科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告
期末報告
中國大陸多元管制體系之分析(第2年)
計 畫 類 別 ： 個別型計畫 計 畫 編 號 ： MOST 102-2410-H-004-161-MY2 執 行 期 間 ： 103年08月01日至104年11月30日 執 行 單 位 ： 國立政治大學政治學系 計 畫 主 持 人 ： 蔡中民 計畫參與人員： 碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：楊博智 報 告 附 件 ： 移地研究心得報告 出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文 處 理 方 式 ： 1.公開資訊：本計畫可公開查詢 2.「本研究」是否已有嚴重損及公共利益之發現：否 3.「本報告」是否建議提供政府單位施政參考：否中 華 民 國 105 年 02 月 29 日
中 文 摘 要 ： 本計劃以中國大陸經濟轉型過程中所形成的多元管制體系為主，旨 在回答一個對於了解 國家與市場間互動重要的問題：中國大陸多元管制體系形成的原因 為何？本計劃主張中國大 陸政府在發展管制體系時，考量的原則是該產業在國民經濟中的重 要性與該產業中國有企業 的比重，而非西方國家以產業特質為主的管制思維。亦即，各產業 經濟治理模式相異主要是 受到政治邏輯而非經濟邏輯的驅動。管制體系的制度設計與產業改 革的規劃密切相關，而產 業政策即為國家意志的展現。國有部門作為中國大陸特殊經濟體制 的核心要素，其規模的大 小也影響了該產業的治理模式。因此本研究計劃所欲驗證的研究假 設為：在維持宏觀經濟穩 定與國有部門優勢的前提下，中國大陸對於不同產業提出相異的改 革政策與保有程度不一的 國有企業，決定了對該產業的管制模式。本研究計劃的自變項是發 展產業政策與該產業中國 有企業的規模，因變項為各產業部門的管制體系，並佐以大量產業 個案研究。本計劃的重要 性有二：一、以實證資料檢證中國大陸多元管制體系的政治邏輯 ，提供理解中國大陸政經發 展一個新的分析途徑；二、挑戰目前西方文獻之主張並回應目前西 方學界對於中國大陸政治 經濟與政府管制議題的討論。 中 文 關 鍵 詞 ： 中國大陸、政府管制、政企關係、產業發展、經濟治理 英 文 摘 要 ： The project centers upon the development of multiple
regulatory mechanisms in China during economic transition. It aims to answer a fundamental question: what causes the various regulatory systems in China? The project argues that the development of regulatory systems in China is driven by the political concerns instead of economic considerations. The institutional designs of regulatory agencies reflect the industrial policies and SOE statuses. The hypothesis of this project is: the more closely the industry relates to the national economy and the greater proportion the SOEs occupy, the more specific the
regulatory model is.
Hence, we expect to have fewer regulatory agencies with concentrated authority. The state has not simply retreated and let the market operate freely. It has transformed into a referee and contributed to the market development and been able to monitor the market and regulate the
enterprises. We observe various regulatory systems, such as the line bureaus under the ministries, comprehensive
charge of specific affairs, and independent regulatory agencies, which reflect different state-industry relations. The goal of this project is to illuminate the logic of multiple regulatory mechanisms by examining the development of different industrial sectors. In this project, we mainly rely on archival studies and content analysis with in-depth interviews and statistical data analysis. Based upon this research agenda, this project focuses on the following subjects: the development of China’s industrial policies and evolution of the state sectors; the interaction between the state and the market, to be more specific, regulatory agencies and enterprises (both state-owned and private); an examination of the regulatory development across the
industries. The project has broader implications for Chinese political economy and illustrates a complex interaction between the state and market under China’s unique economic system - socialist market economy. It contributes to the scholarship on comparative politics and China Studies by providing an innovative approach and explicates a reality that the regulatory models are the outcomes of a complex interaction process dominated by the state during economic transition.
英 文 關 鍵 詞 ： : China, Economic Governance, Industrial Development, State Regulation, State-Industry Relations
INTRODUCTION
When Xi Jinping (Xi) took the reins of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012, he revealed his grand blueprint, ―the China Dream,‖ for China‘s future decade. The
Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee (shibajie
sanzhongquanhui gongbao, Communiqué 十八屆三中全會公報) and the ―Decision on Major
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms‖ (guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige
ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding, Decision 關於全面深化改革若干重大問題的決定) are
considered the clear guidelines to substantiate the China Dream as Xi proposed. In the
documents, it says that ―economic reform is key, and the core solution is the proper relationship between the government and the market, leaving the market to play the decisive role in allocation of resources, and the government a regulatory role.‖1 While the role of the market in the Chinese official context has transitioned from ―basic‖ to ―decisive‖ under the Chin Dream, this article seeks to explore the following questions: how has the market developed in China after having had economic transition for more than three decades? How has the role of the state transformed? What is the relationship between the state and market? What has the China Dream indicated for market development in China? In general, this chapter aims to examine the gap between the official goals and reality in market development and the future growth of the market mechanism proposed by the China Dream. This article argues that the Chinese government has emphasized the regulatory role of the state in market development but has not transformed into an impartial referee as a mature market system requires. It remains a very active participant in economic affairs and has engaged and guided business in the market. The Chinese state favors the state
1 ―Analysts Comment on "Third Plenum" Communiqué,‖ Caijing, 13 November 2013,
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sector and fails to establish a level playing ground for the private sector. The imbalance has been reflected in constraints on market development and hindered regulatory capacity.
This article begins by setting out a brief review of the shift in the role of the market in China. Next, it describes how the Chinese state has built up its regulatory capacity. Section 4 further illuminates structural and institutional constraints that stymie market development. Section 5 elaborates on how the China Dream would contribute to a better market. The article concludes with the implications for China‘s future market development during Xi‘s tenure. By exploring the interaction between the state and market, this article examines the dynamics of the changing roles of both actors. This article contributes to our understanding of the government-industry nexus, thereby demonstrating that building up a functioning regulatory mechanism will lay a strong foundation for market development, but there remains a long way to go under China‘s unique party-state system.
