以責任法則建構我國專利授權法制—以促進技術改良與再創新為中心

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科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告

期末報告

以責任法則建構我國專利授權法制—以促進技術改良與再

創新為中心

計畫類別：個別型計畫計畫編號： NSC 102-2410-H-004-098- 執行期間： 102 年 08 月 01 日至 103 年 07 月 31 日執行單位：國立政治大學法律學系計畫主持人：沈宗倫計畫參與人員：碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：潘玉蘭碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：陳奕之報告附件：出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文處理方式： 1.公開資訊：本計畫涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，1 年後可公開查詢 2.「本研究」是否已有嚴重損及公共利益之發現：否 3.「本報告」是否建議提供政府單位施政參考：否

中華民國 103 年 10 月 25 日

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中文摘要：專利授權乃專利權人管理法定排他權的重要工具。一方面，專利權人得以利用專利授權與上下游廠商達成技術分工，另一方面，專利權人亦得憑藉專利授權獲致收益，以反映專利本身所隱含的用益價值。專利法的宗旨在於透過技術揭露而創造公眾近用專利內容的機會，鼓勵技術的改良與再創新，以提昇國家科技的發展。專利授權恰為達致上述目標的重要樞紐。近年來，無論是專利法學說或是歐美的司法實務發展，似有以「責任法則」的法理影響專利授權契約的趨向。本研究的主要標目，即在於檢視此一趨向在專利法的正確性與正當性。若「責任法則」介入專利授權契約的評價確有助於專利法立法宗旨的達成，本研究將以「責任法則」為中心重新建構我國專利授權法制。並針對近年來專利法的重大爭議，標準規格之關鍵專利的專利劫奪危險與權利金堆疊問題，提出可行之解決模式，供學界與產業界參考。中文關鍵詞：專利授權、財產法則、責任法則、禁制令、損害賠償、授權金、法定排他權、專利劫奪、授權金堆疊

英文摘要： he patent licensing is a significant instrument for the management of the exclusive rights under patent law. On the one side, through patent licensing, the patentee would cooperate with up-stream or down-stream partners on the manufacture of patented products. On the other side, the patentee could obtain royalties by patent licensing that correspond to the value of a patent in the market. The gist of patent law is to anticipate improvement or

re-innovation of patented technologies to enhance national technological development, by making

available access to inventions under the disclosure of a patent. The patent licensing has been playing a key role in satisfying such the gist. Recently, it has been observed that “the liability rule＂ is delivering its influences over the patent licensing agreements. This project will work to explore the justification of “the liability rule＂ under patent law, and further attempt to establish a new model for Taiwanese patent licensing law if “the liability rule＂ comports with the gist of patent law.

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rule, injunction, damages, royalties, exclusive rights, patent hold-up, royalty stacking

