第五章 結論與研究限制
第二節 研究限制與建議
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業差之緣故。另外，本研究結果顯示家族企業與財務分析師預測離散程度呈顯著 正向關係，表示分析師在預測家族企業時，相較於非家族企業各分析師間預測結 果之差異顯著較大。Lang and Lundholm (1996)認為分析師所取得的資訊為影響預 測離散程度的關鍵因素，當分析師皆以企業揭露的公開資訊作為分析基礎，各分 析師間的預測值會較接近，但當分析師以蒐集到的未公開私有資訊作為預測基礎 時，便會增加預測的離散程度。本研究藉此推論在公開揭露的資訊缺乏或資訊可 靠性不高的情況下，分析師傾向於使用私有資訊進行預測，而由於各分析師用以 作為預測基礎的資訊不一致，導致在對家族企業進行預測時，各分析師預測結果 之差異較大。
除了控制股東與小股東間的利益衝突，本研究認為董事會缺乏獨立客觀與監 督、決策職能效果不彰亦為家族企業在資訊揭露的品質與數量上劣於非家族企業 之因素，家族企業中，家族成員多同時兼任董事與經理人，雖有助掌握企業經營 目標與整體營運狀況，但在董事會無法維持獨立性且有效監督管理當局時，便會 發生資訊揭露的不透明及對資訊品質產生負面影響之情況。
第二節 研究限制與建議
本研究在探討財務分析師預測行為時主要採用台灣經濟新報社資料庫中上 市（櫃）公司券商財務預測作為樣本資料，資料建置始於 2000 年，由於其預測 範圍並非涵蓋全數上市（櫃）公司，券商僅針對較有興趣之企業進行長期追蹤，
若本研究選取樣本缺乏該預測資料，會在資料篩選過程中遭刪除，因此，研究期 間受限及僅能針對券商追蹤之企業進行分析為本研究之限制，在研究期間部分，
本研究建議後續相關研究可增加研究期間，以更為完整的預測資訊探討分析師預 測家族與非家族盈餘之差異。本研究使用券商財務預測而並非分析師預測作為樣 本資料，Dugar and Nathan (1995)指出分析師多由券商所雇用並同時對投資者及 企業客戶提供相關服務，許多研究及報導皆認為若企業為券商之客戶時，相較於
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其 他 分 析 師 ， 券 商 雇 用 之 分 析 師 會 提 供 較 為 樂 觀 之 盈 餘 預 測 與 投 資 建 議 (Laderman, Hawkins, and Recio 1990; Dugar and Nathan 1995)，因此，券商所提供 之財務預測整體而言傾向樂觀亦為本研究之限制。
另外，本研究以控制股東出任董事席次過半作為家族企業之主要判斷標準，
在此判斷標準下，我國 2001 年公司法將董事資格修正為無須具股東身分及 2002 年「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」之公布導致符合本研究家族定義之樣本逐年減 少，但本研究認為家族成員控制企業之方式不僅限於擔任董事，即使企業由控制 股東擔任董事之比例漸少，家族成員亦可能透過其他方式控制企業。因此，本研 究建議後續研究可設定其他定義，同時從經營權與所有權之觀點判斷家族企業，
避免忽略原應歸類為家族企業之樣本，進而影響分析結果。
本研究顯示分析師在對家族企業的預測上追蹤意願較低、預測誤差與變異性 都較大，並推論係因控制股東與小股東間之代理問題及董事會缺乏獨立性造成資 訊揭露之數量與品質較差所致。分析師投入預測數量反映企業的前景與投資者對 該企業的關注程度，投資者與分析師對企業缺乏興趣亦代表對企業獲利能力較不 具信心，對企業來說並非好現象。再者，企業提供不可靠資訊導致分析師向投資 者提供缺乏準確性之預測，使投資者在決策時產生困擾與不確定性，打擊投資者 信心，並影響投資意願。因此本研究建議家族企業管理當局應重視公司治理，健 全監督職能，對財務揭露品質嚴格把關，進而使分析師蒐集到充足的資訊，提高 預測準確度以加強投資者的投資信心，最終達到提升企業價值的目標。
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