第五章 結論與建議
第二節 建議
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立 政 治 大 學
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N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
第二節 建議
根據研究結果，房仲聚集對於價格是正向影響，價格會偏向賣方，以較高價 格成交，因為彼此間的競爭會使得價格資訊更偏向賣方的價格，即便資訊變得更 加流通，一開始的參考價格就偏高了，蒐集更多相關資訊後找到的價格也只是偏 高價格中比較低的價格，且隨聚集程度增加影響更加劇烈，因此在進行不動產交 易時，對於買方而言，反而應避免過多房仲聚集，選擇低聚集或無房仲聚集地區，
可以較低價格購得相似特徵的房屋。此外，房仲聚集程度的影響效果將隨價格上 升而下降，但係數值皆為正向，顯示買家在房仲聚集地區對於不同價格住宅皆會 蒐集到較偏向賣方的價格，然而隨房價上升，買家會蒐集更多相關資訊減少價格 偏差，與消費者透過搜尋可找到便宜價格購得商品的搜尋理論一致。
後續研究建議部分，直營品牌相對非直營品牌有更多正向影響價格力量，然 而可能是來自品牌的效果、薪資制度與佣金比例的經濟誘因交互影響的結果，由 於相關變數不足無法再細緻討論各自影響權重。而根據訪談結果，新建案與房仲 店面都會設立在交易量多的地區，而新建案的出現往往對於周遭房地產價格有提 升的效果，因此造成房仲店數量高的地區價格相對較高，以上皆有待後續研究。
此外，未來應蒐集更長期資料，觀察房仲聚集是否造成房價上升，而若能透過更 詳盡的資料蒐集，確實掌握每筆交易過程存有多少位房仲競爭以及控制銷售時間 變數，能夠更精確了解房仲競爭對於不動產價格的關係。
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市與計畫』，44(3)：277-302。‧
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