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壹、前言 ... 1

貳、研究目的 ... 3

參、文獻探討 ... 4

肆、研究方法 ... 5

伍、結果與結論 ... 5

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2 壹、前言本研究原本為二年期計畫，第一年研究主題「以美國專利授權實務為中心探討美國專利授權法制之發展」因審查時發現美國授權實務之相關資料多列為各企業之營業秘密，不易取得，最後依審查委員之建議，本研究直接執行第二年的主題，「以責任法則建構我國專利授權法制」。傳統契約法的討論，經常會提及契約效力在民法規範下的界限問題。雖然契約的形成是當事人間高度自治的結果，但不代表法律無介入評價其效力的可能。一般而論，契約的訂定違反強制或禁止之法律規定，或背於公序良俗，或嚴重違背對外公示的要求，即可能受到無效的評價(民法第 71-73 條)。當契約下權利的行使構成權利的濫用，或違反誠實信用原則，權利亦可能因法律的評價而無法主張(民法第 74 條與第 148 條)。此外，契約在暴利行下亦會影響權利行使的效果。再者，定型化契約若對於他方當事人有重大不利益且顯失公平，該契約亦可能受到無效的評價(民法第 247 條之 1)。最後，當契約下權利的行使，若有不公平競爭或限制競爭的可能，則將接受公平交易委員會的行政管制，自不待言。如本計畫前所強調者，專利法的最終立法目的，決非在單方面嘉惠發明人或專利權人，令其利用法定排他權獲致市場經濟利益，而是藉由專利內容的對外揭露，創造出公眾(包括專利權人的競爭者)近用發明的機會，以利於科技的改良與再創新(或累積創新)，提升國家的產業發展的水準。其實，專利法下相關例外或限制(例如：專利法第 59 條第 1 項第 1 款及第 60 條實驗免責規定)亦是本於此立法意旨所創設。因此，專利權之行使並非絕對的概念，而是應以專利法的立法意旨作為衡量價值或行使界限的依據，強化專利權行使的正當性。若專利權的行使，對專利權人本身研發或行銷計畫並無實質的助益，但卻過度阻礙相關科技的改良與再創新時，此權利的行使將要受到專利法的嚴格檢驗。由此而論，民法第 148 條第 1 項：「權利之行使，不得違反公共利益，或以損害他人為主要目的。」於專利授權契約的意義，似可由專利法鼓勵科技改良與再創新的意旨論之。向來，經濟學者或專利法學者即對專利權的行使與專利法鼓勵改良或再創新的意旨，建立對立的學術論理體系。有採「財產法則」(the property rule)者，亦即由傳統財產權的概念出發，在權利範圍內，專利權人不僅得以利用法定排他權，積極阻止他人實施專利內容，尚得以事後救濟的方式，主張權利侵害的救濟。本此「財產法則」，學說主要的訴求在能充分發揮專利本身的價值，確保專利權人未來繼續從事研發的誘因。當「財產法則」適用於專利權的行使，目前各國專利法所關注的實務問題，反映在專利權人濫用專利的相關權能，不當尋求專利法所允可的利益，特別是當專利權人不事生產，亦不授權他人產銷專利物，卻恣意排除他人進入市場。或者，利用法定排他權脅迫他人訂定重大不利益且顯失公平的

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授權或專利侵害和解契約。當專利物僅為最終產品的元件，最終產品為專利物的改良品時，前述問題更為嚴重，值得深切反省。

相對於「財產法則」，「責任法則」(the liability rule)的訴求較有利於專利技術的改良與再創新。責任法則於專利法下的詮釋下，縱然他人侵害專利，專利權人亦不得主張法定排他權，排除他人進入市場，僅得享有對於他人未經同意實施專利的補償。此補償除包括專利法所規範的損害賠償外，亦包含強制授權下的授權金。「責任法則」雖較能符合專利法鼓勵科技改良，亦有其先天的困境存在。由於「責任法則」著重於事後的利益補償，而非事前的排阻，因此，如何確保受補償的利益得以反映出真正的專利價值，實為「責任法則」下的一大工程。若利益的補償不充分，勢必影響專利權人未來繼續研發的誘因。據筆者的觀察，現今專利法與專利實務的發展，「責任法則」已漸有成為檢試專利授權契約合法性的另一個重要準則。該法則是否得解釋為民法第 148 條第 1 項於專利法的脈絡，仍有討論的空間。但歐美的司法實務，已有相當例證，說明此一趨勢。例如：現今專利侵害的和解磋商，當事人間常援用「責任法則」的概念，以達和解的目的。另外，歐美近來有涉及「關鍵技術」(standards-essential) 的專利授權，因專利權人未能履行「公平合理無歧視」(fair, reasonable, and non-discrimination, FRAND)授權契約條款，致使無法主張「永久禁制令」permanent injunction)(類似排除侵害請求權)或「初步禁制令」(preliminary injunction)(類似定 暫狀態假處分)，以排除被授權人於市場上繼續實施專利內容，例如：Microsoft

Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Case No. 12-35352 (9th Cir., Sept. 28, 2012)。此現象頗值得

研究與觀察，未來是否「責任法則」將介入專利授權契約而形成一重要規制，且如何由該法則以建構或解釋專利授權契約，實為本計畫開展的重心所在。其實，為充分發揮專利法鼓勵科技改良或再創新，亦有新的授權型態產生，例如：「專利聯盟」、「技術交換授權」與「資源開放授權」等，均與「責任法則」具有異取同工之妙。該等授權在實務上與「責任法則」的相互呼應與整合，也是本研究的重要基點之一。在眾多主題當中，本研究嘗試以技術標準規格下關鍵專利之「公平合理無歧視」授權為例證，說明「責任法則」已於專利法體系逐漸生根，在許多攸關公共利益之專利實施，常因責任法則之介入適用而獲致妥善的利益衡量，特別在「禁制令」濫用(類似我國專利法第 96 條第 1 項所規範之權利，或指民事訴訟之定暫狀態假處分)所生之「專利劫奪危險」 (patent hold-up risks)，或專利複合下所生之「權利金堆疊」(royalty racking )等現今專利實務的特殊現象之下。

