從緬甸重要人士之觀點探討羅興亞危機 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. The Rohingya Crisis – Perspectives of. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Key Actors in 政 the Burmese Society 治大立從緬甸重要人士之觀點探討羅興亞危機. er. io. sit. y. Nat. n. a Yannick Heinemann (韓克洋) iv. l C n U Advisor: h Sun, Tsai-wei (孫采薇) engchi. May 2019. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(2) Abstract Discrimination of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar as has been an issue for decades. Contrary to the hopes, the country’s democratic transition did not commence a comprehensive ethnic reconciliation. On the contrary, it laid the foundation for a largescale campaign of purposeful displacement of Rohingya in 2017. This thesis focuses on the framework of symbolic politics to assess the underlying drivers of Rohingya repressions since the country’s democratic transition. It assumes that goal –driven elites exploit ethnic cleavages in their favour. Under references to a myth-symbol complex, they deepen ethnic aversions to a point where a presumably hostile “other” has to be fended off for the sake of the prevalence of the in-group. Democratisation facilitates this process, as it creates an environment for unregulated competition, where actors expect benefits from ethnic outbidding. Based on public expressions made by key societal and political actors in Myanmar after the country’s democratisation, this thesis shows that indeed elites are responsible for creating an anti-Muslim narrative. Brought up by religious actors in Rakhine State and impelled by local ethno nationalist parties, this narrative increasingly defined the image of Muslims as a threat to Myanmar. As the central government under USDP rule first allied with chauvinist forces, and under the NLD turned a blind eye, the depiction of Rohingya transformed from “illegal immigrants” to a “terrorist threat”. Accordingly, measures to repress Muslims got more severe and eventually Rohingya were expelled without significant popular opposition. Thus, a direct connection between actors advancing Islamophobia and actual acts of ethnic violence can be inferred.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. y. Nat. sit. 緬甸若開邦的羅興亞穆斯林遭受了數十年的歧視待遇，並未因該國邁向民主過渡而有所轉. al. er. io. 變，甚至在 2017 年，更成為大規模族群仇恨運動的目標。本文的研究重點在探討緬甸自民. v i n Ch 益，操作族群槓桿，利用種種神話與政治符號所交織的語境，加深了主流社會族群對於 engchi U 「他者」的厭惡與「他者威脅」的想像。而「民主化」更激化了上述過程，因為它為不受 n. 主轉型以來，驅動仇視羅興亞人的根本因素與政治論述，其假設為政治菁英因其自私利. 管制的競爭創造了有利環境，在此各方行為者莫不期望從族群鬥爭中受益（如獲取選票）。本文以緬甸民主化後，中央政府、地方政府、與社會三層面的主要政治行為者的公開言論為研究基礎，並發現這些政治菁英們確實需為其創造了反穆斯林的敘事與氛圍負責。直言之，反穆斯林言論起初是由若開邦的激進僧侶提出，並受到當地民族主義政黨的推動，而使得越來越多當地居民相信穆斯林對緬甸造成威脅。在鞏發黨（USDP）統治下的中央政府，由於選舉考量，首先與沙文主義勢力結盟，而其後繼之的全國民主聯盟（NLD）政府並未改變此路線，甚至因為情勢惡化而進一步對羅興亞穆斯林從「非法移民」轉定義為「恐怖主義份子」。因此，鎮壓穆斯林的措施變得更加激烈，最終羅興亞穆斯林便在沒有受到民眾強烈反對的情況下被驅逐與清洗。總之，本文認為推動仇視伊斯蘭教的行為者，以及具體族群暴力行為，兩者間具有直接的相關性。. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(3) TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. - 1 1.1 Brief history of Myanmar prior to the democratisation ............................................................. - 2 1.2 Research questions .................................................................................................................... - 6 1.3 Theoretical framework .............................................................................................................. - 8 1.4 Research methods .................................................................................................................... - 10 Chapter II: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................... - 16 2.1 Ethnicity as a driver of conflict ............................................................................................... - 16 2.1.1 Historical Explanations .................................................................................................... - 17 2.1.2 Opportunity models .......................................................................................................... - 20 2.1.3 Motives and motivation .................................................................................................... - 24 2.1.4 The constructivist approach to ethnicity in conflicts ........................................................ - 27 -. 政治大. 2.1.5 Symbolic Politics a symbiosis .......................................................................................... - 30 2.2 Research on Rohingya discrimination in Myanmar ................................................................ - 31 -. 立. 2.2.1 Rohingya Identity and Claims to Rakhine Nativity.......................................................... - 31 -. ‧ 國. 學. 2.2.2 Rohingya discrimination .................................................................................................. - 33 2.2.3 Discrimination in the context of the democratisation process .......................................... - 35 2.2.4 Anti-Muslim sentiments ................................................................................................... - 36 -. ‧. 2.3 Major events of violence involving Rohingya since the democratic transition....................... - 43 Chapter III: KEY SOCIETAL ACTORS IN MYANMAR............................................................... - 48 -. Nat. sit. y. 3.1 The Tatmadaw ......................................................................................................................... - 48 3.1.1 Contemporary self-conception ......................................................................................... - 48 -. io. al. er. 3.1.2 Economic interests............................................................................................................ - 49 -. n. v i n Ch 3.1.4 Ethnic reconciliation......................................................................................................... - 52 engchi U 3.1.5 Justifying actor selection .................................................................................................. - 53 3.1.3 Cooperation with foreign countries and armed forces...................................................... - 51 -. 3.2 Thein Sein and the USDP ........................................................................................................ - 53 3.2.1 Economic Reform............................................................................................................. - 54 3.2.2 Foreign affairs .................................................................................................................. - 55 3.2.3 Strategy for ethnic reconciliation ..................................................................................... - 55 3.2.4 Stance towards constitutional change ............................................................................... - 56 3.2.5 Justifying actor selection .................................................................................................. - 57 3.3 Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD ............................................................................................. - 57 3.3.1 Economic reforms ............................................................................................................ - 58 3.3.2 Foreign relations ............................................................................................................... - 59 3.3.3 Strategy for ethnic reconciliation ..................................................................................... - 60 3.3.4 Stance on constitutional change ....................................................................................... - 61 3.3.5 Suu Kyi’s political philosophy ......................................................................................... - 62 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(4) 3.3.6 Suu Kyi’s leadership style ................................................................................................ - 62 3.3.7 Challenges to Suu Kyi and the NLD ................................................................................ - 63 3.3.8 Justifying actor selection .................................................................................................. - 66 3.4 Rakhine Parties ........................................................................................................................ - 67 3.4.1 Background to Rakhine State ........................................................................................... - 67 3.4.2 ANP and RNDP................................................................................................................ - 69 3.4.3 Stance towards ethnic reconciliation ................................................................................ - 70 3.4.4 Linkage with the local population .................................................................................... - 70 3.4.5 Affiliation with militant groups ........................................................................................ - 72 3.4.6 Opinion on other Muslims ................................................................................................ - 72 3.4.7 Justifying actor selection .................................................................................................. - 73 3.5 The Buddhist clergy and Wirathu............................................................................................ - 74 -. 政治大 3.5.3 Status of the clergy in contemporary Myanmar ............................................................... - 76 立 3.5.4 Justifying actor selection .................................................................................................. - 77 3.5.1 Buddhism and the state..................................................................................................... - 74 3.5.2 Previous religious involvement in politics ....................................................................... - 75 -. ‧ 國. 學. 3.6 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................ - 78 Chapter IV: ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTED CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS ............................... - 79 -. ‧. 4.1. The Thein Sein/USDP government ........................................................................................ - 79 4.1.1 Thein Sein’s inauguration – a promising start? ................................................................ - 80 -. sit. y. Nat. 4.1.2 Post 2012 election – giving in to popular demands .......................................................... - 81 4.2 The Tatmadaw ......................................................................................................................... - 89 -. io. al. er. 4.2.1 Strategy concerning Rohingya ......................................................................................... - 89 -. n. v i n C hLeague for Democracy 4.3 Aung San Suu Kyi and the National .................................................. - 99 U i e h n gc 4.3.1 Suu Kyi in the opposition ................................................................................................. - 99 4.2.2 Attitude towards Rohingya ............................................................................................... - 92 -. 4.3.2 Statements around the 2012 by-election......................................................................... - 100 4.3.3 Suu Kyi as a member of parliament ............................................................................... - 102 4.3.4 Suu Kyi and NLD as ruling party ................................................................................... - 102 4.3.5 Hiding behind alibi commissions ................................................................................... - 103 4.3.6 Build-up and reaction to the 2017 violence .................................................................... - 106 4.4. Summary .............................................................................................................................. - 112 4.5 Comparison ........................................................................................................................... - 115 Chapter V: ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL LEVEL ........................................................................ - 120 5.1 Rakhine parties ...................................................................................................................... - 120 5.1.1 The parties’ early attitude ............................................................................................... - 121 5.1.2 Successful linkage between 2012 and 2014 – identifying Rohingya as a threat ............ - 122 5.1.3 The parties’ attack on Rohingya past 2012 .................................................................... - 124 5.1.4 Reactions to the 2017 violence ....................................................................................... - 127 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(5) 5.1.5 Run up for the 2018 by-election ..................................................................................... - 129 5.1.6 Ties to the Tatmadaw ..................................................................................................... - 130 5.1.7 Successful lobbying ........................................................................................................ - 131 5.2 The Buddhist clergy .............................................................................................................. - 134 5.2.1 Emergence of the 969 Movement and Ma Ba Tha ......................................................... - 135 5.2.2 Good relations of Ma Ba Tha and USDP? ..................................................................... - 137 5.2.3 Methods of spreading their narrative .............................................................................. - 139 5.2.4 Wirathu’s and other monks’ narrative ............................................................................ - 142 5.2.5 Evolution of the anti-Muslim narrative and respective demands ................................... - 146 5.2.6 Why engage in politics? ................................................................................................. - 148 5.2.7 Lobbying efforts ............................................................................................................. - 150 5.3 Summary ............................................................................................................................... - 153 -. 政治大 Bibiliography ................................................................................................................................... - 170 立 5.4 Comparison ........................................................................................................................... - 155 -. Chapter VI: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... - 159 -. ‧ 國. 學. Table of Figures and Tables. ‧. Figure 1- Map of Myanmar and Rakhine(Rohingya territory (light red) added by the author) .......... - 3 Figure 2 - Puzzle.................................................................................................................................. - 7 Figure 3- Resources ........................................................................................................................... - 13 Figure 4 - Incidents in Rakhine State ................................................................................................ - 45 Figure 5 - Process leading to severe expulsion ............................................................................... - 167 -. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Table 1 - USDP ................................................................................................................................. - 88 Table 2 - Tatmadaw ........................................................................................................................... - 99 Table 3- Suu Kyi and NLD ............................................................................................................. - 111 Table 4- Rakhine Parties ................................................................................................................. - 134 Table 5- Chauvinist Monks ............................................................................................................. - 153 -. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(6) CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION With the third and fourth wave of democratisation and the end of the Cold War, interstate conflicts have declined while intrastate violence emerged as the most common form of conflict. Reasons for these often-lethal encounters vary from case to case and frequently multiple non-state actors and at least one state-actor are involved at the same time. Ethnic cleavages and tensions are often involved, but research on the conditions under which ethnicity causes or prolongs a conflict has not produced a universal approach. Approaches are as diverse as the nature of different internal conflicts. Having more than 135 different ethnic groups with their respective language and culture, Myanmar seems prone to ethnic conflicts. The country is. 治政大 and recognition of national majority of these revolve around demands for self-determination 立 minorities. One of the groups that is not officially recognised by the Burmese government are indeed one of the regions that has been ridden by internal conflict for several decades. A. ‧ 國. 學. the Rohingya. Despite being resident in their area, presumably even before the Burmese state gained independence from its colonial ruler, they are deprived of citizens’ rights and denounced. ‧. as illegal Bengali immigrants. Their religion and language make them easily identifiable as foreigners by Burmese Buddhist, who have grown susceptible to the narrative of a Muslim. y. Nat. sit. takeover. Since its founding, the Burmese State has taken up the promise to protect the Buddhist. al. er. io. population from external threats. In this course, previous military governments have. n. disenfranchised Rohingya and attempted to disperse them in the name of regulating illegal. Ch. i n U. v. immigration. Some of these measures have genocidal character, ranging from murder and. engchi. abduction to rape, destruction of property and forced birth control. After decades of military dictatorship and isolation, the country finally developed a functioning democracy in the first decade of the new millennium, drawing a growing international attention and interest by human rights organisations and scholars of democratisation and ethnic conflict. Hopes were high that the new government would be more concerned about human rights issues and inclusion of minorities. However, up to now no considerable progress has been observed. The democratisation instead has contributed to the deepening of ethnic cleavages, and advanced the Rohingya expulsion. This thesis intends to examine the political actors responsible for Rohingya discriminations, their motivation, argumentation, conduct and how democracy encourages the exploitation of ethnicity.. -1-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(7) 1.