第五章 結論與建議
第二節 研究限制與建議
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第二節 研究限制與建議
本研究之研究限制如下：
一、資訊揭露不足
本研究係尌可獲得之資料判斷負面消息是否屬於內部控制缺失，礙於報章雜 誌及每家公司自行揭露程度的不同，產生揭露愈多的公司其內部控制缺失可能愈 多的情況。此外，本研究主要係自 TEJ 資料庫取得負面新聞之初步資訊，在過 程中輔以金管會網站、公開資訊觀測站、年報、知識贏家資料庫及聯合新聞資料 庫查詢，TEJ 資料庫若資訊涵蓋不完整，則可能影響本研究所採樣本完整性。
二、資訊揭露之時間點
除了公司在事件發生時自行於公開資訊觀測站揭露之事件外，本研究經由主 管機關裁罰或新聞報導等外部資訊得知公司內部控制有缺失之時間點通常晚於 發生年度，故需逐筆追蹤調整至事件發生年度。此種取樣方式受限於主管機關裁 罰發布及事件被媒體揭露的時間。換言之，若企業可能已發生內部控制缺失情形 但資訊尚未被外界知悉，即不在本研究之樣本範圍內，故亦可能導致樣本之不夠 完整。
三、 內部控制缺失判斷之客觀性限制
為發展出衡量內部控制缺失之客觀標準，本研究係依據缺失發生之事件類型，
判斷內部控制缺失是否重大，以及缺失之要素及目標，每家公司所處產業、公司 特性、企業文化各不相同，每件缺失對其影響程度當然不同；惟本研究係站在外 部人之角度檢視企業內部控制缺失之情況，無法得知各種缺失對個別公司而言是 否重大，其成本效益考量為何？此外，本研究係採較嚴格之標準，將所有缺失全 部納入（包含環保與安全、勞資關係等企業社會責任），廣泛地探討內部控制缺 失對企業經營績效之影響；惟事實上，內部控制有其先天性限制，如人為判斷疏 失、串謀舞弊、管理階層的踰越等，本研究並未納入探討範圍。
為減緩主觀判斷對研究結果的影響，在判斷各類型負面事件是否屬於內部控 制缺失時，請教了曾參與 COSO「內部控制－整體架構」中譯本編譯過程的外部
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專家，26協助驗證。
本研究之建議如下：
一、對主管機關之建議
我國於 1998 年始要求公開發行公司頇於公開說明書及年報中揭露內部控制 制度重大缺失，然而，2004 至 2010 年非金融業 724 家上市公司於聲明書揭露者 僅 23 家，且多數直到員工竊盜及掏空挪用發生後才揭露，這樣的情形很可能意 指直到這些重大事件發生，公司才驚覺內部控制有缺失，其內部控制制度未能防 範於未然。而那些未揭露之公司不禁令人質疑係因其內部控制制度均已相當完善？
亦或是法規中對頇對外揭露之情況未明確規定所致？
美國有研究證實，投資大眾是需要 ICOFR 有效性之相關資訊(De Franco, Guan and Lu., 2005; Hammersley et al., 2008)。投資人係根據公司所公開的財務資 訊，作成投資決策；由於財務資訊是由 ICOFR 所產生，所以這種內部控制對投 資人為攸關，因此，管理階層應把這種內部控制是否有效、是否可資信賴之資訊，
告訴投資人。（馬秀如，1997）但實務上，國內上市公司自願揭露此內部控制缺 失者寥寥無幾。
本研究證實財務報導重編一類的內部控制缺失與經營績效呈顯著負相關，意 指 ICOFR 對於企業經營及股東權益報酬極為攸關，主管機關應多加考量此類內 部控制制度之規範，以設法提升關於內部控制缺失之資訊透明度。
二、對一般企業之建議
實務上，企業的內部控制制度常被企業管理當局誤解為一個成本高且無效益 的機制，有些企業主甚至認為此機能僅在應付政府的要求，所產生的一項無效益 工作。（黃士銘，2010）這種對內部控制制度作用有嚴重誤解的情況，很可能使 企業錯失檢視自己的機會；內部控制之主要目的係幫助企業自我評估，為一動態 競爭的管理工具。內部控制制度乃企業之基石，使得企業能夠穩定長久的經營，
並有助於企業達成多項目標（馬秀如，1998）。
26 葉秀惠，現任群益證券資深執行副總裁及企業金融部主管。
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本研究探討內部控制缺失與企業經營績效之關連性，研究結果顯示有內部控 制重大缺失之公司經營績效較無缺失之公司來得差，亦即，無論與企業獲利有關、
編製財務報表或企業社會責任相關之內部控制缺失，皆有可能影響企業經營績效。
此外，好的內部控制制度功能不僅在防弊更有助於興利，呼籲管理當局應更加重 視此議題。
三、對未來研究之建議
本研究為首篇研究國內內部控制缺失相關議題之研究，實證結果與 Xu and Tang (2008)及黃誌緯（2009）針對美國資本市場之研究相類似，即內部控制缺失 與企業經營績效顯著相關。本研究僅針對內部控制缺失對當期績效的影響做探討，
後續研究者可將期間拉長，探討內部控制缺失對績效是否有持續性之影響，以及 隨著內部控制缺失之改善，績效是否隨之改善等議題。而內部控制缺失之經濟後 果尚有市場負面反應(Hammersley et al., 2008 )、審計公費增加(Hogan and Wilkins, 2008)、資金成本提高(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009)等，也為後續研究者可以針對 我國證券市場探討的議題。
關於公司治理與內部控制缺失之關係，過去有許多文獻(Krishnan, 2005;
Zhang et al., 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009; Goh, 2009; Johnstone et al., 2011)證實公司 治理要素會影響內部控制缺失，後續研究可以更進一步探討內部控制缺失對於公 司治理及經營績效之中介效果。
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