後續研究方向

第七章結論與建議

7.3 後續研究方向

企業將現金還給股東的方式，包括股票買回和股利發放，本研究只討論公司治理對股票買回政策的影響，後續研究者可以探討不同狀況下，例如考量税負或公司風險的狀況下，公司治理對於企業現金支付政策的影響。

另外，股票買回視同減資行為，後續研究者可以針對庫藏股減資和公司法減資，檢視公司治理對於不同類型減資決策的影響。

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經理人提出股票買回計畫

圖 3-1 庫藏股決策流程

列席說明

並參與董事會表決兼任董事

不通過駁回股票買回計畫

未兼任董事

僅列席說明列席說明並參與董事會表決兼任董事

管理者提出股票買回計畫

未兼任董事

僅列席說明

通過股東會覆核董

事會決議和執行情形

a: 公司特性涵蓋公司規模、淨值市價比、自由現金流量、負債比率、資產報酬率和交易市場別。

-2 -3

估計期事件期

+2 事件日

-122 0

圖 5-2 事件研究法之時間線

表 2-1 各國庫藏股制度比較

表 4-1 公司買回庫藏股對內部人和外部股東之可能影響

對內部人有利對內部人不利

對外部股東有利情況(1)

宣告買回庫藏股

情況(2)

不會宣告買回庫藏股

對外部股東不利情況(3) 公司治理好：

較不會宣告買回庫藏股

情況(4)

不會宣告買回庫藏股公司治理差：

較會宣告買回庫藏股

表 5-1 變數定義

A 部分: 應變數

變數說明

TELL 宣告可能。為一虛擬變數，公司於研究期間內有宣告買回股份者為 1，否則為 0。

TIMES 宣告次數。研究期間內樣本公司每一年度累積宣告買回股份的次數。

CAR5 事件期累積平均異常報酬。買回股份宣告日及其前後 2 日累積平均異常報酬。

PUR 宣告買回數量比例。宣告買回股數除以宣告日前一年底流通在外股數。

PURAMT 宣告買回金額比例。宣告買回股數乘上宣告日前 20 日平均股價，再除以宣告日前一年底公司市值。

REPSH 實際買回數量比率。實際買回股數除以宣告日前一年底流通在外股數。

REPAMT 實際買回金額比率。實際買回金額除以執行期間平均股價與宣告日前一年底流通在外股數之乘積。

REP 執行率。宣告當次已買回股數佔預定買回股數比率。

B 部分: 五種特質與整體公司治理變數

變數說明

INDEP 獨立性。公司內部董事長未兼任總經理加 1，控制股東人數未過半加 1，外部董事席次比例大於中位數加 1，總和再除以 3。

RULE 監督性。公司控制股東成員未擔任監察人時加 1，席次控制權與股份控制權偏離差小於中位數加 1，董監質押比率小於中位數加 1，總和再除以 3。

RUN 齊一性。董事會規模小於中位數加 1，內部人持股比率大於中位數加 1，機構投資人持股比率大於中位數加 1，總和再除以 3。

TURNOVER 異動性。公司觀察年度及前二年董事長未異動時加 1，觀察年度及前二年總經理未異動時加 1，總和再除以 2。

KING 集權性。公司無持股 5%以上股東同時擔任董事者時 1，無持股 3%以上次大股東同時擔任董事時加 1，經理擔任董事席次比例小於中位數加 1，股份控制權與盈餘分配權偏離差小於中位數加 1，存在持股 3%以上次大股東未擔任董事時加 1，

總和再除以 5。

G 公司治理。獨立性、監督性、齊一性、異動性以及集權性五

種特質變數之合計數除以 5。

R1 股價漲幅較小。為一虛擬變數，執行期間累積報酬率小於中位數為 1，否則為 0。

INDEP*R1 獨立性與股價漲幅較小交乘項。

RULE*R1 監督性與股價漲幅較小交乘項。

RUN*R1 齊一性與股價漲幅較小交乘項。

TURNOVER*R1 異動性與股價漲幅較小交乘項。

KING*R1 集權性與股價漲幅較小交乘項。

G*R1 公司治理與股價漲幅較小交乘項。

G*FCF 公司治理與自由現金流量交乘項。

C 部分: 控制變數

表 6-1 敍述統計量

(15.3000) (15.0500) (0.2500) (0.00) BM 1.0222

B 部分(N=1462)

變數^b 平均值最小值第 25 百

分位中位數第 75 百

分位最大值標準差 PUR 0.0314 0.0034 0.0166 0.0265 0.0420 0.1109 0.0200 PURAMT 0.0247 0.0005 0.0112 0.0192 0.0303 0.7943 0.0313

