科技部補助專題研究計畫出席國際學術會議心得報告

日期：103 年 10 月 20 日

計畫編號

MOST 102－2014－H－004－098－

計畫名稱

以責任法則建構我國專利授權法制—以促進技術改良與再創新為中心

出國人

員姓名沈宗倫

服務機構及職

稱

國立政治大學法律學系專任副教授

會議時間

103 年 5 月 29 日至

103 年 6 月 1 日

會議地點

美國明尼蘇達州 (Minnesota)的明尼拿玻里斯市(Minneapolis)

會議名稱

(中文)

(英文) the 2014 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting.

發表題目

(中文)

(英文) Remedies of Standard Essential Patents and Patent Abuses in terms of FRAND Licensing

一、參加會議經過

本人有幸於今年(西元 2014 年)參與「法與社會學會」(Law and Society Association)於美國所舉辦的年會暨學術研討會。該研討會的主題為「由全球與區域的視野探討法律與不公平差異」(Law and Inequalities: Global and Local)。

此次學術研討會是由美國明尼蘇達法大學(University of Minnesota)主辦，在美國明尼蘇達州的明尼拿玻里斯市(Minneapolis)舉行。本人於本年度的研究案主題為「以責任法則建構我國專利授權法制—以促進技術改良與再創新為中心」，

其中的核心議題在於「標準規格重要專利」與「公平合理無歧視授權」的研究，

因此，本人即以 “Remedies of Standard Essential Patents and Patent Abuses in terms of FRAND Licensing”為題，以摘要申請發表，獲審通過。此次參與研討會之主要目的，一方面能藉由論文之發表，能帶動相關議題的討論，反省並增益己之研究成果，以利未來國際期刊之投稿；另一方面也希望能參與其他場次的論文發表，

觀摩重要議題的發展與評析，增加本文於專利法與國際智慧財產權法的學養廣度與深度。更期待由此研討會，結識國際智慧財產權法學者，未來國際學術研究合作奠定深厚的基礎。

二、與會心得

本次大會共舉行四天，2014 年 5 月 29 日至 6 月 1 日。因學術主題分配之故，

本人的文章發表被安排於 5 月 30 日上午 10 時 15 分至 12 時，本場次的主題為「智慧財產之限制」(The Limits of Intellectual Property)。由美國西北大學法學院 (Northwestern University Law School)教授 Laura Pedraza-Farina 主持並擔任評論。

本人擔任第一位報告者，論文題目為“Remedies of Standard Essential Patents and Patent Abuses in terms of FRAND Licensing”。首先，本人先介紹專利法對於專利權侵害之救濟，一般而言，該救濟包括「禁制令」(injunctive relief)與「損害賠償」(damages)。「禁制令」與「損害賠償」並非機械式的適用，其相關必要性與範圍(或程度)須受專利法鼓勵創新的意旨所拘束。第二部分，本人以理論的角度探討不適當的救濟所產生的「劫奪效果」(patent hold-up)與「授權金堆疊」

(royalty stacking)的現象，並且各國司法實務對此二問題的態度與立場。第三部分，

本人陳述前所提及的「劫奪效果」與「授權金堆疊」，於電信業技術標準規格的關鍵專利(essential patents)下更加嚴重，專利權每每有被濫用的可能。鑑於技術標準規格的公益性，規格組織遂以組織章程或約款要求關鍵專利權人，對他人應以「公平、合理、無歧視」的方式授權關鍵專利 (Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory licensing, FRANDS)。各國司法實務亦認可此「公平、合理、

無歧視」的授權承諾，而限縮關鍵專利權人主張「禁制令」的可能性。但「授權

金堆疊」的問題仍未相應解決。最後，本人提出經研究後的最適模式，望能同時解決關鍵專利濫用的問題，希望能供各國法制發展與司法實務參考。

第二場報告者是美國明尼蘇達大學法學院教授Samuel Krislov，題目是"The Evolution of American Technology: From Borrower to Patent Troll"，主要是由美國憲法的角度，檢討最初為鼓勵創新所創設之專利法制，至今因專利惡棍(patent troll)的興起，反而破壞了專利法原本之立法意旨，如何重塑專利法制，回復利法者創設專利的初衷，值得慎重思考。

