• 沒有找到結果。

The impact of Taiwan’s democratic experience on the Chinese intellectuals As a Chinese society, Taiwan’s democratic experience has a long impact on the

Taiwan’s Impact on China: draft programme

II. The impact of Taiwan’s democratic experience on the Chinese intellectuals As a Chinese society, Taiwan’s democratic experience has a long impact on the

mainlanders’ understanding of democracy. The influence from the island can at least date back to the mid 1980s when the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was first established, a watermark of Taiwan’s democratic transition. Quite a few liberal intellectuals then used the case of Taiwan to justify their arguments that the mainland deserves a similar process of political democratization. This, of course, was not the standard official point of view then. Typically, Taiwanese democratization has been since the 1990s understood by the Chinese government as a movement related to Taiwan’s separation from the mainland. The image of Taiwanese democracy was also conveyed to the public as political corruption, social chaos and other negative

phenomena. Limited exchanges between the two sides, plus the growing assertive Taiwanese identity, have contributed to many mainlanders’ misperception of liberal democracy. When democracy and national unification have been put on the same equation, the mainlanders tend to trade democracy for unification. Ironically, the sentiment of Taiwan independence released by democratic process has served as an antidote against the potential peaceful evolution on the mainland. For many

mainlanders, Lee Teng-hui’s speech at the Cornell University was something more to do with Taiwan independence than with democratic value, despite the populist flavor in the topic of his speech—“What People Want is Always in My Mind.” Similar, Chen Shui-bian’s slogan of “Taiwan stands up” in his inauguration speech of May 20th of 2000 was equaled to an advocacy of Taiwanese independence, and has nothing to do with whatever democratic value he might have tried to convey in the wake of the first power turnover on the island.

The second power turnover in Taiwan in 2008, however, was positively covered by the media in the Chinese mainland. Many KMT celebrities were interviewed by Channel Four of Chinese Central Television (CCTV), including Wu Po-hsiung (June 2, 2008), Hau Lung-bin (June 29, 2008), Jason Hu (July 7, 2008), Chou Hsi-wei (July 15, 2008), Wu Tun-yi (September 7, 2008), and Chu Li-lun (May 18, 2009). Since then, Taiwanese politician and media commentators have often appeared in the mainland’s TV programs. In addition, Taiwanese commentators, including Cheng You-ping, Chiang Min-chin, Lan Hsuan, Yin Nai-ching, Wang Hong-wei, etc., have become popular commentators in CCTV Channel Four since then. Although these people have to more or less adapt their comments to the political context of the mainland while in the Chinese media, their positive description of Taiwanese democratic politics, respect for popular votes, and acceptance of electoral outcomes have demonstrated to the mainlanders that democracy is a good thing per se.

Competitive elections can end corrupted politics, expose scandals of formal leaders, and make government accountable to the demand of the majority of the people—

improving cross-Taiwan Strait relations. In addition, Chinese intellectuals now can access the web side of some Taiwan-based newspapers, such as China Daily, United

Daily, and The Commons Daily, even though the pro-DPP newspaper, Liberty Times,

is still unavailable (except for a short period in 2008). More intellectuals on the mainland now feel democracy is good for Taiwan and for cross-Strait relations, in

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

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contract to their perception five year ago, and attribute their changing image of Taiwanese democracy to the openness of mass media.

One influential book titled “Taiwan’s Democratic Transition: Experience and Inspiration” has highlighted the changing perception of Chinese intellectuals

regarding Taiwan’s democratic experience. The book was co-authored by Professor Chu Yan-han of National Taiwan University, as well as other distinguished scholars on Taiwan, with a section for special discussion with mainland scholars.13 The perspectives of mainland’s scholars are more relevant here for the sake of this paper.

For example, Yang Guangbin of Renmin University of China argues that Taiwan’s democratic transition with political interaction between the ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and the opposition force (dangwai) has demonstrated a

successful process under one party rule. According to Yang, the mainland may follow Taiwan’s trajectory to first ensure people’s economic rights (prior to 2003), then social rights (between 2003 and 2023), and finally political rights (after 2023).14 It is interesting to note that this timeframe is similar to Larry Diamond’s prediction that the Chinese mainland may move into an uncertain democratization process after 2022 (see footnote 2). In a similar vein, Yu Jianrong contends that political development in Taiwan’s grassroots society is most relevant to the mainland. Internet has created a space for netizens to share their common identity and political values. The “web identity,” as Yu put it, has replaced the command chain of formal organization. For the mainland, Yu argues, political development should start from two steps. The first is to ensure local judicial independence. According to Yu, grassroots court should enjoy its autonomy inmanaging personnel and financial affairs, and the intermediate court should be independent from party and government at the same level. The second is to reform the system of people’s congress through competitive elections. Just like Taiwan’s political transition that started with election at the county level, the

