Joint robustness and security enhancement for feature-based image
watermarking using invariant feature regions
Jen-Sheng Tsai
a, Win-Bin Huang
a, Yau-Hwang Kuo
a,n, Mong-Fong Horng
ba
Center for Research of E-life Digital Technology, Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Cheng Kung University, Tainan 701, Taiwan
b
Department of Electronic Engineering, National Kaohsiung University of Applied Sciences, Taiwan
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 16 March 2011 Received in revised form 28 November 2011 Accepted 29 November 2011 Available online 8 December 2011 Keywords:
Digital image watermarking Feature detector
Knapsack problem Genetic algorithm Differential entropy
a b s t r a c t
Local image features have been widely applied in feature-based watermarking schemes. The feature invariance is exploited to achieve robustness against attacks, but the leakage of information about hidden watermarks from publicly known locations and sizes of features are often unconsidered in security. This paper, therefore, proposes a novel image watermarking approach, which adopts invariant feature regions to jointly enhance its robustness and security. Initially, circular feature regions are determined by the scale-adapted auto-correlation matrix and the Laplacian-of-Gaussian operation. Leakage of secret information is also controlled carefully during feature detection procedure. An optimal selection process formulated as a multidimensional knapsack problem is then proposed to select robust non-overlapping regions from those circular feature regions to resist various attacks. This process is implemented by a genetic algorithm-based approach, and incorporates randomization to mitigate the security risk. Finally, each selected region is normalized to obtain a geometrically invariant feature region, and embedded with a region-dependent watermark to overcome the weakness of multiple-redundant watermarks. The evaluation results based on the StirMark benchmark present the proposed scheme can tolerate various attacks, including noise-like signal processing and geometric distortions. A security analysis in terms of differential entropy also confirms the security improvement of the proposed method.
&2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Digital watermarking, which is regarded as a useful approach for copyright protection, content authentication, and transaction tracking, has been widely applied to image, audio, and video. In all of these applications, the effectiveness of a digital watermarking algorithm depends
on its ability to resist various attacks. According to different intentions of attacks, there are two criteria, robustness and security, which should be considered in the design of digital watermarking schemes [1–7]. Robustness deals with blind attacks that try to destroy or invalidate hidden watermarks without exploiting knowledge of the watermarking algorithm. The robust-ness measurement for watermarking schemes is to eval-uate their ability to successfully detect the hidden watermark after blind attacks. In general, robust water-marking schemes are developed to resist two types of attacks: noise-like signal processing and geometric distortions. Security, on the other hands, denotes the ability of a watermarking scheme to prevent hidden Contents lists available atSciVerse ScienceDirect
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Signal Processing
0165-1684/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.sigpro.2011.11.033
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ886 6 275 7575x62522; fax: þ 886 6 208 8075.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J.-S. Tsai), [email protected] (W.-B. Huang),
[email protected] (Y.-H. Kuo), [email protected] (M.-F. Horng).
watermarks from being accessed by unauthorized users. For the attacks to security, it is usually assumed that the unauthorized users know all knowledge about the water-marking algorithm except the secret key and they try to estimate the hidden watermarks through observing the watermarked images. The security of a watermarking scheme can be measured by analyzing the leakage of information about the hidden watermarks from observa-tions. Until now, most existing watermarking methods have been driven by improvement of robustness, includ-ing the spread spectrum [1,2], quantization index modulation [8,9], and resynchronization [10–27] schemes. But there has been little attention to security in water-marking research. However, recent studies[3–6] have shown that security is as important as robustness in developing digital watermarking schemes. Because a successful attack to security can completely break a watermarking system even though it is robust, designers should consider not only the robustness but also the degree of security in their water-marking schemes.
