公民社會與台灣的國際空間和全球話語：以無國界記者與台灣人權促進會為例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧ 國. 學. Civil Society and Taiwan’s 治International Space 政 and Global Discourse: The Cases 大 of Reporters Without Borders立and the Taiwan Association for Human Rights. ‧. 公民社會與台灣的國際空間和全球話語：以無國界記. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 者與台灣人權促進會為例. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. J. ZACH HOLLO Advisor: DR. YUNG-FANG LIN. June, 2019. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(2) Abstract: This thesis examines the role civil society groups play in expanding Taiwan’s international space. Specifically, it examines two case studies to determine whether and how Taiwanese citizens can use non-governmental organizations to influence intergovernmental organizations from which they’re excluded. The first case study is advocacy done by the Taipei bureau of Reporters Without Borders to influence the United Nations. The second case study is advocacy done by the Taiwan Association for. 治政大 international institutions hypothesis, that Taiwanese citizens can and do influence 立 Human Rights to influence the European Union. These case studies confirm the. through NGOs. Furthermore, this influence via non-governmental organizations. ‧ 國. 學. contributes to behavioral outcomes in geopolitical forums that benefit Taiwan’s interests. ‧. and national security, mainly by ensuring ideological comradery with other democracies like the United States and buttressing international human rights norms that China. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. seeks to bowdlerize.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. I. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(3) 摘要：本文考察臺灣民間社會團體在擴大台灣國際空間中所扮演的角色。具體而言，本文透過兩個案例研究，以確定台灣公民是否以及如何利用非政府組織影響他們被排除在外的政府間組織。第一個案例研究是無國界記者臺北辦公處，為影響聯合國所做的提倡宣傳。第二個案例研究是台灣人權促進會，為影響歐盟所做的主張宣傳。這些案例研究證實了以下的假設：「台灣公民可以並且確實透過非政府組織影響國際組織」。此外，非政府組織的影響有助於臺灣地緣政治的行為結果，利於臺灣國家利益. 治政與國家安全。而其做法主要為確保與美國等其他民主國家的共同民主價大立值與情誼，以及保護中國企圖拆除的國際人權準則。 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. ii. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(4) Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….....1 1.1 Research Background……………………………………………………………...1 1.2 Purpose of Research………………………………………………...………….....4 1.3 Literature Review…………………………………………………………………...5 1.4 Analytical Approach……………………………………………………………….17 1.5 Outline of Thesis…………………………………………………………………..23 Chapter 2 Taiwan on the Global Stage……………………………………………………...25 2.1 Taiwan’s Exclusion and Strategic Considerations……………………………..25 2.2 The Ideological Battle For Legitimacy…………………………………………..29 2.3 The Implications of Taiwan’s Exclusion and NGO Diplomacy………….……32 2.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….……...34. 政治大. Chapter 3 The Case of Reporters Without Borders…………………………………….….37 3.1 Reporters Without Borders in France…………………………………………...37 3.2 The Opening of the Taipei Office………………………..……………………...40 3.3 The Case of Huang Qi and the United Nations………………………………..47 3.4 Taiwan’s Perspective on the Global Stage……………………………………..51 3.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………....56. 立. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Chapter 4 The Case of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights……………………....58 4.1 The Organization’s Beginnings and Current Activities……………………......58 4.2 Global Interaction………………………………………………………………….60 4.3 The case of the Joint Letter to the European Union…………………………..64 4.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………....71. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Chapter 5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………74. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………….80. engchi. iii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(5) Table of Figures Figure 2.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tweet………………………………………………..26 Figure 2.2 Island Chain Display……………………………………………………………..28 Figure 3.1 Financial Journalists Article……………………………………………………..43 Figure 4.1 Three Pillars of FIDH…………………………………………………………….61. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iv. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(6) List of interviews Interview 1 Interviewee name: Cédric Alviani Interviewee position: Reporters Without Borders Taipei bureau chief Interviewee nationality: France Method: In person Location: Reporters Without Borders Taipei bureau Length: 31:44 Date: 03/26/2019 Purpose: To better understand Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF’s) motivation for opening its Taipei branch and to better understand the unique inner workings of that branch.. 政治大. Interview 2 Interviewee name: Anonymous A Interviewee position: Reporters Without Borders Taipei bureau full-time staffer Interviewee nationality: Republic of China (Taiwan) Method: In person Location: Reporters Without Borders Taipei bureau Length: 22:06 Date: 03/26/2019 Purpose: To better understand how Taiwanese citizens can influence intergovernmental organizations through the work they do as full-time employees at international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as RSF.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. Interview 3 Interviewee name: Anonymous B Interviewee position: Former intern at Reporters Without Borders Taipei bureau Interviewee nationality: Republic of China (Taiwan) Method: Skype Length: 10:54 Date: 04/26/2019 Purpose: To better understand how Taiwanese citizens can influence intergovernmental organizations through the work they do as part-time interns at international NGOs such as RSF.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Interview 4 Interviewee name: Paul Coppin Interview position: Head of legal desk at Reporters Without Borders Method: Skype Length: 20:14 Date: 04/26/2019 Purpose: To better understand how a case study piece of advocacy made its way from RSF’s Taipei office to its Paris office to the United Nations (UN).. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(7) Interview 5 Interviewee name: E-ling Chiu (邱伊翎) Interviewee position: Taiwan Association for Human Rights secretary general Interviewee nationality: Republic of China (Taiwan) Method: In person Location: Taiwan Association for Human Rights headquarters in Taipei Length: 30:18 Date: 04/25/2019 Purpose: To better understand the activities of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR), including international interaction such as a case study of advocacy to the European Union (EU). Interview 6 Interview name: Hsin-yi Lin (林欣怡) Interviewee position: Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty executive director Interviewee nationality: Republic of China (Taiwan) Method: In person Location: Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty headquarters in Taipei Length: 35:37 Date: 05/14/2019 Purpose: To better understand the advantages and challenges of Taiwanese civil society in general.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Interview 7 Interviewee name: Yeh-chung Lu (盧業中) Interviewee position: Associate Professor in Diplomacy at National Chengchi University, Vice-President of Taiwan Foundation for Democracy Interviewee nationality: Republic of China (Taiwan) Method: In person Location: National Chengchi University Length: 20:44 Date: 05/15/2019 Purpose: To seek advice on measuring the variable of interest in this thesis: Taiwanese citizens’ effect on intergovernmental organizations through NGOs.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Interview 8 Interviewee name: Seong-Phil Hong Interviewee position: United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention chair-rapporteur Method: email Length: 433 words Date: 05/06/2019-05/07/2019 Purpose: To confirm that the UN received and was brought to action by the advocacy analyzed in a case study of this thesis. Interview 9. vi. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(8) Interviewee name: Anonymous C Interview position: European Union official Method: Phone call Length: 23:22 Date: 05/17/2019 Purpose: To confirm that the EU received and was brought to action by the advocacy analyzed in a case study of this thesis.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. vii. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(9) Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Research Background Taiwan’s political evolution since Chiang Kai-shek’s forces fled to the island in 1949 has seen a shift from stringent authoritarianism to liberal democracy. Taiwan’s civil society subsequently evolved from an underground resistance movement to a vibrant and public ecosystem of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that address issues ranging from human rights to the environment. When Chiang’s Kuomintang (KMT). 治政 maintained the name Republic of China and vowed to大 one day retake mainland China 立. forces established control over the island after fleeing the Chinese civil war, they. from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To this end, the KMT instituted an. ‧ 國. 