As a capstone to this report, it is important to identify the extent to which state levels of political liberties correlate with certain patterns of recommendation issuance, e.g. do more democratic states make stronger recommendations?
Table 7: Regional Groups’ Recommendation Action Categories and Levels of Democracy
Mean action category of recommendations by regional group of state making recommendation
regional group of State
making recommendation Mean action category
Africa 2.85
Asia 2.86
EEG 3.64
GRULAC 3.70
WEOG 3.83
Polity iv level of democracy Mean action category
Autocracy 2.84
Anacracy 2.82
Democracy 3.30
This table presents the mean levels of action recommen-dations by region. Not surprisingly, Africa and Asia make weaker ones, while EEG, GRULAC, and WEOG make stronger recommendations. We also introduce here data developed from the Polity IV research project28 , which pro-vides a typology of countries as authoritarian (autocracy), democracies, or intermediate, with some elements of both (anocracies). The data above shows that autocracies tend to make weaker recommendations, while democracies make stronger, more action oriented recommendations.29
Table 8: Mean Action level for Recommendations Rated
Democracy/Anacracy/Autocracy Classification regional
group overall
auto-cracy
ana-cracy demo-cracy
Africa-Africa 2.85 2.74 2.83 2.95
Africa-World 3.03 3.03 2.99 3.19
Asia- Asia 2.83 2.75 2.64 3.10
Asia- World 3.05 2.88 2.73 3.19
EEG-EEG 3.54 3.44 3.44 3.70
EEG-World 3.74 3.16 3.55 3.88
28. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
29. N.b. for Tables 20 and 21: I had to transpose action levels 3 and 4 to reflect the previously noted reality of the gradation of action levels from 1-5.
We now focus on considering the data in terms of differentiation by regime type and recommending re-gion. The aim is to determine if states that are rated as democratic a) share their region’s recommendation patterns in terms of action levels, or b) whether the regional dynamic pulls countries towards making the same categories of recommendations notwithstand-ing their levels of freedom. This analysis focuses on the Africa, Asia and EEG regions. States in the WEOG and GRULAC regions are almost all rated as democracies and thus have little overall variance in state levels of freedom. The methodology outlined below would thus not yield any useful analysis from these regions.
To arrive at this data generation we first added up total number of recommendations for all regions per action level, and then divided by number of recommendations.
This provides the regional mean of all recommendations.
We then added up the total number of recommenda-tions in each region by democracy, anacracy or autoc-racy status states per region per action level. We then divided by the number of recommendations by status level.
Table 8 demonstrates the positive relationship of all three region’s democratic states to the mean. There is a negative difference of five of six anacratic and autocratic states, and a very small positive difference of the sixth.
The positive relationships of democratic state to the mean show that states are more likely to make stronger recommendations, even within regions. This is a very interesting finding as it suggests that the centrifugal ef-fectexercised within regional groupings containing a ran-geof democracies, anacracies and autocracies to adhere to the mean is mediated by the level of freedom within states. This would appear to support the hypothesis that the freer states will make the stronger UPR recommenda-tions, irrespective of their region of membership.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that while the EEG deviation from the mean was less for anacracies than for autocratic states, as would be expected, this was not the case for the Asia or Africa region states.
In other words, the autocratic states in the latter two regions made slightly stronger recommendations than the anacracies. The differences are small but I have not been able to identify a reason why it would exist at all.
Perhaps anacracies seek to avoid drawing attention to themselves and avoid »rocking the boat« while
autocrat-ic states whautocrat-ich view themselves as having less to lose are more likely to address strong action recommendations to democratic states, especially in WEOG.
This graph demonstrates that democracies in four of the five regions have acceptance rates either meeting or surpassing the overall global average of 73 per cent.
Interestingly, the one exception is WEOG. This is perhaps due to its member states receiving a modestly greater number of recommendations than the average global percentage of Categories 3 and 5 recommendations, which carried with them lower acceptance rates that recommendations in Categories 1, 2 and 4.
Graph 14 shows that autocracies have somewhat lower rates of acceptance of recommendations than anacra-cies, which in turn have slightly lower acceptance rates than democracies. The three regions are compared in
this graph because they contain a range of different re-gime types while GRULAC and WEOG mostly consist of democracies.
An interesting subject for further research is the extent to which states themselves adhere to or implement rec-ommendations they make to others? In other words, is there a marked disconnect from what they are recom-mending and what they do themselves at home? This is beyond the scope of the current study, but limited re-search suggests that states may tend to stay relatively more silent on subjects regarding which they themselves are the object of recommendations. With only a couple of exceptions, for example, states which were the object of recommendations regarding freedom of association did not make such recommendations themselves.30
5. Conclusions
The first cycle of the UPR has resulted in many positive elements. To begin with, states appear to care about the process and how their performance is reflected through it. State participation has been excellent, with quasi-universal participation of states in submitting written national reports, and 80 per cent of states having been represented at at least the Ministerial level at the »inter-active dialogue« stage of the review process.