In this paper we use both robustness and security perspectives to investigate current feature-based water-marking methods, which are resynchronization schemes that exploit the invariant features of a medium to resist attacks. Bas et al. used the Harris detector to extract feature points from an image and the Delaunay tessella-tion to form triangle meshes with theses points for watermarking[16]. Tang and Hang adopted the Mexican Hat wavelet to extract feature regions, and exploited image normalization and FFT to hide watermarks [17]. These two methods exhibit good robustness against most attacks, but features are probably not extracted correctly after suffering from scaling attacks. Therefore, Seo et al. proposed a watermarking method based on the scale-space theory to mitigate this problem[18,21]. Robustness can be also achieved by applying the scale-invariant feature transformation[19], the Harris–Laplacian detector
[22,24], or the difference of Gaussian [23]. Recently, Gao et al.[25]used the affine covariant regions to provide good resistance to geometric distortions. However, most of the existing methods usually suffer from inability to resist random or region-of-interest (ROI) cropping attacks and ineffectiveness in security-related applications.
The invalidation for cropping attacks will become more serious due to the phenomenon described in this paragraph. Since the magnitude of pixels in a feature region will be modified when a watermark is inserted into this region, it is preferred to select non-overlapping regions for watermarking to avoid major degradation of image quality. In order to obtain the non-overlapping regions, some reference parameters have been exploited in existing methods. For example, the corner response
[18,21] and the number of neighboring feature points within a region [17,22] are used to remove overlapping feature regions. In [24], the minimum spanning tree (MST) clustering algorithm was used to cluster the feature regions into groups according to a distance constraint. The region with the largest corner response in each group is then selected to be watermarked. However, non-over-lapping feature regions selected for watermarking by these parameters cannot guarantee that watermark
regions are well distributed over an image. Thus, the probability of successful cropping attacks is raised because the selected regions do not always have the maximum cover range.
Next we discuss the issue of ineffectiveness in secur-ity-related applications. It is here assumed that the attacker knows the details of watermarking algorithm except the secret key according to the Kerckhoffs’ principle. The secret key is an input to some mapping functions that outputs secret parameters, such as the watermark sequence[5]. Without knowledge of the key, the secret parameters cannot be forged or estimated. Unfortunately, it is not difficult for attackers to extract the hidden watermark sequence embedded by most of the existing feature-based methods because of information leakage. The information leakage denotes the information about the hidden watermark sequence achieved from the attacker’s observation [6]. The leakage is mainly from which the watermarked feature regions’ locations and sizes are publicly known and each feature region is embedded with the same watermark. This weakness enables the security attacks to easily break down a watermarking system. For example, the attacker can apply a collusion attack to remove the hidden watermark or a copy attack to fake a watermarked image by collect-ing and analyzcollect-ing a set of feature regions with the same watermark from a watermarked image[28,29,39].
This paper proposes a novel feature-based watermark-ing method that (1) optimizes the cover range of the hidden watermarks for resisting cropping attacks and (2) enhances the security to prevent unauthorized users from accessing the secret parameters. Initially, the Harris– Laplacian detector, which uses the scale-adapted auto-correlation matrix to localize points in the scale space and invokes the Laplacian-of-Gaussian operation to select the points attaining an extremum over scales, is applied to an image to detect its feature points at multiple scale levels
[31,32]. Around these feature points, the targeted circular feature regions are determined based on their character-istic scales and a secret key. The high repeatability of these feature regions offers robustness against transla-tion, rotatransla-tion, scaling, and partial illumination changes, while secrecy of the region size makes it difficult for an attacker to estimate exact range of feature region. Since these feature regions are substantially overlapped and not all stable, we propose a heuristic algorithm to select an optimal non-overlapping region set for watermarking. The region set also features a maximum distribution over the target image to tolerate the cropping attacks. The selection process further incorporates randomization to avoid an attacker correctly identifying the watermarked regions. This work is formulated as a multidimensional knapsack problem and is solved by a genetic algorithm-based procedure. Finally, we perform normalization for each selected region to obtain geometric invariance, and generate a region-dependent watermark sequence, which eliminates the problem of hiding the same signal multiple times, to be additively embedded into the spatial domain of each invariant region.
