中國崛起: 機會或威脅? - 政大學術集成

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(1)論文題目中國崛起: 機會或威脅? The Impact of China Rise: An Opportunity or Threat?. 研究生: 特本希. Student: Bensinle Tep. 指導教授: 李明. Adviser: Professor Ming Lee. 國立政治大學. 學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. ‧ 國. 立. 政治大. 碩士論文. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. A Thesis Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies National Chengchi University In Partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in Asia-Pacific Studies. 中華民國 106 年 10 月.

(2) Acknowledgement I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Professor Ming Lee for the continuous support of my thesis writing and research, for his patience, motivation, and immense knowledge. His guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my graduate study. I would also like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Professor Chung-. 治政 incented me to widen 大 my 立. Min Tsai and Professor Da-Jung Li for their insightful comments and encouragement, which perspectives.. research from various. ‧ 國. 學. On this note, I also thank the staffs of IMAS at the National Chengchi. ‧. University for helping with the management process of writing this thesis.. y. Nat. I thank my fellow classmate and friend Cris Batista for the stimulating. io. sit. discussions, for the sleepless nights we were working together before deadlines,. n. a. translations I required in writing l this thesis.. Ch. engchi. er. and also to Chander Kuo Yi Tseng for his valuable time in helping me with all the. i n U. v. Last but not the least, I would like to thank God and my family: my parents and to my brother and sisters for supporting me throughout in writing this thesis and my life in general.. i.

(3) Abstract As China becomes increasingly influential in world affairs the international community continues to examine their global responsibilities for international economy and regional integrity. The thesis examines the global prominence of China and its status as an influencer in power transitioning and balancing in the region. Through the method of descriptive and normative theorization an analysis is produced where coexistence of historic hegemonic theories creates a new international environment where the perception of a rising China is neither a. 政治大. reason for conflict nor design for a solitary power but rather a phenomenon of. 立. generating equal opportunities and benefits for all concern actors.. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 中國在國際舞台上的影響力逐漸攀升，以全球經濟和區域完整性而言，世界各國也持續觀察自身所扮演的角色與責任。此篇論文以記敘性方法和常態性. y. Nat. io. sit. 理論分析，探討中國在地區的權力轉移與平衡上扮演的重要角色。歷史上，. er. 一個國家勢力的崛起常被負面地視為是霸權和威脅。但以現今中國的崛起而. n. a. v. l C 言，這些過往的霸權理論反而提供了新的詮釋結果：對其他國家而言，中國 ni. hengchi U. 的崛起不會帶來威脅或衝突，反而會帶給各國益處和機會。. Keywords: China Influence, Investment Abroad, International Relations, Regional Power 關鍵字：中國影響力、海外投資、國際關係、區域權力. ii.

(4) TABLES OF CONTENT Acknowledgement------------------------------------------------------------------------- i Abstract and Keywords------------------------------------------------------------------- ii Table of contents--------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii List of Tables and Figures---------------------------------------------------------------- v. Chapter 1. Introduction-------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Research Approach 1.3 Research Methodology 1.4 Scope and Limitation. 立. 政治大. 1.5 Literature Review. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 2. Major Trends in China Rise-------------------------------------------------- 15 2.1 Economic Rise. ‧. 2.2 Military Expansion. sit. y. Nat. 2.3 Rising Image. er. io. Chapter 3. Infrastructural Mechanism Context of China Rise------------------------- 32. n. al. i n C hAbroad 3.2 China Direct Investment engchi U 3.3 AIIB and OBOR 3.1 China’s Term of Trade. v. Chapter 4. Transition in the Asia-Pacific------------------------------------------------ 49 4.1 Opportunity or Threat? 4.2 Response of the Region. Chapter 5. Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------- 57. iii.

(5) Bibliography---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59 Appendix A------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 70 Appendix B------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 71 Appendix C------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 72. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iv. i n U. v.

(6) List of Tables and Figures. Figure 1. Theoretical Framework of the International system. 4. Figure 2.1. China’s Annual GDP Growth Rate (%). 17. Figure 2.2a and 2.2b. Theory of Economic Interdependence. 19. Figure 2.3. China’s Defense Spending (US$Bn). 立. 24. ‧ 國. Trade between China and the World. 34. ‧. io. sit. y. Target Countries of Chinese FDI. n. al. er. Nat. Table 3.2. 學. Table 3.1. 政治大. Ch. engchi. v. i n U. v. 38.

(7) Chapter 1. Introduction The world is changing at a very remarkable speed. If we look at Goldman Sachs projections, 1 by 2025 Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And by 2050, it is projected that China will surpass America and Indian economy will be almost the same size as the economy of America. As China, India, Russia, and Brazil join the global middle class, brain and money will increasingly flow away from the United States. China has already surpassed Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy. The United States in 2010 reported a current account deficit of $470 billion, 2 contributing to imbalances that threaten the future of US growth, while China racked a surplus of $305 billion.. 政治大 invests strategically around the 立 world. Meanwhile, on the other hand, with its annual deficits as China channels its accumulating surpluses into sovereign wealth funds, which the government. America piles up on its financial debt, China becomes the leading foreign purchaser of American. ‧ 國. 學. treasuries. 3 According to the words of John Mearsheimer, this is one of the reasons America mustn’t be afraid of Chinese takeover because China is one of the big contributors of US. ‧. publically held debt, where it holds about $1.1 trillion of US debts, which means that China. io. y er. essentially going to be getting pay offs from US for a long time.. sit. Nat. already owns US, it doesn’t make sense for China to go stage a war against US when China is. As China continues to climb the economic ladder, their power of influence in. al. n. iv n C h ebecomes because of its progressive nature the study h i andUmore relevant over time. n g cmore. international affairs will continue to expand. China’s global rise is not a new area of study, but. 1. 2. 3. Dominic Wilson, “Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to 2050,” Global Economics Paper, no. 99, Economic Research from the Goldman Sachs, October 2013. http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive pdfs/brics-dream.pdf Bureau of Economic Affairs, U.S Department of Commerce, “US Current-Account Deficit, First Quarterly 2010: Preliminary Estimates of US International Transactions,” 2010. https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2011/pdf/trans_annual10_fax.pdf Charles A. Kupchan, “The World in 2050: When the 5 largest Economies are the BRICS and Us,” The Atlantic, 2012. http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/02/the-world-in-2050-when-the-5-largest-economies are-the-brics-and-us/253160/. 1.