貳、研究目的

本研究嘗試從「責任法則」的理論基礎建構我國授權法制，並利用特殊授權型態輔佐之，以達致確保科技改良與再創新的專利法立法目標。如本研究所提及者，專利為無體財產權，其權利的正當性又繫於專利法的政策目的或立法意旨，

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4 因此專利價值並非絕對的概念，價值的存在決非因專利的授予而當然獲致，尚須視專利權人是否勤勉地實施專利或令他人有機會實施專利，以促成專利立法者所珍惜的科技改良與再創新。斷然地採取「財產法則」形塑我國專利法體系而不區別各種科技市場的利益衡量，雖可創造出專利權人豐厚的研發誘因，但在恣意地排除他人實施專利內容的危險下，實有礙科技改良與再創新等專利法立法目標的達成，將原本所期待的公共利益，轉為專利權人依法可支配的利益，產生專利法規範意旨外的超額利益。再者，「財產法則」若無節制地適用於授權契約關於權能用益的對價衡量與契約權利義務的主張，甚至延用於專利侵害的損害賠償計算，更助長專利立法意旨下專利權人與潛在研發者(公眾)真正利益衡量的扭曲。本研究有鑑於此，深自警惕，期待以「責任法則」所建構的法理，作為評價專利授權契約法效的重要依據，重新檢討我國專利授權法制的爭議，特別是針對現今電信業標準規格下的關鍵專利，相關之「公平合理無歧視」授權，以比較法的方法，檢討與反思「責任法則」於專利法制之展望，供實務界參考，更可作為司法解釋或未來相關立法的藍圖。參、文獻探討因為美國相關文獻眾多，以下僅列舉近年來英文學術期刊所登載的重要文獻；例如：RAYMOND T.NIMMER &JEFF C.DODD,MODERN LICENSING LAW (2012-2013 ed.); BRAIN G BRUNSVOLD & DENNIS P. O’REILLEY, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSING

AGREEMENTS (6th ed. 2008); WRIGHT, BRADLEY C., DRAFTING PATENTS FOR

LITIGATION AND LICENSING (2008); GOMULKIEWICZ, ROBERT W. ET AL., LICENSING

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND APPLICATION (2008); MILGRIM, ROGER M. &

BENSEN, ERIC E., MILGRIM ON LICENSING (2010)(LexisNexis database); EINHORN,

HAROLD AND PARKER, THOMAS, PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS

(2010)(LEXISNEXIS DATABASE).

本研究關於「以責任法則建構專利授權法制」部分。在「責任法則」與「財產法則」於專利法體系下的適用與反省部分，就申請人相關文獻的蒐集，Rosa Castro Bernier, Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law (2010)，無論就法律經濟分析理論的引用，各國專利法規範與司法判決的整理，以及國際公約於相關議題的現況解析，實為豐富詳實，有助於本計畫對於「責任法則」在專利法體系下適用的參考與檢討。至於，「責任法制」與「授權法制」與專利授權契約的關係，有二大重要學術論著，值得研讀，以求研究的精進。其一為早期美國柏克萊大學法學院教授 Robert P. Merges 所發表的文章，主要的訴求，乃是利用「權利管理機構」磋商專利授權，而避免強制授權的產生，以「財產法則」置入授權的談判，將有助於研發誘因的確保，並降低交易成本。參見 Robert P. Merge, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,

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84 Calif. L.Rev. 1293 (1996) 另一為美國史丹佛大學法學院教授 Mark A. Lemley, 則有不同的觀察點，Lemley 教授強調現今實務上的專利侵害和解與授權磋商， 已有以「責任法則」為談判基礎的趨勢。參見 Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around

Liability Rules, 100 CALIF.L.REV.463 (2012).

