CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES
B. TYPOLOGIES FOR REFUGEES
Borrowing from analytical liberalism and constructivism, it would be possible to have a better understanding of refugee movements in the Southeast Asian context because: a) Southeast Asian refugee flows have been heavily tied with non-state actors (constructivism) and national/domestic policies (analytical liberalism), b) responses from ASEAN member states towards different refugee crises from the 1970s to the present have greatly varied (constructivism) particularly since the membership to the ASEAN, the drafting of the AHRD in 2012, and internal pressures from interest groups (constructivism and analytical liberalism). Due to the nature of the two mentioned theories, units of analysis are both refugees (individuals/groups) and states.
B. Typologies for Refugees
The uniqueness of Southeast Asian refugee flows is geopolitical in nature. Stories of persecution are considerably territorially confined within the national limits, except for periods when waves of political ideologies influenced multiple countries, as was the case in the aftermath of the Vietnam War on 1975.32 Sweeping victories of the Communist regime in Indochina displaced urban populations to the countryside, many of which became refugees that fled to Thailand. Throughout the course of this period until the 1990s, several waves of refugees from the region would flee to Southeast Asia, finding asylum in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Hong Kong, until the United States and other Northern states accommodate them as a third country. Given the similarity of origins of refugees at any given period of movement, identifying them according to categories help make distinctions and analysis clearer.
Egon Kunz (1981) developed a scheme of categorizing refugees based on their circumstances and attachment to their former home country. He elaborates that regardless of whether or not a refugee voluntarily left or is an exile, his relationship to his former home country’s population can be categorized as:
a. Majority-identified refugees – are those with shared opposition to events with the majority of compatriots, identifying with the rest of the population but not the government.
32 Millions of refugees came flocking to Southeast Asian countries from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the 1970s.
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due to past events which may or may not include discrimination. These refugees have previously desired to be recognized as part of the nation but were rejected by the nation, or smaller sections of its society.Examples of these are people belonging to specific faiths, cultural groups/minorities. Unique to this category of refugees is that the idea of returning to their former home country is rarely considered due to past events that contributed to their situation.
c. Self-alienated refugees – are exiles who have completely dissociated themselves with both the citizens and the government of their former home country, save for the attachment to "panoramic aspects" of their homeland.
This categorization has helped shed light on the movement of refugees according to their attitudes toward being displaced and other contributing factors in a host country such as cultural compatibility, policies that had an effect on population, and social receptiveness. Kunz33 argued that opportunities afforded by societies to refugees are highly dependent on their characteristics (i.e., being multi-ethnic, pluralistic, etc.).
Furthermore, he notes that states in their developmental stages are less likely to manifest discriminatory behaviour, with their social order being more fluid.
Another slant to the study of refugee movements is represented in the work of Russell King on “Theories and Typologies of Migration”34 where he points out the different trajectories of migrants as:
a. between two countries (A↔B), where migrants may choose to permanently settle in a new country, or eventually return to the homeland;
b. onward migration (A → B → C), where migrants move to a succeeding country after previously relocating (e.g., Somalian migrants in the Netherlands who moved to the U.K.); and
33 Egon F Kunz, "Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory," International Migration Review (1981):
42-51.
34 King, 7-9.
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17 c. transit migration (A→X→B), where migrants have to go through intervening countries before finally settling (e.g.,
sub-Saharan migrants entering Europe).
His interpretation of migration trajectories is particularly useful in the assessment of the case of Southeast Asian refugees as it properly categorizes them based on their respective resettlement/relocation behaviour. In fact, this model can aptly accommodate all major refugee crises in the region.
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18 C. Southeast Asia’s Refugees
Southeast Asia's growing influence and success roots from the region's rich cultural backgrounds. However, the problem with this diversity is visible in the difficulty of forming concrete decisions as the requirement is to arrive at a consensus on all issues. This requirement’s implication is significant as any well-meaning proposal that has the potential of benefiting the ASEAN as a whole can be easily shot down by a single negative vote.35 It also proves to be difficult or nearly impossible to pressure member states into recasting a vote to reach a consensus given “The ASEAN Way” of doing things. ASEAN member states operate under the Association's six fundamental principles declared in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)36:
Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nation;
The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner;
Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
Effective co-operation among themselves (member states).