mainland can set political reform at the central level as the last step.15 Li Luqu of East China University of Politics and Law argues that democratizations in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore have indicated that Confucius society can accept modern democratic culture and plural political institutions. According to Li, among East Asian countries and areas, there are two democratization models. One is represented by Taiwan, South Korea and Philippine.

Their political transitions fit with typical transition model in late developed areas described by Western political scientists. Another model is represented by Singapore and Malaysia that have experienced intra-system democratization. The regime has to inject modernity and competition factors into itself in order to conserve Confucius and authoritarian framework. The fact that Singapore and Taiwan, the two typically Confucian societies among others, followed different democratization trajectories invalidates the assumed impossibility of Confucian society to accommodate liberal democratization. Li recognizes that Taiwan’s political transition, like other cases in East Asia, has demonstrated the problem of unfitness between modern democratic spirit and Chinese traditional culture, resulting in constant social and political fissure and conflict. The common phenomena of patron-client politics, traditional family and faction politics, ethnic conflicts, and informal rule that constrained people’s behavior                                                                                                                

13 Chu Yunhan, Taiwan Minzhu Zhuanxing de Jingyan yu Qishi [Taiwan’s Democratic Transition: Experience and Inspiration] (Beijing: shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [Social Sciences Literature Press], 2012). It is worthy to know that most part of this book had been completed before 2009, but it didn’t go to press until three years later.

14 Yang Guangbin, “Taiwan minzhuhua zhuanxing de lujing yilai”[Path Dependency in Taiwan’s Democratic Transition], Taiwan’s Democratic Transition: Experience and Inspiration, pp. 233-236.

15 Yu Jianrong, “Wangle de rentong chaochu zuzhi de mingling”[Shared Identity in the Web Overtakes the Command Chain in the Organization], Taiwan’s Democratic Transition: Experience and Inspiration, pp. 237-239.

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beyond formal law and regulation, have all indicated the conflict between tradition and modernity. Diffusion of modern culture and rise of middle class, however, are the main forces pushing for political democratization, regardless of the degree of the influence of Confucianism and the specific model of democratization (whether they have transferred into a new regime or not). 16 One may disagree with Li’s argument that Singaporean model in modern society is qualified as democracy. His point, however, is the comparability of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, suggesting the two sides will move toward the same direction, even together with some other countries in East Asia.

Li Fan of Institution of China and World Studies agrees that Taiwan’s democratic experience has significant influence on the mainland’s democratization. During the process of China’s reunification demanded by the central government on the mainland, the mainlanders cannot help but wondering why Taiwan can practice democracy featured by party competition and political liberty but not the mainland. After all, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are both Chinese societies influenced by Confucian traditional. According to Li, yet, democratization on the mainland will be greatly different from what has happened in Taiwan. Taiwan’s democratic transition started from authoritarian regime, while the mainland will begin with the movement away from totalitarianism. Regime difference has caused different types of transition, including various paths, strategies, and process of institution building. As for one party system, Taiwan as well as Mexico started from authoritarian rule and the party that promoted democratic transition had chances to come back to power;

democratization in the totalitarian one party system, however, often resulted in institutional collapse and few former ruling parties could come back to power.

Transition away from an authoritarian society can relieve the ruling party’s concern with the process of democratization, whereas transition away from totalitarian regime will end it a warning signal. The mainland, Li continues, may take a new transitory path different from the two trajectories mentioned above, but it can learn some good lessons from the two transitory paths. In short, the mainland will take a long way toward democracy and the initiative stage will take very long time with a lot of blockage and problems and unpredictable future.17

This doesn’t suggest that Chinese intellectuals have all taken competitive elections for granted. For some, political consultation can substitute for competitive elections as a way of reflecting the will of the people in a harmonious way. For others, China can achieve good governance mainly through the rule of law. In general, the Chinese scholars on the mainland believe democracy and the rule of law are good things, while keeping some reservation on the value of free elections. Economist Zhang Weiying of Peking University appreciates Taiwan’s experience of initiating economic liberalization before political democratization. According to Zhang,

Taiwan’s government has offered a living space and free market for entrepreneurs, in addition to other active functions it played in the island’s economic development.