The UPR has also resulted in many cases of heightened communication and dialogue between governments and non-state actors. It has also created a baseline set of documentation. In addition to reports summarizing information received from stakeholders, NGOs and na-tional human rights institutions in preparation for each country’s review before the Council, states have had to go on record regarding their human rights performance through the preparation of their national reports (which can be accessed at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBod-ies/UPR/Pages/Documentation.aspx). The UPR has also become an important tool for identifying areas where technical assistance and capacity building is needed.
In some cases the prospect of an upcoming review serves as an incentive for states to ratify more human rights treaties or to extend an invitation to the special
30. Two states which did, Azerbaijan and the Democratic People’s Repu-blic of Korea, made the recommendations to Armenia and the RepuRepu-blic of Korea respectively, states with which they have been in conflict.
procedures of the HRC. The UPR has also triggered self-evaluations by states, with the prospect of a future re-view before the Council leading many states to engage in a process of internal review and inter-ministerial dis-cussion.31
In addition, some diplomats and observers of the UPR process suggest that unlike the other HRC functions – and the UN General Assembly – the UPR process is not principally regionally driven; that states make their recom-mendations largely on an individual basis. And in some significant ways the UPR is utilized in an apparently uni-form fashion. For example, the distribution of recommen-dations by SuR region shows that all regions receive rec-ommendations in close proportion to their membership in the U.N. It is also clear that in all regions most recom-mendations received fall into wither Categories 4 or 5.
And the popularity of Category 4 recommendations is cross-regional in nature. If this dynamic deepens it could help lead to a diminution of the regional bloc dynamic which has tended to create blockages in global relations, especially in universal fora such as the United Nations.
The analysis contained here, however, also reflects that in important ways the UPR still functions through a regional prism. Analysis of the recommendations demonstrates that patterns exist reflecting the polarized nature of the contemporary international community, and different ap-proaches to dealing with human rights issues. Frankly put, states in Asia and Africa tend to take a softer approach to addressing human rights issues amongst themselves. This is clearly depicted, for example, in the results of China’s review. That state accepted all 41 of Asia and Africa’s rec-ommendations, 38 of which fell into Categories 1, 2 and 4. By contrast, China only accepted eight of WEOG’s 69 recommendations, two-thirds of which were in Catego-ries 3 and 5. This may represent a desire on the part of African and Asian states either not to antagonize China or it may represent a less confrontational cultural orientation with a fellow state still seen to have much in common with developing nations.
Closer examination of this situation, however, yields some grounds for optimism. In recent decades the expansion of democracy around the world presents a
31. Joanna Harrington (2012): UN Human Rights Council Brings to an End the First Cycle for Universal Periodic Review, EJIL Analysis, http://
www.ejiltalk.org/un-human-rights-council-brings-to-an-end-the-first-cycle-for-universal-periodic-review/.
possibility of more concerted and stronger approaches to protection and promotion of human rights in fora such as the HRC, including the UPR. For example, the Latin American region finds itself in-between WEOG on the one hand, and Asia and Africa on the other, in how its member states utilize the UPR. EEG data is somewhat consonant with that of WEOG. Both the GRULAC and EEG regions demonstrate that respect for human rights is not the preserve of any one geographic region. GRULAC, for example, can be generally consid-ered »southern« as a result of its colonial heritage and role in the global economy, while its stance on human rights reflects greater consonance with WEOG’s inter-pretation of the universal nature of human rights. This has useful policy implications in that GRULAC could play a greater leadership role in creating common pur-pose among states from different regional groups.
We have also sought to identify a range of issues which demonstrate both the fashion in which states acted along regionally-oriented lines, and differences and similarities between regions. Through the presentation of data on UPR performance related to levels of democ-racy and freedom by state within regions, we see that in Africa, Asia and the EEG regions more democratic states are more willing to both make and accept more action-oriented recommendations. The overwhelming percentage of Category 5 recommendations come, for example, from countries that are rated as democratic in the Polity IV database.32 This suggests that should the number of democratic states increase around the world, the robust use of international human rights procedures such as the UPR should also increase, notwithstanding regional dynamics in Africa and Asia which have tended to emphasize national sovereignty over the application of universal values.
We have previously noted that WEOG, GRULAC and Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic from the EEG region combined for three-quarters of all Category 5 recommendations, even though they only account for about one-third of the U.N. membership. By contrast Asia, Africa and the remainder of EEG states combined for only one-quarter of these recommendations while they consist of about two-thirds of the U.N.
member-32. There are several democracy assessment methodologies which could have been used here but the widely referenced and utilized Polity IV methodology provides an aggregated scale which was appropriate for this research.
ship. The number of rejections of WEOG Category 5 recommendations was high for Africa, Asia and GRU-LAC, and lower for EEG and WEOG. These data reflect regional differences in approach to the UPR.
So the jury is still out. Many states, especially in the south, continue to conflate the concept of »coopera-tion« with only praise or positive statements regarding the conduct of other states. This is especially true for states with significant political, policy or other affinities or interests in common. States thus have a tendency to ignore or downplay poor human rights situations in cer-tain other states. The UPR’s second cycle will be a key test of whether greater discipline can be exercised. The review of China, for example, will be closely watched to see if it proves merely to be a repetition of soft rec-ommendations on the part of many African and Asian states which largely ignore that state’s limitations on hu-man rights. More generally, the extent to which second cycle recommendations will follow-up on those made in the first cycle will be an indicator of sustained attention and focus on addressing key human rights issues.
