome banquet during toasting, a ranking general in People's Liberation Army Air Force approached him and his Asian-American officer with a toast. “To your health.” Drink. “To your families.” Drink. Finishing with “And to remembering that blood is thicker than water. Chinese blood runs through you. You understand us, and know that no matter what flag you wear on your shoulders, you are Chinese first and foremost.” As he noted CCP's propaganda at the Chinese diaspora has never changed.110
There are two groups that CCP distinguishes. The first one is ethnic Chinese such as students at American schools, or business people. The second group is non-ethnic Chinese people. This is very visible on the Chinese push for creating a global registry of Uyghurs no matter where they
107 South Africa: Journalist loses column after publishing an article critical of China. [online]. Reporters Without Borders, 2018. Retrieved from: https://rsf.org/en/news/south-africa-journalist-loses-column-after-publishing-article-critical-china. [visited 29.12.2019].
108 Beijing works to rally 'sons and daughters' abroad to help create 'Chinese Dream'. [online]. ABC News, 2018.
Retrieved from: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-04/beijing-official-urges-outreach-to-non-mainland-chinese/9506388. [visited: 29.12.2019].
109 China's Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. [online]. The Hoover Institute, 2018.
Retrieved from: https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/00_diamond-schell-chinas-influence-and-american-interests.pdf. [visited 31.12.2019]. Page 29.
110 CHAN, Eric. Fifth Column Fears: The Chinese Influence Campaign in the United States. [online]. The Diplomat Magazine, 2019. Retrieved from: https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/fifth-column-fears-the-chinese-influence-campaign-in-the-united-states/. [visited 31.12.2019].
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live. To gain this information, Chinese officials have been threatening their relatives who still live in PRC. The same applies to Tibetans living in the US. A more prominent individual higher the chance that he or she might be harassed by China even though he or she lives in the USA. These people were even offered protection by the FBI.111
One of the main actors here is Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) which states that its purpose is: “to enhance unity and friendship in overseas Chinese communities; to maintain contact with and support overseas Chinese media and Chinese language schools; [and] to increase cooperation and exchanges between overseas Chinese and China related to the economy, science, culture, and education.”112
There are various methods that Beijing uses. First is the promotion to “honorable” positions of elite members of Chinese communities in order to strengthen the ties with the community as a whole. Afterward, these people or whole groups are following CCP's narrative and work on actively silencing any opposition towards the party or its policies. The second method is threatening. Critics of the party are threatened that if they do not cease their activities it will have repercussions on their relatives still living in PRC.113
The reason why the CCP is influencing the Chinese diaspora is to gain support for CCP and its rule in PRC, for its policies and to isolate and silence any criticism that might come from dissidents, human rights activists, religious refuges. Isolation of these groups is key for the party.
3.2.6 Political sphere
Except for CAMP and the Chinese diaspora, there is another target for CCP to aim at. Those targets are foreign governments and political elites. Cases from New Zealand and Canada revealed that ministers and MPs of Chinese heritage might have used their influence to alter their country's political direction in a way that is favorable to PRC.114
111 China's Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. [online]. The Hoover Institute, 2018.
Retrieved from: https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/00_diamond-schell-chinas-influence-and-american-interests.pdf. [visited 31.12.2019]. Page 31.
112 Ibid, [visited 31.12.2019]. Page 31.
113 Ibid, [visited 31.12.2019]. Page 32.
114SMYTH, Jamie. New Zealand Urged To Probe Lobbying by China-born MP. [online]. Financial Times, 2017.
Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/74982450-e546-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da. [visited 2.1.2020].
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A very prominent example comes from Australia. China and Australia have a long history of economic bonds going all the way to the 19th century and today PRC accounts for 24% of Australian import and export, making it number one. China realizes this advantage and is not afraid to use it to make Australia do or not do what they want. There is a history of Chinese lobbying Australian politicians and threats with economic retaliation.115
This escalated in 2017 with resignation from Opposition Labor Party Senator Sam Dastyari who was accused of being too close to Chinese donors. This allegation was strengthened by his position on South China in which he defended PRC's position as a matter of the integrity of Chinese borders and its matter to China. But suspicion was sealed when Fairfax Media revealed that Dastyari warned Chinese Australian businessman, Huang Xiangmo, that his phone may have been tapped by Australian intelligence agencies. 116
As it is apparent Chinese sharp power of penetration, piercing, and co-optation have a wide range in general. Even though the essence of sharp power and its goals are the same, every country is different. Beijing has to tailor its strategy to various specifics that could be economic, political, or
As it is apparent Chinese sharp power of penetration, piercing, and co-optation have a wide range in general. Even though the essence of sharp power and its goals are the same, every country is different. Beijing has to tailor its strategy to various specifics that could be economic, political, or