至於關鍵專利之「公平合理無歧視」授權，相關重要文獻，請參見本報告第伍章「結果與討論」所附本人所發表之文章，茲不贅述。

肆、研究方法

請參見本研究計畫之申請書。本研究採用類似傳統社會科學研究方法的「非介入研究」(non-intervention research)下的「內容分析法」(content analysis)、「歷史研究分析法」(historical research analysis)以及「比較研究法」(comparative research)。伍、結果與討論本研究之研究成果可分為二大部分，第一部分是關於責任法則於專利法制下正當性之確立。主要討論財產法則下專利權的不當行使，著重於「禁制令」所形成之「劫奪危險」與專利複合下的「權利金堆疊」等現象對於專利法制與立法目標之衝擊；第二部分則強調責任法則於專利法制之實踐，本研究是以標準技術規格下關鍵專利的「公平合理無歧視」授權為探討中心。

以下所列之文章"Remedies of Standard Essential Patents and Patent Abuses in terms of FRAND Licensing"，為本人於西元 2014 年 5 月 30 日於「法與社會學會」年會所發表(the 2014 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting)，其為本研究之研究成果之第二部分具體內容。

第一部分專利法制下專利劫奪(patent hold-up)與權利金堆疊(royalty stacking)之爭議一、專利權複合與一物一權主義傳統物權一般而言存在於權利人對於有體物的支配關係，以所有權為例，藉由此支關係，所有權人原則上得以對所有權客體自由使用、收益與處分。一旦該支配關係因無權占有標的物而破壞，所有權人除可就無權占有期間，其無法支配標的物所生之經濟損失，向無權占有人主張侵權行為之損害賠償，尚得依物權法所賦予所有權人之所有物返還請求權，請求無權占有人回復原先所有權人對於標

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6 的物之支配關係。據司法判決實務之發展，所有物返還請求權之主張，無須考量無權占有人之主觀歸責性，僅聚焦於所有權支配關係為無權占有所破壞之利益狀態。似不以所有權人於無權占有前對於標的物之利用狀態為據，衡量准予所有物返還請求權的妥適程度。當然，無權占有人於無權占有後，對於標的物之利用計畫與勤勉與否，與所有物返還請求權亦無直接的關連。亦即，縱然所有權人於無權占有前，對於標的物並無利用計畫，亦不授予他人用益，或雖有計畫，但欠缺勤勉的注意而任標的物處於無人利用狀態，依我國法的解釋，仍得享有所有物返還請求權。同理，無權占有人於占有後以勤勉的態度充分利用標的物，創造福利，甚至為所有權人於無權占有前所未能者，仍無法逃脫所有物返還請求權之訴究。只要存在所有權關係，在無權占有的情形下，所有物返還請求權似乎是當然解釋。立法者所關注者乃所有物若遭無權占有時，所有權人所面臨無法行使所有權之不利益現象。此在強調「一物一權主義」的傳統物權法體系下，實可理解。特別是所有權的概念下，一標的物僅能為一所有權管領，而一所有權的支配議受限於一標的物。由此而論，當所有權人對於標的物享有所有權之支配關係時，該所有物即為所有權人得以支配管領之唯一標的物，相關利用之計畫有賴前之支配，所有權人之經濟利益亦來自於對標的物獨有的支配。此支配利益無自他標的物替代之可能，利益藉由所有權客體之擴大或複製而衍生，更是無法想像。因此，若暫不考率物權實施的效率與福利，所有權對於標的物之支配關係若因無權占有而破損，所有物返還請求權之賦予與行使，於物權法有其正當性，否則支配的關係無法再續，所有權之權能將形同虛設，反而造就了無權占有人對其無權占有物逆向的事實支配關係，與物權法創設及規範所有權之立法意旨有所出入。暫時跳脫所有物無權占有的思考，再由無權占有的損害賠償救濟觀之，一物一權主義的概念著實影響以無權占有侵害所有權之損害賠償計算。由於一所有權的支配範圍限於單一標的物，因此無權占有所生之損害，當與標的物之利用與經濟利益有關，無由以他標的物之利用與經濟利益損失，納入無權占有的損害賠償計算，除非行為人同時以無權占有侵害他標的物，但應是另一個所有權或定限物權侵害的問題。另外，一特定標的物僅容許一所有權之存在，無權占有絕不可能同時侵害複數所有權，更無須慮及無權占有下，損害賠償計算是否慮及複數所有權間賠償分配的問題，以及是否將全部損害賠償給予其中之一的所有權人，有過度補償的情形。其實，一物一權主義貫徹下，無權占有的損害賠償計算，因所有權支配關係明確，趨於單純，所有權人較無超額討索的可能，無權占有人亦無過度賠償的危險。二、專利法制下的排除侵害請求權與損害預防請求權較之傳統物權，專利權所支配者，非特定之有體標的物，而是在於解決技術問題的構想，該構想是以文字表達揭露於申請專利範圍內。無論專利權為物品專