The long-term success of the HRC will depend upon states being able to recognize that criticism, including that emanating from the UPR process, can be a com-ponent of cooperation. Otherwise, there would be little likelihood of making progress.
The overall results of this analysis suggest that while the UPR’s support may be broad, it is not necessarily deep in terms of creating a more robust mechanism. Many states may feel that they have to »go along« with it, but they are either sceptical of its impact or, on the oth-er hand, may fear it and have little intoth-erest in seeing it further develop. The job of reforming the HRC is thus one of working from the inside, and strengthening both specific functions such as the UPR and more generally shoring up the supporting constituency within the U.N.
Given the consensus-based nature of the UN HRC deci-sion-making process, it is not surprising that it is evolu-tionary rather than revoluevolu-tionary in nature. To develop and successfully implement a strategy for enhancing the UPR with increased ability to effectively promote and protect human rights globally is a sensitive and delicate task, which must be done very carefully. It must take into account the multi-polar context in which the various regional groupings hold veto power.
The process has worked imperfectly but it does have some positive results to date and represents real poten-tial for further institutionalizing respect for human rights in state norms and practices. While the UPR appears to be unlikely to be a total failure, it is important to be alert to the »emperor wears no clothes« syndrome, which demonstrates that simply wishing something to be the case does not make it so.
This report concludes on a more general note. Interna-tional organization peer reviews such as the UPR take place in context of greater global respect for human rights as reflected, for example, in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. R2P includes a »hard«, top-down inter-national community-based approach while peer reviews embrace a »soft«, bottom-up and state-centric ethos.
R2P represents »tough love« while peer reviews take the opposing bookend of a participatory, less critical ap-proach to nurturing human rights. Both, however, can enmesh states within the dynamic of heightened respect for universal human rights norms and reflect moves to adopt more flexible interpretations of the national sover-eignty concept. R2P has focused on international action in the face of egregious violations of human rights and enforcement of universal norms.
By contrast, peer reviews reflect a consensual approach, chipping away at the national sovereignty argument, and over less egregious issues than those addressed by R2P.
Peer review mechanisms may strengthen R2P by deter-ring future human rights abuses, thus minimizing the need for R2P military intervention. These complementary approaches can serve an important purpose in helping to stitch human rights and related norms into the fabric of governance.
6. Recommendations
Based on the experience of the UPR over the first cycle, there are a range of recommendations that can be iden-tified which could help to further strengthen the UPR mechanism. They could contribute to ensuring its long-term role as in important instrument in the mainstream-ing of universal human rights norms into regular state practice. Most of these recommendations do not require additional reform or review; they could simply be imple-mented by voluntary state practice within existing rules.
An illustrative list could include the following:
n Heighten Engagement of NGOs. Continued emphasis and attention must be placed on providing an enabling environment in which NGOs can provide their input into the various stages of the UPR process. These range from having a meaningful and substantive role in the prepa-ration of the national report, having a recognized role in the Geneva country review process, and engaging in oversight of SuR state compliance with accepted recom-mendations subsequent to the review.
n Emphasize the Role of NHRIs. There are also a number of reforms that can be taken to strengthen the role of NHRIs, including the development of further judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms to enhance their independ-ence, dedicated funding streams that are not subject to political manipulation; more frequent visits and in-teraction with mandate holders from international and regional human rights mechanisms; and expansion of the practice of issuing shared reports and coordinating follow up recommendations.
n Provide more action-oriented Recommendations. Ver-ifiable and concrete recommendations must be at the core of the UPR process. Non-specific recommendations give great latitude to SuRs to define how they are to be achieved, which can serve to undermine the utility and impact of the recommendations.
n Emphasize Second Cycle Follow-Up. Recommend-ing states should, in the second cycle, make as needed follow-up recommendations to those posed in the first round, and not simply duplicate recommendations from their first review.
n Make meaningful mid-term reporting the norm. In line with strengthened follow-up procedures, the proc-ess to institutionalize mid-terms reports two years after the country review should be accelerated. An increasing number of states are doing so even though it is not a mandatory practice, and was not included in the original precepts establishing the UPR.33 It is now commonly rec-ognized that mid-term reports allow for states to high-light progress, and to note challenges in the implemen-tation of their accepted recommendations. It can also permit consideration by the state and the international
33. In Lebanon, for example, NGOs created an implementation calendar covering the 4 years to the next UPR review. They have established a joint NGO-government committee which oversees implementation and facilitates periodic reporting back to the HRC.
community of ways that compliance can be enhanced prior to SuR’s second cycle review four years after the initial one took place.
n Promote serious and sustained SuR engagement. For example, SuRs should avoid to the extent possible ac-cepting recommendations on the basis that what they are already doing is being requested.
n Promote serious and sustained SuR engagement. For example, SuRs should avoid to the extent possible ac-cepting recommendations on the basis that what they are already doing is being requested.