學. authoritarian system of government that emphasized Chinese identity formation, strictly. ‧. controlled flows of information, and prevented the mobilization of opposition protest movements. Due to heavy-handed repression often used by the KMT to maintain. y. Nat. io. sit. control, this period, lasting from roughly 1949 to 1987, came to be referred to as the. n. al. er. “White Terror” period of Taiwanese history. During the White Terror period, Taiwan’s. Ch. i n U. v. civil society mainly comprised dissident social movements, both at home and abroad,. engchi. which advocated liberal political reforms and often also a Taiwanese national identity. In April 1975, Chiang Kai-shek died, passing the reins of power to his eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who began to slowly loosen the government’s authoritarian grip. Under his leadership, dissidents and the media were granted more leeway, and increased numbers of native Taiwanese (as opposed to those who arrived to Taiwan after fleeing the Chinese civil war) were allowed to enter the government. In July 1987, about half a year before Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, martial law in Taiwan was lifted,. 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(10) paving the way for democratic reforms. His successor, Lee Teng-hui, took part in the country’s first presidential election and became the first democratically-elected president of Taiwan. Since Lee’s election victory, Taiwan’s democracy has successfully facilitated three peaceful transitions of power over five elections. These elections not only ushered in pro-independence politicians, but also included a KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, who served from 2008 to 2016. In addition to elections for the president, Taiwan also began holding elections for legislators, mayors, and referendums on policies concerning. 治政大Taiwan’s civil society rapidly After Taiwan’s democratization in the mid-1990s, 立. specific issues.. expanded and took on a new diversity in organizations and agendas. The country now. ‧ 國. 學. hosts offices of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Doctors. ‧. Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontiers, MSF) and Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontieres, RSF, 無國界記者), and Taiwanese NGOs such as the. sit. y. Nat. io. er. Taiwan Association for Human Rights (台灣人權促進會) play an active role in global. al. discussions surrounding political and social ethics. NGOs in Taiwan now take up issues. n. iv n C ranging from women’s rights, migrant h eworkers’ h i Uglobal healthcare, human rights, n g crights, religious advocacy, journalistic freedom, and more.. But as Taiwan’s civil sphere evolved to reflect more openness and collaboration, the island’s presence in the global political arena gradually deteriorated as China’s rise forced it into isolation. The CCP, which won the civil war in 1949 and maintained a monopoly on power in mainland China ever since, has consistently held that Taiwan is a province of China which will someday be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary. A central tactic in the CCP’s campaign to gain control of Taiwan is its. 2. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(11) attempt to exclude Taiwan from formal participation in international organizations. In many of the world’s most influential international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO), Taiwan is excluded at Beijing’s request. The CCP is a key donor to many of these organizations, and it uses its leverage to prevent international bodies from allowing Taiwan to play the same role as sovereign nations, which would grant recognition and confer legitimacy to Taiwan’s selfruling government. And as China’s economy continued to grow after Deng Xiaoping’s. 治政大 relations with Beijing as an abandoned formal recognition of Taiwan, seeing closer 立 economic reforms of the late 1970s, more and more countries around the world. economic boon. Today, only 17 countries recognize the Republic of China and have. ‧ 國. 學. formal diplomatic relations with Taipei.. ‧. Taiwan itself is conflicted on the matter. After democratization in the mid-1990s, Taiwan’s leaders relinquished the goal of retaking control of mainland China from the. y. Nat. io. sit. CCP, but they stopped short of declaring formal independence for fear of increasing. n. al. er. already high tensions with Beijing. China’s leaders feared Taiwan’s democratization. Ch. i n U. v. could scuttle the goal of eventually absorbing the island into the authoritarian Chinese. engchi. nation. Since Taiwan democratized, its political juxtaposition with China has grown more and more jarring. Beijing since then doubled down on its authoritarian model and recently removed presidential term limits for Xi Jinping, abandoning the system of collective leadership established by Deng Xiaoping and reverting the country’s politics back to a cult of personality style of one-man rule reminiscent of the chaotic Mao Zedong era. Taiwan, meanwhile, transformed into one of the most liberal societies in Asia. Political protests abound, popular elections occur regularly and with peaceful. 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(12) transitions of power, the LGBT community enjoys a relatively high degree of freedom and respect, newspapers publish without overt censorship, people can access the entirety of the internet, and civil society groups such as NGOs are free to organize and advocate on whatever issues they deem important. 1.2 Purpose of Research This research examines the potential impact that Taiwan’s civil society has on its international space. Specifically, I will examine whether and how NGOs in Taiwan play a role in enhancing the island’s footprint in international affairs. Can NGOs act as. 治政大 given that they cannot do so middlemen for Taiwanese people to influence geopolitics, 立. through formal channels because their country is excluded from international bodies. ‧ 國. 學. such as the UN? Are NGOs able to fill some of the void left by Taiwan’s exclusion? If so,. soft power?. ‧. does this influence via NGOs advance Taiwan’s foreign policy interests and boost its. y. Nat. er. io. sit. I argue that NGOs in Taiwan often play a crucial role in giving Taiwan’s citizens a voice on the global stage. This is because through NGOs, Taiwanese citizens are often. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. able to influence international organizations from which they are excluded. Taiwanese. engchi. citizens are also able to use NGOs to advocate for Taiwan’s values and interests. Global discourse on issues like human rights is impacted by Taiwan. For example, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) often submits cases to the United Nations Human Rights Council about journalists being extrajudicially imprisoned. Sometimes these cases are in China. RSF’s Taipei office acts as a research outlet for China cases. Taiwanese employees of RSF’s Taipei office write case reports which are taken by employees of RSF’s Paris office to the UN. The Taiwan Association for Human Rights. 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(13) (TAHR), on the other hand, works closely with other international human rights organizations, such as the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). Sometimes, the two organizations collaborate in organizing conferences and choosing itineraries for those conferences. In ways like this, NGOs act as a bridge between Taiwan’s people and international institutions. 1.3 Literature Review 1.3.1 Origins of Civil Society. 治政大wrote Politics. In it, he makes ancient Greek philosopher who in the fourth century BCE 立. Literature relating to civil society can be traced all the way back to Aristotle, the. what is widely considered the first reference to civil society, arguing that in order for. ‧ 國. 學. people to be good citizens they must take part in communities. “[H]e who is unable to to. ‧. live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state [or polis]” (Aristotle 1996: 1253 a26-9;). Aristotle. y. Nat. er. io. sit. used the term koinonia politike, which in Latin read societas civilis, and eventually arrived in English as civil society.. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Aristotle’s work became popular with classical Arab philosophers like Ibn Sina. engchi. (980-1037) and Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), also known by their Latin names Avicenna and Averroes, respectively. Aristotle’s ideas subsequently made their way to medieval European thinkers. In 1265, William of Moerbeke made the first Latin translation, which Catholic philosopher Thomas Aquinas used to craft commentaries on Aristotle’s thoughts. “It is largely through Aquinas that the ideas of man as a social and political animal, of the citizen as one who participates in government, of the classification of. 