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF MYANMAR PRIOR TO THE DEMOCRATISATION Today Myanmar is a state with great ethnic diversity. A census identified 135 ethnic groups within Burmese territory.1 In 2014, a vast majority, constituting 88% of the Burmese population, are Buddhists, while Christians and Muslims make up 6.2% and 4.3% respectively. A major part of the more than 2 million Burmese Muslims lived in Myanmar’s western province Rakhine.2 Rohingya, in particular, inhabit the stretch of land along the coast in Rakhine’s north between the State’s northern Border to Bangladesh and Sittwe and the area between Buthidaung and Rathidaung (see Fig. 1). After the end of British colonial rule and during the following nation building, the Bamar-ethnicity and Buddhism came to dominate state and society. Consequently, supressed. 政治大 present for most of second part of the 20 century. Even now, after democratic transition and 立 efforts to negotiate a peace or ceasefire agreement, clashes between ethnic armies and security minorities engaged in violent protest for self-determination. This state of civil war remained th. ‧ 國. 學. forces are still a regular occurrence.. Early Burmese history shows influences from Chinese, Tibetan, Thai and Cambodian. ‧. as well as Indian culture, with Hinduism and Buddhism arriving via trade routes with India and. y. Nat. Sri Lanka. Around the 11th century, an emerging ethnically Burmese pagan kingdom spread out. sit. along the Irrawaddy Valley and incorporated smaller local tribes and cultures. The kingdom. n. al. er. io. adopted Buddhism as state religion and served as its protector, allowing the religious. v. community to grow continuously. Yet, the religious society was not exclusive and allowed for cultural and religious pluralism.. 3. Ch. engchi. i n U. 1. Nick Cheesman, "How in Myanmar “National Races” Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya," Journal of Contemporary Asia 47, no. 3 (2017a)., 8. 2 "The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census," in Census Atlas Myanmar (Department of Population; Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, 2014)., 26. 3 Azeem Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide, (Oxford University Press, 2016)., 34-35, 37-38. -2-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(8) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. FIGURE 1- MAP OF MYANMAR AND RAKHINE(ROHINGYA TERRITORY (LIGHT RED) ADDED BY THE AUTHOR)4. After a series of wars with the British Empire, Burma (including Arakan) became a British colony in 1886. The colonial ruler focused on the central regions and the exploitation of. 4. MIMU UN Cartographic Section, "Rakhine State, Myanmar (as of 16 Jul 2013)," ed. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2013).. -3-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(9) its resources. Frontier regions remained relatively autonomous.5 The British governed Burma under the principle of “divide and rule”. On the one hand, they set up a centralised state and extensive bureaucracy closely tied to British India. On the other hand, they heavily restricted power of local leaders, marginalizing the Buddhist and Bamar majority.6 The proximity of the colonies of British India and British Burma furthermore facilitated immigration of Indian workers.7 Additionally, the British recruited non-Bamar ethnic groups for administrative and military positions, contributing to further separation between Bamar and Indian immigrants in the central areas and other ethnic groups in the periphery. 8 Consequently, the country’s demographics were coined by “plural societies”, several ethnic communities that coexisted but never merged into a single political unit.9 During the turbulent decades of the First World War, Great Depression and Second World War, anti-colonial movements and hardened identities. 治政大 of the Burmese Independence hostilities. Due to considerable influence and armed resistance 立 occupation, Burmese independence was realized in 1948. Army, against British and Japanese formed and rejection of British colonisers and their Indian supporters grew into occasional 10. ‧ 國. 學. Postcolonial Burma inherited a complex mixture of ethnic groups, whose territories were included in the Burmese state. Aung San, General in the Burmese Independence army and. ‧. father of Aung San Suu Kyi, had laid the foundation for a multi-ethnic Burmese federal union in crafting the Panglong agreement in 1947. This agreement allowed administrative autonomy. y. Nat. sit. for frontier states, with the prospect of independence if the union should fail. Based on the. er. io. agreement, the Union of Burma was founded in 1948. Regardless of the inclusive idea of the. al. v i n disenchantment of multiple minorities, similar liberties as other groups. C hwhich were not given U i e h n g carose and eventually led to the disintegration As a result, multiple insurgencies of ethnic groups n. Panglong Agreement, the federation experienced a domination of the Bamar majority and a. of the union.11 The military, led by Ne Win, seized power in 1962, stating that the coup was necessary to prevent chaos and disorder. However, insurgencies prevailed with 25 armed groups existing. 5. S.C. Saha, Perspectives on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence or the Politics of Conviction? (Lexington Books, 2006)., 56. 6 Kim Jolliffe, "Ethnic Armed Conflic and Territorial Administration in Myanmar," ed. The Asian Foundation (Yangon, Myanmar: The Asia Foundation, 2015)., 9. 7 Carl H. Landé, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia," Studies in Comparative International Development 33, no. 4 (1999)., 101. 8 Jolliffe, "Ethnic Armed Conflic and Territorial Administration in Myanmar.", 9. 9 Landé, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia.", 101. 10 Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide., 42-44. 11 N. Ganesan, "Democratization and Its Implications for the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar," (The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University, 2017)., 115.. -4-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(10) at high point.12 Northern border regions where essentially autonomous and rebel groups set up administration and a flourishing trade relations with neighbouring states. Additionally, a powerful, China-backed communist insurgency spread from the north in the late 60s. 13 The military government aimed to secure unity and stability through a Buddhist and Bamar-focused nationalism and the strong presence of forces in contested regions. As a result, Aung San’s idea of “Unity in Diversity” was abolished in favour of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, which included extensive counterinsurgency campaigns, rigorous isolation from external influences, religious co-optation and the establishment of a heavily centralised one-party system.14 In the 1980s, clientilism and economic mismanagement eventually culminated in unrest and predemocracy demonstrations. Supported by Buddhist monks these uprisings turned out so severe that they threatened the stability of the country. 15. 政治大 law and order. During the transition the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 立 was formed and country renamed to “Union of Myanmar”. The new regime continued with In 1988 General Saw Maung succeeded Ne Win in a coup d’état, supposedly to secure 16. ‧ 國. 學. the Burmanisation of the country and attempted to extend its influence and presence in remote areas. The mid 90s saw a signing of various ceasefire agreements. 17 At the same time, conflict. ‧. and human rights violations remained present. In combination with a bad economy, this caused an estimated 600.000 to 1 million refugees and over 1 million internally displaced people. 18. y. Nat. sit. The regime proceeded to rule under martial law, but allowed the formation of parties and. er. io. scheduled an election for 1990.19 In this context, the National League for Democracy (NLD). al. v i n and liberal democratic thought appealed C h to a variety Uof actors, including the Buddhist e n gresults c hofi 1990, but the junta picked up previous community. The SLORC ignored the election n. was formed with Aung San Suu Kyi as the leading figure. Her combination of Buddhist ideals 20. commitment to reforms and political opening. Facing diplomatic isolation and sanctions by western countries Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 and the SLORC was renamed into “State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC). Seemingly pushing for democratisation, the regime 12. Landé, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia.", 92. Jolliffe, "Ethnic Armed Conflic and Territorial Administration in Myanmar.", 15-17. 