THE SHIFTING ROLE OF THE MARKET IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT
In 1987, the CPC announced that the new economic system is ―the state manages the market, and the market guides the enterprises.‖ The Chinese state adopted the rule of separation of ownership and management and lunched state-sector reform. In the Fourteenth National Party Congress in 1992, Jiang Zemin（江澤民） for the first time made it the goal of economic reform to establish a socialist market economic system and confirmed the basic role of the market in allocating resources.2 In the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee, the CPC approved the ―Decisions on some questions related to the setting up of a system of socialist market economy‖
2 ―Woguo Shichang Tiji Jianshe De Licheng‖ (The process of market-building in our country), People Net (04
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(guanyu jianli shehuizhuyi shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding 關於建立社會主義市 場經濟體制若干問題的決定). The document substantiated the goals and principles of reform and aimed to create an open market system nationwide. In the work report of the Fifteenth National Party Congress in 1997, Jiang again confirmed the basic role of the market in allocating resources and emphasized the improvement of the market mechanism. In the work report of the Sixteenth National Party Congress in 2002, it advocates letting the market play a basic role in allocating resources to a great extent and developing a variety of market mechanisms.3 In the work report of the Seventeenth National Party Congress in 2007, Hu Jintao（胡錦濤）
summarized China‘s experience in developing a market system in the past three decades and set a goal to accelerate the establishment of an open, competitive, orderly market with a focus on commodities and elements of production.4
While building up a market system, it is also necessary for the state to create a regulatory mechanism accordingly. A competitive market would not come into being without being
bolstered by a functioning regulatory agency and a comprehensive legal system. Before 2002, the Chinese top leadership put their emphasis on facilitating marketization, managing
macroeconomic controls and breaking monopoly and local protectionism. In 2002, they first introduced the role of the government in supervising economic activities and public services and reducing the administrative agencies‘ review and approval power. The idea of state regulation was formally introduced in 2007 when Hu Jintao elaborated on the issue of ―improving the fundamental economic system and modern market system.‖ Hu mentioned that they need to reform the monopoly industries, introduce a competitive mechanism and strengthen state
3 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-11/17/content_632268.htm, accessed 5 March 2014. 4 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568_4.htm, accessed 5 March 2014.
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regulation and social monitoring.5 On the eve of leadership transition in 2012, one noteworthy point in Hu Jintao‘s report in the Eighteenth National Party Congress is that Hu did not mention the basic role of the market at all and there is no single paragraph under the title of ―the modern market system.‖6 Instead, Hu stressed that the state-market relationship is the core issue of economic reform and the state shall respect market rules and function better. The concept of market has been exploited in certain fields, such as ownership and finance. Such transition has paved the way for the new concept of market Xi elaborated later. Nonetheless, to what extent the market can develop and function well and how the state manages its relationship with the market hinges on the state‘s regulatory capacity, which in China was initiated well before 2012 in the 1990s.
BUILDING REGULATORY CAPACITY IN CHINA
While moving away from the interventionist state, the Chinese government has implemented a series of administrative reforms in which institutional changes have notably empowered the central government in all aspects.7 During economic transition, the Chinese state has restructured its regulatory system and created new regulatory agencies in order to manage the newly
established market mechanism.
In the 1980s, after initiating economic reform, the Chinese state gradually loosened its control over the national economy and introduced a market system. While the private sector was just burgeoning and exhibited great potential, the state still played a dominant role in the
5
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568_4.htm, accessed 5 March 2014.
6 http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_113711665_5.htm, accessed 5 March 2014.
7 Dali Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford,
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emerging market. In the 1990s, the private sector rose rapidly at the expense of the state sector and forced the central government to reform the inefficient state sector. The major policy of ―grasp the big corporations; get rid of the small ones‖ (zhuada fangxiao 抓大放小) was
promulgated in 1997 to reshuffle the state sector. The state kept the large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) public-owned and reorganized them into business conglomerates (zhengqi fenkai 政企分 開), especially those in the monopoly and strategic industries, regarded as the ―commanding heights‖ of the national economy. For the small SOEs, the state either privatized or transferred them to local governments in order to unload a heavy financial burden.8 The state has gradually retreated from many aspects of the economy and the size of the state sector has shrunk
considerably.9 What accompanied this large-scale SOE reform was comprehensive development of regulatory systems and extensive government reorganization in 1998, spearheaded by then Premier Zhu Rongji （朱鎔基）and focused on administrative streamlining. Ten ministries that managed specific industries were eliminated and reinstituted as bureau-level government bodies supervised by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC).10 Comprehensive
commissions such as the State Development and Planning Commission and SETC were further empowered.11 This reform initiative was a monumental effort to change the role of the state in the market and the government-industry relationship and led to the establishment of new
8 Dicheng Zhang, Zhongguo Guoyouqiye Gaige Biannianshi (The Chronicle of the Chinese State-owned Enterprises
Reform), (Beijing: Zhongguo Gongren Chubanshe, 2006), pp. 427-29.
9 The state sector has been growing again since 2005 and its expansion has posed a major threat to the development
of the private sector. ―Guanzhu zai guoyouhua‖ (Paying Attention to ―Re-nationalization), Zhongguo Xinwen
Zhoukan, (China News Weekly), No. 11 (27 March, 2006).
10
When SETC was abolished in 2003, these bureaus were transformed into business association, and they still have close ties with the state.
11 Fifteen ministries in total were dismantled in 1998. For more detailed information, see Zhiyong Lan, ―The 1998
Administrative Reform in China: Issues, Challenges and Prospects,‖ Asian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1999), pp. 29-54; ―1998 nian guowuyuan gigou faige fanggan‖ (The Institutional Reform of the State Council Reform in 1998), People Net (11 March 1998),
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regulatory systems.12 The state is no longer the exclusive controller but separate owner and regulator to the SOEs and a referee to private corporations. A large-scale regulatory reform was initiated and many regulatory agencies and rules have been instituted and/or reorganized since 1998 (see Table 1).
Following the logic of regulatory development in the Western experience, we expect to see a functioning regulatory mechanism in China because, in an authoritarian regime, politicians are not under pressure to earn resources, votes, or money for elections but have greater power to implement policies. It is justifiable to assume that China‘s regulatory bodies are in a stronger position to supervise the industries, especially those industries in which the SOEs are dominant actors. However, to what extent and through what channels the prosperous private sector is able to lobby government officials to issue preferential policies remains a question. Still, considering the weak legislature and limited democratic participation, China‘s regulatory agencies enjoy a higher degree of autonomy from politicians and industries; they are able to enforce rules independently of the input of specific groups. In addition, the Chinese government has not developed a formal channel, neither the National People‘s Congress nor business associations, through which two-way communication can take place between policy-makers and private firms. In short, under China‘s unique economic structure, state regulators are expected to perform well.