Comparing the existing feature-based methods[16–27], we investigate the important issues of feature-based
watermarking methods to improve the robustness and security. First, we propose the optimal region selection process to enhance the resistance to cropping attacks. Different from our previous work [26], the method proposed in this paper does not need the time-consuming simulated attacking procedure, and its goal is to make the selected feature regions achieve the greatest distribution over an image to withstand cropping attacks, which is not considered in [26]. Moreover, the detailed implementa-tion of the genetic algorithm-based heuristics is described in this paper. The experimental results have demon-strated that our method has better coverage in the resilience to ROI cropping, random cropping and centered cropping attacks. Also, the evaluation on the StirMark benchmark confirmed the goodness of our method in the resistance to other attacks, including noise-like signal processing and geometric distortions. Second, we propose the region-dependent watermark based on feature descriptor, and incorporate randomization in feature region detection and feature region selection for security enhancement. The region-dependent watermark is derived from the framework of the content-dependent watermark with DCT block-based media hashes[39]. The novelty is that we exploit the feature description as the media hash, which is created by generating the orienta-tion histograms. The feature descriporienta-tion has been proved to be distinctive and robust[33], and it is obtained during feature detection without additional DCT operations[39]. Furthermore, the incorporated randomization in deter-mining the feature regions for watermarking makes the secrecy of their locations and sizes to mitigate the security risk. A security analysis in terms of differential entropy for feature region detection and feature region selection is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Feature detection with a controlled secret leakage is presented in
Section 2and a novel feature region selection scheme to enhance both robustness and security for watermarking is also proposed. In Section 3, the details of region-depen-dent watermark embedding and detection schemes based on local features are described. The experimental results, mainly for robustness evaluation and security analysis, are given inSection 4. Concluding remarks are drawn in
Section 5.
2. Robust and secure image features for watermarking Local features representing image structures, ranging from points to regions, have been adopted in many applications, such as object recognition, image retrieval, and camera calibration[30–34]. These features, which are powerful references, have also been applied successfully in feature-based watermarking methods since they can be preserved after suffering distortion such as scaling, rota-tion, or illumination changes. In general, a feature detector performs a specific transformation on an image to extract local features for watermark embedding and detection. However, a feature region extracted by a detector is not directly applicable to digital watermarking because of the following issues. The locations and sizes of extracted
features can be publicly found by the attackers. Embedding watermarks into all regions will also cause heavy image degradation and low robustness since most of features are overlapped. Although many new feature detectors have been proposed to enhance the robustness of feature-based watermarking[16–27], most methods are still vulnerable to security attacks and cropping attacks. Therefore, a qualified feature-based watermarking scheme should examine the robustness of the adopted feature detector, avoid the information leakage of secret parameters, and determine an appropriate non-overlapping feature region set. This section presents two processes, feature region detection and feature region selection, which are impor-tant in achieving the desired goal.
2.1. Detection of robust and secure features
In this section, the Harris–Laplacian detector, which consists of scale-adapted auto-correlation matrix and the Laplacian-of-Gaussian operation, is adopted[31,32], while the secret leakage is carefully controlled in order to identify local image features. First, the scale space of an input image I is calculated by the function L at a set of scales to represent different levels of resolutions, which is formulated as
Lðx,
s
DÞ ¼Gðx,s
DÞnIðxÞ ð1Þwhere x¼(x,y) denotes the image spatial coordinate,
s
Disthe differential scale, ‘‘n’’ represents the convolution
opera-tion, and the uniform Gaussian kernel G is defined by Gðx,
s
DÞ ¼ 1 2ps
2 D eðx2þy2Þ=2s D: ð2ÞThen the scale-adapted auto-correlation matrix
m
(x,s
I,s
D) is applied in the scale space to describe thelocal image structure, and it is formulated by
m
ðx,s
I,s
DÞ ¼s
2DGðx,s
IÞn L2 xðx,s
DÞ LxLyðx,s
DÞ LxLyðx,s
DÞ L2yðx,s
DÞ 2 4 3 5 ð3Þ wheres
Iis the integral scale, and Liis the first derivativecalculated in the i direction that iA{x,y}. The corner response estimating principal curvature of the matrix is computed by its trace and determinant as
Cðx,
s
I,s
DÞ ¼detðm
ðx,s
I,s
DÞÞ0:04traceðm
ðx,s
I,s
DÞÞ: ð4ÞThe feature point with large corner response repre-senting significant curvatures has higher repeatability. The candidate points are then determined if their corner response is a local maximum and larger than a threshold TR used for filtering out unstable feature regions.