Given this set of fundamental principles, it has been challenging for the Association to pressure its members on certain key issues, one of which is on the increasing problem on irregular migrants and/or refugees, the bulk of which had been from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos from 1970s to the 1990s,37 and Myanmar in more recent years.
35 Simon SC Tay, Jesus P Estanislao, and Hadi Soesastro, Reinventing Asean, vol. 228 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 281.
36 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)
37 Steenhuisen, B. (2005). Last Vietnamese boat refugee leaves Malaysia. Retrieved June 26, 2010 from http://www.UNHCR.org/43141e9d4.html.
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Refugee Statistics: Originating vs. Residing*
Originating Residing
*As of June 2015
Recent developments on refugee issues in Southeast Asia have mainly been limited to lesser developed countries as both origin and asylum. The following had been published in the Human Rights Watch World Report of 2016:
Cambodia38
Since late 2014, a wave of Montagnard ethnic minority asylum seekers from Vietnam has arrived in Cambodia. Most of them practice forms of Christianity that Vietnamese authorities characterize as "evil way" religion. In early 2015, Cambodia recognized 13 as refugees but refused to allow more than 300 other Montagnards to register as asylum seekers. At least 54 were summarily returned to Vietnam in violation of the Refugee Convention, while those remaining in Cambodia faced the threat of similar deportation, and some decided their best option was to return "voluntarily" to Vietnam.
In June 2015, the government implemented a deal with Australia to resettle some of the refugees held on the island of Nauru, but conditions for refugees in Cambodia were so inadequate that only four refugees agreed to relocate. In September, one of the four decided to leave Cambodia.
38 Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Cambodia
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rescuing boatloads of ethnic Rohingya from Burma and Bangladesh stranded at sea for weeks on poorly provisioned, unseaworthy vessels. Although Indonesia agreed to bring rescued asylum seekers and migrants ashore, it said that they would only be sheltered temporarily and would need to be resettled to third countries after a year.As of August, there were 13,110 refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia, all living in legal limbo because Indonesia is not a party to the Refugee Convention and lacks an asylum law. This included 1,095 children detained in immigration centers, of which 461 were unaccompanied minors.
Malaysia40
The discovery of mass graves on the Thai-Malaysia border containing the remains of suspected victims of trafficking highlights the continuing problem of trafficking in Malaysia. Approximately 99 bodies, many reportedly ethnic Rohingya from Burma, were found in May, and another 24 graves were discovered in August.
Little information has been made public about progress in identifying and investigating suspects involved in these trafficking camps or government officials who may have aided and abetted operations.
Myanmar (Burma)41
The maritime exodus of Rohingya Muslims dramatically increased in 2015, with Rohingya families departing from Burma and Bangladesh on smuggling vessels, at times joined by large numbers of Bangladeshi migrant workers. An estimated 94,000 people fled between January 2014 and May 2015, of which some had fallen prey to smugglers. Those who took to boats to reach Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia were initially refused entry but were eventually given temporary shelter by the latter two after intensive international media coverage and pressure.
39 Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Indonesia
40 Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Malaysia
41 Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Burma
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An estimated 110,000 refugees who fled Burma during decades of civil war remain in nine camps in northwest Thailand. UNHCR, international and national nongovernmental organizations, and the Thai government continue to discuss a plan for voluntary repatriation of members of this group. Refugees continue to express concerns about insufficient participation in planning for their return and the uncertain security situation in Burma, including the prevalence of land mines in some of the areas to which they may return.Thailand42
Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
Asylum seekers are treated by Thai authorities as illegal migrants, and subject to arrest and deportation.
In May 2015, Thai authorities discovered at least 30 bodies at an abandoned human trafficking camp in Songkhla province close to the Thai-Malaysian border.
Police reports indicated the dead were ethnic Rohingya from Burma and Bangladesh who starved to death or died from abuses or disease while held by traffickers who were awaiting ransom payments before smuggling them into Malaysia. On May 22, Thailand hosted an international meeting to address the thousands of Rohingya asylum seekers and migrants stranded at sea in small boats, but, unlike Malaysia and Indonesia, refused to work with UNHCR to conduct refugee status determination screenings or set up temporary shelters for those rescued.
Despite the peril faced by those on the boats, Thai authorities regularly took action to prevent boats carrying Rohingya from landing in Thailand. On many occasions, boats were intercepted and pushed back to sea after receiving rudimentary humanitarian assistance and supplies from Thai authorities.