Nonetheless, various measures of governance confirm the poor performance of government effectiveness and regulatory quality in China‘s fast-changing economic
environment.13 The evidence of the unsustainability of reform strategies demonstrates that the
12 In a strict sense, China had no regulatory systems but ―controlling‖ systems before the 1990s.
13 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project 2013 issued by the World Bank shows that in 2012 in a
―governance effectiveness‖ index, China was at the 56th percentile, similar to Tunisia, Suriname, Jamaica and Colombia. In another index of ―regulatory quality,‖ China was at the 44th percentile, similar to that given to poorly-regulated countries such as Gambia, Honduras, and Uganda. See ―Worldwide Governance Indicators‖ at
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Chinese government is trapped in a cycle of pervasive corruption and deteriorating governance.14 The erosion of state capacity has resulted in an unsolvable contradiction that leads to a vicious cycle in regulatory development. While the central leaders aim to promote economic governance, their need to ensure economic dominance and political stability by continuing to enhance control over state assets hinders regulatory enforcement and stifles competition. In turn, an unruly market and reform stagnation increases the possibility of social unrest, leading to challenges in state governance. The leadership‘s normative preferences greatly constrain the development of regulatory agencies. Moreover, the regulatory agencies face great institutional constraints, significantly reducing regulatory capabilities. The powerful, corporatized state firms (especially those supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission), the axiomatic party-state structure, legacies of the planned economy, fragmented regulatory authority and the undeveloped legal system all partially account for the incompetence of regulatory bodies. Different from their counterparts in democratic countries that face pressure from elected politicians, Chinese regulatory institutions are exposed to a higher risk of being captured by their fellow government entities that have vested interests in the industrial sector. A unique style of business lobbying emerges from a different composition of interest groups that are mainly composed of government entities and SOEs.15
Can the Chinese government extensively adopt an advanced institutional model of the independent regulator to monitor industries? Can we then expect more effective state regulation like that observed in Western countries? Advised by international organizations, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
14 Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Development Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2006).
15 The study of lobbying behavior in China by Scott Kennedy is a provocative work and explores
business-government relations through the lens of specific policy issues. See Scott Kennedy, The Business of Lobbying in
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Development (OECD), China created several independent regulatory agencies as policy transfers ―driven by perceived necessity.‖16
It also made commitments concerning the impartiality of regulatory agencies in its World Trade Organization agreement on services. It confirmed that ―for the services included in China‘s Schedule of Specific Commitments, relevant regulatory authorities would be separate from, and not accountable to, any service suppliers they regulated, except for courier and railway transportation services.‖17 Nevertheless, these independent state regulators are immersed in a complex political system and constrained by the state‘s interest in continuing its control over crucial industries.18 They are unable to function well. Consequently, the newly established independent regulators have in fact very limited autonomy and share similar weaknesses and challenges with the non-independent regulatory agencies, such as the ministerial departments. Some Chinese scholars propose that an integrated regulatory institution will work better than several independent regulators in their respective industries.19 These ideas were translated into the administrative reforms of 2008 and 2013, and the Chinese state created several super ministries accordingly.
16 Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance to the People‘s Republic of China for Establishing the National
Electricity Regulatory Commission (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2002); David Dolowitz and David Marsh,
―Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making,‖ Governance, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2000), pp. 5–24; and OECD, APEC-OECD Co-operative Initiative on Regulatory Reform (Paris: OECD, 2001).
17 World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, Document WT/ACC/CHN/49
(Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2001), p. 65, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/CHN49.doc.
18 Margaret Pearson, ―The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging
Regulatory State‖, World Politics, Vol. 57, No. 2 (2005), pp. 296-322.
19
Yingjuan Ma ―Zhongguo zhengfu jianguan jigou goujian zhong de queshi yu qianzhanxing sikao‖ (On the Imperfection and Forward-looking Thinking about the Construction of the Chinese Regulatory Agencies), Hebei
Faxue (Hebei Law Science), Vol. 26, No. 6 (2008), pp. 80-86; Junhao Wang and Xiaomei Zhou, ―Dabuzhi beijing
xia longduanxing chanye de guanzhi jigou gaige: yi zhongguo dianli guanzhi jigou gaige weili‖ (Discussion about Reform of Regulatory Agencies in Monopoly Industries under China‗s Large Government Departments System: Taking Regulatory Agency in China‗s Electricity Industry as an Example),,Zhongguo Gongye Jingji (China Industrial Economics), No. 244 (2008), pp. 47-56.
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CONSTRAINTS ON CHINA’S MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Market development has encountered both structural and institutional constraints in China. With regard to the structural constraint, it refers to the existence of overarching comprehensive
government entities and a substantial state sector. With regard to the institutional constraint, it indicates the status of regulatory agencies and the leadership mobilization system.
The Chinese state has not liberalized industries in terms of their nature but in terms of their importance to the national economy.20 That is to say, the entry barriers have been lowered or removed and the market system has been established in some industries, such as textile and electronics, but not in others, such as telecommunications and oil. Moreover, private enterprises remain prohibited in certain industries. In response to different degrees of market development, the Chinese state has created regulatory agencies in various institutional arrangements, such as independent regulatory agencies, ministerial departments and institutions or organizations under the State Council. One common feature of these regulatory agencies is that they fail to function well and promote market operations due to China‘s unique economic regime. They are situated in a broader institutional context with structural and institutional constraints. The dilemma reflects the future of China‘s development.
Structural Constraints
20 A similar concept is the strategic value of a sector by Hsueh. See Roselyn Hsueh, China’s Regulatory State: A
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In the current Chinese government structure, there are two comprehensive commissions: the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), responsible for overseeing
macroeconomic planning and state asset management respectively.21 They are ministry-level entities at the pinnacle of party-state control over the national economy. While China moves toward a market economy, these commissions have not weakened but on the contrary, they have strengthened. They have greater power in the central government and their major task is to ensure the state‘s dominant role in the market.
The NDRC, recast in 2003 from the merging of the State Development and Planning Commission, the State Council Office for Restructuring the Economy and parts of the SETC, is a mighty actor in the policy area.22 It serves the role of first among equals in the State Council and makes general policy recommendations for managing the national economy and troubleshooting. As a facilitator and coordinator, the NDRC covers a wide range of administrative duties and has, more or less, interacted with all ministerial entities like a miniature State Council. It inherits two important responsibilities from its institutional legacy: reviewing and approving projects (shenpi
quan 審批權) and setting prices (dingjia quan 定價權), especially the energy tariff. The
price-setting authority is an effective tool for a state actor to develop a viable energy market and promote competition, while the examination and approval system is the main process through which a state is able to enforce preventive regulation. The NDRC, however, regards these two critical regulatory powers as policy apparatuses to adjust and balance economic aggregates for the nation, not for the industrial sector. In the evident cases of contradiction between the coal and
21
The SETC was established in 1956, the first state entity of its kind. It was dismantled in 2003 and its authority was dispersed to SASAC, NDR, and MOC.