14 Martin Dec Smith, Ethnic Groups in Burma : Development, Democracy and Human Rights / Martin Smith ; in Collaboration with Annie Allsebrook, ed. Annie Allsebrook and International Anti-Slavery, Human Rights Series ; No. 8. (London: Anti-Slavery International, 1994)., 25. 15 Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide., 52-54. 16 Ibid., 55. 17 Jolliffe, "Ethnic Armed Conflic and Territorial Administration in Myanmar.", 18-20. 18 Smith, Ethnic Groups in Burma : Development, Democracy and Human Rights / Martin Smith ; in Collaboration with Annie Allsebrook., 30. 19 Ibid., 27-28. 20 Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide., 55-57. 13. -5-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(11) showed more interest in securing legitimacy, investments and the military’s grip over the economy than promoting free market or political reform. 21 However, a “Roadmap to Democracy” was designed in 2003 and finally a new constitution scheduled democratic elections for 2010.22 Because of the unfair advantages of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the NLD boycotted the elections. Eventually the USDP secured 80% of the votes.23 The election process was significantly rigged and did not qualify as a democratic election. De facto military-rule continued under the new premier Thein Sein until the elections in 2015.24 The 2015 election finally saw a landslide victory by Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. However, the first tenure of the democratic party is still ridden by ethnic conflict, a bumpy peace-process, military influence, human rights violations and hostilities towards Rohingya. After initial attacks by a Rohingya militant group, the Burmese military launched a. 治政大 how an act like this could campaign of ethnic cleansing. In the following it will be assessed 立 the leadership of a human rights activist. occur in a democratising state under counteroffensive in August 2017, which many western observers characterised a systematic. ‧ 國. 學. 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS. ‧. Democratisation is always connected to high hopes for economic growth peace and. y. Nat. sit. stability. However, these effects are not guaranteed to occur immediately. In the case of. al. er. io. Myanmar, the economy and international relations improved, but at the same time, communal. n. violence erupted in Rakhine state and culminated in a cleansing campaign with significant. Ch. i n U. v. involvement of the military. The puzzle is what motivates, drives and prolongs the hostilities. engchi. towards the Rohingya in the years after the first democratic elections. A preliminary explanation is that Democratisation amplifies pre-existing ethnic tensions as it creates an environment for elite competition. Attempting to maximise material gains or influence, elites and key societal actors potentially exploit ethnic cleavages to gain and mobilise supporters. Crucial in this context is the creation and exploitation of the anti-Muslim sentiments (see Fig. 1). It will therefore be necessary to scrutinize who the responsible actors are, how they position themselves towards Rohingya, how they create spread their narrative and which concrete. 21. Stephen McCarthy, "Burma and Asean: A Marriage of Inconvenience " in Burma or Myanmar? The Struggle for National Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2010)., 360. 22 I. Holliday, Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar (Columbia University Press, 2012)., 82-83. 23 Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide., 73. 24 Holliday, Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar., 85-87.. -6-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(12) Socio-political conditions: Democratisation and competition. Event: -communal violence -> suspected conspiracy -> Expulsion of Rohingya -> state –induced cleansing. Statments about /framing. Multiple Actors. Criminal activity Protection of national race. 立. Preserving law and order Muslim threat. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. FIGURE 2 - PUZZLE. Illegal immigration 政 Ethnic治cleansing大. political measures they implemented. Assessing the driving forces in the conflict, it is desirable. sit. y. Nat. to carve out each actor’s motivation. This is achieved through an analysis of existing literature. io. er. on ethnic conflict and the political environment in Myanmar. Initially it will thus be necessary to identify the mechanics of ethnic conflict in general as well as the relevant actors in Myanmar. al. n. and their aspirations.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Secondly, based on the identification of actors and their intents, it will be analysed what statements and justifications are given by major politicians and leaders of opinion when defending their attitude and actions in order to characterise their position. This will allow to make additional inferences about how and by whom the conflict is initiated and prolonged. It is furthermore important to pay attention to the interaction of involved actors, if they exert influence on other and if discriminatory policies were introduced in reaction to growing islamophobia.. The relevant research questions are the following: 1. What is the relevant actor’s attitude towards the Rohingya? 2. How do they frame the conflict and justify their position and actions after violence had occurred? -7-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(13) 3. Did the spread of Islamophobia translate into concrete political measures of discrimination?. 1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK This section will outline the theories and frameworks, which will be elaborated in the literature review. This research will build on theories from different fields of study that contribute to the bigger picture of ethnic conflict. One approach, focusing on structural factors, is the analysis of a countries colonial history. Generally, countries with a previous colonial system that disenfranchised the majority group and left political structures for open political competition after de-colonialization are more likely to experience ethnic conflict. This however,. 治政 the prolongation and intensity of the conflict, additional findings 大 on ethnic conflict have to be taken into consideration. To 立 generally explain the outbreak of violence in unstable or. only explains the structural conditions under which ethnic conflicts possibly emerge. To assess. ‧ 國. 學. democratising states the author will additionally refer to academic findings that clarify why ethnicity or poverty per se are not a generator of conflict, but a weak state, poverty and rough. ‧. terrain are. This argument is expanded by studies, which demonstrate that a state during democratic transition is more prone to nationalist conflict, especially when previous ethnic. Nat. sit. y. divisions are prolonged. A foundation of this argumentation is the assumption that actors show. io. er. rational behaviour in order to define and pursue their goals. Hence, influential actors can exploit ethnicity, if it is beneficial for them. These findings support the assumption that conflicts will. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. emerge when opportunities for material gain or maximisation of influence are present. However,. engchi. they focus on the circumstances for internal conflict and civil war and not necessarily on ethnic conflicts and the involved actors. In combination, all these findings point to an exploitation of ethnic grievances by rational, yet greedy elites, in a situation where democratisation, weak state institutions are accessible resources provide the framework and incentives. It is therefore necessary to further assess mechanisms of ethnic conflict in due consideration to the role of identity and ethnicity, their construction, and the involved actors and their motivations. Early research in ethnic conflict treated ethnicity as a static identity that in itself carries rivalries and potential conflict with other groups. This Primordialism assumes ethnic identity is rooted in ancient and unbreakable ties between a territory, its people and their culture, language and religion. These characteristics are thus passed on by previous generations to their offspring. A change or fusion of ethnic groups is therefore impossible. In this approach conflicts stems from ancient adversaries and myths of an intended extermination through the -8-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(14) other, which is used to justify violence as an act of violence. This approach is considered insufficient to explain ethnic conflict, however certain actors use the motives of unbreakable blood ties and alleged myths of extermination to define and mobilise their target group. On the other hand, the concept purposeful construction manipulation of ethnicity is considered a valid explanation for ethnic conflict. The basic assumption is that identities are neither inherited nor static, but socially constructed. From these findings, it can also be derived that national identities are purposefully constructed by certain actors or agents in order to pursue their individual goals or strengthen national coherence. This suggests that actors can intentionally manipulate ethnic groups and create adversaries when it benefits their agenda. This approach therefore does not exclude realist concepts of rational actors and maximisation of wealth and power.. 