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(14) government by the number and quality of its rulers, of the mixed constitution, and many other concepts entered the medieval milieu” (Blythe 1986, 547-65). William of Moerbeke’s original Latin translation, though, would eventually be superseded by that of Leonardo Bruni, an Italian Renaissance historian and humanist. Much of Bruni’s work, including his translation of Aristotle’s ideas and formulation of civil society, was tailored to advance his goal of promoting humanism. He wrote in the introduction to his translation of Aristotle’s Politics that it is crucial “to know what a city is. 治政 destroyed … Man is a weak creature and draws from大 civil society the self-sufficiency 立 and what a commonwealth is, and to understand how civil society is maintained or. and capacity for perfection he lacks on his own” (Hallberg and Wittrock 2006, 40).. ‧ 國. 學. Only later would the term civil society become intimately linked with Western-. ‧. style democracy. After narrowly surviving the bloody French Revolution with an aristocratic background, French diplomat and intellectual Alexis de Tocqueville. y. Nat. io. sit. journeyed to the United States, where he “marvelled at the way Americans – in contrast,. n. al. er. he thought, to continental Europeans – participated in countless associations and. Ch. i n U. v. thereby breathed life into their democracy” (Hoffmann 2006, 2). Tocqueville was looking. engchi. for a way democratic societies could avoid the gruesome proletariat violence of the French Revolution. He believed he found it in the voluntary associations that made up civil society in the United States. “If men are to remain civilized, or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased,” he wrote (Tocqueville 1835, 585). Tocqueville was not actually a proponent of democracy. His “view of American society was that of a French aristocrat engaged in analysing the dangers that. 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(15) democracy, which he thought would inevitably come, held for the old European social order” (Hoffmann 2006, 5). Yet his writing proved foundational for the idea that civil society is part and parcel of democratic politics. “Tocqueville’s belief in an intrinsic connection between civic activism and democracy is still the central point of reference for most contemporary theories of civil society” (Hoffmann 2006, 2). It’s worth taking a moment here to notice how in its journey to our modern understanding, the idea of civil society, like most fragments of accepted knowledge,. 治政 according to their own beliefs and biases to suit their大 own agendas. Each man had a 立. passed through the articulations of men (and they were all men) who shaped it. goal. Aristotle sought to intellectually undermine the conservative elites who sentenced. ‧ 國. 學. his master’s master, Socrates, to death; Aquinas wanted to harmonize divine Christian. ‧. belief with agnostic philosophical arguments to definitively prove the existence of God; Bruni made it his mission to push religion aside, formulating knowledge as free from. y. Nat. io. sit. dependency on the divine; and Tocqueville was desperate to curb the excesses of the. n. al. er. French Revolution and protect the privileges of Europe’s social elite, of which he was a member.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The concept of civil society experienced a lull in popularity during the mid-1800s, as more attention was paid to analyzing the industrial revolution. “It bounced back into fashion after World War II through the writings of the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, who revived the term to portray civil society as a special nucleus of independent political activity, a crucial sphere of struggle against tyranny” (Carothers and Barndt 1999-2000, 19). These writings were inspirational to social movements in eastern Europe during the. 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(16) Cold War, and eventually the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent wave of democratization would make civil society a byword for political liberalization. 1.3.2 Defining Civil Society Instead of asking what civil society is, it may be more useful to declare what it is not. Civil society does not involve business or commerce; it does not seek profit in the traditional sense as a motive. Civil society does not involve politicians; it does not seek direct political power. “Civil society is the realm of ordinary citizens, who join and. 治政 desires” (Howard 2003, 35). As to the difficult question大 of how to measure civil society, 立. participate in groups and associations because of their everyday interests, needs, and. Marc Howard advocates conducting surveys to find out the percentage of respondents. ‧ 國. 學. who take part in associations in specific countries, as this “not only give[s] a better. ‧. approximation of the development of that country’s civil society than can come from a hollow list of total numbers or types of registered organizations, but they also facilitate. y. Nat. io. sit. extensive comparisons among the social strata of the country being studied, as well as. n. al. er. with other countries” (Howard 2003, 53). This representative survey approach has an. Ch. i n U. v. advantage in that it can usually be replicated in multiple countries, which “provides the. engchi. best overall opportunity for comparative research on this important attribute of democracy and democratization” (Howard 2003, 55). 1.3.3 Civil Society as an Independent Variable In modern academic literature, civil society is often analyzed in conjunction for some result. Will it spur democracy? Does it foster economic development? Can it weed out corruption? Questions like these have guided countless academic studies that. 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(17) sought to probe how beneficial civic associations are for different aspects of society. Some of this research has focused on specific places. For example, Rob Jenkins argued that India’s democracy “has progressed much further in terms of inclusiveness than with respect to accountability” (Jenkins 2007, 55), and that in the mid-1990s civil society groups began to play an important role in chipping away at corruption by uncovering specific acts of malfeasance, harnessing the efforts of average citizens, and focusing “on the local level, where routinized corruption. 治政大 mechanisms through which themselves could do the most to expose the precise 立 was a daily curse, where the theft of public resources was personal, and where citizens. corruption took place” (Jenkins 2007, 59).. ‧ 國. 學. Civil society is often thought of as a byproduct and self-reinforcer of democracy,. ‧. as “almost all agree that a healthy democracy requires many voluntary associations and much local activity” (Ehrenberg 1999, 233). But its link with liberal politics may in fact. y. Nat. io. sit. come not primarily from civil society activities inside democracies, but rather from the. n. al. er. demise of authoritarian regimes, particularly in former Soviet regions. “There is. Ch. i n U. v. widespread agreement in the literature on the East Central European Velvet. engchi. Revolutions that civil society was pivotal to the overthrow of communist regimes in 1989” (Jensen and Miszlivetz 2006; Bernhard 1996, 135). However, other literature tries to dispel simplistic monocausal ways of thinking about civil society throughout the Cold War and thinks of civil society rather “as a master frame with which civic movements across Eastern Europe sought to mobilize public support in light of changing political opportunities” (Glenn 2001, 26-27).. 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(18) Some literature is now less optimistic about civil society in eastern Europe. For example, Anders Uhlin wrote that post-Soviet civil society in eastern Europe is weak because, apart from strong trade union membership, “few people are engaged in civil society activities and most civil society groups have failed to mobilize members” (Uhlin 2006, 152). In Russia, civil society stagnated because, despite laws protecting the rights of associations, there is “resistance from public officials, a political culture of apathy and distrust, and a legal system oriented towards protecting those in power rather than making them accountable to an organized public” (Uhlin 2006, 153; Weigle 2000, 338).. 治政 Civil society’s failure to take root in Russia was not for 大 a lack of trying on the part of the 立. people, but rather due to “the absence of a link between organized activism and state. ‧ 國. 學. power” (Weigle 2000, 377).. ‧. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a lot of political science literature in the 1990s focused on democratic transition. But more recently, given the rise of China and. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Russia’s backsliding from democracy back to authoritarianism, recent political science literature has looked more at authoritarianism as a resilient form of government not. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. necessarily prone to collapse. Civil society in these cases is studied for its ability to exist. engchi. in an environment with significant restraints. And in fact Russia led the way in cracking down on civil society to prevent democratization. It passed a law in 2006 that placed NGOs under strict surveillance and limited the ability of NGOs to receive foreign funding; other authoritarian countries soon followed suit (Koesel 2018, 257-258). One of the most consequential paths of civil society in recent decades has been its foray into developmental economics. NGOs working in developing countries for the purpose of poverty reduction began increasing dramatically in quantity and scale in the. 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(19) late 1970s (Banks and Hulme 2012, 5). This happened shortly after global development assistance policy took a neoliberal turn, with poor countries pressured into embracing structural adjustment that canceled welfare services and state expenditures, emphasizing market-driven, trickle-down growth (Banks and Hulme 2012, 5; Murray and Overton 2011). As this neoliberal shift continued to bear little developmental fruit, philanthropists began to see NGOs as a useful way to fill the vacuum of public services for the poor (Gill 1997; Barr et al 2005; Lewis 2005; Murray and Overton 2011). Thus. began. one. of. civil. society’s most well-known innovations: the 治政大 local NGOs that work with developmental NGO. These can take the form of small 立 that. provide. healthcare. services. to. remote. 學. NGOs. ‧ 國. foreign donors to provide malaria nets to low-income households, large international locations,. entrepreneurial. ‧. organizations that seek to nurture small businesses and innovation, and more. “Where states cannot provide sufficient goods, services or enabling environments that help. y. Nat. er. io. sit. citizens in securing livelihoods, or where disadvantaged groups are excluded from existing state institutions, alternative channels of service provision and/or holding. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. governments to account must be found. It is into this gap that NGOs have neatly fitted”. engchi. (Banks and Hulme 2012, 3). Developmental experts and practitioners grew disillusioned with the neoliberal approach by the 1990s, and soon articulated a different strategy of fostering “good governance” that recognized the importance of public expenditures (Murray and Overton 2011). However, by this time, NGOs were so imbedded in on-theground efforts at poverty alleviation that they never fell out of significance, and they found support in a post-Cold War international community that valued human rights and grassroots participation (Murray and Overton 2011).. 11. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(20) Developmental NGOs have received measured criticism, mainly that they often supply services without teaching local populations to provide these services for themselves, and that they do not efficiently accomplish long-term structural changes in target countries (Banks and Hulme 2012, 3). But they have nonetheless been accepted as crucial players in the fight against global poverty. Some research into civil society has been more theoretical, such as Francis Fukuyama’s article that argued the existence of a complex interrelationship between. 治政大 Ethics 1.3.4 Civil Society, International Interaction, and Global 立. civil society, social capital, and economic growth (Fukuyama 2001, 7).. Another discussion involving civil society has been that of global ethics. Can. ‧ 國. 學. international civil society groups facilitate interaction across cultures that foster shared. ‧. normative values? “For the first time in history, a dynamic and globally connected civil society is emerging, independent of government,” wrote Don Eberly, who worked for. y. Nat. io. sit. many years in the US State Department (Eberly 2008, 278). He argued that civil society. n. al. er. groups have goals that “are all linked to the ethic of human worth and dignity, which. Ch. i n U. v. must be guarded and transmitted by a global civic culture … A diversified and tolerant. engchi. political culture can rise up from this subsoil of democratic civil society” (Eberly 2008, 289). Regarding classic international relations theories, global ethics is probably most related to constructivism. As Alexander Wendt argues, the global political arena fosters social interactions where countries’ “identities and interests are socially constructed” (Wendt 1999, 248). Key to his theory is the notion that different countries can foster a. 12. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(21) shared culture comprised of shared ideas which are then institutionalized and acted upon (Wendt 1999, 249). 1.3.5 Taiwan’s International Space Taiwan cannot directly take part in many of the geopolitical arenas Wendt referred to because it is excluded. This was not always the case. The Kuomintang as the Republic of China (ROC) was a founding member of the UN in 1945 and took a permanent seat on the influential security council. After the Kuomintang lost the. 治政 represent China, even as they no longer had control of大 the mainland. But this changed 立. Chinese civil war and fled to Taiwan in 1949, they retained the UN seat and claimed to. in 1971, when diplomatic maneuvering by other nations on behalf of the People’s. ‧ 國. 學. Republic of China (PRC) succeeded in expelling the ROC from the UN. No seat was. ‧. maintained for representing the people of Taiwan.. That isolation grew worse and worse, as Beijing’s economic reforms in 1979. y. Nat. er. io. sit. ushered in a new era of Chinese wealth and power. As a small nation of only 23 million, Taiwan has seldom been able to leverage its own successful economy and. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. democratization to gain access to international political organizations. Only under the. engchi. presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, who endorsed the PRC’s preferred verbiage regarding the “1992 Consensus” that means there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of that China, did Taiwan make limited progress. Under Ma Ying-jeou’s Kuomintang presidency, Taiwan was allowed to be an observer at World Health Organization assemblies, and Beijing did not object to Taiwan being represented at the Asia–Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2008 annual meeting. Beijing’s acquiescence was critical to these endeavors.. 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(22) Some scholars of cross-strait relations believe Ma had the right approach, and that negotiating with Beijing is the only way to expand global participation. “Beijing’s ﬂexibility in its application of the ‘one China’ principle and the Ma administration’s practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei’s demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability” (Wang, Lee and Yu 2011, 249). But that endorsement of the PRC’s insistence that Taiwan is part of China is opposed by many in Taiwan, including politicians in the Democratic Progressive Party. 治政大 Now, the DPP is trying to at Taiwan’s increasingly close relations with the mainland. 立 (DPP), which came to power in 2016 after a wave of student protests expressing anger. expand Taiwan’s international participation while maintaining that Taiwan is an. ‧ 國. 學. independent country.. ‧. As Jacques deLisle wrote shortly after the inauguration of independence-leaning DPP president Tsai Ing-wen, politicians in Taiwan seeking to expand the island’s. y. Nat. er. io. sit. international space “must do so in the face of continuing, and possibly increasing, resistance from Beijing and amid uncertainty about the policies of key states, including. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. China and the United States” (deLisle 2016, 550). Taiwan was not allowed to continue. engchi. observing World Health Organization meetings, but it maintained its spot at APEC meetings. Observers believe a tough road lies ahead for Taiwan’s quest to gain formal representation on the world stage. The question I seek to probe is, given Taiwan’s exclusion from formal international bodies, can NGOs help Taiwan interact with the world so that Taiwan can take part in influencing and absorbing global norms? 1.3.6 NGOs in Taiwan. 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(23) As formal avenues of interaction narrowed, however, informal ones proliferated. Taiwan’s democratization ushered in an era of interaction through global NGOs. In order to understand how this happened requires a brief historical overview. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, writing about the history of civil society in Taiwan, said there are several distinct periods to distinguish. The first, which he called political forces in absolute command, lasted from 1947 to 1962. “All aspects of public life were placed completely under the control of the party-military state … Taiwanese civil society. 治政 Suppression and coercion were immediately applied大 to any autonomous demands” 立. fell under the complete control of the Mainlander-dominated central state apparatus.. (Hsiao 1990, 164).. ‧ 國. 學. The second period lasted from 1963 to 1978. Hsiao called it economic forces in. ‧. relative command. “Economic forces gradually emerged as the KMT state incorporated economic growth into its priority agenda for ruling Taiwan … Economic considerations. y. Nat. io. sit. were taken very seriously, allowing the rise of new economic interests to articulate and. n. al. er. exert their influence on the state” (Hsiao 1990, 164). During the end of this period,. Ch. i n U. v. kernels of civil society began to appear, but these remained mostly confined to intellectuals (Hsiao 1990, 165).. engchi. The third period lasted from 1979 to 1990, when he was writing. He called it social forces in mobilization. “In the past ten years, the civil society, across ethnic and class lines, has developed a new life cycle” (Hsiao 1990, 165). New civil society groups grew more bold in pressuring the state for change. “One means was to voice grievances growing out of the serious social problems facing Taiwan. The other, and more direct,. 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(24) way was to organize collective action, with demands that the state should respond” (Hsiao 1990, 165). Hsiao went on to say that these protest movements, nurtured by civil society, began to advocate systematic change. “One objective of Taiwan's protest movements of the 1980s has been to acquire autonomy from the domination of the authoritarian state. Reform has been sought not only of a specific public policy or a specific function of the state apparatus but also to transform the power relations between the authoritarian state and the mobilizing civil society” (Hsiao 1990, 165-166). That systematic change. 立. 治政大culminating eventually did come,. in Taiwan’s first. presidential election in 1996. Steadily thereafter, Taiwan’s civil society activity became. ‧ 國. 學. more international, not only with Taiwan’s NGOs playing a role globally, but also with. ‧. international NGOs coming to Taiwan in order to expand their influence in Asia. “According to governmental registration records, currently there are more than 40,000. y. Nat. io. sit. NGOs in Taiwan, and more than 2,000 of them have conducted cross-national activities. n. al. er. or are affiliated with international NGOs” wrote Wei-chin Lee in 2012 in an OP-ED for Brookings.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. These NGOs take many forms, but a majority of them focus on poverty, healthcare, and disaster relief (Lee 2012). According to Lee, NGOs can often be used as a placeholder for Taiwan’s perspective in international affairs. “NGOs offer Taiwan visibility and a voice for diplomatic sustainability as well as a sense of dignity, respect, and self-worth for an associational life in the global community. Participation in them is an important part of Taiwan’s‘huolu waijiao’ (活路外交) or‘flexible diplomacy’”(Lee. 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(25) 2012). In fact, civil society is seen as so important to the government that Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) even has a department dedicated to NGO interaction. 1.4 Analytical Approach In order to assess my research question, I will employ a qualitative analysis that focuses on two case studies. The first case involves advocacy done by an international French NGO called Reporters Without Borders 無國界記者 (Reporters Sans Frontieres, RSF), which is headquartered in Paris but operates a foreign bureau in Taipei. The. 政治大人權促進會 (TAHR), a local Taiwanese human rights NGO that often collaborates with 立. second case involves advocacy done by the Taiwan Association for Human Rights 臺灣. ‧ 國. 學. other human rights NGOs around the world. These two case studies, one involving a foreign NGO and one involving a domestic NGO, will offer two distinct demonstrations. ‧. of how Taiwan is able to influence international institutions through civil society. As. sit. y. Nat. Taiwan is excluded from formal international institutions, civil society allows Taiwan to. er. io. access a “track II diplomacy,” or informal, people-based diplomacy.. al. n. iv n C h etwonNGOs which Taiwanese employees of these g c hacti toU influence global political bodies Through interviews and analyses of public statements, I will detail the ways in. from which Taiwan is excluded. The independent variable here is Taiwanese people’s participation in civil society organizations, and the dependent variable is whether Taiwan gains an international voice as a result. In order to measure this, I will assess whether Taiwanese people are able to actually change the proceedings of international institutions through the indirect channel of NGOs. If the answer is yes, then the proceedings of relevant international institutions must be different from the counterfactual of if Taiwanese people were not taking part in the NGOs. I will also. 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(26) discuss whether and how Taiwan’s global influence through NGOs advances its own geopolitical interests. In order to carry out this research, I will first conduct interviews with employees of these NGOs. These interviews will be held with both Taiwanese employees and, if relevant, interviews with citizens of other countries who work at the NGOs. I will also interview people who work at the intergovernmental organizations in question to confirm they were influenced by the NGO advocacy done by Taiwanese citizens. I will also. 治政大able to assess how Taiwanese research. By conducting these interviews, I will be better 立. interview other experts on civil society in Taiwan for general advice on conducting my. employees interact with people at geopolitical institutions around the world as part of. ‧ 國. 學. their work. How are Taiwanese NGO workers able to influence global discourse on. ‧. issues like human rights? What are the cases in which Taiwanese people can influence international organizations from which they are excluded?. y. Nat. io. sit. My interviews will therefore comprise questions about the global aspect of NGO. n. al. er. workers’ jobs. I will ask my interviewees to detail for me their interactions with other. Ch. i n U. v. international NGOs or intergovernmental organizations. For example, I will have. engchi. Anonymous A, a Taiwanese employee of RSF, tell me about case reports he/she has written which have been taken to the UN Human Rights Committee by his/her colleagues in Paris. Was he/she able to play a similar role as if he/she was a citizen of a member state of the UN? In the case of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR), I will ask Taiwanese employees about interactions they have with international human rights groups. What are other international NGOs with which they are in frequent contact?. 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(27) What transpires in their interactions? Is TAHR able to affect the global discourse on human rights? Are they able to play an indirect role in intergovernmental organizations from which Taiwan is excluded? Another important question I will ask is what are they not able to do. What are the weaknesses of trying to affect intergovernmental bodies through NGOs? What are some instances in which these employees have experienced exclusion? This will allow me to assess the limitations of track II diplomacy.. 治政 with publicly available documents. For example, much大 of the RSF case reports filed to 立 The interviews will likely last around half an hour each and will be corroborated. the UN Human Rights Council eventually become publicly available.. ‧ 國. 學. I’ve chosen these two cases because each sheds a valuable light into a different. ‧. form of NGO interaction: RSF elucidates the workings of a foreign NGO in Taiwan, while TAHR shows the case of a Taiwanese NGO. Taiwan has both many local NGOs. y. Nat. er. io. sit. and many international ones. While Taiwanese NGOs may primarily seek to yield an outward effect of influence, and international NGOs may primarily seek to yield an. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. inward effect of influencing Taiwan, I am interested to probe whether the distinction is. engchi. so clear-cut, or if it is in fact more fluid, with both local and international NGOs having both inward and outward paths of influence. These two cases are important because they resemble the values Taiwan has worked hard to foster since the end of martial law. Both NGOs do work relating to human rights and are emblematic of Taiwan’s shift away from authoritarianism several decades ago.. 