22 Lyman Miller, ―The 10th NPC and China‘s Leadership Transition,‖ China Leadership Monitor, No. 7 (Summer
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electricity industries, the ultra high voltage power grid system and the stability of the consumer price index, the NDRC misapplied its regulatory tools in an attempt to manage the national economy. A common predicament for the market mechanism is that it operates in the shadow of NDRC‘s absolute power.23
SASAC was established in the government restructuring of 2003 and is in charge of the ownership and operation of the central SOEs. It plays the role of both owner and manager of state assets and demonstrates the state‘s dominance in the national economy.24
The central government delegates SASAC to improve SOE performance and oversee the managerial stratum to prevent illegal acts and wrongdoing.25 Nonetheless, SASAC carries a goal that is in conflict with developing a fair, competitive market system. SASAC focuses on maximizing profitability and building national champions. It evaluates all central SOEs in terms of their business
performance with the indicator of ―economic value added‖ (EVA) every year, and it tries to ensure their profitability.26 This goal motivates SOEs to expand their operations and be more willing to comply with the oversight of SASAC instead of following market rules. Moreover, SASAC together with the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party wields power over personnel appointments in the central SOEs. They propose that high-level SOE managers‘ rotation among SOEs within the same industry could foster healthy competition and
23 See ―Dang xiangdui longduan de mei zaoyu juedui longduan de dian‖ (When Relatively Monopolized Coal Meets
Absolutely Monopolized Electricity), Nanfengchuang (Window on the South Wind), No. 13 (2009).
24 For example, SASAC is the owner of three telecom enterprises and major regulator in the telecommunication
industry. See Yukyung Yeo, ―Between Owner and Regulator: Governing the Business of China‘s Telecommunications Service Industry‖, The China Quarterly, Vol. 200 (December 2009), pp. 1013-32.
25 Barry Naughton, ―SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China,‖ China Leadership Monitor, No. 24 (Spring
2008), pp. 1-9.
26 EVA is a value-based measure of a firm‘s financial performance and captures the true economic profit of
enterprises. SASAC first adopted the EVA system in 2010 and later fully replaced the original indicator of return on equity (ROE) in 2012.
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prevent any one firm from dominating the industry.27 Nonetheless, the reality proves that job rotation helps SOE managers develop closer ties with the central government and other state firms.28 It consolidates market oligopoly instead of competition and is detrimental to market development. Unfortunately, the regulatory agencies are unable and have no authority to correct this misbehavior.
While the Chinese state has coined innovative terms for its unique economic regime, e.g., socialist market economy or socialism with Chinese characteristics, it clearly distinguishes itself from capitalist regimes. The core element of socialism — state ownership — continues to dominate the national economy. That is to say, privatization and liberalization has never been central to certain industries, especially those in the commanding heights or pillar industries. After the industrial reshuffling and corporate restructuring in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the central SOEs have greatly improved their performance and many have become international-level business conglomerates.29 In certain industries, such as the telecommunication and electricity sectors, the Chinese state adopted liberalization without privatization in order to promote competition while keeping the sector under state control. Ironically, it did not inspire competitive activities but collusion among the SOEs to strengthen their monopoly status. In addition, a phenomenon of ―state sector advances, private sectors retreats‖ (guojin mintui 國進 民退) first appeared in 2006 and some industries, such as coal and iron and steel, have
experienced renationalization.30 Even though the Chinese state adopted a strategy of ―split
27 There were several rounds of job rotation in seven state electricity enterprises, three state telecommunication firms
and three state airlines in the past few years.
28 Author‘s interviews with a mid-level official of SASAC in Beijing on February 7, 2012.
29 In 2005, there were 10 central SOEs listed in the Fortune Global 500. The number increased to 44 in 2012 (more
than a third of the total central SOEs) and three of them were listed among the top 10. See http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500, various years.
30 Qi Su, ―Longduan hangye guojin mintui‖ (The State Advances and the Private Sector Retreats in the Monopoly
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politics from regulation‖ (zhengjian fenkai 政監分開) to strengthen the regulatory agencies, the supreme goal of building national champions and enhancing the value of state assets has
motivated the SOEs to overlook regulatory rules and pursue profit maximization.
In addition, administrative rank (xingzheng jibie 行政級別) empowers SOEs to challenge the regulatory agencies. It is a system exclusive to China and refers to the status and treatment an official receives in a particular position. This is a legacy from the planned economy to facilitate personnel mobilization between the government, party and SOEs. Each government and party post has an equivalent administrative rank, and the positions in the SOEs are also assigned administrative ranks when the SOEs are established.31 The regulatory agencies suffer from this system because they cannot deal with the SOEs as subordinates or regulated entities but as parallel institutions in terms of administrative rank. The regulatory officials are unable to request relevant information from the SOE managers who carry higher administrative ranks. This
happens between the mid-level officials and managers most often.32 For example, a manager of a central SOE with the section-level (keji 科級) could decline a request for information by a deputy section-level (fu keji 副科級) cadre of the regulatory agency. Administrative ranks build a hidden barrier for regulatory entities to function well. Furthermore, the SOEs can exploit their special quasi-governmental status and close connections to lobby government officials for their own interests. Behaving as interest groups in the Western sense, they have greater influence over the policy-making process than the private sector. Compared to the SOEs‘ easy access, private
(Worry about ‗Guojin Mintui‘), Zhongguo Qiyejia (Chinese Entrepreneur), 27 April 2009, http://www.iceo.com.cn/zazhi/2009/0427/191624.shtml, accessed 20 May, 2012.
31 As of March 2014, among 113 central SOEs, 53 of them are at the vice-ministry level. Moreover, the system
serves a practical function in that, by carrying this title, SOE employees are able to switch to the equivalent positions in political career tracks more smoothly, and vise versa.
32 Author‘s interviews with an associate research fellow in the Development Research Center of the State Council
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entrepreneurs experience difficulty in expressing their concerns to the relevant institutions in the central government. Impartial competition is hardly possible.
Institutional Constraints
Personnel mobilization across industries and government institutions, especially
regulatory entities, is found not only in China but also other countries, including Western states such as the revolving-door phenomenon in the U.S. and ―amakudari‖ in Japan. The former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, for example, was the chief executive officer of
Goldman Sachs before joining the government. But they need to be confirmed by the Senate with a majority vote. Nonetheless, in China it is happening on a much larger scale that includes SOEs, various levels of government entities and party systems. In so doing, cadres gain diverse working experiences and more knowledge of the art of the state.33 Nonetheless, this institutional
arrangement has significantly disturbed market development and deteriorated regulatory effectiveness.
We identify three types of leadership mobilization among the government, market and regulatory agencies. First, regulatory agencies welcome top leaders from the government who have neither expertise nor experience in relevant affairs. The former chairman of SERC, Wu Xinxiong（吳新雄）, was former governor of Jiangxi and has never worked in the power sector. Former director of SAIC, Zhou Bohua（周伯華）, had worked in the party and political
systems in Hunan Province for more than 35 years before taking the directorship. Current
33 A form of practice ―guazhi duanlian‖ is not included in our discussion here. In guazhi duanlian, a cadre would be
sent to an agency to serve a period of time with a non-executive appointment. This working experience is often more nominal than real on cadres‘ resume.