(8) 1.1 Purpose Objective of the study This thesis intends to state that the rise of China will adjust power balancing among the major players in the Asia-Pacific region, by highlighting their leadership role in development investment mechanisms. The thesis will assert the affirmative rise of China on the grounds that the rise is trending at a different international setting juxtaposed to Cold War bipolar system, where existing power and emerging power will balance each other through counter alliances and inter dependent economic relations. So that China will not jeopardize their position by replacing the status quo but would consolidate with the system.. 立. Significance of the study. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. What makes the study significant for international studies is that it involves the world’s fastest developing nation and second’s largest economy in the world that has a quite a share of. ‧. international influence at hand. It has been continuously studied on par with the super power. y. Nat. America, making their relationship one of the important strategic relationships of the 21st. al. er. io. with regard to its intentions- positive/peaceful or negative.. sit. century. Given this status, the rise of China has been a subject of immense scrutiny, especially. n. iv n C h e n(Westphalia), opposed to the Western international system g c h i Uwhich will instigate further research The study of rising China echoes the coming of East Asian system (Eastphalia) as. on institutional changes in the field of international relations. The world has long been steered by powerful western nations and international institutes governed by them. The Asian financial crisis brought Asia into its knees and the disappointing action of global financial institutes gave a learning lesson. 4 The lesson for Asia was that they would have to start building their own defenses. The void left by the ‘guardian’ states in Asia gave China the opportunity to take the role of a leader in the region.. 4. Pablo Bustelo, “The East Asian Financial Crises: An analytical Survey,” Instituto Complutense de Estusios Internacionales, ICEI Working Paper 10, 1998. http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/eid/pb/ICEIwp10.pdf. 2.

(9) Ever since China opened up to international market during the late 1980s, their economic progression took America by surprise and they had since confronted China from various angles. Even though they may state otherwise, we can’t deny that there are indications US has been building a conception of ‘China threat’ in terms of foreign policies. China like any other sovereign nation is advancing its nation into economic modernity in the face of rapid globalization in order to keep up with the international community, especially because they have the capital too. Also at times, US allegations give no choice for China but to retaliate in various issues which makes them look like the “bad guy” because America has more leverage in terms of soft. 政治大. power. For example, China’s list of grievances such as continued US military support in the region, territorial claims makes them look bad against the US.. 立. China has had a remarkable period of growth shifting from a centrally planned to a market. ‧ 國. 學. based economy and integration into the international system promises to moderate its approaches towards its Asian neighbors. From Chinese perspective the key question for a rising nation is. Nat. sit. y. ‧. how to handle its relationship with existing institutions and system.. er. io. 1.1 Research Approach. al. n. iv n C U approach will help us gain an h e na qualitative of rising China as a research domain. Hence, g c h i research The purpose of the thesis expresses a need for learning more about the dominant concepts. understanding of the underlying reasons of the research subject which will further provide insights to develop hypothesis for potential quantitative research. To analyze the varying developments of the rise of China a theoretical design has been considered for the thesis, especially when the subject study is developed in an international setting. Theoretical reasoning defines why this phenomenon has occurred, what were the major factors in how this phenomenon has been developed, who were involved, and what has this trend in store for the future. In order to study this phenomenon of a rising nation, first we will consider a structure of the anarchic international system as a background setting to conceptualize the rise and fall of a 3.

(10) nation. In accordance to the theory of structural realist and constructivism, the following diagram represents the working and interpretation of various units in the system and the construction of identities, interests, intentions, and behavior of states. Figure 1: Theoretical Framework of the International System Self-help system. 政治大. Autonomous States. 立. Goals/Interests. ‧ 國. 學. Int. structure. Distribution of Power. ‧. Small Powers. y. Nat. Big Powers. Identities. n. al. er. io. sit. Int. structure. Intentions & Behavioral Patterns. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. (Source: Framework by the author). International theory defines a self-help system of autonomous states whom have goals and interests for their survival, but due to an anarchic system there is a distribution of power into big power (stronger states) and small power (weaker states). This distribution of power will help realize their goals/interests accordingly, which makes up their identity and ultimately their behavioral pattern.. 4.

(11) Both schools of thought are better addressed according to Kenneth Waltz’s theorization, 5 in which there are two main assumptions: First, the international system is anarchy, thus it is a self-help system consisting of states that are autonomous each of which must defend itself. Their main goals are survival, territorial integrity, and domestic autonomy. These goals establish their intentions in the international politics. Second, in an anarchic society there is a distribution of power, shared among all units in the system. This results in classification of units into how much power each other possesses (small power or big power). Differences in power yield differences in the types and magnitude of constraints that states face, forming an identity of who they are, what they are, and how others. 政治大 These theories gives us the interpretation that international politics is made up of states, 立 whose characteristic are the same but they differ in their capabilities. The less powerful states are should perceive them thus, resulting in variation in behavioral pattern.. ‧ 國. 學. seen confined in a corner while the great powers rule the court, often times interfering with the affairs of smaller ones, sometimes knocking them over, dominating the game and determining its. ‧. course of action.. sit. y. Nat. International relation is a social construct, where social phenomenon such as states, alliances, or international institutes is not thought to exist independent of human meaning. io. er. and action. The key idea is that international relations are also constructed by ideational. al. n. iv n C actors, that is, identities and interests ofhstates e nare h i U to social interaction. g cendogenous. structures such as shared norms, ideas, belief, which shapes the social identities of political 6. These. identities inform interests, which in turn shapes behavior. For example, Chinese nationalism shaped the identities and interests of China, which contains norms that guide how their leaders could play the game of politics, and encourage leaders to draw from their political identity to manoeuver their interests. 7 Thus, how Chinese leaders play their regional games was constructed by the norms of Chinese politics. This theoretical reasoning explains why. 5 6 7. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., reissued 2010, p.91. John Baylis, et al, Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford, UK: Oxford Press, 2011, p.155. Andrzej Walicki, “Ernest Gellner and the Constructivist Theory of Nation,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol.22, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1998, pp.611-619. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036761. 5.

(12) China is rising- because the interactive international environment influences reconstruction of identity. Further as we move from the international structure, the theory of trade expectation or economic interdependence will interpret the nature of rising states, here China (or other nonwestern rising states). According to the theory, state’s dependence depends on the benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade. With benefits of trade as positive and costs of severed trade being negative, the expected value of trade (future trading) may be anywhere between the two extremes 8. For example, if a state has positive expectations that the other will maintain a free and open trade over long period, then the expected value of trade will be positive or in other words,. 政治大. the economic interdependence will be peace-inducing. Whereas, if a state expects that trade will be severed by the trading partner due to policy decision, then the state will attach a negative. 立. expected value of trade or in other words, the economic interdependence will be threat-inducing.. ‧ 國. 學. If trade is severed and the dependence is threatened, the prospect of war can only be ascertained based on relative power balance. For example, smaller states could be compromised. ‧. in case the future of peaceful trading is negative, but if actors are roughly equal in relative power, then they will assign a high expected value to continued peaceful trade, and will choose peace as. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. rational strategy.. 1.2 Research Methodology. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In terms of research methodology, the approach to the study is descriptive, theoretical, and normative, reliant on secondary sources of data collection. Such documents will be interpreted and analyze in accordance to the above theoretical approach. Some concepts in this study may apply economic analysis, for example, in understanding the factors on how the rise of China has developed, like Chinese investment market.. 8. Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” International Security 20, no. 4, 1996, pp. 17-19. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539041. 6.