政治大 identity and existence of historic adversaries between ethnic groups is combined in the model 立 The combination of realist strive, political conditions, purposeful construction of. of symbolic politics. This approach assumes a fluid definition of in-groups and out-groups. ‧ 國. 學. through societal actors, including purposeful manipulation if is beneficial for the elite’s aspirations. In this case they refer back to an already existent “myth-symbol complex” that. ‧. contains a historical narrative, defines the own cultural traits and membership criteria as well. y. Nat. as distinguishes from others. If the identity’s myth-symbol complex contains strong negative. sit. presumptions towards particular adversaries, a violent clash is more likely. In contrast to the. er. io. rationalist approach, the symbolist model assumes that less individual or group interests are the. al. n. v i n C hgroup perceives itsUposition as threatened by a different particularly strong if a dominant ethnic engchi ethnicity. Finally, for ethnic conflict to break out, political opportunity must be present. This. main driving force behind ethnic conflict but an ideological struggle for group worth. It is. means that actors must have the possibility to mobilize their supporters without having to fear repression. An access to state institutions greatly increases this opportunity. As ethnic conflicts take place in various political conditions and under reference to a variety of motives, it is difficult to design a “one-fits-all theory”. The case of Myanmar combines a multitude of mechanisms, opportunities and conditions, created by previous colonialization and recent democratisation. Elite behaviour in the country is equally motivated by realist interests as they exploit ancient myths and hatreds. Hence, the comprehensive framework of symbolic politics will be considered as the primary theoretical framework for this research.. -9-. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(15) In this research, “Muslim” and “Rohingya” are used virtually synonymously. If not indicated otherwise, the use of the term Muslims, applies to Rohingya in Myanmar in particular. If another Muslim group, such as the Kaman, is addressed it will be clearly indicated. The sentiments in Myanmar are a based on an anti-Muslim narrative, which as a whole is intended to discredit Rohingya. The term Muslim is used in this research for three reasons: The term Rohingya, in its contemporary form, is contested and presumably a modern political construct. Thus, when discussing aversions that are rooted in the country’s socio-historic context, the broader term “Muslim” will be used as a broad self-identification as Rohingya has not been salient prior to Muslim nationalist movements in Myanmar in the50s and 60s. Secondly, a great deal of anti-Rohingya sentiment is related to fears of a Muslim conspiracy, jihad or global and local terrorism. Thus, a great deal of rhetoric revolves around alleged Muslim threat, when it is. 治政大 intend to refer to Rohingya. A Rohingya. Consequently, they use the term Muslim, but mostly 立 when looking at the word “Bengali”. As most relevant similar observation can be made. deployed to target Rohingya in particular. Thirdly, relevant actors avoid using the term. ‧ 國. 學. Burmese actors avoid using the term Rohingya, they use “Bengali” when referring to the said Muslim minority. This makes it difficult to differentiate in what cases they exclusively address. ‧. Rohingya or people from Bangladesh. In most cases, it can be assumed that this inaccuracy is intended and serves to label the Rohingya as foreign interlopers in the first place.. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. 1.4 RESEARCH METHODS. Ch. i n U. v. The thesis will analyse the circumstances and developments in a given country.. engchi. Consequently, it is a single case study. The foundation of this research will be oriented towards process tracing. This method is suitable to explain causal relations regarding the emergence of social phenomena from diagnostic pieces of evidence. Process tracing can either explain data gathered through quantitative studies, test or alter existing theories or generate and test new hypotheses. It pays special attention to the temporal sequence of events that lead to an observed outcome.25 The basic focus of this research is the causalities for the hostilities towards the Rohingya. Point of departure is the emergence of ethnic grievances and how they facilitate ethnic conflict. Therefore, the existence of grievances can be considered the observation while ethnic violence is the outcome. The causal mechanism that links both together is object of this study. 25. James Mahoney, "The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences," Sociological Methods & Research 41, no. 4 (2012)., 570-573.. - 10 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(16) The tested theory of symbolic politics assumes that in a democratising society grievances are exploited by calculating elites who deliberately exacerbate tensions to gain support. Since individuals will be considered agents of identity-construction, an identity that in turn fuels the conflict, this research can be considered actor based, dealing with actors at middle and top-level.26 This requires an initial identification of the relevant elites, their motivations as well as an evaluation of the conflict. If the existing theories are not sufficient to explain the causalities and mechanisms of this specific case, it will be necessary to develop own explanations for nonsystematic, case specific mechanisms. Technically this is switching between a theory-testing approach of process tracing and explaining outcome process tracing.27 To assess if elites in Myanmar can be characterised as hawkish, insofar as they exploit. 政治大 incidents will be analysed. It is important to analyse the character of statements and how the 立. existing grievances, the statements given by major societal actors before and after violent. conflict is framed, while also integrate public statements the political context. Two mechanisms. ‧ 國. 學. are plausible. Public pressure could coerce political actors to adopt a xenophobic stance and deploy corresponding rhetoric and policies. Alternatively could political actors be the source of. ‧. inflammatory speech that mobilises an initially neutral public. Additionally, this research. y. Nat. intends to characterise and compare the position of key societal actors towards the Rohingya. sit. and the hostilities directed towards them. This will help outline the origins of the anti-Muslim. er. io. narrative and its impact on the prolongation of the conflict. In this regard, it is also necessary. al. n. v i n C hto pressure and lobby towards Muslims allowed societal actors e n g c h i U politicians and, in turn, if politics to look at concrete actions undertaken by actors. This serves to analyse if growing antipathy. responded to societal pressures by introducing discriminatory policies or campaigns against Rohingya. Lastly, attention should be directed if political elites purposeful advance ethnic cleavages to mobilise supporters. This research uses the term “societal” to point out that the analysed actors are part of. the same society, a network of people, on different levels. Their position reaches from religious actors with close relations to the local population to the political and military leadership that mostly operates within its own realm. All of them, in their own way, have an influence on the public discourse and the perception of Rohingya. The term societal is furthermore used to avoid. 26. "Conflict Analysis," in Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, ed. Colin Roth (London: 2004)., 2-3. 27 Melanie Punton and Katharina Welle, "Applying Process Tracing in Five Steps," Centre for Development Impact Practice Paper April 2015, no. 10 (2015).. - 11 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(17) confusion with the term social actor, which is a term used in sociology. In short social actor describes an individual that, based on free will and individual capabilities, interprets action and human interaction and reacts accordingly. In particular cases the social actor can be bound by its (self-) ascribed role, or try to change values or perceptions of a given group. This thesis will draw information from primary and secondary sources, focusing on major actors of the Burmese society with considerable influence on public opinion. Based on this, key actors the position of major institutions in the Burmese society will be deducted. Three major levels can be identified: the elected central government, in which positions of the National League for Democracy, USDP and the Military have to be differentiated, the local Rakhine government represented by the local parties and their representatives, and the societal level on which Buddhist groups oppose Muslims. This research will focus on a few major actors.. 