Vietnam43
Vietnam maintained close security ties with Cambodia, despite some border friction between the two countries. Vietnam successfully pressured Cambodia to refuse
42 Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Thailand
43 Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Vietnam
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to register hundreds of Vietnamese Montagnards as asylum seekers and to return dozens of Montagnards back to Vietnam where many have been subjected to persecution.The condition and status of contemporary refugees in Southeast Asia is reflective of a recurring truth so common among the ten ASEAN member states. While reports show a more tolerant and accommodating response from refugee-hosting countries in the region, there remains to be the lack of a legal framework to process inbound or newly arrived refugees44 as evident in Thailand. In 2012, however, attempts to institutionalize human rights offered a better opportunity for asylum seekers to afford rights despite their condition through the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD).
The provisions of the document pertain to perceived basic rights to life, civil and political rights, employment, education and personal development among others.
The status of a refugee’s application rests on the laws of destination states. This is evidenced by the prioritization of "national interests of governments" as argued by Petcharamesree.45 True enough, responses to the refugee issue vary across Southeast Asia: tolerance with a degree of protection (Indonesia), labelled as "illegal" (Malaysia), registered and granted camp residence (Thailand),46 processed and granted asylum (Philippines, ao 2012)47, and refused (Singapore)48 among others. While Southeast Asian states may have different approaches individually49, refugees are collectively referred to as “irregular migrants” in the ASEAN.
Under the AHRD, refugees [in theory] are afforded the following rights:
freedom of movement, right to seek asylum, right to a nationality, right to work, right to education. The AHRD provisions on the right to development (Article 35) and the right to peace (Article 38) are by far the most novel in comparison to other regional
44 MISS SARINYA MOOLMA, “Us Resettlement for Displaced Persons from Myanmar: Protection in a Protracted Refugee Situation in Mae La Shelter” (Chulalongkorn University, 2011), 4.
45 Sriprapha Petcharamesree, "The Asean Human Rights Architecture: Its Development and Challenges," (2013).
46 Susan Kneebone, "Comparative Regional Protection Frameworks for Refugees: Norms and Norm Entrepreneurs," The International Journal of Human Rights 20, no. 2 (2016).
47 Zebadiah Canero, "Timeline: Philippine Laws and Policies on Refugees," Rappler, 20 June 2015, accessed 29 August 2016, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/96929-timeline-philippine-law-policies-refugees.
48 Brian L Foster, “Ethnicity and Economy: The Case of the Mons in Thailand” (University of Michigan., 1972).
49 This is also reflected in news coverages by different media outfits across the ASEAN: (See The MalayMail Online vis-a-vis Inquirer.net; keywords: refugee, illegal migrants)
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novelty runs short as it is perceived to “limit accountability” for specific violations.50D. Push and Pull: Regional experience
In the general sense, push factors influence the departure of people from their lands of residence, often causing flight due to unstable political situations, degrading socio-economic conditions, lack of opportunities, and persistent military conflict in their origin communities. Inversely, pull factors are mostly seen as positive characteristics observed in destination country, “such as higher standard of living, employment opportunities, safety and freedom of expression.”51 Loescher further suggests that existing migrant networks within a prospective asylum country is also important in influencing mobilization among refugee groups.
Indochina States
A 1986 survey of Indochinese Refugees in Thailand52 conducted in the then existing refugee camps of Ban Vinai, Ban Napho, Khao I Dang and Phanat Nikhom, refugees attested that the main reason behind their departure was the worsening situation in their countries of origin. While the decision to flee was a personal choice for Kampucheans (Cambodians) and Laotians—in fear of possible punishment and insertion into seminar camps or be extrajudicially killed for dissent and/or non-cooperation, Vietnamese refugees were “persuaded” to relocate by friends and relatives who have earlier fled Vietnam and have later settled in refugee camps. Similarly, however, all three refugee groups expressed that the political situation was the same for all three home countries and freedom was hardly existent. Furthermore, the refugees in question were either reluctant to or skeptical about returning to their previous communities/country to resume their former lives as political situations continued to prove unfit to permit the return to normalcy.53
50 Katherine G Southwick, "Bumpy Road to the Asean Human Rights Declaration," (2013).
51 Gil Loescher, "Beyond Charity," International cooperation and the global refugee crisis (1993).
52 The respondents for the study were residing in clustered camps according to their ethnic groups:
Hmong (Ban Vinai), Laotian (Ban Napho), Kampuchean (Khao I Dang), and Vietnamese (Phanat Nikhom). Survey questions were divided into three parts 1) General background, 2) Migration circumstances, and 3) Resettlement to third countries where information about existing networks in a prospective country were supplied.