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7 利或方法專利，只要與專利物有關，一旦實施申請專利範圍，即可產出實體的專利物。此專利物之產出數量並無限制，隨著申請專利範圍之實施，專利物相應產出。且專利物不因申請專利範圍實施而有數量或品質遞減的現象，相對而言，申請專利範圍所涵括的技術，亦不可能因實施的次數增加，而有技術耗損的情形。質言之，專利權雖直接支配申請專利範圍所載之特定技術，實則間接支配無窮無盡的專利物。專利法為保護前述之支配關係，立法者特別賦予專利權人法定排他權，降低他人未經授權擅自實施申請專利範圍之可能性。在此須特別說明者，乃專利權人對於申請專利範圍支配關係之遭受破壞，並不似傳統物權之實務發展，他人藉由對於標的物之無權占有以障礙所有權人對於所有物之支配關係，而常發生於他人未經授權實施申請專利範圍，吾人得謂之「無權實施」。縱然他人無權占有專利物，並不影響專利權人對於申請專利範圍的支配管領，本身仍得實施申請專利範圍，製銷專利物，於市場上遂行其經濟計畫。無權占有專利物雖不致直接衝擊專利權人對於申請專利範圍的支配關係，專利權人仍須面臨無權占有物進入市場後可能產生之經濟不利益。因此，傳統物權法上賦予所有權人之「所有物返還請求權」對於專利權支配關係的確保，實無直接的貢獻，是故專利法於專利權侵害之相關救濟，並不著墨於「專利物返還」，而在於申請專利範圍之無權實施。由於申請專利範圍之無權實施勢將產製專利權人預期外的不法專利物，此舉弱化了專利權人對於申請專利範圍的支配，若在價格與品質上能維持與合法專利物均等的水準，該不法專利物則會對合法專利物發生市場替代或先占的結果或危險。此時，專利權人若能阻斷非法專利物於市場繼續流通的結果，或防止非法專利物進入市場，專利權人對於申請專利範圍之支配關係，方得獲致相當程度的回復。因此，傳統物權法的「排除侵害請求權」與「損害預防請求權」，仍為專利法所承襲，以維護專利權人對於申請專利範圍的支配關係。然而，專利法與傳統物權相同，均有肩負著特定的經濟使命與政策目標，且涵攝於相關立法意旨當中。任何權利之行使當然受到此立法意旨的拘束或限制。前述富涵經濟政策的立法意旨可能以立法的方式呈現，成為權利行使之限制；亦可能以上位的概念節制權利行使範圍與深廣，以達致法律所期待之政策目標。以物權法為例，所有權之行使除受限於誠實信用原則而不得構成濫用外，尚有為調和眾多土地、建物或土地與建物間所有權行使的衝突，而立法建構的「相鄰關係」規範，以貫徹「如他人干涉，無礙所有權之行使者，不得排除之」之相關意旨。同時，為鼓勵所有權人勤勉利用土地以創造社會利益，若所有權人怠於利用，物權法允許他人於一定條件成就下以「時效」取得相關的權利。另外，物權法亦為周全土地與建物的合法共存與相關權利的讓與，常明文建構法定物權以確保土地與建物間的合法依存權限，不因土地或建物的所有權移轉而導致拆屋還地的不利結果。相較於物權法，專利法具有明顯的政策意涵，其立法目的並非在嘉惠特定的專利權人，藉由排他權的授予，確保其研發成本的回收與合理利潤的增益，以創造其未來繼續研發的誘因，誘因的創造僅是達致終極目標的手段。專利法真正