14
Director Zhang Mao（張茅） moved to SAIC from the Ministry of Health where he was the vice minister. Former director of State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) Luo Lin （駱琳） has a similar background; before taking over the directorship of SAWS, Luo had worked in
Liaoning for more than 25 years. Luo‘s successor, Yang Dongliang（楊棟樑）, was deputy mayor of Tianjin and had been working in the city for almost two decades. More interestingly, the deputy director of SAWS is Yang Yuanyuan（楊元元）, who was a pilot and former director of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). Ling Chengxing（凌成興）, head of the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, had been working in Jiangxi for almost three decades and had been the general manager of local tobacco corporate for only three and a half years.
Second, former SOE top managers were assigned to lead the regulatory agencies. The chairmen of two independent regulatory agencies in the financial sector, China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), both worked in state banks right before they took their positions.34 Li Jiaxiang（李家祥） was appointed director of CAAC when he was the general manager of Air China. After having been the deputy general manager of China Eastern Airlines for five years, Li Jun （李軍）was assigned deputy director of CAAC. Miao Yu（苗圩）, the minister of Industry and Information Technology (IIT), was former general manager of Dongfeng Automobile Corporation. Shang Bin（尚兵）, former party secretary of China Telecom, was appointed vice minister of IIT in 2012. Wang Yumin（王禹民）, former chairman of China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation, became the vice chairman of SERC in 2004. Mu Zhanying （穆占英）became
34 Xiang Junbo of CIRC was former chairman of China Agricultural Bank. Former and incumbent director of CSRC,
15
SASAC‘s chairman of the Supervisory Board of Major Large SOEs after having been the general manager of China Nuclear Engineering Group for 13 years. Third, top government and
regulatory officials were appointed to lead SOEs. The current chairman and party secretary of China Mobile, Xi Guohua（奚國華）, was former vice minister of IIT. The former deputy director of CAAC, Wang Changshun（王昌順）, is now the general manager of Air China. Wang Shoujun（王壽君） in fact switched with Mu Zhanying to be the general manager of China Nuclear Engineering Group. Zhang Guangning（張廣寧）, former party secretary of Guangzhou, was assigned as chairman of the newly established board of Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation. Zhang used to work in the iron and steel industry but shifted to the political track more than 15 years ago.
The abovementioned cases are not exhaustive, but they clearly show China‘s extremely complicated personnel networks. Although it is said that such arrangements help government officials to better understand business operations, personnel adjustments managed by the party-state have prevented China‘s market mechanism from functioning and private enterprises from competing with their counterparts in the state sector. Leadership mobilization between the government and SOEs has resulted in either the deterioration of professionalism or the
development of personal connections among the top leaders and a failure to separate the rights and responsibilities between government and public corporations.
Another institutional limitation is that while the Chinese state created new regulatory agencies to manage the developing market system, the entire process involved acute problems of power redistribution and resource reallocation. Therefore, the Chinese state presented a
16
entities. This situation is rarely found in Western countries because new agencies are established to either replace the old ones (e.g., the British Office of Communication) or monitor new policies (e.g., the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) rather than tamper with existing agencies. Therefore, China‘s market regulators have not been delegated complete discretion over
regulatory affairs as their Western counterparts have. They are besieged by other state bodies and share regulatory authority with them. Such dispersion of regulatory power signifies
fragmentation of regulatory entities instead of a division of labor. Moreover, the responsibilities of regulatory agencies are poorly delineated and are not defined by the appropriate statutes. Namely, there are no relevant laws passed or amended by the National People‘s Congress to provide strong and necessary backing to the regulatory agencies.35 China‘s Electricity Law was promulgated in 1996 and has never been amended afterwards. It is totally unsuitable today. In addition, although it is part of their commitment, China has not yet enacted a
telecommunications law after entering the World Trade Organization more than a decade ago. Given this state of affairs, both state and private enterprises are unable to identify competent authorities and clear directions to follow, but the former enjoys better connections in the marketplace.
Furthermore, while multiple government bodies have been delegated authority to take charge of various duties, they have used the power to pursue their own interests and enforcement has turned into political intervention in the guise of monitoring market operations. In any
particular industry, enterprises face numerous government institutions that have partial
regulatory power over different matters. There also exists jurisdictional confusion, with several agencies claiming authority in the same issue areas. The involvement of local governments
35 The problem with the legal system is less intense for regulatory agencies in the financial services sector. The
Securities Law, the Insurance Law and the Commercial Banking Law were all adopted in the 1990s and amended in the 2000s. The Law on Banking Regulation and Supervision was passed in 2003 and amended in 2006.
17
exacerbates the situation. Electricity regulation clearly illustrates this problem of
fragmentation.36 Between 2003 and 2013, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) was the major regulatory body in the power sector and was responsible for market development. Multiple government institutions, however, had strong interests and played a role in supervising the industry. The NDRC was in charge of reviewing and approving the construction projects of power plants and infrastructure and setting power tariffs. SASAC owned and managed the colossal state power companies that dominated the sector and aimed to maximize profits. The Ministry of Environmental Protection was responsible for environmental impact assessment. The Ministry of Land Resources and the Ministry of Water Resources handled land-use reviews and water-related affairs respectively. Local governments were the gatekeepers in the regulatory process and conducted preliminary reviews, but they were devoted to developing industry as well.37 Because it failed to operate effectively and establish a market system, SERC was abolished in 2013 and its functions were transferred to the National Energy Bureau under the NDRC. In addition, market development and state regulation in the telecommunications industry demonstrates the issue as well.38
Moreover, the State Anti-Monopoly Commission (SAMC) led by Vice Premier Wang Yang describes another picture. It was established in 2008 in line with the Anti-Monopoly Law, and the first director was then Vice Premier Wang Qishan.39 It is composed of three major entities: the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau of NDRC, the Anti-Monopoly Bureau (the Office of Monopoly Commission) of the Ministry of Commerce and the
36 Chung-min Tsai, ―The Reform Paradox and Regulatory Dilemma in China‘s Electricity Industry‖, Asian Survey,
Vol. 51, No. 3 (2011), pp. 520-39.
37 Because an abundant electricity supply is a key element of economic development and local revenues, local
governments are very sensitive to the issue and look at the advantage they can garner from investment in power companies.
38 Pearson (fn. 17), pp. 309-10.
39 It has four deputy directors, including the director of NDRC, the Minister of Commerce, head of SAIC and
18
Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Bureau of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce. They are responsible for policymaking, maintaining market order and enforcing laws and regulations, respectively. Such a troika arrangement reflects departmentalism and the central state‘s failure to integrate the existing three government bodies that share partial regulatory authority into one functioning regulator. The central state expects them to collaborate but, in fact, they compete instead.40 They have managed cases separately and have made independent
decisions that significantly impede market development.
Fragmentation in state regulation illuminates a predicament in which various government bodies all play important, and not necessarily equal, roles in ongoing regulation. When creating new regulatory agencies or integrating existing regulatory bodies, the central state was unable to delegate full authority and provide enough resources for the regulatory agencies to function effectively. No matter what the institutional design, China‘s regulatory agencies face the
dilemmas closely tied to the country‘s unique economic regime of ensuring state dominance and fail to facilitate market improvement. The Chinese state has favored the state sector at the expense of the private sector and it is harmful for the developing market mechanism in the long run.