53 A. Pongsapit, and N. Chongwatta, "The Refugee Situation in Thailand," in Indochinese Refugees:
Asylum and Resettlement (Thailand: Chulalongkorn University, Institute of Asian Studies, 1988), 38-47.
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Differing from the example of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, Myanmar’s refugees were predominantly internally displaced people uprooted by the constant tug-of-war between insurgency and counterinsurgency movements.54 This insecurity derived from clashes in conflict areas have greatly put local communities at risk as civilians are caught in the crossfire, where they are identified by counterinsurgents as “potential collaborators or sympathizers” of militants. At the root of the refugee movement, causes of border crossings can be attributed to what displaced the people within the country, which Lang55 argues can be any of or a combination of the following:
1. Raids in villages believed to support insurgents’ cause, which sees the pilfering of local resources such as food supply, assets, and subjection of villagers to torture and execution;
2. Imposition of unjust levies, extortion, and demand for ransom;
3. Conscription of villagers for forced labor as porters for the military, inescapable unless payment is exacted in lieu of the service;56 and the
4. Forceful eviction and relocation of villages seen fit.
The case of non-Burmese (Burman) refugees that have moved into the camps across the Thai-Myanmar border show that proximity (and familiarity of terrain) is a major factor behind the decision to relocate. The fact that shared histories exist between some of Myanmar’s indigenous groups (e.g. Shan and Siamese) by virtue of traditional
“galactic polities” of satellite tributary states forming a state-patron nexus prior to the arrival of European colonizers, such cross-border migrations had been, in the past, treated with flexibility.57 Furthermore, some of Myanmar’s indigenous groups share a similar cultural background with their neighbors across the Thai-Myanmar border. As exemplified by the Mon people, it was possible to coexist in Thai villages bordering
54 Hazel J Lang, Fear and Sanctuary: Burmese Refugees in Thailand (SEAP Publications, 2002), 68-79.
55 Lang, 68.
56 Households in the Ye Pyu township were made to pay 200 kyats per month as porting charge, aside from the mandatory provision of six to fifteen laborers to port for Burmese troops. (Committee for the Promotion of People’s Struggle in Monland, 1995)
57 Victor B Lieberman, "Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma," Modern Asian Studies 12, no.
03 (1978): 458. Also, Robert E Elson, "International Commerce, the State and Society: Economic and Social Change," The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia 2, no. Part I (1992): 131-32.
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25 their state due to the similarity in livelihood practices, them being wet rice farmers.58 The existence of an established indigenous community comprised by Mon, Karen, and Tavoyan, as well as some Thais, which was the case for refugees settling in Wangka, Thailand, has been notably helpful in attracting newcomers. Places in Thailand like Wangka are considered to be “safe places to settle,” allowing even for the establishment of familiar industries or livelihood similar to what refugees left behind in Myanmar.59
58 Brian L Foster, Ethnicity and Economy: The Case of the Mons in Thailand (University of Michigan., 1972).
59 Lang, 136.
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The advantage of approaching the topic of refugee flows from the perspective of analytical liberalism is that it permits analysis to be done on two-levels, as opposed to other International Relations theories like neo-liberalism and liberal institutionalism whose assumptions apply only on the system-level. Constructivism, on the other hand, is known for being closer to neo-realism and liberal institutionalism in terms of levels of analysis being on the system-level, but has been adopted into this study due to the recent developments in its use for ontology studies60 by introducing non-state and transnational actors into the approach (e.g. NGOs, UNHCR). Constructivism is then seen to be more inclusive and dynamic, seeing that internationally occurring phenomena influences domestic politics and vice-versa.
60 Thomas Risse and Antje Wiener, "'Something Rotten'and the Social Construction of Social Constructivism: A Comment on Comments," Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 5 (1999).
International refugee movements transpire within a framework subject to international norms. However, it should be noted that flight happens only when push factors displace people and villages, making them vulnerable to a host of
International refugee movements transpire within a framework subject to international norms. However, it should be noted that flight happens only when push factors displace people and villages, making them vulnerable to a host of