(13) Given the broad and vast study of the global rise of China and their economic components, the important properties of the content of the study are identified as: China influence, Investment abroad, International Relations, and Power in Asia-Pacific region. Another approach that may help conduct the study is through comparison between the West and East system, where the rise of China is applied in a different setting as compared to historical rising powers of the West and also comparison of key Chinese leaders, as how as how their national policies may have affected the development of Chinese power over time.. 政治大 The study on rising China 立is an ongoing process because it is a developing phenomenon.. 1.3 Scope and Limitation. The scope of the study goes beyond the domain of economic motives although this research. ‧ 國. 學. explores the influence of growing China on Asia-Pacific and its intimidation on power transitioning in the region through the urgings of theoretical reasoning and economic. ‧. development mechanism. For the intent of this paper, data are limited to the years in the early. sit. n. al. er. io 1.5 Literature Review. y. Nat. 2000s and by the narrow availability of materials on recent developments of Chinese progress. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. There are numerous literatures on the global rise of China and its image on the West and the pacific region. In this chapter, the literature will be compiled into three major themes that incorporate the key notes of the study: The economic rise of China, regional effect, and the inevitable balance of power in the region.. Theoretical context of a Rising Power As mentioned on the onset, the theoretical context helps us understand why something has occurred. As for this case, it helps us understand the circumstances of phenomena like rising China in the millennial. 7.

(14) Mearsheimer’s International theory states that there are five assumptions of the International system. 9 First, States are main actors and there is nothing above them- anarchy; second, every nation has some sorts (it can vary) of military capabilities; third, no one can know what each other states intentions are. Intentions are uncertain; fourth, survival is the highest goal of all states. It is not the only goal but it is an obvious no. 1 goal; finally, States are strategic experts. This setting of the international system results in three forms of state behavior- first, states fear each other and for two reasons: one, because there is always a possibility of a rising power, secondly if there is trouble there is no higher authority you can turn to because the. 政治大. International System is anarchy. This leads to second form of behavior- self-help: because there is no higher authority to turn to you must help yourself. The third form of behavior is that the. 立. best way to survive in the anarchic system is to be continuously powerful, that is, you want to be. ‧ 國. 學. the hegemon in the system. That is why America does not like competition and wants to continue holding on to their global power status.. ‧. These forms of behavior help us clarifies why there exist great power rivalry, or why is there a rise and fall of states. As the realist theory suggests, because differences in power creates. y. Nat. er. io. how others perceive them.. sit. the types and magnitude of constraints states face, identity of who they are, what they are, and. al. n. iv n C you can do is be a regional hegemon, sohthat i Uin the system dominate your region. e nnogother c hstates Because the international system does not allow you to be the global hegemon, the best. So then what implication does this have on the economic rise of China?. John Mearsheimer’s theory of the international structure is approachable up to the extent when he argues the hegemonic and revisionist nature of states. China’s intentions, he believes are hegemonic and will use force to alter the balance of power. 10 Isaac Freedman states these predictions are based on estimates of the economic rise of China and that it will convert. 9. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001 pp. 3133.. 10. Ibid p.17.. 8.

(15) economic power to war-fighting power. 11 However in the ensuing period a struggle for rise in power does not have the capacity to ensure a new world order, perhaps because the age of Nuclear weapons have paved way for more integrated relations and economic interdependence. Attempting for hegemony would compromise a state’s survival and China is not ignorant of this fate and recognizes the hazards of war with the US or the rest of the world for that matter.. Power Transition in the Region What does China and rising states beyond China want, what are their ambitions and interests and visions? The global power transition is complex and full of uncertainties especially. 政治大 be a kind of democratic revolution. In the sense that, more people in more societies will seek to 立 have a voice in the running of the global order.. in the East Asia where China is at the centre of this. Regardless, this global transformation will. ‧ 國. 學. Even if there is contestation and power rivalry, it won’t be a struggle of overthrowing of. ‧. liberal international order. Indeed, what we have seen in recent decades is that China and other rising states like BRICS, Australia, South Korea, are rising from within rather than instigating. sit. y. Nat. ‘revisionist intentions’ around the rules of law and international institutions. In one sense or the other, the rising non-western states are also experiencing in their own the same problems the. io. n. al. er. West experience, what we call the 21st Century problems- like problems of inequality,. i n U. sustainable growth, climate change, infrastructure, immigration. 12. Ch. engchi. v. Some of the reasons why power transition this time may be different from what we imagined from the past is that the international system is a complex, multi-layered, integrated, accommodating difference, shared leadership, and hence different from past orders. Unlike the offensive realist claim, China has pursued policies within the current Western international order. For example, their active participation in international organizations has doubled since 1966. Also China derives its foreign policies based on “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, which opines that all foreign relations will be dealt with mutual respect for 11 12. Isaac Freedman, “The Peaceful Rise of China,”Academia.edu, No. 9, pp.3-4. http://www.academia.edu/5623559/The_Peaceful_Rise_of_China John Ikenberry, “The rise of China and the Future of Liberal World Order,” Chatham House, 2014, p.9. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140507RiseofChina.pdf. 9.

(16) sovereignty, mutual respect for territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference of internal affairs, equality and benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 13 China and non-western states wants a modern system that liberal internationalism offers, minus the American and Western hegemonic aspect of it. One of it is openness and access to trade, investment, and technology. China indeed is progressing aggressively in the Asia-Pacific region and appears to have the ability to be a rising power. But in a broader perspective, perhaps it is not really a rise of China but a broader global transformation. John Ikenberry describes this phenomenon as rise of global middle class- not just BRICS but Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia, and Canada. 14 Many non-western states are rising in some aspect or the other: first they want to have. 政治大. a say in their region, and more generally they are engaging actively in stakeholder diplomacy, such as multilateral cooperation, influencing world politics through agenda-settings, bridge-. 立. building, coalition diplomacy where South Korea is a perfect example of this. China’s approach. ‧ 國. 學. is using infrastructural development as a means to bring state-to-state relationships and resource relationships. Hence, it depends on the rest of the world being liberal.. ‧ sit. y. Nat. Power Rivalry. al. er. io. Tracing back from history, America has never appreciated competitors, for example. n. Imperial Germany during WW1 in the Western Hemisphere, the Imperial Japan in WW2, the. Ch. i n U. v. Soviet Union when they were becoming the possible hegemon in Europe after the fall of Nazi. engchi. Germany, and now possibly China in Asia. Just like how Americans do not like any presence in the Western Hemisphere, likewise the Chinese are not going to like the Americans sitting at their doorstep. They are going to do anything to keep them away just like Americans would at their end. Why? because states want to maintain certain influence in their region. China may simply be trying to mark its regional hegemony. How has US reacted to this? Suddenly US announced Pivot to Asia which they’ve stated had nothing to do with containing China, but we know that it was specially design to contain China. US had been confident about ‘balancing coalition’, that is,. 13 14. Andrew J. Nathan, Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security, New York: W.W. Norton, 1997, p.260. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal World Order,” Chatham House, 2014 p.7. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140507RiseofChina.pdf. 10.