治政 be included. Among the prioritized persons are Aung 大 San Suu Kyi and Thein Sein as 立state. To assess the position of the Burmese military, the representatives of the Burmese. If the available data is not sufficient, additional important representatives of these groups will. ‧ 國. 學. Tatmadaw, the statements of its Senior General Min Aung Hlaing will be added. Secondly, Ashin Wirathu, who is leader of the 969 movement and vice chairman of the Patriotic. ‧. Association of Myanmar (Ma Ba Tha) which are spearheading the anti-Muslim campaign, will be included in the analysis. On the local level, official statements of the Arakan National Party. Nat. sit. y. (AND) and the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), respectively their members. er. io. will be collected and analysed. Rohingya leaders are responsible for publishing several works and articles, arguing for their full integration into Burmese society. However, they are mostly. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. ignored or rejected in Burmese media and thus have no significant impact on construction of. engchi. identity in Myanmar. Their argumentation furthermore relies on an interpretation of history and intention to prove Rohingya nativity in Myanmar. Therefore, their influence on sparking ethnic hatred is marginal, as they generally do not criticise other ethnic group’s positions or status in society. Most crucial is indeed the rendering of Rohingya as immigrants or even a threat to the state, which is mostly done on the side of Burmese Buddhists through various speech acts or publications.. - 12 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(18) This part of the research can be characterised as discourse analysis. It follows the logic of critical discourse analysis, which assumes that “language use contributes the (re)production of social life – then, logically, discourse must play a part in producing and reproducing social inequalities.”28 In sum, this research assumes that ethnic tensions are amplified through the statements given by opinion leaders in the Burmese society. Consequently, the elites can be identified as a major cause for its prolongation. To assess the attitude of these leaders and to evaluate if it fits the theory of symbolic politics their statements directed at the public audience will be analysed.. BBC monitoring/. • Democratic Voice of Burma • Mizzima • Asia News Monitor. ProQuest Database. Mabatha/969 Wirathu. • International Crisis Group • Amnesty Internationals • Human Rights Watch • United Nations. NGOs. ‧ Additional Sources. • Commission Reports • Party Publication • Facebook Status • Narinjara (Arakanese news agency). y. Comments on actors and situation in:. Nat. io. FIGURE 3- RESOURCES. • The Irrawaddy • The Myanmar Times • Foreign Policy. transregional publications. sit. RNPD/ ANP. 立. 政治大. 學. Local Level. Thein Sein. er. Aung San Suu Kyi. ‧ 國. Central government level. al. n. v i n C hon the service of BBC This research will primarily rely e n g c h i U monitoring and ProQuest, which. organise local media content in a databank that is updated daily. Furthermore, The Irrawaddy and The Myanmar Times, newspapers by the Burmese expat-community, will serve as a resource for the latest articles and interviews. A Rakhine-based news agency, Narinjara, will also be included. Additionally, information can be extracted from UN reports or NGOs such as Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group. Variety and amount of resources will be crucial. Further information will be gained from interviews or speeches published in newspapers, government press releases, or in the form of materials on the internet. This research will therefore also include available blogs, Facebook status and interviews published on YouTube if they provide relevant information or interviews. However, it will be vital to take. 28. John E Richardson, "Analysing Newspapers," An approach from critical discourse analysis New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2007)., 26.. - 13 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(19) credibility and possible partisanship into consideration. As far as available, official party statutes or programs will be included in the analysis as well (see Figure 3). Priority of the analysis will be justifications and explanations that are given to characterise Rohingya and explain or justify the stigmatisation and expulsion of the Rohingya and the nature of contestations in Rakhine State, preferably in chronological proximity to outbursts of hostilities or violence or on important occasions with a big audience. The thesis will be concerned with developments since the elections of 2010 in which multiple political and societal forces competed for influence and interpretational sovereignty. Especially the latest events, starting with assaults by the ARSA, acts of retaliation and the resulting exodus of thousands of Rohingya in August 2017, will be scrutinized. This, on the one hand, allows drawing inferences about the relation between democratisation, the development of the ethnic. 政治大 other hand, it provides uniqueness to the research and makes it stand out from previous works, 立 since it draws inferences from a recent event of considerable size and severity.. conflict in the context of state building and the position of important public figures. On the. ‧ 國. 學. After having summed up the research on ethnic conflict and the relevant information on the history and development of the country towards a democracy, as well as the relevant actors,. ‧. the analytical part of this research begins with the inauguration of Myanmar’s first. y. Nat. democratically elected president in 2011. The country’s recent development can be roughly. sit. separated into four parts. Firstly, an initial stage of democratisation during the USDP tenure,. er. io. where new freedoms allowed for the growth of suspicions towards Rohingya and culminated. al. n. v i n C hSuu Kyi’s inauguration counteract in the first few months after e n g c h i U in February 2016. Eventually the attacks of ARSA in October 2016 initiated a third period, characterised by increasing. in discriminatory policies. Secondly, a phase of worsening rhetoric and simultaneous failure to. securitisation of Rohingya issues as a matter of terrorism. This eventually culminated in the events of August and September 2017 where a humanitarian crisis was caused by the Tatmadaw’s rigorous anti-terrorism offensive. In this context, the Burmese government officially declared ARSA a terrorist organisation, confirming the narrative of the many chauvinist individuals. This, and the fact that in the aftermath of the military operations a majority of Rohingya fled the country marks a final stage. We thus have to consider the state of affairs prior to August 2017 as events during democratisation, while after the 2017 conflict the term crisis is adequate. This research tracks public statements of relevant actors from 2011 to the aftermath of the 2017 crisis. Some relevant expressions, within half a year after August 2017 are included to scrutinise if actors have changed their position after Rohingya have been - 14 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(20) dispersed or if they solidify the portrayal of expansionist Muslims to obstruct a repatriation of Rohingya.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. - 15 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(21) CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW To assess ethnic conflicts, a plethora of approaches has been worked out. These can generally be divided into explanations focusing on opportunities provided by political and economic circumstances, and alternatively on personal motivations such as greed or grievances. Consensus is that greed or existing grievances, in the form of ethnic hatreds, is not a sufficient explanation for the existence of ethnic conflicts. Rational actors can exploit aversions, but the conditions have to allow this to happen. An environment for ethnic conflict can arise during political transition, when lack of institutional strength and sudden emergence of new actors benefit unregulated competition. In most cases, manipulating elites are a driving force by purposefully creating concepts of enemies under reference to ethnicity and connected myths,. 政治大 social construction. The following section will sum up the relevant literature and give an 立 overview over discrimination, xenophobia and the influence of political transition in Myanmar symbols and aspirations. This presupposes that ethnic and national identities are products of. ‧ 國. 學. as well as of the relevant actors.. ‧. 2.1 ETHNICITY AS A DRIVER OF CONFLICT. Nat. sit. y. Ethnicity or the co-existence of differing ethnic groups is not a sufficient explanation. er. io. for the emergence of violent conflict. Ethnic differences can exacerbate existing conflicts, but can also have opposing effects. Beissinger (2008) finds that ethnic diversity and strong ethnic. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. nationalism can even have a positive impact on nation building and democratisation, if leaders. engchi. manage to integrate ethnic diversity into the national identity of the state.29 Kaufman (2010) remarks that ethnic conflict does not necessarily have to be carried out violently. In its nonviolent from, ethnic conflict includes minorities struggling to get their language or religion officially recognized, the banning of specific food or freedom to practice religious rituals. Nonviolent ethnic conflict can also revolve around economic issues. Often people have tighter business relations with individuals of similar religion or ethnicity. This is not intentional or aimed at excluding others but based on a greater quantity of interactions with people of a similar social status. Nevertheless, prejudices, grievances and envy of the excluded can emerge. In the worst case, this diffuses into the state-level and causes institutionalized discrimination or racism.. 29. Mark R Beissinger, "A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization," Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008).. - 16 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(22) The potential for violent conflict, in Kaufman’s explanation, increases if one of the involved groups upholds and exploits political dominance.30 When it comes to violent conflict, all cases can be analysed through different prisms. Some emphasize opportunities for material or political gain or conditions to uphold armed resistance, while others prioritise the deliberate construction and instrumentalization of ethnic identity. The former focuses on structural conditions that allow rebel groups to emerge. The latter focus on the dynamics of how ethnicity is exploited by certain actors. Social construction of ethnic identities plays a vital part the latter analyses. It generally rejects that a static ancient identity or hatred is the driver of a conflict. Universal findings hereby originate in social psychology and instrumentalism. Social psychology concludes that “when the group’s myth-symbol complex points to. 治政大 Politicians will then be able to appeal to symbols of past hostility.” If at the same time, the 立originating from the other group, measures against the other group feels an existential threat the other group as an enemy, its members will be predisposed to be hostile to the other group. 31. ‧ 國. 32. These findings are supplemented by the. 學. group can be labelled as “self-defence”.. instrumentalist school, which assumes that ethnicity is exploited by elites to influence. ‧. competition over tangible goods in their favour. Hence, ethnicity itself is not the generator of conflict. Elites manipulate identity in order to purposefully deceive the public and gain support. Nat. sit. y. for their cause. In this strategy, security fears are often exploited or artificially generated,. er. io. creating sentiments of “us against them”. In addition to conflicts over tangible interests, a contest for status or group worth is often involved in which groups desire to express their claim. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. for political dominance or a higher social status.33 Elite manipulation of identity or ethnicity. engchi. does not occur in a political vacuum. Changes in the political system or even the historic background may have an effect and have to be taken into consideration. Despite relying mostly on the mechanisms of social construction, this thesis will include an overview over other explanations in the following.. 2.1.1 HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS Each individual internal conflict is embedded in a local cultural, economic and historical context. Case-specific historic analysis can therefore provide valid insights on unique drivers. 30. Stuart J Kaufman, "Ethnicity as a Generator of Conflict," Routledge handbook of ethnic conflict 91 (2010). Ibid., 99. 32 Ibid., 98-99. 33 Ibid., 100-101. 31. - 17 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(23) and characteristics of the conflict. For Myanmar, as a former British colony, it is therefore reasonable to bear in mind mechanisms of conflict in postcolonial states. In general, post-colonial states often base their legitimacy on the promise of economic development. If this developmental state fails, it loses its monopoly over power and gives rise to intrastate violence. It is not necessary that a state fails entirely. It suffices if economic redistribution does not benefit minority groups or if the monopoly of power is concentrated at the dominant group. Consequently, the state loses its legitimacy among a certain group who then refers back to take political or rebellious action. In this context, the ethnic diversity is the precondition for unequal treatment, but in itself it is not a generator of conflict. Only if a group experiences a discrimination based on ethnic criteria, a conflict emerges. If a state provides an institutional framework for negotiation, ethnic conflict can be reduced, yet this is unlikely in. 政治大 For Southeast Asia, Wee and Lang identify the issue of “new states and old 立. weak, freshly democratising or discriminatory states.34. communities”. This means national borders do not overlap with pre-existing territories of ethnic. ‧ 國. 學. groups causing the merging of different ethnicities and power-aspirations under one governmental unit. In multi-national states, different groups eventually try to secure their. ‧. influence or hold on power, from which one usually rises as the dominant one. The resulting. y. Nat. preferential treatment of the own group deepens ethnic cleavages. Additionally institutions for. sit. conflict resolution are absent and the promise of economic development cannot be maintained.. er. io. Hence, violence is likely to occur among ethnic lines. 35 This implies that historical. al. n. v i n However, the existence of differentC ethnicities h e n giscnoth the i Uroot cause behind the conflict. It is. developments and demographic composition are one factor in the build-up of ethnic conflict.. rather unregulated competition and lacking state abilities to provide mechanisms for dialogue conflict resolution. In other words, an opportunity for groups to compete and mobilise along ethnic lines has to be present. Other findings show that states with a British colonial history have a higher probability of experiencing ethnic conflict. Blanton, Mason and Athow reject a grievance-based explanation and focus in their analysis on different colonial systems of colonial administration. The authors argue, “Grievances are not likely to result in collective violence unless counterelites and mobilizing structures are available to persuade aggrieved individuals to participate in. 34. Vivienne Wee and Graeme Lang, "Ethnic Violence and the Loss of State Legitimacy: Burma and Indonesia in a Context of Post-Colonial Developmentalism," Perspectives on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence Or the Politics of Conviction? (2006)., 50-54. 35 Ibid., 67-68.. - 18 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(24) the collective action.“36 They are consequently a catalyst when it comes to mobilizing members of ethnic groups, but not a sufficient explanation. Crucial is the creation of a framework in which mobilisation can occur. This can be traced back to styles of colonial rule. The authors differentiate between an unranked and a ranked system of ethnic stratification. The ranked system, typically set up by French colonial rulers, revolved around cultural administration and a centralisation of the administration. This allowed one ethnic group to gain superiority while depriving others of their means to mobilise. After independence, the group that was previously in charge is able to preserve dominance in administration without having to compete with other (previously disenfranchised) groups. 37 This enables them to secure hegemony and suppress other ethnic groups by impeding their potential to mobilise and their “ability to pursue political grievances through conventional political channels.”38 The British colonial rule however, was. 治政大 ended up in competition for ethnicity did not exist. Consequently, different ethnic groups 立 states with former British colonial rule, witnessed a influential posts. After independence, based on an unranked system in which a horizontal division of labour based on culture or 39. ‧ 國. 學. perpetuation of ethnic conflict, which was amplified by the absence of the regulating power of the colonial ruler and the reinforcement of already existing hierarchies. Since these hierarchies in countries that belonged to the British Empire.40. Nat. y. ‧. provide the foundation for ethnic mobilisation, conflict along ethnic lines was and is more likely. sit. During their rule over Burma, the British firstly allowed immigration of Hindu and. er. io. Muslim-Indian workers into Burma, but also granted relative autonomy to ethnic groups in the. al. peripheral regions.41 Additionally they facilitated the migration of trained Indian administrative. n. v i n staff into Burma, who quickly became in the country’s political institutions. C anh important group U i e h n g cas a disadvantaged group in its own country, Consequently, the Bamar majority saw themselves exposed to foreign rule. Landé points out that after independence, the risk of conflict between. ethnic communities is great when the largest and political powerful unit has occupied low position during colonial rule. After regaining dominance this group will use power to change conditions in its own favour. 