While entrepreneurship has provided an incentive for democracy, China has a long tradition of meritocracy. Thus, how to combine democratization with elitism is a new issue to be explored. Zhang argues that it may be difficult to adopt Taiwan’s elective                                                                                                                

16 Li Luqu, “Dongya liangzhong zhengzhi fazhan moshi de bijiao fenxi”[A Comparative Analysis of Two Politically Developmental Models in East Asia], Xinshiye [New Vision], 2011, No. 1, pp.30-32.

17 Li Fan and Huang Xiaomei, “dalu yu Taiwan minzhuhua zhi butong”[Difference between the Mainland and Taiwan in Democratization], paper delivered to a conference “A Comparison between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait in Political Development: Performance, Development and Trend” hosted by Taiwan Chengchi University, October 17, 2012; posted on the Web of Institution of World and China Studies, Background and Analysis, No. 312, http://www.world-china.org/newsdetail.asp?newsid=3697 (2013-01-24) [2013-05-10].

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politics on the mainland at the initiative stage of democratization. Rather, Hong Kong’s election featured by functional groups may be more relevant to the mainland in the future.18 In a similar way, sociologist Qiu Zeqi of Peking University argues that Chinese traditional politics was featured by expectation for a good emperor, rather than normal party politics. Qiu is wondering what are the social conditions for electoral democracy and how to guarantee the rights and benefits of the majority people. According to him, democracy is a political issue per se, but in Taiwan it has become a technical issue during the transformation of political institution and party system. In the United States, political position is more important than practical issues and party has its own belief and political integrity. By contrast, political vision is subject to short-term practical issues for maximizing votes in Taiwan. According to Qiu, it is important to ensure fair and participatory democratic spirit. If citizens’

electoral rights have been distorted as purchasable goods (votes) of political parties, election will be disgraced as a purely political take and give, resulted in political opportunism. Thus, the mainland should learn from the United States, Australia, and Sweden to maintain the core value of democracy, rather than evolving in interest-oriented competition among different forces and factions with political brand name.19 Both Zhang and Qiu take a cautious position on the relevance of Taiwan’s democratic experience to the mainland. Their reservation, however, is based on the different stages of democratization between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait or the poor performance of Taiwan’s democracy compared with Western democracies.

Democracy and rule of law are the two sides of the same coin. Some law professors and experts have also taken Taiwan’s experience in search for the

mainland’s legal and political reforms. As Si Weijiang contends, legal reform on the mainland cannot proceed with political reform. As a matter of fact, judicial reform per se is part of political reform. According to Si, Taiwan’s abolishment of the Martial Law and other legal articles that prohibit the establishment of new parties is the precondition for political reform.20 Liu Jianhong of Chungcheng University in Taiwan has published a paper on the relevance of Taiwan’s Administrative Procedure Law to the drafting of the same law in the mainland. This paper was published in the Journal of Ganshu Administration University (No. 4, 2011) and posed on the Web of

Government under Rule of Law, China University of Political Science and Law. Its main argument is that Taiwan’s Administrative Procedure Law is the product of the spirit of democracy and rule of law. According to Taiwan’s experience, whether or not such a law can be made and enforced depends greatly on the attitude of

administrative departments. Only when civil servants realize that the administrative procedure law can not only guarantees human rights in general, but also protects the interest of civil servants in particular, free them of injustice pressure, can the

administrative departments wholeheartedly accept the administrative procedure law.21                                                                                                                

18 Zhang Weiying, “Jingji ziyouhua ying zai minzhuhua zhiqian”[Economic Liberalization Should Take Place before Political Democratization], Taiwan’s Democratic Transition: Experience and Inspiration, pp. 227-232.

19 Qiu Zeqi, “Taiwan xuanju yinfa de sikao”[Some Thoughts Stimulated by Taiwan’s Election], Taiwan’s Democratic Transition: Experience and Inspiration, pp.245-252.

20 Si Weijiang, “Taiwan sifa gaige jingyan dui dalu de jiejian yiyi”[Meanings of Taiwan’s Experience in Legal Reform for the Mainland]. Gongshi Wang [Consensus Web],

http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/thyj/article_201001204492.html (2010-01-20)[2013-05-15].