(17) to work together with Chinese neighbors in containment. These neighbors are India, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, Philippines. But the problem with this strategy is the theory of ‘security dilemma’, that anything the US will do for defensive purposes and/or China’s neighbors do to contain China will look offensive to China. And anything that the Chinese will do for defense will look offensive to the Americans. Taylor M. Fravel also discusses the theory of offensive realism predicting a future of conflict in great power rivalry, because of benefits of aggression. 15 He applies different principles of international relations to identify the weightage between the benefits of aggression against cost, and recognizes the importance of revisionist intentions in power transitions and note. 政治大 Unlike the past, this century power transitioning takes place at a different international 立 setting and the concept of rising China can be endorsed by the theories of economic that some transitions have been peaceful.. ‧ 國. 學. independence that highlights the wide-ranging costs that China would pay for aggressive policies, especially the damage it would bring to their decades of economic reforms and jeopardize its. ‧. participation in the international system that has facilitated greatly its rise.. sit. y. Nat. It is in the interest of China that they will likely avoid benefits of aggression against costs; otherwise it would most certainly trigger the formation of a coalition of states to contain China. io. n. al. er. which would ultimately undermine their grand strategy of reassurance. 16. Ch. i n U. v. In the East Asian community, China and Japan are two crucial pillars, when in the 1980s. engchi. Japanese investment in East Asian contributed to common prosperity and now the Chinese economy is assuming the role of regional integration and will shape the economic future of the region. Sino-Japanese relations are dividend on various issues. For example, the Chinese nuclear tests and military expansion began to make Japan nervous of Chinese intentions, while Japan strengthened alliance with the US, which in turned fuelled Chinese perception of renewed Japanese militarism. But even more ironic is that they both enjoy ever closer economic ties. Amitav Acharya writes that Japan and the US worry about possible Chinese dominance of the 15. 16. Taylor M Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion,” MIT, International Studies Review, Vol.12, 2010, pp. 520-532. http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.ISR.china.expansion.pdf Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security, California: Stanford University Press, 2005, pp.133-36.. 11.

(18) East Asian community but both China and Japan need to keep their economic and diplomatic relationships from being undermined by nationalist political posturing. 17 Relative power of the US in the ASEAN has never been more distinct. American hegemony today is a two-track for ASEAN. Balance of power sees it as a stabilizing force against a rising China and keeping peace in the region. But at the same time, dependence on American power also raises question about ASEAN’s own autonomy and relevance. In dealing with the US, China, India, and other major powers, it is important to know that its unity and credibility is vital so that its sates are not confronted with Hobbesian nightmare.. China’s Second Rise. 立. 政治大. Scholars have scrutinized the negative perception of China rise on the lines of territorial. ‧ 國. 學. expansion, because historically states have fought over territories more than any other issues. However, given the current international system the analysis of territorial expansion of China. ‧. becomes unnecessary. China’s recent territorial disputes suggests that future territorial expansion may be unlikely; stronger China will sought cultural hegemony over physical control; and. sit. y. Nat. globalization of supply chains creates production interdependence, and rise of markets generates human capital and technology that conflict over land is the least important. And also most. io. er. importantly there are costs involved: states must bear in mind the political and diplomatic costs. al. n. iv n C negative impact on their economic development h e n gascwell h i asUthe political legitimacy of the ruling. of territorial expansion; economic costs that China would pay for aggressive policy and the. party.. While we look into the intentions and behavior, we must also understand the characteristics of China itself, because it is after all our environment that creates our identities and interests. In order to understand how China has been rising or whether there exist China rise, Hsiung emphasizes the history. 18 The history of Chinese dynasties tells us that China has once been the global power before the coming of western exploration and until the Opium war.. 17 18. Amitav Acharya, Asia Rising, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2008, p. 26. J.C Hsiung, China into its Second Rise: Myths, Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Challenges to Theory, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2012, pp.52-56.. 12.

(19) Then after the last Dynasty and all the wars post 1949, China saw the onslaught of the modern political development of Chinese communism with the founding of the republic under the Chairmanship of Mao Zedong. Then came Deng Xiaoping who revolutionized the Chinese economy and entry into the world market. Ever since, China has never looked away from building an economic empire. It is a widespread assumption that as countries modernize, they also westernize. It is an assumption that modernity is a product of competition, markets, and technology. But it is not. It is also shaped by history and culture. Chinese civilization is one of the oldest that remained to this day, changed but not altered. Domestic developments in China cannot be evaluated by. 政治大. comparing it with those countries born of the Westphalian tradition. When China re-rises it is not like the arrival of “new kid on the block”, instead it is almost comparable to a meeting of two. 立. civilizations. Like for example, the re-rising of China must assimilate into the Westphalian. ‧ 國. 學. system, for it to be integrated with other members of that system.. In the recent decade, China under Xi Jinping has seen various plunges but that didn’t stop. ‧. its growing dominance. In 2014, China total GDP took over US in terms of purchasing power parity. 19 More important than their size, many were surprised by the speed with which it was. y. Nat. sit. growing. Chinese consolidated leadership has helped built a huge foreign reserve of almost $3. al. er. io. trillion, by far the biggest in the world. It has also helped Beijing to pursue its global strategy of. n. investment and reshaping financial architecture. China’s growing strength indeed threatens the. Ch. i n U. status quo, and this has led to various assessment of imagining.. engchi. v. Image Making Imagining is important in the sense that images that existing powers have of rising power influence the policies they pursue. America-China imagining is an interesting case. In case of America’s imagining of rising China, McGiffert makes it clear that as long as China improves in material capabilities American image of China will be increasingly negative. However it is also. 19. Ian Bremmer, “The 5 Facts Explain Why China Is Still on the Rise,” TIME, August 20, 2015. http://time.com/4005404/china-economy-influence-growing-tianjin/. 13.

(20) understood that the economic aspect of their relationship makes it difficult for them to make decisions on national security interests against economic interests. 20 America’s self-mage of “exceptionalism”, which means that America believes it is a special chosen state created to be the redeemer of the inferior, is prominent in their policies and decision making. It seem like they cannot stand the fact that China rejected Western teachings and values that made them powerful. Often times the West tends to force their ‘values’ unto third world societies largely unaware of their condescending attitudes and practices toward the East. Mahbubani remarks that economic development is probably the most powerful tool to ‘liberate’ the third world. 21 It. 政治大 political decisions. For example, today China is no longer under the tight control of the 立 communist party like Mao did. Deng Xiaoping’s reform killed that possibility. In this aspect and shakes up old social arrangement and paves the way for the greater percentage of the society and. ‧ 國. 學. changes in the international society, the containment of China only brings more complications in China’s strategy for reassurance.. ‧. After centuries of trying to come to prominence the time has arrived for Asia to par with. sit. y. Nat. the West and likely to avoid petty disputes and historical squabbles. It is safe to say that European and North Americans will never understand the nature of this psychological revolution. io. er. because they cannot step into the Asian’s mind and they’ve never had to struggle with the. al. n. iv n C one’. The development of rising East Asia h egives n gconfidence c h i Uthat they can come to par with the. subconscious assumption that perhaps they are second-rated never good enough to be ‘number. major power in the west. China’s emergence as a great power in the Asia-Pacific is not a preparation for war but rather a preparation for progress into a new millennium. 22 China rise will influence power transitioning in the Asia-Pacific by giving China greater incentives for integration where US relative command may decline.. 20 21 22. Carola McGiffert, China in the American Political Imagination, Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies Press, 2003 pp.80-85. Kishore Mahbubani, Can Asians Think?, Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International Pvt. ltd, 2010, pp 58-59. John G. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.87, No 1, 2008. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west. 14.