CAR5 0.0173 -0.2133 -0.0203 0.0173 0.0552 0.2229 0.0660 REPSH 0.0202 0.0000 0.0079 0.0164 0.0279 0.1087 0.0162

REPAMT 0.0247 0.0000 0.0089 0.0193 0.0331 0.1811 0.0223 REP 0.6973 0.0000 0.4000 0.8717 1.0000 1.0180 0.3466 INDEP 0.4512 0.0000 0.3333 0.3333 0.6667 1.0000 0.2752 RULE 0.4109 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 1.0000 0.3423 RUN 0.5670 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 0.6667 1.0000 0.2948 TURNOVER 0.7052 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3524 KING 0.6323 0.0000 0.4000 0.6000 0.8000 1.0000 0.1850 G 0.5533 0.1467 0.4533 0.5533 0.6533 1.0000 0.1386 SIZE 15.6846 12.9500 14.6400 15.5000 16.4000 19.8000 1.4245 BM 1.0533 0.1605 0.6009 0.9445 1.3477 6.0403 0.6019 FCF 0.0094 -0.0865 0.0000 0.0000 0.0150 0.1329 0.0271 DEBT 0.4126 0.0543 0.2917 0.4016 0.5115 0.9426 0.1791 ROA 0.0557 -0.2365 0.0241 0.0494 0.0879 0.3132 0.0625

PCAR -0.0462 -0.5613 -0.1422 -0.0426 0.0514 0.5422 0.1681 PSTD 0.0256 0.0046 0.0185 0.0254 0.0320 0.0524 0.0096

RET 0.0741 -0.4144 -0.0431 0.0450 0.1630 1.0953 0.2004 STD 0.0253 0.0064 0.0188 0.0250 0.0312 0.0489 0.0087

a 表 6-3 和表 6-4 迴歸模型中所使用變數，分成宣告買回和未宣告買回兩類，刪除 0.5%極端值後之結果列示於 A 部分。B 部分為表 6-5 至表 6-10 迴歸模型中所使用變數，刪除 0.5%極端值後之各項敍述統計值。

b 各變數定義請參見表 5-1。

c 未括弧 P 值為兩個獨立樣本雙尾 t test，括弧內 P 值為雙尾 Mann-Whitney U test。

表 6-2 相關係數矩陣^a

A 部分:

變數^b TELL TIMES INDEP RULE RUN TURN-OVER

KING G1 SIZE BM FCF DEBT ROA

TELL 1

TIMES 0.82 1 INDEP -0.04 -0.03 1 RULE -0.04 -0.06 0.17 1 RUN -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 0.04 1 TURN-

OVER 0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.00 0.01 1 KING -0.08 -0.06 0.11 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 1 G -0.08 -0.09 0.43 0.60 0.40 0.49 0.26 1 SIZE 0.09 0.12 0.07 -0.19 -0.13 -0.08 0.03 -0.16 1 BM -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.18 -0.08 0.11 -0.08 0.06 1 FCF 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 1 DEBT -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 0.10 -0.06 0.27 0.19 -0.12 1

ROA 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.12 -0.13 0.13 -0.01 -0.46 0.14 -0.33 1

B 部分：

變數^b CAR5 INDEP RULE RUN

TURN-OVER KING G SIZE BM FCF DEBT ROA TSE PCAR PSTD C1 CAR5 1

INDEP 0.03 1 RULE 0.03 0.32 1

RUN 0.03 -0.10 0.06 1 TURN-

OVER 0.00 -0.12 0.07 -0.04 1

KING 0.03 0.10 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 1

G 0.04 0.48 0.69 0.37 0.47 0.27 1

SIZE -0.07 0.01 -0.44 -0.21 -0.12 0.11 -0.33 1 BM 0.10 0.03 -0.14 -0.14 -0.08 0.10 -0.13 0.16 1

FCF 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.17 1 DEBT -0.05 0.16 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 0.16 0.05 0.40 0.13 -0.05 1

ROA -0.05 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.18 -0.12 -0.46 -0.01 -0.21 1

TSE -0.02 -0.19 -0.37 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.22 0.46 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.03 1

PCAR -0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.08 1 PSTD 0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.12 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 1

C1 -0.07 0.04 0.08 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.03 -0.26 -0.10 0.14 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 0.09 1

C 部分：

變數^b PUR PURAMT INDEP RULE RUN

TURN-OVER KING G SIZE BM FCF DEBT ROA TSE D1 D2 PUR 1

PURAMT 0.48 1 INDEP 0.06 0.01 1

RULE 0.12 0.04 0.32 1

RUN 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 0.06 1 TURN-

OVER -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 0.07 -0.04 1

KING -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 1 G 0.07 -0.01 0.48 0.69 0.37 0.47 0.27 1 SIZE -0.30 -0.13 0.01 -0.44 -0.21 -0.12 0.11 -0.33 1

BM -0.06 0.09 0.03 -0.14 -0.14 -0.08 0.10 -0.13 0.16 1 FCF -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.17 1

DEBT -0.08 0.03 0.16 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 0.16 0.05 0.40 0.13 -0.05 1 ROA 0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.18 -0.12 -0.46 -0.01 -0.21 1

TSE -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 -0.37 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.22 0.46 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.03 1 D1 0.08 0.00 -0.10 0.22 0.03 0.09 -0.29 0.05 -0.27 -0.44 -0.13 -0.24 0.15 -0.19 1