However, it is difficult to be set as a fixed value for different input images[34]. According to the suggestion in
[43], the threshold should be set to 1% of the maximum response value of all extracted feature regions. In order to achieve scaling invariance, the integral scale of all candi-date points is compared to the characteristic scale of local image structure. The characteristic scale, which is rela-tively independent of scale change, is obtained by search-ing for a local extremum over multiple scale levels of Laplacian-of-Gaussian. Candidate points for a set of scale levels
s
n are identified by settings
I¼s
n ands
D¼0.7s
Iwheres
n¼{d
is
09s
0¼1.5,d
¼1.1, i¼1, 2, y, n}.The scale step factor
d
between two successive levels affect the accuracy of the scale of the candidate point. It should be small to achieve high accuracy and is set to 1.1 in this paper according to the suggestion from[32]. The number of scale levels n depends on the possible scale changes of an image for different applications and is set as 15 in our experiments. The Laplacian-of-Gaussian of the candidate points is calculated as9LoGðx,
s
nÞ9 ¼s
2n9Lxxðx,s
nÞ þLyyðx,s
nÞ9: ð5ÞA candidate point at the ith scale level is regarded as a feature point with a characteristic scale
s
c(s
c¼d
is
0) if itsLaplacian-of-Gaussian is a local extremum over all scale levels and is higher than a pre-defined threshold as follows:
9LoGðx,
s
iÞ94 9LoGðx,s
jÞ9, j 2 fi1,i þ 1g ð6Þ9LoGðx,
s
iÞ94TLoG: ð7ÞThe threshold TLoG is set to 10, which refers to the
suggestion from[31]. In order to achieve rotation invariance and incorporate controlled secret leakage in the outputs of the feature detection, each feature point is further used as the center to derive a corresponding circular feature region with a key-dependent radius r determined
r ¼
a
Us
c ð8Þwhich is formulated by a secret key
a
and the feature point’s characteristic scales
c. Obviously, the circular featureregions obtained by the scale-adapted auto-correlation matrix and the Laplacian-of-Gaussian operation are highly distinctive and matched with a high repeatability against various image distortions [31,32,34]. The key-dependent radius prevents an attacker from easily accessing a feature region by controlling the uncertainty of its size, and infor-mation leakage is also reduced while the watermark is embedded into the region.
2.2. Feature region selection
This work aims to obtain appropriate non-overlapping regions for watermarking since there are serious overlaps and instability in the extracted feature regions. In addi-tion to removing some overlapping regions, the feature regions selected should have maximum distribution over the image to withstand cropping attacks and to incorpo-rate randomization for security. Therefore, this work is formulated as an optimum problem constricted by image quality and regions’ overlapping circumstance as follows: maximize X NR j ¼ 1
b
jrjsj ð9Þ subject to X NR j ¼ 1 qjsjrTq ð10Þ and XNR j ¼ 1 pijsisjo1, i ¼ 1,2, . . ., NR ð11Þwhere NRis the number of feature regions extracted, rjis
the radius of region j, {
b
j} are key-dependentpseudo-random numbers with the mean
m
and variances
2, and sj
is defined as sj¼
1, if the region j is selected; 0, otherwise:
(
ð12Þ The variable qj denotes the distortion of a
water-marked region j compared with its original region, and Tq refers to the limitation of quality degradation of an
image after being watermarked. Eq. (11) means that only one region can be selected in each overlapping case. The value of pijis dependent on the overlapping situation of
the two regions of i and j: pij¼
1, if the region i overlaps with region j, and iaj; 0, otherwise:
(
ð13Þ In order to solve this combinatorial optimization problem, we transform it to a multidimensional knapsack problem (MDKP) by modifying the expression of its constraints as follows: maximize X NR t ¼ 1
b
trtst ð14Þ subject to X NR t ¼ 1o
ktstrTok, k ¼ 1,2, . . ., m: ð15Þ In Eq. (15), the variableso
kt and Tok represent the composite weights and constraints of quality distortion and overlapping status specified in Eqs. (10) and (11), respectively. When k¼1, theno
1t¼qtand To1¼Tq, which is equivalent to the constraint formulated by Eq. (10). Each k greater than 1 correspondingly denotes a specific index pair (i, j), iaj, in Eq. (11). Then the constraints specified in Eq. (11) can be reformulated into Eq. (15) as follows:Referring to Eq. (11), it is obvious that
pijsisjo1, 8ri,8rj: ð16Þ
Since si, sjand pijA{0,1}, Eq. (16) can be rewritten as Eq. (17)
pijsiþpijsjr1 ð17Þ
that is,
0 s1þ0 s2þ þpijsiþ þpijsjþ þ0 sNRr1: ð18Þ Let Tok¼1, and
o
kt¼0 when tai or j, otherwiseo
kt¼pij. We can getXNR
t ¼ 1
o
ktstrTok: ð19ÞAggregating Eq. (19) for different values of k, we conclude Eq. (15) and m ¼ ðN2RNRÞ=2þ 1.