(21) Chapter 2. Major Trends in China Rise Ever since the establishment of PRC in 1949, China was perceived as geopolitical extension of the Stalinist Communist Empire threatening US interests in Asia. Then after realizing the importance of “China card” against Soviet Union, America considered China as a “strategic partner”, which was then lost when Soviet collapsed and focused was shifted towards China becoming a “threat”. Early 1990s prompted the beginning of ‘Chinese threat’ labeled by the American mass media. It appears that the real threat was not Chinese communist economy but its military expansion fueled by growing nationalism. Theoretically, the growth of China’s military. 政治大 other’s intentions. Every sovereign 立 nation has the caliber and freedom to choose what it wants.. modernization does not come as a surprise in a system of insecurity and uncertainty of each 1. ‧ 國. 學. By late 1990s American scholars began to calculate the threat of China as grave as challenges with EU and Japan (EU was merely an economic challenge and Japan would. ‧. compromise with US because it needs security protection). Only China presented a multidimensional threat to US in political, military, cultural, economic aspects because China differed. Nat. sit. y. greatly from America in these aspects. Also China’s intended rise in the region was anxious for. io. er. America, who prevents any single country from gaining overwhelming power. These hegemonic thought itself is provoking to any nation if not only to China, just because America being the sole. al. n. iv n C U Africa and Central Asia sides h ofe the with China regarding the long dominance n gWest, c hfori example superpower the international society lean towards it even though they share same grievances. with China, giving more reasons to America to add to the fear. But it is only a natural phenomenon in constructivism if a country is protecting, channeling, and building its interests. Also, China in return has never showed signs of aggression (only passive-aggressive) in requiring its interests. China’s geostrategic political threat turned into geo-economic threat after the turn of the 21st century. Economists forecasted that the world in 2020 would likely be one in which Asia is the main engine of the global economy, with China. 1. John J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001, p. 32.. 15.

(22) and India merging as ‘major powers’. 2 If China’s rise as world’s economy power is predicted then it means there is a relative decline in America’s economic hegemony. Besides geo-economic threat, China rise also has geopolitical dimension, for example in the early 2000 both China and India was perceived as potential threat to America, but the level at which this threat was perceived was different. In the case of India they were considered ‘natural ally’ which mean that America supported the rise of India. Here, the difference between the two was their political ideology, so if this was real that means China threat also consists of geopolitical threat, according to US. If theorists were to fear whether China rise is a threat or not based on past examples of. 政治大 timer, and its behavior in international is very different from past examples. It is said that first立 timers are aggressive predators, not only is this second time for China but also in its first time various nations rising and falling, it should be kept in mind that China’s current rise is not a first3. ‧ 國. 學. (before the Western exploration) its rise was benign.. ‧. This chapter will express the major developments of the China Rise phenomena giving accounts of its economic credibility and growth which affect the progress in military and its. sit. n. al. er. io 2.1 Economic Rise. y. Nat. image making in the region and ultimately the world.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. China’s economic growth has quadrupled since the 1980s intensifying to become one of the world’s fastest growing economies. Private and semi-private enterprises, higher education, and international trade all contributes to higher economic growth in China. More importantly international trade and inflow of huge amount of Foreign Direct Investment are underlined as the main engines of China’s growth performance.. 2. 3. Anthony Fensom, “China, India, to lead world by 2050 says PwC,” The Diplomat, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-india-to-lead-world-by-2050-says-pwc/ J. C Hsuing, China into its Second Rise: Myths, Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Challenges to Theory, Singapore: World Scientific publishing Co., 2012, p. 48.. 16.

(23) China’s economy expanded at an annual rate of 6.9 per cent in the second quarter of 2017, beating the government’s target in a year of political transition. 4 Growth remained at its strongest level since the third quarter of 2015. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Annual Growth Rate in China averaged 9.71 percent from 1989 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 15.40 percent in the first quarter of 1993 and a record low of 3.80 percent in the fourth quarter of 1990.. Figure 2.1: China’s Annual GDP Growth Rate (%). GDP 16 14. 立. 12 10. 2010. io. 2011. 2012. 2013. 2014. 2015. 2016. GDP. al. n. [Source: The World Bank]. 2009. 2017. y. 2008. Nat. 2007. sit. 0. ‧. 2. er. 4. ‧ 國. 6. 學. 8. 政治大. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The National Bureau of Statistics added that the 6.9 % growth rate showed China’s economy had become ‘more stable, co-ordinated, and sustainable’. The signs of slow growth were due to the government tightening monetary policies and property sector at the start of 2017. The global presence of Chinese economic power project the rise of China as an ‘Economic Rise’ deemed to take up the role of a responsible leadership. In other words, as long as China is considered relevant in the world economy their role as a leader contains them from causing any risk to the international order. 4. Gabriel Wildau, Tom Mitchell, “China GDP Growth Points to 2017 Economic Rebound,” Financial Times, July 27, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/6e46e302-6878-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614. 17.

(24) Liberals and realists have argued the potentiality of economic dependence among great powers with probability of war. The theory of trade expectations 5 clarifies the notion of economic dependence by fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of trade gives states the incentive to be cooperative while the realist view that the potential cost of over dependence can push states to war to ensure continued access to necessary and vital materials and goods. In addition to this, the theory introduces a new variable- the expectations of future trade. Economic interdependence among states will be peaceful if states expect that trade levels in the future is high. If their future trade expectations are low, then the most dependent state will likely initiate conflict for fear of losing the economic wealth that supports their long term security.. 政治大 initiate conflict which means that China’s rise as an economic power guarantees little to no 立 power conflict and war. Another example in contrary is the case of North Korea. The continued Realists have opined that only the most dependent state in the economic network will. ‧ 國. 學. sanction on the country forces them to initiate instability and war for their economic security because they are highly dependent nation with no future trade expectancy.. ‧. To simply construct a theoretical logic to this theory, let us consider the following. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. graphical representation:. 5. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014, p.16. 18.

(25) Theory of Economic Interdependence. level of dep.. *. level of dep.. *. * * future trading. future trading. (Figure. 2.2 a). (Figure. 2.2 b). [source: author]. 政治大. Figure (2.2a) accounts the Liberals perspective of state’s expectation to its trading. 立. environment. It assumes that states seek to maximize welfare therefore the more the level of. ‧ 國. 學. future trade expectancy the higher the level of economic interdependence and actors will foster peace given the benefits of trade over war. Figure (2.2b) accounts the Realists assumption that. ‧. states seek to maximize security thus at higher level of dependency states severe trade ties (low future trade expectancy) to escape potential vulnerability.. y. Nat. sit. State’s dependency depends on benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade. Benefits. al. er. io. being positive and costs being negative, the expected value of trade may be anywhere between. n. the two extremes, depending on a state’s estimate of the expected probability of securing open trade or being cut off.. 6. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The prospect of conflict or hegemony in case trade is severed can only be ascertained based on the relative power balance. For example, only if one state is more powerful than the other can there be threat, but if both states are equally powerful then the expected value of future trading is high and thus likely to trade peacefully and project healthy relationship and leadership. Modern technology has increased the costs and risk of aggression making trading more preferential. Norman Angell makes the argument that trade pays more than war through the observation that states tend to choose peaceful trade over ‘old method’ of power politics because. 6. Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectation,” International Security, Vol.20, No. 4, 1996, pp. 20-21.. 19.

