59 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d at 270.
60 Id, at 273-74.
61 Id, at 274.
62 Zitter, supra note 45, at 351.
63 582 F. 3d. 314 (2009).
64 368 U.S. 186 (1962).
26 制專屬總統關於外交(foreign relation)之職權，司法部門不得介入67。惟第二巡迴 法 院 認 原 告 未 請 求 法 院 定 立 一 關 於 氣 候 變 遷 之 綜 合 性 且 含 攝 範 圍 廣 博 (comprehensive and far-reaching)之決定，因該決定之職能屬於行政獲立法部門；
實則，原告請求之對象，限於六家排放溫室氣體之火力發電廠，並主張其行為構 是而生者，法院將面對連串無力處理之政策問題(unmanageable policy questions) 如溫室氣排放之減量速率、何人需適用減量規定、孰應承擔減量之成本、減量對
65 Id, at 321 [quoting Baker 369 U.S. at 210 (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [ (1) ] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [ (2) ] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [ (3) ] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [ (4) ] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [ (5) ] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [ (6) ] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”)]
為例，其中密蘇里州以仳鄰之伊利諾州汙水排入密西西比河 (Mississippi River)而該河流有 43 英里流經密蘇里州聖路易市(St. Louis)，造成當 州居民、農業甚至製造業之損害為由，提起公害侵權行為訴訟，請求法院判決禁 止伊利諾州繼續排放，而法院依精細之科學證具及專家證詞，判決密蘇里州主張
66 Legal Information Institute, Commerce Clause (“The Commerce Clause refers to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”),
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause (last visited Oct. 9th 2010).
67 582 F. 3d. 324 (2009).
68 Id, at 325.
69 Id.
70 Id, at 326.
71 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
27
之損害與伊利諾州之排放行為有因果關係72。第二巡迴法院復指出，於法律已完 善訂定完整規則之場合，法院當然無判斷餘地，惟於法律規範設計不良甚至未規 定之場合，普通法適可補充解決其不足，畢竟其較具對事實之敏感度(factual sensitivity)，亦較可解決實際問題 73。是故，侵權行為法基本原則及公害侵權行 為之普通法得提供本法院足夠決定原告請求之指引，被告知主張為免杞人憂天， 件(political case)亦不等於政治問題 78
2. 原告具當事人適格
。
第二巡迴法院首先確認原告各州有基於主權及對其人民保護者之地位 (parens patriae)79基於類似主權利益(quasi-sovereign interest)，有當事人適格80
首先，法院認原告主張之現有損害(current injury)─加州積雪層之縮減及早 融與其所導致之夏日水源供應減少，已損害加州之財產，正如聯邦最高法院 Massachusetts et. al. v. E. P. A一案中認定麻州海岸土地之減少屬可得特定之實質 損害，本案中加州之損害亦係實際發生而非假設性者
79 Steven H. Gifis ed., BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (4th ed. 1996)[“the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability”].
80 582 F. 3d. 333-340.
81 Id, at 341-42.
28 率」(probability)成分在其中83。於Massachusetts一案中，麻州海岸土地未來將消 失之面積與消失之速度均不確定，仍不影響聯邦最高法院對損害之認定，顯見任 美國法律重編中關於侵權行為法(Restatement (Second) of Torts)之公害侵權行為 部分，足適用為檢驗特定案件是否構成公害侵權行為之基準91
90 363 F.Supp. 110 (D.Vt.1973), aff'd 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct.
3182, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974).
91 582 F. 3d. 351 (2009).
29 適格，然法院引用聯邦最高法院於Nat’l sea Clammers Ass’n v. Cict of New York一 案之見解，認欲使公害侵權行為普通法之目的克竟全功，應允許且鼓勵私人提起 原告因卡崔納颶風(Hurricane Katrina)所造成之損害及懲罰性賠償 95。原告主張被 告關於石油、石化及電廠之營業所排放之溫室氣體直接造成全球暖化，並因之導
92 Id, at 352 [quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, §821 B(2) (“Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include the following: (a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent and long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.”)].
93 582 F. 3d. 362 (2009).
94 585 F.3d 855 (2009).
95 Id, at 859.
96 Id, at 860.
97 Id.
30 體判定侵權行為成立之近因原則(proximate cause)104要求不同，前者以非直接之 因果關係可公平追溯行為與損害之牽連者即為已足，故原告依科學文獻建構被告
104 The leading test for proximate cause focuses on whether the defendant should have reasonably foreseen, as a risk of her conduct, the general consequences or type of harm suffered by the plaintiff.
In essence, the foreseeable harm test requires (1) a reasonably foreseeable result or type of harm, and (2) no superseding intervening force. The extent and the precise manner in which the harm occurs need not be foreseeable. For details, see e.g. Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock &
Engineering Co., Ltd., [1961] A.C. 388.
105 585 F.3d 864 (2009).
106 Id, at 865-66.
31
治問題」(political question)107。就前者言，一爭點不具可審斷性乃指於憲法上非 司 法 機 關 所 有 職 能 得 決 斷 者 (not constitutionally capable of being judicially 適格。而California v. General Motors一案縱遭法院以不可審斷之政治問題為由駁 回且最末無疾而終，然其效應亦使其後加州加入康乃狄克州對發電廠提起訴訟之 Connecticut et. al. v. Am. Electric Power Co. Inc.一案二審獲勝訴，聯邦第二巡迴法 院非惟否定氣候變遷之公害侵權行為訴訟屬不可審斷之政治問題，並確立因全球
113 Nikhli V. Gore & Jennifer E. Tarr, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 34 Harvard Envtl.
L. Rev. 577, 578 (2010).
32
「矯正正 義」(Corrective Justice)乃私法基礎原則之一，其乃指不正義
（injustice）現象之矯正與補償，唯於相關之不正義皆已被處理或安排之場合始 有可能達成，亦即損害他人者須負一矯正義務（obligation to correct）115，而侵 權行為法之目的即在課予有錯誤作為而造成其他個人之損害者修復該損害之義
氣體排放此一領域有其先佔性(Occupy)，故判決原告等不得以聯邦普通法取代 CAA，縱 CAA 尚 未就溫室氣體排放訂立統一規範亦然。為判決中亦指出：CAA 則對於州之侵權行為法無不具先 佔性，故其判決無礙原告再以州法為基礎對溫室氣體排放者提起侵權行為訴訟。顧聯邦法院對氣 候變遷是否構成侵權行為一事，仍未有實體法律意見。詳見 564 US 10,19-26 (2011).
。排
115 William Lucy,PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 315-17 (2007).
116 Matthew D. Adler, Commentary: Corrective Justice And Liability For Global Warming, 155 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1859 (2007).
117 P Eduardo M. Penalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 Nat. Resources J. 563, 574 (1998).
118 Daniel A. Farber, Responses to Global Warming: The Law, Economics, and Science of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1605, 1641 (2007).