21 Liu Jianhong, “Taiwan “xingzheng chengxufa zhiding gongbu shinian zhi shishi jingyan: wei dalu xingzheng chengxufa qicao gongzuo tigong jiejian”[The Enforcement Experience of Taiwan’s Administrative Procedure Law after It Was Made and Issued Ten Years Ago: A Relevant Reference to the Mainland in Drafting Administrative Procedure Law], Ganshu Administration University, No. 4, 2011;Zhongguo zhengfa daxue fazhi zhengfuwang [Web of Government under Rule of Law, China University of Political Science and Law],

http://law.china.cn/features/2011-09/22/content_4499207.htm (2011-09-22)[2013-05-10].

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Law Professor Xu Zhangrun of Qinghua University gives a high evaluation of legal studies in Taiwan. Xu notes that a unique phenomenon in the mainland’s law studies and teaching during the early and middle 1980s was the diffusion into the mainland of the works by Taiwan’s law scholars, whose fresh works were

comprehensively read by their counterparts in the mainland. This was in great contrast with the situation before 1979 when the two sides as the same Chinese nation were unfortunately subject to military tension and political hostility. According to Xu, Taiwan was a small island compared with the mainland; from the geographical, economic, political and military perspectives, the so-called two sides of the Taiwan Strait are asymmetric and therefore the “two sides” not an exact term to conceptualize their relations. In addition, Taiwan’s population of 23 millions was only a small portion of 1.3 billion Chinese people. Just because of the Cold War between the capitalist camp led by the United States and socialist camp led by the former Soviet Union, Taiwan gained its strategic importance in the game of great powers. However, Taiwan’s true leverage in cross-strait relations does not lie in its economic miracle, advanced weapons, or foreign support, but its political culture and legal system that will contribute to the development toward constitutional democracy -- based on economic and social developments -- on the mainland. Xu is happy to see that the historical isolation of Taiwan from the mainland has contributed to the plural development of Chinese civilization to some degree. Once the communication channels between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are open, each side can cultivate the other side with its own wisdom in life. Such a cultural pluralism is originated from different social environments of the two sides and will lead to the enrichment of Chinese civilization. Xu recognizes that law studies in Taiwan are the continuity and development of the mainstream of Chinese legal tradition that can trace back to the political reform in the late years of Qing dynasty. By contrast, the legal system on the mainland started from the revolutionary practice in the regions controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. This legal system, following the experience of Soviet Union and guided by Marxist doctrine of class struggle, emphasizes simplicity and convenience to the people. Both systems are chosen by different groups of the people during the large-scale social and cultural transition in modern China, thus,

demonstrating different patterns of westernization. According to Xu, different legal systems on the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau have demonstrated the openness and creativity of Chinese civilization. Modern Chinese legal civilization, as opposed to moral civilization and religious civilization in the history, is the direction of future development for the Chinese people. 22

III. Conclusion

Taiwan’s economic miracle, relatively equal distribution of income, social autonomy and plurality, democratic transition with political stability and effective governance, and peaceful development of cross-strait relations, have all positive impacts on the relevance of Taiwan’s experience to the mainland. The acceptance of Taiwan’s successful experience in creating economic miracle on the part of

mainland’s intellectuals has increased gradually over years. The book compiled by Yi Gang has demonstrated a departure from earlier reserved viewpoints represented by Li Jiaquan. One should keep in mind the group of Chinese economists led by Yi Gang                                                                                                                

22 Xu Zhangrun, “Duoxiangdu de xiandai hanyu wenming falü zhihui: Taiwan de faxue yanjiu duiyu zuguo dalu tonghang de yingxiang”[Multi-dimensional Wisdom in Modern Chinese Legal Civilization: Influence of Law Studies in Taiwan on Law Profession in the Mainland], http://www.papersbar.cn/news/20065/show31693.htm [2013-05-10].

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once studied in the United States had more opportunities to learn about Taiwan’s development -- thanks to their group-visiting to the island back in the early or mid-1990s -- than their counterparts on the mainland then.

Meanwhile, the knowledge and acceptance of Taiwan’s experience in social, legal and democratic development have also gradually expanded among Chinese intellectuals on the mainland. The image of Taiwan’s democracy was damaged by the quality of democratic process on the island for some years, including political

corruption and “black gold”, endless boycott as well as occasional fighting in the legislative organ, and ineffective of the minority government under the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Increasing Taiwanese identity and

movement toward independence have also aroused great concerned among Chinese

movement toward independence have also aroused great concerned among Chinese