Since MDKP is an NP-hard problem [36], the genetic algorithm (GA), a heuristic search approach based on the principles of evolution in nature [36,37], is employed to efficiently obtain a near-optimal solution in this paper. GA exploits the string structures to make an effective search, and works with a population of individuals that represent candidate solutions to a given optimization problem. It is
very likely that the obtained solution is a global solution since there are crossover and mutation operators and diverse individuals in the population being processed. The evaluation and analysis in[38]also demonstrate the solu-tion of MDKP determined by GA is the best approximasolu-tion to the global optimum among various optimization meth-ods. Firstly, a fixed length and fixed order binary bit string S 2 f0,1gNRrepresenting a candidate region set, in which 1 at the jth bit indicates region j is selected, is regarded as a chromosome of an individual in a population for GA opera-tion. The length of S depends on the number of the extracted feature regions. The GA-based search procedure to find a near-optimal solution includes the following steps: 1) Population initialization: the initial population is drawn
randomly to maintain diversification of chromosomes. Each individual in the population should be a feasible solution without violating the constraints in Eq. (15). 2) Fitness evaluation: Fitness is used to evaluate the
possibility of an individual to be the best solution. Each individual in current population has its own fitness to represent degree of success as shown by FitnessðSÞ ¼X
NR
j ¼ 1
b
jrjS½j ð20Þwhere S[j] denotes the jth bit in the chromosome of an individual. The fitness corresponds to the objective function in Eq. (14), and maximization of the fitness leads to the best solution of feature region selection. 3) Parent selection: This step is to select individuals from a
population for a mating pool to generate new offspring. Based on the natural principle of survival of the fittest, the binary tournament selection is used, which works by forming two tournament pools of individuals, each containing two individuals picked randomly from the population. Two individuals with the highest fitness, each drawn from one of the two tournament pools, are selected to be parents.
4) Crossover and mutation: The generation following the selected parent individuals is obtained by two GA operators, crossover, and mutation. First, uniform crossover is adopted for any two parents to generate a single child whose chromosome is determined by copying the corresponding bits in the chromosomes of the two parents. Each copied bit is chosen randomly with equal probability from the two parents using a binary random number generator. If the random num-ber is 1, the bit is copied from the first parent; otherwise it is copied from the second parent. Then the mutation operation is used to flip a small number of bits in the child’s chromosome, changing them from 0 to 1 or vice versa. It is noted that the generated child solution by crossover and mutation operators may not be feasible due to the MDKP constraints. A repair operator is used here to overcome this problem[37]. 5) Termination: An iterative process from step 2 to this
step is executed to find the best solution. The termina-tion conditermina-tion is satisfied when either a user-defined maximum number of iterations is reached or the fittest one is unchanged during a large number of iterations.