(26) even though war was once legitimate, modernization has made it difficult to supplement oneself through force, by destroying economic bonds. 7 China’s economic acceleration can be assumed through four stages of reformation: First, 1980s- set up of modern economic management system. Second, 1990s- increasingly privatized corporate system that strengthened profit incentives; set up new system of urban society safety nets, rural compensation efforts, well-funded police, and arrest of ringleaders, violent protestors, and some corrupt officials. Third, 2001 through 2007 by now China was surging with domestic investment and consumption and its entry into the WTO stimulated growth to more than tenfold. China’s fourth reform phase began in 2008 with its newly formed government, with young. 政治大. leadership meant to last for the next fifteen years. This period of young leadership promoted promising combination of economic growth alongside environmental protection and social. 立. welfare.. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese theorists rooted their development strategy in the work of Friedrich List. 8. who. insisted that policies must make state a key player in development, such strategies include. ‧. selective protectionism and promoting champion industries, because countries pass through stages of industrial maturation linked to their level of development. 9. sit. y. Nat. Its economic growth over the years has cumulated China into a major global commercial. io. er. and institutional leader, with its size double to that of America. Implications of its growth. al. n. iv n C domestic market will send ripples around hthe i U policies will influence liquidity e nworld, g citshmonetary suggests China will take the lead in shaping trade and investment patterns, any fluctuation in the. and interest rates everywhere, leadership of international institutions will gravitate toward China. Thus, China’s economic activity will spill into every conceivable dimension of international relations. The United States will only have an important secondary influence.. These factors itself incline to rationalize the notion that the nation’s economic rise is a pure opportunists with large encompass of actors interested in its investment and assistance both global and regional. It is easier to achieve an advantageous position through economic 7 8. 9. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, New York: G.P Putnam’s Sons, 4th edition, 2015, p.59. Albert Keidel, “China’s Economic Rise: Fact and Fiction,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, 2008, p 2-4. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb61_keidel_final.pdf Friedrich List, National System of Political Economy, New York: Cosimo Classics, 2011 p.22.. 20.

(27) multilateralism than militarism. For this reason, Chinese economic and diplomatic influence has spread rapidly. The price America has to pay for containing China will only grow and its effectiveness will be only reduced because no country will wish to sacrifice their economic gain in exchange for any political and military alliance to contain China. Lately reports calculate that China’s open-market based economy has created problems of inequality in per capita income between the coastal and interior provinces, 10 and to achieve balanced growth so as to reduce these disparities appears to be one of the major policy challenges China has to face in order to maintain a steady GDP growth rate and social stability. Krugman argues that China will face a limit on growth sooner or later, since it depends heavily. 政治大. on a massive increase in input with only small improvement in productivity, as in the case of East Asian economies. 11. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 2.2 Military Expansion. ‧. Major western security analysts have projected China’s rising economic power as a tool to potential military expansion. They also believe that the growth of Chinese military power will. Nat. sit. y. be a potential source of conflict between major powers in Asia. As of now, China’s military. io. er. capabilities are relatively weaker than America and unlike America, who enjoys a system of bases and agreements like those found in Guam, Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, and Central. al. n. iv n C U power, with which they are Americans distinguish clearly betweenhrising e n Chinese g c h ieconomic Asia, China has no such system. Thus, US clearly enjoy substantial military advantages. The. comfortable, and military power, with which they are less comfortable, despite America’s own military supremacy. Amongst all of Chinese activity, perhaps the most provocative has been China’s devotion to the “nine-dash line”. It is this array of disputes in the South China Sea that has prompted tension in the region and infamously indicted China of expanding and upgrading their military capabilities. 10 11. John Knight, Sai Ding, China’s Remarkable Economic Growth, North Carolina: Oxford University Press, 1st edition, 2012, p. 99. Paul Krugman, “The Myths of Asia’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.6, 1994, p.63. http://www.brmandel.com/uploads/3/2/4/5/3245755/myth_of_asias-miracle.pdf. 21.

(28) The South China Sea is incredibly rich in natural resources- 11 billion barrels of oil, 190 trillion of natural gas, and 10% of the world’s fisheries and most importantly 30% of the world’s shipping trade flows through here to booming economic centers and markets of South East Asia 12 . Currently five countries lay claim to some part of it based on the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, which states that a nation’s territorial water extend up to 200 nautical miles from its shores or otherwise known the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). 13 China argues they have historical claim to South China Sea (SCS) dating back to naval expedition in the 15th century and following WW2 when Japan lost control of all the surrounding seas, China used the moment to claim the sea by drawing a border that encompass 90% of the. 政治大. SCS, which became known as the 9 Dash Line 14 and has no concrete clarification to its boundaries.. 立. In the middle of it all are the Spartly Islands currently claimed by China, Brunei, Vietnam,. ‧ 國. 學. Philippines and Malaysia. These clusters of Islands are at the heart of the SCS, and any country that can claim the Spartly Islands can extend their EEZs to include them and gain exclusive. ‧. rights to the surrounding territories. 15 China building man-made islands in these inhibited islands and installing military bases took the dispute to the new level because it threatened the position. io. sit. y. Nat. of the other claimants.. er. Now the dispute becomes even complicated when US start to take notice. Although. al. n. iv n C waters. But h eChina h i theU US presence n g csees. America has no claims to the SCS, it being the lone super power uses their massive naval army to defend the international. in the area as an. encroachment in their backyard.. China is building airstrips on disputed islands in the South China Sea, moving oil rigs into disputed waters and redefining its airspace but without any clear program for turning such assertion into the acknowledged status it sees. This troubles the neighbors, and it definitely 12. GlobalSecurity.Org report on South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-oil.htm 13 UNCLOS, Oceans and Law of the Sea, United Nation. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm 14 Beina Xu, “South China Sea Tensions,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2014. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/south-china-sea-tensions 15 Robert Beckman, Leonardo Bernard, “Maritime Boundary Disputes in the east and South China Seas,” Forging a Common Maritime Future for ASEAN and Japan, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2015 pp. 27-29.. 22.