42 This was certainly the case in Myanmar. The underlying explanation for conflict is therefore not the channels for mobilisation, but the regained. 36. Robert Blanton, T David Mason, and Brian Athow, "Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 4 (2001)., 474. 37 Ibid., 478-480. 38 Ibid., 488. 39 Ibid., 476. 40 Ibid., 481. 41 Landé, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia.", 92, 100-101. 42 Ibid.,101-103.. - 19 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(25) dominance of a native ethnicity, that attempts to extend its influence into peripheral regions. After independence, a growing nationalism and aspired Burmanisation of the country not only turned against Indian and Muslims, but also led to conflict between the centre and the periphery, hence the dominant Buddhist Bamar and various minorities. The British colonial system of “divide and rule” consequently created an arena in which various ethnicities could compete in after independence, but where one group clearly dominated the others.43 These findings are generally compatibly with findings on opportunity and democratisation, which presume that conflicts will arise, when the conditions allow it. Democratisation, in this context, provides the structural framework for newly arising groups to compete for power, while lacking the capacity to reconcile due to its underdeveloped institutions.. 立. 2.1.2 OPPORTUNITY MODELS. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Structural approaches analyse ethnic conflicts through observable factors that facilitate uprising or conflicts. Next to materialistic opportunities and existing grievances, ethnicity is. ‧. treated as independent variable. In general, the findings confirm that ethnicity is not the driving. y. Nat. force behind conflict, but the intention of acting elites is. With the intention to maximise gains. sit. or power, actors can exploit or reinforce existing grievances for their own purpose. But most. er. io. important is the socio-political framework and country’s geography that facilitates the. al. v i n C houtbreak of civil war Collier and Hoeffler frame the as connected to the simultaneous engchi U existence of opportunities and motives. Motives usually comprise a combination of (possibly n. formation of insurgent groups.. misperceived) grievances and greed. 44 These include ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion and economic inequality. 45 The conditions under which a rebellion takes place are summarised as opportunities. Opportunities include economic factors such as funding by a hostile government or a diaspora, possible resource extraction, per-capita income, male secondary schooling and growth rate and weak governments as well as difficult terrain.46 The authors conclude that motives alone are not a sufficient explanation for ethnic conflict – the structural factors creating opportunities are crucial. The authors note that a 43. Ibid., 108-109. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford economic papers 56, no. 4 (2004)., 564-565. 45 Ibid. 570-572. 46 Ibid., 565-569. 44. - 20 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(26) negative impact of ethnic diversity only emerges when a certain group exerts dominance over others.47 The findings support the thesis of opportunity and greed-driven conflict and reject the influence of grievances and ethnic diversity. From the motives, only repression and ethnic dominance increase the conflict risk.48 Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner later developed a “feasibility hypothesis” from the Machiavelli Theorem that no profitable opportunity would go unused.49 The thesis says that, “Factors that are important for the financial and military feasibility of rebellion but are unimportant for motivation decisively increase the risk of civil war.”50 Thus personal greed alone is not a sufficient explanation for the outbreak of internal conflicts. Among the factors that contribute to a higher risk of civil war are GDP, commodity export, previous conflict and social fractionalisation, but also previous colonial history, population of young men and. 治政 as the creation of labour, which both diminish the pool of大 potential rebels. Colonial history, 立 number of young men and mountainous areas are confirmed as factors that increase the. mountainous areas. GDP directly translates into a state’s capacity to control uprisings as well. ‧ 國. The authors furthermore confirm that religious and ethnic. 學. likelihood of conflict.. fractionalisations increase the risk of armed conflict.51 The authors conclude with a positive. ‧. evaluation of the feasibility thesis. “where a rebellion is feasible it will occur.” 52 While these findings allow to generally evaluate the risk of ethnic rebellion in a given country, they. Nat. sit. y. primarily serve to explain large-scale armed resistance and not communal violence and. er. io. discrimination as in Myanmar.. al. v i n and democratisation on rebellion C and ethnic uprising. Related research confirms that not hengchi U ethnicity or hatred per se generate conflict. Instead, the opportunities that emerge during n. An additional focus of attention on structural factors to the impact of political transition. political changes facilitate rebellion. Examining insurgencies and civil war, Fearon and Laitin (2003) demonstrated that the factors that favour civil and internal wars in the 90s were neither economic inequality nor ethnic or religious diversity but factors such as weak governments and authorities which allowed insurgent groups to retreat from governmental influence into uncontrolled and remote regions. Often conflicts were protracted from former eras and changes in the national political system allowed latent conflicts to turn into violent uprisings. Regularly 47. Ibid., 588. Ibid., 576f, 581. 49 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War," oxford Economic papers 61, no. 1 (2009)., 3. 50 Ibid., 3. 51 Ibid., 12-14. 52 Ibid., 24. 48. - 21 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.

(27) financial shortcomings on the side of the state play an important role. Lacking funds to effectively supress or deter uprisings either through effective institutions or police left states prone to internal conflicts. In parallel, life as an insurgent, with all risks and benefits calculated became more attractive than that of a peaceful civilian which increased the number of participants.53 Mansfield and Snyder (2002) build on their previous findings that states which are undergoing democratic transition are more likely to participate in external wars than regimes that remained unchanged or changed in autocratic direction.54 After a broad analysis of a variety of data and variables they conclude that Transitions to more pluralistic political systems coincided with the rise of national independence movements, spurring separatist warfare that often spilled across international borders. In other cases, transitional regimes clashed in interstate warfare.55. 治政 In this research the authors focus on the conditions under大 which democratisation stimulates hostilities. They find that the 立 outbreak of nationalist movements is caused by insufficient ‧ 國. 學. institutional control-mechanisms which are exploited by reckless elites that use nationalist appeals in order to rally for their cause. Democratising state in general show a high intensity of. ‧. competition among a multitude of social groups, interests and actors. Since party-system, legislature, courts and media in democratising states are often in their infancy and thus easy to. Nat. sit. y. manipulate, the appeal to nationalist sentiments in order to gain support is a viable strategy for. io. er. elites. This often contains the creation of a perceived threat to the nation that justifies the exclusion of certain groups from political participation. Due to the weakness of institutions and. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. media as well as a general lack of information, little mechanisms to punish or hold perpetrators. engchi. accountable exist. Thus, nationalist mobilisation continues unobstructed and in the worst case turns to violence against perceived alien element within the state. The thesis that democratisation implies mass mobilisation on behalf of elites, who purposefully construct foes, is confirmed by the findings of Cederman, Hug and Krebs. The authors add that violence might be an attempt of a new regime to silence opposition. According to their analysis, both democratisation and autocratization increase the probability of violence.56 The authors furthermore confirm that higher GDP is positively related to the absence of 53. James D Fearon and David D Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American political science review 97, no. 1 (2003). 54 Edward D Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War," International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002). 55 Ibid., 297. 56 Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, and Lutz F Krebs, "Democratization and Civil War: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4 (2010)., 379.. - 22 -. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900129.