The computational cost of the proposed feature region selection method is dominated by the GA-based search procedure for solving MDKP. Furthermore, the computa-tional cost of this procedure mainly depends on the number of feature regions and the constraints (image quality and regions’ overlapping circumstances) in MDKP. The number of feature regions is proportional to the length of individual chromosome that affects the execu-tion time in fitness evaluaexecu-tion, crossover, and mutaexecu-tion. As for the constraints, they are related to the execution time for searching feasible solutions in GA. A more detailed complexity analysis of GA for solving MDKP can be found in [37]. Basically, the computational cost of feature region selection in most of the existing feature-based watermarking methods only depends on the regions’ overlapping circumstances, for example, the operations for removing region overlapping by comparing the region’s corner response[18,21] and the number of neighboring feature points within a region [17,22]. In
[24], the operational cost is to cluster the feature regions into groups by the minimum spanning tree clustering algorithm. In order to achieve the desired optimization goal, the execution time of the proposed feature region selection method is longer than the above-mentioned methods. According to our empirical study that the GA-based search procedure was coded in Borland Cþþ and executed on an Intel Core2Duo 2.4 GHz PC, the execution time spent in searching the near-optimal solu-tion is within 2 min for all test images in our experiments. 3. Proposed watermark embedding and detection schemes
The detailed procedures of watermark embedding and detection are described here, with their block diagrams depicted inFigs. 1 and 2, respectively.
3.1. Watermark embedding scheme
As shown inFig. 1, the adopted feature regions in a cover image are extracted and selected by the detector and selector described inSection 2. In the step of feature
On the other hand, a too small D makes the clustering ineffective.
4.3. Discussions
In this section, we discuss how to balance the three conflicting factors: robustness, capacity, and impercept-ibility in the three main processes of our method: feature detection, feature region selection, and watermark inser-tion. In the feature detection, there is a trade-off among the three factors while determining the secret key for the key-dependent radius of the feature region. A large value of the secret key would increase the capacity of the region to be watermarked, but the robustness and impercept-ibility would be decreased[22,24]. Also, a too large value would cause that the ranges of most feature regions exceed the image size. On the other hand, the value should not be too small since the capacity of feature region cannot be smaller than the watermark length. Therefore, we consider that the secret key should be large enough to make all feature regions’ sizes equal or larger than the watermark length, and should be small enough to make the ranges of most feature regions not exceed the cover range of an image in our empirical study.
In the feature region selection process, the capacity is regarded as a constant since the same watermark is embedded into each selected feature region in the feature-based watermarking methods, and its size is determined in the feature detection process. So, there is a trade-off between robustness and imperceptibility in the feature region selection. Selecting more feature regions to watermarking will produce more redundant watermarks for an image. This will increase the robust-ness but decrease the imperceptibility of the image. In the feature region selection process, we use the threshold Tq
to limit the quality degradation of the image to be watermarked and select the regions to achieve the best robustness under the limitation. It decides the level of the imperceptibility in the proposed method, and the robust-ness of a watermarked image is also determined techni-cally. For example, Tqis set as 40 dB by considering the
PSNR between an image and its watermarked image. Then, embedding watermark into the selected regions will not degrade the image quality below 40 dB.
Finally, in the watermark insertion process, there is also a trade-off, related to the watermark embedding strength for each region, between robustness and imper-ceptibility. The capacity is still considered as a constant since the region’s size is determined in the feature detection process. A large embedding strength will increase the robustness but decrease the imperceptibility. Here, we use the noise visibility function (NVF) to deter-mine the appropriate embedding strength, which can avoid large degradation of image quality. The NVF that characterizes the local image properties can achieve the best balance for the two factors[42].
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a novel method to jointly enhance the robustness and security of feature-based
image watermarking schemes. The controlled randomiza-tion is incorporated in determining the feature regions of an image for mitigating the leakage of secret information. In addition, an optimal selection process is proposed, formulated as the multidimensional knapsack problem and solved by genetic algorithm-based heuristics. The experimental results of robustness evaluation demon-strate that our method can effectively resist various attacks, including noise-like signal processing and geo-metric distortions. The security evaluation in terms of differential entropy is also derived, and the performance of the proposed method is confirmed.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for giving constructive and useful comments to improve this paper. This work is supported in part by the National Science Council of Taiwan under Grants 97-2221-E-006-144-MY3 and 98-2221-E-006-222-MY3.
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