(29) troubles America. In other words, China’s desire to re-establish itself (without being fully clear about its intentions) and America’s determination not to let that desire disrupt its interests and those of its allies (without being clear about how to respond) have caused tension and distrusts in the region and among allies. According to the State Council, 16 China plan to extend its global military reach to safeguard its economic interests, while also defending its territorial claims at sea against ‘claimants’ and prying by the United States. Beijing has insisted its military is dedicated to international security cooperation and peaceful development, in order to protect their national interests. For example, in a move welcomed by other nations, China sent a 700 strong. 政治大. peacekeeping force in the winter of 2014 to South Sudan, where it has extensive oil interests, marking the first time it has sent an infantry battalion on a UN mission. 17. 立. China is the only country besides the US to have a triple-digit defense budget (in USD). 18. ‧ 國. 學. This level of spending is remarkable given where China started off. For example, in the late 1990s, their military spending roughly totaled to about $10 billion on par with Taiwan and. ‧. definitely lesser than Japan and South Korea. However, since then the budget began to rise significantly, firstly because their economy soared and secondly, the low inflation rate in the last. y. Nat. io. sit. two decades means real growth in defense spending has nearly matched nominal growth.. er. Defense budget identifies the importance of a country’s armed forces relative to other. al. n. iv n C U The following graph represents translate its potential capability for power h e into n gpower c h i itself.. organs of the state. No matter how much a country spends on military, it must still find ways to. China’s defense spending according to three sources: The official Chinese Defense Budget, US Department of State, and a non-partisan third party, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI):. 16. 17. 18. Chinese Military Strategy white paper outlining the new policy of ‘active defense’, released by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, May 26, 2015. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm David Smith, “China to send 700 combat troops to South Sudan,” The Guardian, December 23, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/23/china-700-combat-troops-south-sudan-africa-battalion-un peacekeeping Global Firepower list of Military Strength Ranking 2017. http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 23.

(30) Figure 2.3: China’s Defense Spending (US$bn) 250 200 Chinese offical defense budget. 150. US Department of Defense. 100. SIPRI 50 0. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. [Source: Various 19]. 政治大. Estimating Chinese Defense budget is inconsistent as there is no universally accepted. y. Nat. sit. standard for reporting military spending. Although China provides official estimates of its. io. er. defense spending, external estimates of the same are often higher than Beijing’s official number. Therefore, the above graph has been drawn from three different sources for a comparison. al. n. analysis.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Official figures released by the Chinese government peg the country’s 2016 defense budget at $146.6 billion, an increase of 7.6 percent from the 2015 budget of $144.2 billion. The SIPRI estimates the overall 2016 figure at $226 billion and the 2015 estimate at $214 billion. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) places the 2015 defense budget at more than $180 billion, while the SIPRI puts the number at $214.1 billion.. 19. China’s National Defense http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress https://www.defense.gov , SIPRI Military Database https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 24.

(31) China’s rising defense spending follows from almost two decades of modernization efforts. China began military modernization in earnest after the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, an event that exposed fundamental weaknesses in China’s ability to deter foreign intervention in China’s sovereignty disputes. Additionally, the increase in China’s defense spending during this period was, in part, a response to domestic policies that left China’s defense budget relatively low. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Chinese defense budget suffered even as economic reforms increased China’s overall wealth, which prompted the PLA to increase its low funding through business investments. Due to corruption and a host of other problems, the PLA was forced to strip in 1998, a move that resulted in increased defense costs for the Chinese government. 20. 政治大. Even though China’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP has not risen significantly,. 立. China’s aggregate spending increase has corresponded with several high-profile procurement. ‧ 國. 學. programs, military reforms, and doctrinal and strategic shifts within the PLA. 21 These changes have facilitated China to play a larger role in regional and international security. Some of these. ‧. efforts, such as China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations, antipiracy efforts, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are welcomed contributions to global governance. On. sit. y. Nat. the other hand, defending China’s security interests in the East and South China Seas may strain. io. al. er. relations with other regional actors.. n. While Chinese military spending has increased considerably over the past decade,. Ch. i n U. v. China’s military budget lacks in comparison to the U.S. military budget. The United States spent. engchi. 3.3% of its GDP on defense in 2016, with a nominal expenditure more than two and a half times higher than China’s figure. Even when considering the estimation discrepancies discussed above, China would have to spend a great deal more to match U.S. defense spending. Unlike the United States who maintains a global military presence, China has no bases on foreign soil and its defense interests are primarily focused within the Asia-Pacific. Potential military expansion has also been speculated since President Xi announced in 2013 that the country would invest in historic Silk Road trade routes across Asia to Europe and 20 21. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, New York: Routledge, 2nd edition, 2012, p. 239. Global Security Organization Report on China’s Defense Budget https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm. 25.

(32) Africa. In the interest of securing raw materials and natural resources for the functioning of their economy China seem to have developed bases in various strategically located port cities where nations like US or France already have established military facilities. After all China is only the third most powerful military in the world behind US and Russia. 22 More importantly, the world should be anxious about relations between Russia and US under the Trump administration. In the course of last year alone various events like the establishment of Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, political engagement surrounding the Ukraine crisis, Abenomics, rise of Asian companies (Alibaba), points towards the emergence of a more complex, multipolar world. In a bigger picture, we see how geographically the world GDP is moving towards the East. 政治大. with China and India aiming to become largest economic powerhouses. Based on the rise of Asia and a stabilization of the Eurozone, a scenario of a multipolar world is expected as the world. 立. economy rests on three pillars- namely America, Europe and Asia. 23 Therefore, as long as China. ‧ 國. 學. builds an adequate, modern defense capability and continue peaceful economic development, the China threat theory will have no audience.. ‧ sit. y. Nat. 2.3 Rising Image. Since the establishment of PRC in 1949, theories on China’s foreign policy is perceived. io. er. as geopolitical extension of the Stalinist Communist empire threatening US interests in Asia.24. al. n. iv n C h elostnwhen as a ‘strategic partner’, which was then i Ucollapsed and focused was shifted g c hSoviet Then after realizing the importance of ‘China card’ against Soviet Union, China was considered. towards China as the ‘threat’. This idea of ‘threat’ escalated when in 1995 Beijing showed displease when Taiwan’s then President Lee Deng Hui lashed China’s dictatorial regime on his visit to the US, in which an almost armed-showdown happened the following year when Taiwan was preparing for its. 22 23. 24. Global Firepower list of Military Strength Ranking 2017 http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp Michael O’Sullivan, “Towards a multipolar world?,” Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2015 p.5. http://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=EE7A6A5D-D9D5-6204 E9E6BB426B47D054 William C. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican Era,” The China Quarterly, No. 15, special issue: Reappraising Republic China, 1997, p.4. http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Kirby%20Internationalization%20of%20China.pdf. 26.

(33) Presidential election and Beijing retaliated (to scare voters from voting Lee to second term) by testing missiles across the Cross-Straits and US sending its carriers in to the Taiwan Strait.25 These incidents prompted the beginning of ‘Chinese threat’ label by American media. It appears that the real threat was not Chinese communism of economy, but its military expansion fueled by growing nationalism. According to America, China’s military buildup would soon allow Beijing to threaten American interests. China’s growing economic and military power considered a threat is first of all, judgmental to China’s intentions when every nation has the sovereignty and freedom to safeguard its own national interests. Hence China’s growing power could also be an approach to. 政治大. be on par with other major power that it is surrounded with especially after the Dengist reform (after entering the competitive market).. 立. Realist opines that an unbalanced power is a potential danger to the other, what if we. ‧ 國. 學. were to apply this theory to China’s perspective too, for example it could be considered that for Beijing America is a threat too. If every rising power proves to be expansionist and predatory. ‧. then why should America not be considered a threat when they are a self-designated policeman.. y. Nat. Power-transition theory examines the order of power in the international system, and how. io. sit. states are either satisfied or dissatisfied with the distribution of power. 26 So the state on top. er. dictates the resources and conditions based on its power and other states below decides whether. al. n. iv n C challenge the system. Thus, analysts of h Chinese i Ua major conflict when the state rises e n gpower c hfear. they are satisfied with the conditions. A rising power unsatisfied with the rules of the game may. in power to directly challenge the main power.. So far, the Chinese has not made any observable intent in declaring war against the status quo because when they are equally compatible, they won’t risk going against major players. Also considering the world environment today, and how America and China has been trying to maintain a stable relationship against all odds, rising power and existing power can very much come to work together, if the existing power would encourage healthy rise of new powers and not cause distrust by attempting to content rising nations. America is still powerfully influential 25 26. Weixing Hu, “The Taiwan Strait And Asian Pacific Security,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.11, No.1, 1997, pp.149-182. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23255755 A.F.K Organski, Jacek Kruger, The War Ledger, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp.11-16.. 27.