第三場報告者是美國紐約大學法學院(New York University Law School)教授 David Bergan，題目是"The Legality of Intellectual Property in Vietnam"。該文除以比較法之角度觀察越南在數位時代著作權法制與保護問題，更以田野調查方法，

訪談民眾對於著作權法制的認知與盜版數位商品的態度，反省與檢討相關議題。

頗有新意，更有科際整合的解析，法律與社會科會在著作權議題相互印證，值得一讀。

第四場報告則是側重網路服務提供者(Internet Service Provider)於數位時代，

為遏止著作權或商標權侵害，所應扮演著角色。題目為"The New Censorship"，

報告者為美國西南大學法學院(Northwestern University Law School)教授John Tehranian。雖然網路服務提供者雖對服務使用者於網路之活動，並無積極的監控的義務，但仍負有相當之著作權或商標權侵害防止義務。然而，前述防止義務如何啟動，義務的範圍為何，實攸關權利的保護與網路活動的資訊自由流通，此實為現今著作權與商標法制所應關注者。

第五場報告者為美國聖地牙哥大學法學院(Law School, University of San Diego)教授Orly Lobel，報告題目是"The New Cognitive Property"。主要是由財產權的觀念解析無體財產權之屬性與特性，特別是在現今數位時代，無體財產的公示問題與功能。該文對於無體財產的反省與未來法制的展望，頗為中肯。

本文於此次「法與社會學會」2014年研討會發表的文章，經在場學者的討論，

本人將於會後調整研究果內容，預定投稿至美國科技法律或智慧財產權法相關學術期刊，或德國 Max Planck Institute 所發行的 IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law，期待能順利投稿與刊登，以將研究成果分享於國際間專利法的學術界。

三、發表論文全文或摘要

Remedies of Standard Essential Patents and Patent Abuses in terms of FRAND Licensing^

Chung-Lun Shen^

I. Introduction

The phenomenon of “patent thickets” has been well recognized by the economists and legal scholars, especially in the industries of semi-conductor, communication and information. It is a common thought in practice that cross-licensing and patent pool are both playing significant roles in alleviating the problem of patent thickets, which often brought about patent blocking and prohibitive transaction cost in implementing a specific technological process. Certainly, the availability of cross-licensing and patent pool depends upon the well development of Stand Setting Organizations (SSOs). In order to make technological standards available for practitioners to access, not only does SSOs request its members to disclose any owned patents essential to the standard(Standard-Essential Patents, SEP), but it also made an agreement with its members to promise a obligation for licensing such the patents to third parties under a “Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory”

terms (FRAND). In the past, the dispute about SSOs occurred under competition law when a member concealed the essential patents and asserted them against its competitors later. Another dispute is involved in the refusal to license essential patents under a patent pool.

Recently, the issues of FRAND interacting with SEP are emerging under patent law in various jurisdictions, inclusive of U.S., European countries, Japan and Korea.

Based upon the FRAND-SEP issues, this article attempts to raise academic thoughts according to the gist of patent law, and to propose an optimal legal model to examine and resolve some core disputes for the future reference of judicial cases or case law in the various jurisdictions.

 The first draft is made for the 2014 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting. It is noted that the article has not been completed, and the further argument as well as notes will be added for supplement later.

 Associate Professor, College of Law, National Chengchi University in Taiwan; S.J.D., Maurer School of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.

Firstly, we should probe into the real meaning of SEP and FRAND in patent law.

In other words, we ask whether the jurisprudence of patent law would oblige the patentee to license the SEP with FRAND terms provided that SEP and FRAND licensing terms are relevant to the expectation of technological improvement and cumulative innovation which patent law always cherishes. And we are also concerned about how to define SEP and FRAND under patent law.

Secondly, if the answer for the above-said question is affirmative, what effects that the failure to comply with such the implicit obligation would put upon the exercise of exclusive rights owned by the patentee of SEP? As the observation over the development of U.S., European countries, Japan and Korea, it seems that the patentee would be deprived of the right to apply for the permanent injunction under patent law owing to the failure to offer the FRAND licensing. In addition, when the third parties infringed upon SEP but they were not provided any opportunity for negotiation about FRAND licensing terms, this fact led to a retrained calculation of damages for patent remedy that would be subject to reasonable royalties under the FRAND terms.

