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The Analysis of Advertising Effects in Different Competition Behavior and Cost Type 陳建中、楊維娟

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The Analysis of Advertising Effects in Different Competition Behavior and Cost Type 陳建中、楊維娟

E-mail: 9314252@mail.dyu.edu.tw

ABSTRACT

According to the Quantity and the Price competition patterns, the thesis explores the effects and impacts of the different advertising strategies which are based on fixed and changing advertising expenditures engaged by different firms. For the heterogeneous double monopoly model, we assume that the demand function is in fixed elastic form. Under the price competition, the price-making behavior is independently decided by firms. Moreover, the advertisement cost can be passed to and absorbed by the consumers. For advertising strategy, if the expenditure of advertisement had been considered as the fixed cost, firms will speculate their counterparts

’ decisions. However, if the expenditure of advertisement had been considered as the changing cost, each firm will make its own advertising rate decision. Also, the advertising rate will be higher when the price is higher. When there is a competition occurred on quantity, firms will speculate their counterparts’ strategies in order to engage the right decision. Also, those strategies are in the substitution relations. While the advertising cost is considered as a fixed cost of expenditure, firms engage the strategies based on considering their counterparts’ decision. Nevertheless, the relationships among those selected advertising strategies will rely on the elastic size. And the those strategies could be supplemental or the substitutive to each other. On the other side, while the advertising cost is considered as a changing cost of expenditure, the decision-make of advertising strategies of different firms will be independent and finally affect each other through the diverse quantity and advertising rate. Comparing the profit of firms, firms will gain lower net profit if they engaging advertising strategies whether they are in mature market or whether there are competitions between quantity and price and whether the advertising cost is considered as fixed or change essence. Unless the advertising behavior of firms will not bring negative influence, the firms will be trapped into the decision model as the prisoner’s dilemma while they engage the advertising strategies.

Keywords : competition patter ; cost structure ; advertising strategy

Table of Contents

目錄 封面內頁 簽名頁 授權書 iii 中文摘要 v 英文摘要 vi 誌謝 vii 目錄 viii 圖目錄 x 表目錄 xi 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景 與動機 1 第二節 研究目的 5 第三節 研究限制 6 第四節 研究架構 6 第二章 文獻探討 8 第三章 模型設定與求解 13 第一節 基 本模型與求解 13 第二節 廣告為固定成本之模型與求解 15 第三節 廣告為變動成本之模型與求解 17 第四章 廠商間的競爭策 略分析 19 第一節 無廣告下之分析 19 第二節 廣告為固定成本 20 第三節 廣告為變動成本 24 第四節 利潤分析 27 第五章 結 論 29 參考文獻 31

REFERENCES

參考文獻 1. Aaker D. A. , 1991, Managing Brand Equity, The Free Press N.Y. 2. Aakerberg D. A., 2001, “Empirically Distinguishing Informative and Prestige Effects of Advertising,” The Rand Journal of Economics , vol. 32 , pp. 316-333. 3. AlstonJ.M. , J. W. Freebairn

J.S.James, 2001, “Beggar-thy-Neighbor Advertising: Theory and Application to Generic Commodity Promotion Programs,” Amer. J. Agr. Econ.

83,pp.888-902. 4. Brozen , 1976, Economic Value of Advertising in Advertising and Society, New York University Press, New York, pp. 109-141,.

5. Becker G. S., K. M. Murphy, 1993, “A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad,” The Quarterly Journal of the Economics , pp.941-964. 6. Blanct G. L., 1998, “Informative Advertising Competition,” The Journal of Industrial Economics , vol. , pp.63-77. 7. Grossman G. M. , C. Shapiro, 1984, “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products,” Review of Economic Studies, 51,pp.63-81. 8. Greuner M. R., D. R. Kamerschen & P. G. Klein , 2000, “The Competitive Effects of Advertising in the US Automobile Industry,” International Journal of the Economics of Business, vol. 7, pp. 245-261. 9. Kihlstrom R. E. , M. H. Riordan , 1984, “Advertising as a Signal,” Journal of Political Economy , vol.92 , pp.427-450. 10. Nelson P. , 1970, “Information and Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy , vol.78 , pp.311-329. 11.

Nelson P. , 1974 , “Advertising as Information,” Journal of Political Economy , vol.82 , pp.729-754. 12. Orzach R. , P. B. Overgaard & Y.

Tauman , 2002, “Modest Advertising Signals Strength,” The Rand Journal of Economics , vol.33 , pp.340-358. 13. Pigou A. C., 1920, The Economics of Welfare, First Edition. 14. Porter M. E., 1974, “Consumer Behavior, Retailer Power and Performance in Consumer Goods Industries,” Review of Economics and Statistics , pp.419-436. 15. Porter M. E, 1980, Competitive Strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and competitors. New York: The Free Press. 16. Pastine I. , T. Pastine , 2002, “Consumption Externalities, Coordination, and Advertising,”

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International Economic Review , vol.43 , pp.919-943. 17. Schmalensee R. , 1978, “A Model of Advertising and Product Quality,” Journal of Political Economy , vol.86 , pp.485-503.

參考文獻

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