D2 -0.14 -0.08 0.22 -0.04 -0.14 -0.16 0.22 -0.01 0.46 0.18 0.00 0.58 -0.10 0.10 -0.36 1

D 部分：

變數^b REPSH REPAMT REP INDEP RULE RUN

TURN-OVER KING G SIZE BM FCF DEBT ROA TSE STD RET LARGE EARLY

REPSH 1

REPAMT 0.91 1 REP 0.52 0.46 1

INDEP 0.02 0.03 -0.06 1

RULE 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.32 1

RUN 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.10 0.06 1

TURN-

OVER 0.06 0.03 0.10 -0.12 0.07 -0.04 1

KING -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.10 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 1 G 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.48 0.69 0.37 0.47 0.27 1

SIZE -0.27 -0.21 -0.04 0.01 -0.44 -0.21 -0.12 0.11 -0.33 1 BM -0.10 -0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.14 -0.14 -0.08 0.10 -0.13 0.16 1

FCF 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.17 1

DEBT -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 0.16 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 0.16 0.05 0.40 0.13 -0.05 1 ROA 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.18 -0.12 -0.46 -0.01 -0.21 1

TSE -0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.19 -0.37 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.22 0.46 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.03 1

STD -0.13 -0.09 -0.22 -0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.10 -0.01 1 RET -0.05 -0.04 -0.18 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 1

LARGE 0.51 0.45 0.39 0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.15 -0.05 1

EARLY 0.08 0.06 0.37 -0.09 -0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.08 -0.13 0.09 1

a A 部分為宣告可能(TELL)和宣告次數(TIMES)、B 部分為事件期累積平均異常報酬(CAR5)，C 部分為宣告買回數量比率(PUR)和宣告買回金額比率(PURAMT)以及 D 部分實際買回數量比率(REPSH)、實際買回金額比率(REPAMT)和執行率(REP)與迴歸模型所使用其他變數，刪除 0.5%極端值後之相關係數矩陣。

b 各變數定義請參見表 5-1。Pearson 相關係數測試結果，相關係數大於等於 0.06，達 1%顯著水準;大於等於 0.03，達 5%顯著水準;大於等於 0.02，達 10%顯著水準。

表 6-3 公司治理對宣告可能的影響

表 6-4 公司治理對宣告次數的影響

^a INTERCEPT ? -1.336*** 0.00 -1.461*** 0.00 INDEP - -0.286*** 0.00

表 6-4 公司治理對宣告次數的影響

表 6-5 公司治理對宣告買回市場反應的影響

表 6-6 公司治理對宣告買回數量比率的影響

表 6-7 公司治理對宣告買回金額比率的影響

表 6-8 公司治理對實際買回數量比率的影響

A 部分：

模式 1 模式 2

變數^b 預期係數 P 值係數 P 值 INTERCEPT ? 0.074*** 0.00 0.071*** 0.00 INDEP - 0.001 0.18

RULE - -0.002* 0.08 RUN - -0.001 0.24 TURNOVER - 0.000 0.38 KING - -0.001 0.28

G - -0.002 0.25

SIZE - -0.004*** 0.00 -0.004*** 0.00

BM + -0.001* 0.06 -0.001* 0.07 FCF + 0.010 0.21 0.011 0.19

DEBT ? 0.007*** 0.00 0.007*** 0.00 ROA + 0.008 0.11 0.008 0.12 TSE + 0.003*** 0.00 0.003*** 0.00 LAW1 + 0.004** 0.05 0.004** 0.03 LAW2 - 0.005*** 0.00 0.005*** 0.00 STD - -0.106*** 0.01 -0.105*** 0.01

RET - 0.007** 0.02 0.007** 0.02 RETC1 - -0.010*** 0.00 -0.010*** 0.00

LARGE + 0.017*** 0.00 0.017*** 0.00 EARLY + 0.001* 0.08 0.001* 0.07

Adj. R² 0.3580 0.3506

N 1462 1462

B 部分：

表 6-9 公司治理對實際買回金額比率的影響

A 部分：

表 6-9 公司治理對實際買回金額比率的影響

A 部分：

在文檔中公司治理與公開市場買回關聯性之研究 (頁 80-154)

第七章 結論與建議

7.3 後續研究方向

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Financial Economics

圖 3-1 庫藏股決策流程

圖 5-2 事件研究法之時間線

表 2-1 各國庫藏股制度比較

表 4-1 公司買回庫藏股對內部人和外部股東之可能影響

表 5-1 變數定義

表 6-1 敍述統計量

表 6-3 公司治理對宣告可能的影響

表 6-4 公司治理對宣告次數的影響

表 6-4 公司治理對宣告次數的影響

表 6-5 公司治理對宣告買回市場反應的影響

表 6-6 公司治理對宣告買回數量比率的影響

表 6-7 公司治理對宣告買回金額比率的影響

表 6-8 公司治理對實際買回數量比率的影響

表 6-9 公司治理對實際買回金額比率的影響

表 6-9 公司治理對實際買回金額比率的影響

第七章結論與建議