Finally, if the FRAND Licensing serves a precondition for the SEP patentees to ask for a complete remedy against the infringer, what authority we would rely upon to carry out the thought. One possible approach is to take advantage of third-party benefits under contract law. Competition law is also a feasible approach to limit the non-proportionate exercise of exclusive rights enjoyed by the SEP patentee.

However, due to some deficiencies in implementing contract law or competition law on this issue, this article proposes the thought of co-ownership to reconcile the conflicting interests between what the SEP patentee enjoys under patent law and what the public obtains from the FRAND licensing. Simultaneously, it is expected to settle the long-term controversies of patent hold-up and royalty-stacking through the proposed model of co-ownership. Also, royalty calculation under the model of co-ownership for FRAND licensing is another focus of the article.

II. The Distortion of Patent Remedies—The Risks of Hold-Up and Royalty-Stacking A. Damages and Injunctive Relief under Patent Law

The remedies under patent law are established to cure or avoid the disadvantageous economic status of the patentee caused by patent infringement.

Generally speaking, both damages and permanent injunction are inherent and popular within patent remedies in the various jurisdictions. The former functions to return the patentee to the economic status where the patent infringement would not have happened in the market. It is certain that damages usually are not a perfect tool to cure patent infringement because sufficiency of evidence has much influence over calculation of damages under patent law. As to permanent injunction, meaning the right to prevent the current patent infringement or the risk of patent infringement in the legal system of continent, its legislative purpose is to keep the accused products or processes out of the market to secure the patentee's economic interests from interference of patent infringement, either by driving the accused products or processes out of market, or by preempting them in the market. Compared with damages as a liability basis that provide the accused products or processes with an chance to enter the market but seek the objective price to recover the economic losses caused by patent infringement, permanent injunction serves as a property basis to comply with the subjective will of the patentee in the marketing scheme to exclude completely any possibility of marketing of accused products or processes.¹

Although the remedies of damages and permanent injunction are nominally admitted or stipulated under international or domestic patent law, the enforcement of patent rights through them would be still subject to the scrutiny of patent law's legislative gist, rather than is as an necessary outcome of patent infringement. The ultimate purpose of patent law is not to favor any specific inventor by granting the exclusive rights to merely save its incentive on future research and development.

Instead, patent law works to create the room for potential inventors' improvement and cumulated innovation over current inventions to promote industrial development.² In other words, without too much negative impact upon normal exploitation of the patentee on its patent, patent law would tolerate the release of part monopoly protected by the exclusive rights to lead to sufficient technological competition for the purpose of improvement and cumulative innovation.³ As a result, patent law doesn't only favor the patentee, but also any potential inventors in the same or analogous field of technology. The gist of patent law may be reflected in the determination of requirements of subject matter and patentability. Relatively, when a patent was granted, the exercise of exclusive rights, including patent licensing and assertion of patent infringement, also should be checked by such the gist. If the exercise of exclusive rights will impede the technological improvement and cumulated

1 See Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L.REV. 463, 466-69 (2012).

2 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75TEX.L.REV.989, 1068-72 (1996).

3 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM.L.REV. 257, 282-84 (2007).

innovation of claimed inventions, and the benefits such exercise brought about cannot compensate the costs borne in the technological improvement and cumulated innovation, it is justified under patent law to establish the exceptions and limitations of patent rights.

As above-mentioned determination of patentability and exercise of exclusive rights, the remedies of patent infringement never go beyond the governance of patent law's gist promoting technological improvement and cumulative innovation. Under a optimal status, the value that patent remedies produce under patent law results from the patent's surpassing contribution over prior art and the patentee's due diligent on practicing the patent.⁴ Patent remedies are usually stipulated by patent law without an indication about their boundaries corresponding to the legislative purpose, but a mechanical practice on patent remedies would take risks in bringing about excessive compensation to the patentee or prohibited costs to the potential competitive inventors.

An permanent injunction may be admitted to block the accused products from entering the market, but such the products were made with reference to the combination of the patent and other extra technological contributions that is economically indivisible. Under this situation, if the patentee has no plan to practice its patent as a way the accused products were made, the above-mentioned injunction would unquestionably prevent the competitors from adopting new ideas to improve the use of the patent in the market.⁵ And the new ideas have no chance to be

在文檔中以責任法則建構我國專利授權法制—以促進技術改良與再創新為中心 (頁 44-74)

科技部補助專題研究計畫出席國際學術會議心得報 告