CHINA DREAM AND ACTION FOR A BETTER MARKET
40 Wei Liu and Peng Xie, ―Zhongguoshi fanlongduan wunian‖ (Chinese Style of Anti-Monopoly for Five Years)
Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 27 September 2013, http://www.infzm.com/content/94649, accessed
19
The CPC has announced 16 categories and 60 missions as their goals and directions.41 The major issue of ―accelerating the perfection of modern market systems‖ (jiakuai wanshan shichang tixi 加快完善市場體系) illuminates China‘s position that ―establishing a unified and open,
competitive and orderly market system is the basis for the market to have a decisive function in the allocation of resources.‖ It includes five significant tasks: creating fair and transparent market regulations, perfecting a mechanism in which prices are determined by markets, instituting a uniform urban and rural construction land market, improving financial market systems and deepening science and technology structural reform.
Up to February 2014, reform projects related to four of these tasks have already been initiated. First, on the issue of the open market, in early December of 2013 the Ministry of Commerce and 12 other ministries jointly issued the ―program on eliminating regional blockades and breaking up industrial monopolies‖ (xiaochu diqu fengsuo dapo hangye longduan gongzuo
fang’an 消除地區封鎖打破行業壟斷工作方案).42
Second, concerning the price mechanism, in the first press conference in January 2014, the spokesman of NDRC, Li Piaomin, mentioned that the NDRC will improve the price-setting mechanism and facilitate reform in the electricity, civil aviation, natural gas, railroad and water industries.43 Third, with regard to the financial market system, on November 30, 2013 the State Securities Regulatory Commission unveiled the
―Opinions on Further Promoting the Reform of the System of Offering for New Shares‖ (guanyu
jinyibu tuijin xingu faxing tizhi gaige de yijian 關於進一步推進新股發行體制改革的意見),
41 See
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/group/docs/iwer/CCP-Central-Committee-Resolution-concerning-Some-Major-Issues-in-Comprehensively-Deepening-Reform--China-Copyright-and-Media.pdf.
42
―Shangwubu deng shi‘er bumen kaizhan xiaochu diqu fengsuo dapo hangye longduan gongzuo‖ (Twelve Ministries including the Ministry of Commerce and etc started to work on eliminating the regional blockade and break industrial monopoly), Xinhua Net, 10 December 2013, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-12/10/c_125837789.htm, accessed 21 February 2014.
43 ―Fagaiwei: jinnian jiang jiji tuidong shuidianqi jiagegaige‖ (NDRC: will actively implement the reform plans in
water, electricity, and gas tariffs), Xinhua Net, 22 January 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-01/22/c_119084057.htm, accessed 21 February 2014.
20
and People‘s Bank of China issued the ―Interim Measure for the Administration of Interbank Certificates of Deposit‖ (tongye cundan guanli zhanxing banfa 同業存單管理暫行辦法).44 Fourth, as for the structure of technology, in February 2014 the Standing Committee of the State Council declared a reform plan for intellectual property rights, ―Opinion on Making Publicly Available According to Law Information on Administrative Penalties Concerning the Production and Sale of Fake, Counterfeit, and Sub-standard Goods and Intellectual Property Rights
Infringement‖ (guanyu yifa gongkai zhishou jiamao weilie shangpin he qinfan zhishichanquan
xingzhengchufa’an xinxi de yijian 關於依法公開製售假冒偽劣商品和侵犯知識產權行政處罰
案信息的意見).45
Another subject closely related to market development is ―persisting in and perfecting basic economic institutions‖ (jianchi he wanshan jiben jingji zhidu 堅持和完善基本經濟制度). It stresses the importance of public ownership as the basis of the socialist market economy and encourages the expansion of the non-public economy. Four works are identified: perfecting the property rights protection system, developing a mixed-ownership economy, promoting the modern enterprise system in the state sector and supporting the development of the non-public economy. The director of SASAC, Zhang Yi（張毅）, has made two major statements
regarding the mixed economy and SOE reform. On December 26, 2013, Zhang said that SASAC needed to establish some constraint mechanisms such as a fair pay scale for SOE managers, a
44
―Zhengjianhui fabu ‗guanyu jinyibu tuijin xingu faxing tizhi gaige de yijian‘‖ (CSRC announced the ―Opinions on Further Promoting the Reform of the System of Offering for New Shares‖), Sina Net, 30 November 2013,
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/yjdt/20131130/154717488809.shtml, accessed 21 February 2014; ―yinghang gonggao ‗tongye cundan guanli zhangxing banfa‘ jiuriqi shishi‖ (The Central Bank Announced that ―Interim Measure for the Administration of Interbank Certificates of Deposit‖ will be effective on December 9), People Net, 8 December 2013, http://finance.people.com.cn/bank/n/2013/1208/c202331-23779901.html, accessed 21 February 2014.
45
―Guowuyuan pizhuan yijian guiding: jiamao weilie he qinquan xingzheng chufa‘an xinxi xugongkai‖ (The State Council approved the Opinion Indicating that the Information about the Production and Sale of Fake, Counterfeit, and Sub-standard Goods and Intellectual Property Rights Infringement should be publicized), People Net, 20 February 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0220/c1001-24410436.html, accessed 21 February 2014.
21
sound financial management and audit system and information disclosure. Two months later in February 2014, Zhang mentioned that the state will develop a mixed economy with a focus on solving the problem of state-assets‘ dominance in the market and restructuring the SOEs to allow for more private capital and improved corporate governance.46
Although the Chinese state has revealed many reform projects concerning the
improvement of the market system, there has been no further information about three important mechanisms: a property rights protection system, a non-public economy and an urban and rural construction land market. It is clear that the success of China‘s market development hinges on SOE reform and the China Dream has reconfirmed this essential premise. Nonetheless, it also shows that the Chinese state has adopted a political logic but not an economic logic in building up a market system. Unfortunately, what the Chinese leadership has missed is that the state sector no longer has a subordinate responsibility for policy tasks but instead has become the country‘s largest interest group, pursuing their own profit. Moreover, simply restructuring the SOEs will not necessarily introduce a level playing field, but creating a functioning regulatory system will do just that.
CONCLUSION
After advancing into the reform era for more than three decades, China now faces a new challenge of advancing market development while sustaining economic growth. The market is expected to play the decisive role in allocating resources, but the more important point is the state‘s regulatory capacity. Only by fostering effective state regulation can the market
46 ―Guoziwei, tansuo jianli chuziren shenpi shixiang qingdan‖ (SASAC Explores to Establish a List of Approval as
Investor), 18 February 2014, Sina Net, http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140218/100818248644.shtml, accessed 22 February 2014.