(34) but it is this power that they try to intervene in the affairs of smaller nations in the name of international peace and security, and anything that goes against their interests are branded as a probable threat. Thus, it could also be considered that imaging of China rise as an intimidation to international system could be a well-constructed western concept. Realist theory is too closely tied to the pre-globalized past and thus cannot adequately explain the behavior of states in the new international relations. 27 The implication of power in transitioning theory is that ‘the amount of power a nation has does not determine its behavior or policies, what matters is intention’. For example there is no certainty that war is inevitable as a result of one rising power overtaking the existing power, the result depends on whether the rising. 政治大. power have extensive intentions. For example, in the 1990s the US took over Great Britain without war in economic terms, Japan moved ahead of Soviet Union without conflict over the. 立. transition. Likewise, Chinese intentions are scrutinize in terms of challenging with the US. A. ‧ 國. 學. point to note is the environment that China finds itself today. China is rising in a globalized market world where every spoil have already been appropriated. For China it means their. ‧. country will be covered with foreign firms, contributing to their development. Hence, it is unlikely that China will be so foolish as to seek self- destruction by trying to destroy the existing. sit. y. Nat. system. With this paradigm shift many analysts are directing their attention to why China’s. io. America thinks they should be.. n. al. er. Asian neighbors (with obvious exception of Japan) are not worried about China as a threat as. Ch. i n U. v. To point another example, at the 2005 international security conference in Singapore,. engchi. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked ‘Since no nation threatens China, why is China increasing its investment in the building of new weapons systems?’ to which the Chinese responded, ‘As no nation threatens the US, why is America’s total military expenditure so high that it is more than the total defense expenditures of all the rest of the world combined?’28 If China rise was a threat, then it would be assumed that their consequent rise would result in many of Asian neighbors to tighten ties with America, however as important is 27. Richard Rosecrance, “Power and International Relations: The Rise of China and Its Effects,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol.7, Issue 1, 2006, p.32. https://academic.oup.com/isp/article abstract/7/1/31/1836975/Power-and-International-Relations-The-Rise-of?redirectedFrom=fulltext 28 ‘Rumsfeld: China buildup a threat to Asia,’ The Associated Press, 2005. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8091198/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/rumsfeld-china-buildup-threat-asia/. 28.

(35) American allies to Washington, regional relationships has heightened in the recent years with China playing key leadership roles in various activities, especially in economic bridging. Regional response will be further discussed in the following chapter but it is safe to make points that Beijing has made clear stable regional environment is important and major neighboring powers are stake-holders. Although Japan has affiliation with US army, in recent years Abe administration seemed to have shown interest in parting ways with US in terms of security building and organizing its own army. Because of their bondage (as a result of their defeat in WW2) with America, Japan has been frustrated with their negligence, underestimation, and fading influence.. 政治大. John Mearsheimer reasoned that the mightiest states will attempt to maintain their hegemony in their part of the world, while making sure that no rival power dominates another. 立. region. 29 However, unlike himself he introduced a variable ‘intentions’, next to anarchy and. ‧ 國. 學. power similar to the point made by Richard Rosecrance.. If China does not demonstrate an intention to challenge the existing world order, or if. ‧. other states including reigning hegemon do not perceive such an intention on the part of the rising Chinese power to seek domination, then there is not necessarily going to be a hegemonic. y. Nat. sit. war. As a logical derivation, therefore, the question whether the rising China is going to be a. al. er. io. threat does not purely depends on China alone. Rather, a lot also depends on whether other. n. powerful states especially the existing hegemon attempt to suppress it, and thus creating its. Ch. i n U. v. dissatisfaction with the system. America has been showing intention or trying to suppress China. engchi. rise, there are numerous instances but to point out some few- assembling the Asian neighbors against China and whisking a revolt in Africa against China’s supposed “neocolonialism”. 30 Signs of suppression from others may create a backlash for example China will be disappointed with the system and retaliate, which will most likely force them to embrace an intention to seek to change the system, even though they may not have the intention now. So what does the rising power want, security or domination? According to neoliberals, the existing international order, such as openness, economic integrity, liberal internationalism,. 29 30. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: WW Norton & Company, 2011, p.36. Adam Tiffen, “The New-Neo Colonialism in Africa,” Global Policy, No.19, 2014. http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/19/08/2014/new-neo-colonialism-africa. 29.

(36) provides a capacity of the system to ‘absorb China’ rather than be replaced by a Chinese-led order. It is a rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as United Nations (UN) and norms such as multilateralism. In this capacity the rise of China is merely a threat. China as a rising power has too much at stake, because China is a beneficiary of the rules and institutions (World Health Organization, UN, International Monetary Fund). On the other hand, core characteristic of Chinese society show heavy emphasis on education and respect for authority in society, a record of enduring unity and political stability, etc. Most important of all is the people’s acceptance of the state. Scholars are led to believe it is. 政治大 large believe in respecting authority. In contrast to Americans, who do not trust their government, 立 but embrace the Jeffersonian belief in the ‘least government’, the Chinese habitually respect due to the Chinese traditions of Confucianism, but anyhow it seems like that Chinese tradition at. ‧ 國. 學. authority, including their government.. ‧. When it comes to the international status of mainland China, the study of its tradition are influential in understanding the societal changes within. Chinese civilization is one of the oldest. sit. y. Nat. that remained to this day, changed but not altered. Why is it important? because domestic developments in China cannot be evaluated by comparing it with those countries born of the. io. er. Westphalian tradition. When China re-rises it is not like the arrival of “new kid on the block”,. al. n. iv n C of China must assimilate into the Westphalian h e nsystem, g c hfori itUto be integrated with other members. instead it is almost comparable to a meeting of two civilizations. Like for example, the (re) rising. of that system.. Whether China under Communism makes any difference? Many analysts fear that China comes from Soviet experience. Indeed, the Soviet engineered spread of Communism to Central Europe, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba. It also created Communist North Korea in 1948. 31 During the Cold War it was trying to export Communism to much of the Third World. However, unlike the Soviet, even under the leadership of radical Mao Zedong, China was never caught with substantial evidence that it was also exporting Communist revolution or building. 31. James Hsuing, China into its Second Rise: Myths, Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Challenges to Theory, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2012, p.247.. 30.