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(28) This is important because human rights is an issue which Taiwan has the opportunity to capitalize on for soft power. Also, both NGOs do work that is critical of China’s human rights record, which is important because China is the source of Taiwan’s isolation. At international forums like the UN Human Rights Council, China is now slowly pushing for the world to recognize an alternative definition of human rights. Under China’s new definition, human rights include the right to peace, security, education, and pursuit of wealth, but human rights do not include other freedoms like. 治政 succeeds may be affected by Taiwan’s influence via 大 NGOs, as Taiwan can offer an 立. freedom of the press, assembly, expression, religion, or the right to vote. Whether China. important Chinese-speaking rebuttal to China’s truncated articulation of human rights.. ‧ 國. 學. In order to measure the hypothesis, I will firstly seek to directly confirm that. ‧. staffers at the UN and EU did consult the advocacy documents put forward by the Taiwanese civil society workers in my case studies. This will be done through. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. question.. sit. communicating with staffers at the UN and EU who were privy to the deliberations in. Ch. i n U. v. Secondly, I will classify the level of influence achieved by advocacy into three. engchi. tiers. The first tier is the most basic. It incorporates general advocacy made for the public, designed to draw support for a particular cause, but not likely affecting decisions made by policy-makers. A promotional tweet or blog post could fit this description. The second tier of advocacy influence is more sophisticated. It involves targeting specific actors, often politicians or other leaders, who have the power to act on the issue in question. This advocacy may be open to the public, but it usually focuses on specific events in order to try to shape the way policy-makers will behave at those events. A. 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(29) limitation of this second tier is that the advocacy done, while homing in on specific leaders and events, inevitably falls into a general issue category such as human rights or environmental concerns. Therefore, this advocacy finds itself situated within a vast body of discourse touching upon the same topics found in the advocacy. This causes the existence of possible confounding variables when evaluating whether a certain act of advocacy caused a certain outcome. The third tier is the most narrow and precise. Like the second tier, it involves. 治政 goes directly to the decision-makers in question, so we大 can be sure that no confounding 立 time-specific advocacy to a certain influential audience. But unlike the second tier, it. variables exist, and we can say for certain that the act of advocacy caused a certain. ‧ 國. 學. outcome.. ‧. My theoretical framework draws mostly from constructivist international relations theory, as I argue that its focus on social interactions and shared values relates most. y. Nat. er. io. sit. closely with the practice of civil society. Taiwan has been excluded from most formal international institutions, and therefore has no way to take part in the legal benefits of. n. al. liberalism.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. And although Taiwan relies on a realist military relationship with the United States for survival, it cannot use its military or monetary power for substantial influence, as China always looms more powerful. I therefore argue that constructivist shared values fostered from international interactions offer the best theoretical framework from which to view Taiwan’s international influence. The theory of constructivism arises from the concept that “Many structures we take to be immutable in IR are actually embedded social relationships that are. 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(30) contingent to a large extent on how nation-states think about and interact with one another” (Sterling-Folker 2013, 130). According to the constructivist paradigm, “we create our own security dilemmas and competitions by interacting in particular ways with one another so that these outcomes appear to be inevitable” (Sterling-Folker 2013, 128). As prominent constructivist thinker Alexander Wendt posited, the international political structure gives rise to social interactions where nations’ “identities and interests are socially constructed” (Wendt 1999, 248). An important aspect of his argument is that. 治政大 composed of shared ideas different leaders and societies can construct a shared culture 立 which are then normalized into institutions and influence behavioral patterns (Wendt. ‧ 國. 學. 1999, 249). This last element about institutionalization is not unimportant. “Once ideas. ‧. have influenced organizational design, their influence will be reflected in the incentives of those in the organization and those whose interests are served by it” (Goldstein and. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Keohane 1993, 20).. The ideological infrastructure underpinning these institutions comprises norms. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. with “collective expectations with ‘regulative’ effects on the proper behavior of actors. engchi. with a given identity,” (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 679-680). Norms, if accepted by groups of people over time, become subconscious understandings, and “such collective understandings, and their accompanying social identities and interests, can become reified or embedded over time so that alternatives seem unimaginable” (Sterling-Folker 2013, 128). For this particular thesis, it is important to consider human rights and civil society through the lens of constructivism. Can Taiwanese citizens contribute to the. 22. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(31) reinforcement of global human rights norms through international civil society interactions? Will its global civil society engagement foster a shared culture with citizens of other countries? Can Taiwan help frame a global human rights discourse that socially constructs other states’ interests to align with its own? As Wendt noted, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992, 395). In a world governed by disparate governments vying for power and influence, can Taiwan mold the institutional design of organizations from which it’s excluded, thereby affecting the incentives of individuals in those institutions? Could Taiwan’s values coalesce. 立. 治政大 countries with those of other. so that one day. alternatives to those values would seem unimaginable?. ‧ 國. 學. 1.5 Outline of Thesis. ‧. Chapter one of this thesis introduced Taiwan’s civil society situation and political landscape, then detailed the motivations and goals of this research. It then featured a. y. Nat. er. io. sit. literature review that delved into the origins of civil society and how its meaning has shifted over the course of human history. The literature review also discussed how civil. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. society plays into Taiwan’s politics and international interactions. Chapter one then. engchi. included an analytical approach to explain my research methodology. Chapter two of this thesis discusses Taiwan’s precarious position on the world stage and how NGOs affect that position. From which international organizations is Taiwan excluded? What are the implications of Taiwan’s exclusion? How do NGOs help Taiwan play a role in these international organizations? What are the implications of Taiwan’s global discourse via NGOs? What are the strengths and weaknesses of NGO diplomacy?. 23. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(32) Chapter three of this thesis discusses the specific case of Reporters Without Borders (RSF). What are the origins of the French NGO and what are its operations in its headquarters in Paris? When and why did it open its office in Taipei? How does the Taipei office, together with the Paris office, play a role in international institutions? How does this promote Taiwan’s perspective on the global stage? Chapter four of this thesis delves into the case of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR). How did the organization begin? What are its Taiwan activities?. 治政 How does this interaction promote Taiwan’s perspective大 on the global stage? 立. What are its global activities? How does it interact with international human rights NGOs?. A conclusion discusses the study’s findings and make recommendations for. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. further research.. Ch. engchi. 24. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(33) Chapter 2 Taiwan on the Global Stage This chapter discusses Taiwan’s precarious position in global politics and considers how its exclusion affects its ability to pursue its interests. This chapter also provides the reader with background information regarding strategic and tactical power dynamics between Taiwan, China, and the United States that make Taiwan a unique middle power caught in the middle of a great power competition between the U.S. and China. Chapter 2 then delves into the contentious topic of ideological legitimacy for the. 治政 discusses what implications this holds for Taiwan’s 大 civil society. Lastly, the chapter 立 governments of Taiwan and China through the contested lens of democratic values, and. details the strengths and weaknesses of Taiwan’s track II diplomacy, or diplomacy. ‧ 國. 學. through civil society.. ‧. 2.1 Taiwan’s Exclusion and Strategic Considerations. Excluded from many of the international political arenas in which countries. y. Nat. er. io. sit. pursue their own interests and espouse their own ideologies, Taiwan has no direct avenue to influence global politics in its favor. It cannot formally express its identity in. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. relation to other polities on the global stage. That leaves economic, military, and civil. engchi. society interactions as some of the only channels through which Taiwan can exert influence. Taiwan’s. current. government,. under. President. Tsai. Ing-wen. of. the. independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has fought an uphill battle trying to gain representation for Taiwan at international organizations. In addition to not gaining access to the United Nations, Taiwan was excluded in 2019 from the World Health Organization (WHO). As a February 2019 article in Focus Taiwan News Channel. 25. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(34) noted, Taiwan acted as an observer in the World Health Assembly from 2009-2016, but since 2017 “China has persuaded the WHO not to invite Taiwan, in line with Beijing's hardline stance on cross-Taiwan Strait relations after President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the Democratic Progressive Party took office in May 2016” (Yeh 2019). Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lamented Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO in a tweet on February 18, 2019 scheduled to coincide with World Health Day:. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 2.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tweet Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC (Taiwan). Taiwan’s unique exclusion from international political fora takes place amid a severe disadvantage and an empowering advantage. Its disadvantage is China’s. 26. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(35) relentless campaign to block any and all displays of Taiwanese identity or manifestations of de facto sovereignty. Taiwan’s advantage is its partnership with the United States. Although the U.S. does not formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, it provides crucial support to Taiwan by selling the island advanced weaponry and maintains extensive trade links with the island’s economy. In the American foreign policy mindset, Taiwan is an important ally in the longterm strategic standoff with China, which shows signs of developing into a new Cold. 治政大 tariffs on Chinese goods, even before the election of Donald Trump, who imposed 立. War. Growing unease about China burst to the surface of United States official circles. initiating a trade war that simmers to this day. Official talk of the threat China poses to. ‧ 國. 學. the U.S. has ranged from then Secretary of Defence Ash Carter’s announcement in. ‧. February 2016 that great power competition will color the Pentagon’s priorities for the foreseeable future to FBI Director Christopher Wray in April 2019 saying that China is. y. Nat. er. io. sit. now America’s biggest threat due to its economic and intelligence espionage (Freedberg and Clark; DeAeth).. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. In the midst of this strategic rivalry, Taiwan plays a crucial role in preventing. engchi. China’s expansion into the Western Pacific and maintaining America’s military advantage. Ian Easton, a scholar specializing in the military dimensions of the USTaiwan-China relationship, wrote in a 2016 article: Every professional American strategist since Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur has recognized that Taiwan is a center of gravity in the AsiaPacific. The island sits astride the world's busiest maritime and air superhighways, right in the middle of the first island chain, a defensive barrier for keeping Chinese naval power in check. America does not need Taiwan as a base for its soldiers, marines, sailors, or airmen, but it does require that the island remain in the hands of a friendly government. If Taiwan were lost, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines would become. 27. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(36) extremely vulnerable to the threat of Chinese naval blockades and air assaults. For this reason (and many others), any PRC attempt to gain control of Taiwan would almost certainly be regarded as an attack on the vital interests of the United States, and therefore repelled by any means necessary, including military force. (3-4) As mentioned, Taiwan plays a crucial function in keeping Chinese forces at bay relative to American troop deployments and allies in Asia. The following is an illustration of the strategic importance of Taiwan’s location in Asia:. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 2.2 Island Chain Display Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and Project 2049 Institute. 28. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(37) The map shows how Taiwan is at a vital position to assist the U.S. in keeping Chinese forces within the first island chain. 2.2 The Ideological Battle For Legitimacy Beyond strategic and tactical considerations, Taiwan’s partnership with the United States and opposition to China take on ideological dimensions of liberal democratic values emphasizing checks and balances and individual rights versus authoritarian values emphasizing collective well-being and state control. While these. 治政 material power comparisons between nations, they 大 play a huge role in the lived 立. questions concerning values and political legitimacy may seem less important than raw. experience of everyday people. Political values are the essential cleavage between. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan and China in terms of how their respective leaders claim political legitimacy, and. ‧. this cleavage has foreign policy ramifications.. The United States is a country that prides itself on its democratic values and. y. Nat. er. io. sit. unabashedly seeks to spread those values to the world in the belief that doing so will make the world a safer place. This perspective also has deep implications for the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. international community. As Senator and 2020 presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren. engchi. notes in a 2019 article in Foreign Affairs, “There’s a story Americans like to tell ourselves about how we built a liberal international order—one based on democratic principles, committed to civil and human rights, accountable to citizens, bound by the rule of law, and focused on economic prosperity for all” (Warren 2019). Warren later argues that in upholding and further building this liberal international order, the United States should not shy away from defending those who advocate for democratic values in the face of pressure from repressive governments: “Around the. 29. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(38) world, we should aggressively promote transparency, call out kleptocracy, and combat the creeping influence of corruption. And we should stand with those who bravely fight for openness and pluralism in Moscow, Beijing, and beyond” (Warren 2019). Since Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s, it has come to represent a shining ideological victory for the U.S. over China, as the world now has a Chinese democracy, disproving the Chinese Communist Party’s argument that democracy and human rights are incompatible with Chinese culture. In touching on the ideological implications Taiwan’s democracy holds for China in his 2016 article, Ian Easton notes: “The CCP. 治政 views Taiwan, which exists as a free and independent大 state that is officially called the 立. Republic of China (ROC), as a grave threat to its grip on power. Taiwan is anathema to. ‧ 國. 學. the PRC because it serves as a beacon of freedom for Chinese speaking people. ‧. everywhere” (2).. Cédric Alviani, RSF’s Taipei bureau chief who I interviewed on March 26, 2019,. y. Nat. er. io. sit. echoed this sentiment:. Taiwan represents the best we could hope for the Chinese society because in a few decades Taiwan has managed to turn itself into a peaceful society that is very respectful of the human rights, of the rule of law, of the democratic process. So this is the blatant example that what the Chinese authorities say has no ground. President Xi Jinping likes to say that democracy cannot work in a Chinese culture context, that freedom of the press cannot apply in an Asian culture. All these things are obviously not correct, and Taiwan is the proof of this.. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Taiwan, for its part, engages in democracy promotion as part of its foreign policy strategy. One example of this is the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, established in 2002 by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and founded by the Taiwanese government. The organization describes its own mandate on its website as follows: “Domestically, the TFD strives to play a positive role in consolidating Taiwan's democracy and fortifying. 30. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(39) its commitment to human rights; internationally, the Foundation hopes to become a strong link in the world democratic network, joining forces with related organizations around the world” (TFD, Background). Also on the organization’s website is an explanation of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy’s dedication to democratic values from the chairman, Su Jia-Chyuan: “In the near future, not only will we persist walking down on the road of democratic reforms, but also are willing to perform our duties and to share our valuable experiences to the. 治政 experiences and human rights ideas to every corner of 大 the world” (Su). 立. international society without holding anything back in order to spread our democratic. One example of a democracy promotion activity put on by the foundation is a. ‧ 國. 學. youth conference for young promoters of human rights from all around Asia called the. ‧. Asia Young Leaders for Democracy program (AYLD). A web page explains: “Each year, young practitioners advocating for democracy or human rights across the countries in. y. Nat. discussions, and site visits” (TFD, What is the AYLD?).. n. al. Ch. er. io. sit. Asia are selected to participate in the AYLD which empowers them through lectures,. i n U. v. The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy is proof that Taiwanese leaders take. engchi. liberal democratic values seriously and consider it worthwhile to invest taxpayer money to try to spread and safeguard those values in the region. Within the big-picture ideological struggle between China and liberal states like Taiwan and the U.S., NGOs play a critical role. Less attached to the interests of particular countries, NGOs are often seen as relatively free from conflicts of interest and therefore objective and trustworthy in setting global discourse. For Taiwan, NGOs play an even more important role than in most countries because of Taiwan’s global political. 31. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(40) exclusion. In the earlier mentioned OP-ED for Brookings by Wei-chin Lee in 2012, he writes: An active push for enthusiastic engagement in international activities through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has surged as an alternative approach to the expansion of Taiwan’s international space. NGOs have long been cherished as an avenue through which Taiwan can navigate the turbulence of globalization, the rapid revolution of information technology, and the high degrees of complexity and interdependence in numerous transnational and interconnected issue areas across which various powers and interests compound and compete. By complementing the role and function of states, NGOs are an international venue for the representation and articulation of Taiwan’s public interest in areas such as the promotion of human rights, environmental sustainability, local community infrastructure construction, public health advancement, agricultural assistance, and humanitarian reliefs. They also represent an important forum in which Taiwan can share its experiences, learn from the experiences of others, and develop networks of connections. (Lee 2012). 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. As will be discussed in detail in this thesis, I argue a similar point to Lee’s. I argue that. ‧. Taiwan’s NGOs play an important role in granting it a way to influence organizations it does not have direct access to.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. 2.3 The Implications of Taiwan’s Exclusion and NGO Diplomacy Taiwan faces immense challenges as a country without a formal voice. Its. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. exclusion leaves it unable to represent its own interests in some of the most important. engchi. decision-making deliberations in the world. In particular cases, its isolation may leave its citizens’ lives on the line, as in the case of health. A Time article from May 2017 detailed the issue of Taiwan’s exclusion from the World Health Assembly: “Experts warn that Taiwan’s exclusion from the assembly, the decision-making body of the World Health Organization, creates a ‘dangerous’ public health risk for East Asia and beyond” (Smith 2017).. 32. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(41) This issue hit home in 2003 when Asian countries scrambled to control an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) that originated in China’s Guangdong province. An article in Nature from April 2003 investigated the trouble Taiwanese medical researchers had in obtaining crucial information on the virus because Taiwan is excluded from the World Health Organization; in the article, Taiwanese researchers complained of being denied crucial samples and information that would have aided the fight against SARS on the island (Cyranoski 2003). Unreliable access to global health information is one of Taiwan’s most severe disadvantages it faces because of its exclusion.. 立. 政治大. Because of its exclusion from formal participation in international institutions,. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan is forced to rely heavily on soft power for impacting geopolitics. NGOs are one. ‧. of Taiwan’s main soft power assets. The first scholar to use the term soft power was Joseph Nye, who introduced it to articulate a country’s influence that derides not from. y. Nat. io. sit. economic or military strength, but from other less quantifiable attributes. He later. n. al. er. explained it as “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the. Ch. i n U. v. agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive interaction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye 2011, 21).. engchi. Contrary to realism, an international relations theory which relies mainly on material power dynamics to explain international interactions, soft power posits that preferred outcomes can be pursued by means other than force and coercion. Other countries can be persuaded, coopted, inspired. Soft power allows a country like the United States to get other countries to act in its best interest through appeal to shared ethical values, cultural appeal, and reverence of good governance. “Mutual democracy,. 33. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.

(42) liberal culture, and a deep network of transnational ties mean that anarchy has very different effects than realism predicts” (Nye 2011, 19). Another important aspect of soft power, relating also to constructivism, is the way we construct our own ontological existence through narratives. “By choosing particular narratives to justify our actions, we do not simply make sense of the world, as an epistemological positivist might assert, but actually make the world according to those narratives” (Sterling-Folker 2013, 132). A country’s narrative is one of its soft power. 治政大 legitimate policies, a positive Other soft power resources “include culture, values, 立. resources.. domestic model, a successful economy, and a competent military” (Nye 2011, 99). A. ‧ 國. 學. critical task for any country is power conversion, which essentially means using those. ‧. resources to obtain desired outcomes. “Whether the possession of power resources actually produces favorable behavior depends upon the context and the skills of the. y. Nat. io. sit. agent” (Nye 2011, 22).. n. al. er. One of Taiwan’s main soft power assets is civil society. There is certainly an. Ch. i n U. v. admiration for Taiwan among many human rights activists in Asia who live in less open. engchi. societies. Some of these activists have even relocated to Taiwan as a safe haven to engage in advocacy for democratic reform. As a quick example, human rights activists from Vietnam relocated to Taipei to run a website titled The Vietnamese, which publishes articles focusing on human rights abuses in Vietnam. Being a safe haven for liberal reformers makes Taiwan an influential place for many grassroots activists in Asia and beyond. 2.4 Conclusion. 34. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.004.2019.A06.