22
mechanism develop further. Nonetheless, the current situation demonstrates that the Chinese state is marching backward as their economy opens further. The central government prioritizes the goal of enhancing the socialist party-state regime, including regulatory development. As the state sector regains its momentum and expands at the expense of the private sector, the
weaknesses of state regulation become more remarkable. When interacting with the market, the Chinese state protects its state assets and ensures the dominant status of SOEs in their respective industries. In some strategic industries in which SOEs monopolize, the market system is not established and competition is very limited. The comprehensive commissions, a legacy of the planned economy, has not faded away but strengthened in overseeing and leading the national economy. Personnel mobilization between the government, party and SOEs has facilitated regulated firms in building up connections with the regulatory authority. In a multi-agency setting, the regulatory agencies‘ capabilities are seriously undermined and discredited.
Accordingly, state regulation is beset by an intractable and hydra-headed bureaucracy. In short, both structural and institutional constraints prevent the market system from improving.
Returning to the questions this article posed at the very beginning, we find that the future of market development under the China Dream remains ambiguous, if not negative. The Chinese state itself is the root of the difficulty because the role of the state has not changed a lot in the shift from the planned economic system to the market economic system. The state merely intervened in the economy in a different way. While the robust private sector has contributed enormously to China‘s rapid economic growth, it is always threatened by an ―unlevel playing field‖ in favor of the state sector. Hence, to what extent the market can develop remains to be decided by the Chinese state instead of mutual interaction between the state and industry. The
23
slogan of the China Dream has already inspired expectations and imagination in China, but unfortunately it might be very difficult to realize, if not impossible.
24
Table 1. Selected Regulatory Agencies in China Supervisory Agency Institutional Status Year Established/ Reorganized Industry Scope Head (previous position) China Banking Regulatory
Commission
State Council I 2003 Banking Shang Fulin
(former chairman of CSRC) China Insurance Regulatory
Commission
State Council
I 1998 Insurance Xiang Junbo
(former chairman of China Agricultural Bank)
China Securities Regulatory Commission
State Council
I 1992 Securities Xiao Gang
(former chairman of Bank of China) Civil Aviation Administration Ministry of
Transport
Ministerial Department
2003/2008 Civil Aviation
Li Jiaxiang (former general manager of Air China)
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
State Council
O 2001 General Zhi Shuping
(former deputy party secretary of Henan)
State Administration for Industry and Commerce
State Council
O 2001 General Zhang Mao
(former vice Minister of Health) State Administration of Work
Safety
State Council
O 2001/2003 General Yang Dongliang
(former deputy mayor of Tianjin) State Electricity Regulatory
Commission
(abolished in March 2013)
State Council
I 2003 Electricity Wu Xinxiong
(former governor of Jiangxi) China Food and Drug
Administration Ministry of Health Ministerial Department 1998/2008 Food, Cosmetics, Drug, Zhang Yong
(former director of Food Safety Office of the State Council)
State Tobacco Monopoly Administration Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Ministerial Department
1984/2008 Tobacco Ling Chengxing
(former deputy party secretary and deputy governor of Jiangxi) State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission
State Council
S 2003 General Jiang Jiemin
25 chairman of CNPC) Ministry of Environmental Protection State Council
Ministry 2008 General Zhou Shengxian
(former director of the State Forestry Administration)
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
State Council
Ministry 2008 Iron and Steel, Telecom, Electronics
Miao Yu
(former party secretary of Wuhan) National Development and Reform
Commission
State Council
Ministry 2003 General Xu Shaoshi
(former minister of Land and Resources)
State Anti-Monopoly Commission State Council
Coordinatio n Institute
2008 General Wang Yang (jointly held by Vice Premier)
I: Institution directly under the state Council (Guowuyuan zhishu shiye danwei) O: Organizations directly under the State Council (Guowuyuan zhishu jigou)
S: Special organization directly under the State Council (Guowuyuan Zhishu teshe jigou)
科技部補助專題研究計畫執行國際合作與移地研究心得報告
日期：2015 年 5 月 10 日一、執行國際合作與移地研究過程
此次移地研究乃利用赴該校參加學術會議的機會，與該校學者進行訪談，共五日，
詳細日程如下：
第一天，啟程赴美國；第二天，於柏克萊加大進行訪談；第三、四天，參加學術會
議；第五天，返台。
二、研究成果
透過訪談得以理解美國學者對對中國大陸的市場運作及政府管制體系之運作的看法
並交換彼此研究中國政治經濟的心得。此外，亦赴該校圖書館蒐集書面資料。
三、建議
美國學者對於中國大陸的研究觀點不同於臺灣學者，理論性較強，因此吾人除了前
往大陸外，美國也是值得進行田野的地點，與美國的中國研究學者溝通想法將能獲
得更多理論上的啟發
四、本次出國若屬國際合作研究，雙方合作性質係屬：(可複選)
□分工收集研究資料
□交換分析實驗或調查結果
□共同執行理論建立模式並驗証
□共同執行歸納與比較分析
□元件或產品分工研發
□其他 (請填寫) _______
五、其他
無
計畫編號
MOST 102－2410－H－004－161－MY2
計畫名稱
中國大陸多元管制體系之分析
出國人員
姓名
蔡中民
服務機構
及職稱
政治大學政治系副教授
出國時間
104 年 4 月 29 日
至 104 年 5 月 3
日
出國地點
美國加州柏克萊加州大學
出國研究
目的
□實驗 ▉田野調查 □採集樣本 □國際合作研究 □使用國外研究設施
科技部補助專題研究計畫執行國際合作與移地研究心得報告
日期：2015 年 7 月 30 日一、執行國際合作與移地研究過程
此次移地研究共十四日，詳細日程如下：
第一天，啟程赴北京；第二天，於北京師範大學進行訪談；第三、四天，赴國家圖
書館查找資料；第五天，於北京行政學院進行訪談；第六天，赴中關村圖書大廈採
購書籍；第七天，與國資委處級官員進行訪談；第八天，與北京市發改委副處級官
員進行訪談；第九天，赴西單圖書城採購書籍；第十天、於北京大學進行訪談；第
十一、十二天、與私營企業經理進行訪談；第十三天，與中央國有企業經理進行訪
談；第十四天，返台。
二、研究成果
對於中國大陸的市場運作及政府管制體系有了進一步了解，透過訪談釐清各種產業
間的管制機關與其運作的異同，此外亦蒐集了大量的書面資料可供後續分析參考。
三、建議
臺灣學術界可與中國大陸的大學教師們建立長期關係，透過合作進行研究計畫或是
定期互訪，增加彼此的了解。我方學者可藉此進行拓展訪談對象，也可以協助大陸
學者強化理論性分析。
四、本次出國若屬國際合作研究，雙方合作性質係屬：(可複選)
□分工收集研究資料
□交換分析實驗或調查結果
□共同執行理論建立模式並驗証
□共同執行歸納與比較分析
□元件或產品分工研發
□其他 (請填寫) _______
計畫編號
MOST 102－2410－H－004－161－MY2
計畫名稱
中國大陸多元管制體系之分析
出國人員
姓名
蔡中民
服務機構
及職稱
政治大學政治系副教授
出國時間
104 年 7 月 10 日
至 104 年 7 月 23
日
出國地點
中國大陸北京市
出國研究
目的
□實驗 ▉田野調查 □採集樣本 □國際合作研究 □使用國外研究設施
五、其他
無
科技部補助專題研究計畫出席國際學術會議心得報告
日期：2015 年 5 月 10 日一、參加會議經過
該會議室由美國柏克萊加州大學東亞中心主辦，及兩天的會議中有來自美、
中、臺三方的學者參加，兩天的會議中有四個場次，主題分別是兩岸關係的政治面、
兩岸的經濟互動、兩岸間的認同議題及圓桌論壇。
二、與會心得
會議以兩岸關係為主，討論其對亞洲的影響，就此機會學習美國及大陸學者對兩
岸關係的看法，也透過彼此私下互動，能進行深入的交談。
三、發表論文全文或摘要
In January 1990, the Taiwanese government announced the “Measures on Indirect Investment and
Technical Cooperation with the Mainland” (Dui dalu diqu jianjie touzi huo jishu hezuo guanli banfa) and officially lifted the ban on investing in China. Simultaneously in this era of change Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour and the adoption of a socialist market economic system in the Fourteenth National Party Congress in 1992 ensured a more business-friendly investment climate in China. Regardless, cross-strait relations would continue to stumble over the next few years along with industrial restructuring in Taiwan and changing economic development in China respectively. Former president Lee Teng-hui (hereafter Lee)
計畫編號
MOST 102－2410－H－004－161－MY2
計畫名稱
中國大陸多元管制體系之分析
出國人員
姓名
蔡中民
服務機構
及職稱
政治大學政治系副教授
會議時間
2015 年 5 月 1 日
至 2015 年 5 月 2
日
會議地點
美國柏克萊加州大學
會議名稱
(中文) 中國、臺灣與崛起的亞洲
(英文) China, Taiwan, and Rising Asia
發表題目
(中文) 臺商在中國大陸投資的轉型（2000-2014）
promoted “southward policy” in 1994 and issued his motto: “don’t rush, be patient” (jieji yongren) in 1996 accompanied with new regulations over Taiwanese investment in China (TIC). In 2000, Lee’s successor Chen Shui-bian (hereafter Chen) won the election and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the ruling party. Chen’s hostile attitude toward China and the DPP’s pro-independence stance made cross-strait relations very difficult and political exchanges were suspended. In the time since incumbent president Ma Ying-jeou (hereafter Ma) took power in 2008 the Taiwanese government has reinitiated interaction with China and cross-strait relations have made great progress.
Against this background, this article aims to explore the following questions: has the change of political authority affected the patterns and amount of Taiwanese investment in China? How have Taiwanese business people (Taishang) responded to the changing political landscape? What has changed and what has not about TIC since the 1990s? In general, what is the transition of TIC in the past two decades? Concerning data availability and the shifts of political power in Taiwan, this article focuses on TIC between 1991 and 2014 (under three Taiwanese presidents). By examining the data from both Taiwan and China, this paper argues that TIC has been driven mainly by economic motivations and is barely affected by tumultuous political situations. The depoliticization of business characterizes TIC. Taishang have remained intact despite the political turbulence but been excluded from the domestic policy-making process. In recent years, TIC has been gradually declining due to a deteriorating investment environment on the mainland.
This article demonstrates that while the amount of TIC has been generally increasing over the past 25 years, the composition of TIC has radically changed due to both endogenous constraints and exogenous factors. In terms of endogenous constraints, rising labor costs and shifting local preferential policies have degraded the benefits and forced Taishang either to look for new sites with lower production costs or devote themselves to technological and industrial upgrades. Regarding exogenous factors, volatile global markets and growing competitiveness from domestic enterprises have prompted Taiwanese companies to integrate themselves into China’s local markets. These trends show that TIC has been heavily influenced by the macroeconomic environment in China and that political struggles between Taiwan and China have not led to the transition of TIC.
四、建議
我方可主動與美國的大學或研究中心合作舉辦類似會議，並邀請大陸、香港、新
加坡等地學者一同參加，增進學術交流與合作深度。
五、攜回資料名稱及內容
會議論文合集（所有學者發表之論文）
六、其他
無
科技部補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表
日期:2016/02/29科技部補助計畫
計畫名稱: 中國大陸多元管制體系之分析 計畫主持人: 蔡中民 計畫編號: 102-2410-H-004-161-MY2 學門領域: 比較政治無研發成果推廣資料
102年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表
計畫主持人：蔡中民 計畫編號：102-2410-H-004-161-MY2 計畫名稱：中國大陸多元管制體系之分析 成果項目 量化 單位 備註（質化說明 ：如數個計畫共 同成果、成果列 為該期刊之封面 故事...等） 實際已達成 數（被接受 或已發表） 預期總達成 數（含實際 已達成數） 本計畫實 際貢獻百 分比 國內 論文著作 期刊論文 1 1 100% 篇 研究報告/技術報告 0 0 100% 研討會論文 1 1 100% 專書 0 0 100% 章/本 專利 申請中件數 0 0 100% 件 已獲得件數 0 0 100% 技術移轉 件數 0 0 100% 件 權利金 0 0 100% 千元 參與計畫人力 （本國籍） 碩士生 1 1 100% 人次 博士生 0 0 100% 博士後研究員 0 0 100% 專任助理 0 0 100% 國外 論文著作 期刊論文 0 0 100% 篇 研究報告/技術報告 0 0 100% 研討會論文 1 1 100% 專書 1 1 100% 章/本 專書論文一篇 專利 申請中件數 0 0 100% 件 已獲得件數 0 0 100% 技術移轉 件數 0 0 100% 件 權利金 0 0 100% 千元 參與計畫人力 （外國籍） 碩士生 0 0 100% 人次 博士生 0 0 100% 博士後研究員 0 0 100% 專任助理 0 0 100% 其他成果 （無法以量化表達之 成果如辦理學術活動 、獲得獎項、重要國 際合作、研究成果國 際影響力及其他協助 產業技術發展之具體 效益事項等，請以文 字敘述填列。） 無成果項目 量化 名稱或內容性質簡述 科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目 測驗工具(含質性與量性) 0 課程/模組 0 電腦及網路系統或工具 0 教材 0 舉辦之活動/競賽 0 研討會/工作坊 0 電子報、網站 0 計畫成果推廣之參與（閱聽）人數 0