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8 的立法目的是在創造現行研發與技術改良或累積創新並行的環境，以提升國家產業技術的發展。其實，任何科技的研發絕無完美可言，更不可透過單一研究就能「一次到位」，永久地解決未來所有的相關技術問題，遑論技術本身於研發中存在的缺失與盲點，因此，既有技術的改良與再創新即為科技發展中的重要樞紐，也是科技恆久不滅的基石。雖然專利權乃是國家就特定發明授予專利而專利權人依法得享有之排他權與法定救濟權，並以申請專利範圍為權利行使之依歸，但並不代表在申請專利範圍的界限下，專利權人得以任意行使其專利法所賦予的排他權與救濟權。若過度容認專利權人行使法定排他權與救濟權，實質上等同排擠了他人對於相關技術改良與累積創新的機會，更可能將他人的研發成果或技術貢獻，於僵化的權利解釋，納入專利權範圍，實有違專利法的立法意旨。是故，當解釋專利法第 96 條第 1 項之專利權侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權時，除須確認專利權之存在與專利權侵害之事實或危險，包括專利權無效抗辯(吾得稱之為請求權的「可行性」)，尚應以前述立法意旨檢視該等請求權之必要性。若專利權侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之主張，無助於專利相關技術的技術改良或累積創新，甚或有抑制之可能，此時如仍令專利權人得以行使此二權利，實無必要，同時亦欠缺權利之正當性，易構成專利權之濫用。專利權為無體財產權，無嚴格的一物一權主義適用。如前所強調，專利有類公共財的屬性，反覆實施申請專利範圍，無論為合法授權或非法侵權，若專利所保護的技術與物品的製造生產有關，即可無限制產生專利物。專利權人依法得以直接支配申請專利範圍，相對而言，等同間接管領申請專利範圍實施下所產出之專利物。此與傳統物權法規範下，一所有權效力僅及於單一標的物，有所不同。從另一個角度觀察之，單一專利物有可能存在原專利以外的其他貢獻，甚至同一標的的產製是同時實施複數專利始得成就。舉例而言，假設 A 物為一最終的消費品，其由 X、Y 與 Z 等三個不同的物理元件所組成，而欲將前述元件組裝成 A 物則須以 W 技術為之。若單就 X 元件、Y 元件與 Z 元件而言，各有獨立的專利保護，W 技術亦包含於其他專利內。是故，A 物的產製，同一時間須受四個獨立專利的授權，否則任一專利未受授權，即有可能令 A 物成為專利法下的非法專利物，相關產銷行為構成法定排他權之違反，負擔侵權的評價。此現象亦與傳統物權法的一物一權主義所有出入，單一標的物決無同時存在數個所有權的可能。由於專利權之無體財產性，擺脫了一物一權主的拘束，當面臨權利侵害所衍生之損害賠償問題，創造出傳統物權所未面臨的複雜狀況。於前例的情形下，若有專利權侵害發生，即他人未經各專利權人之授權，產銷 A 物。此時損害賠償的計算，實有如何將損害賠償總額分配於各專利權人的問題。究竟應以 X 元件、Y 元件、Z 元件與 W 技術對於 A 物的技術貢獻以決定分配的比率？亦或平等分配？學說與司法實務上頗有爭議。特別是當一最終消費品是否存在複數專利狀態不明，而僅有其中一專利權人求償損害時，問題的爭議更加劇烈。

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9 承前所論，無論何種法定救濟，均不能超脫專利法之立法意旨與目的而任由專利權人享有絕對性之權利主張。以專利權之侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權為例，縱然專利權之有效性與侵權之可能性受到確認，不當然代表專利權人得依法行使侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之相關救濟。該等權利得以行使與否，尚須以專利法之立法意旨與目的嚴加檢視，排除或預防侵權物進入市場的效果，究竟有益於專利法倡議技術改良與累積創新以促進科技進步之目標，或對此目標之達成，形成相當程度的障礙或阻滯。若為前者，侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權即有專利法的正當性；後者的情形，侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之行使則有違專利法制之創設目標，執意前述權利主張之允可，固可令專利權人回復其因專利權侵害所生之經濟不利益，卻影響他人就專利所保護之技術，從事改良或再創新的可能，以權利之主張加諸專利法鼓勵技術創新目標達成之成本，是為權利之濫用。其實，專利權雖為私權，但相關之行使受限於專利法確保相關技術改良與累積創新之目標，由此觀之，專利權亦可視為肩負公共利益之公權，過度的行使有排擠公共利益之嫌。專利法之立法意旨恰為專利權屬性之分界，符合立法意旨的排他權與相關救濟，專利權人得以自由為之，為私有財產權之概念。一旦有逾越立法意旨規範分際之虞，排他權之行使則應有利於相關技術改良與累積創新，始得為專理法所認可。就經濟學的角度論之，專利法立法目標之達致，僅依憑專利權人對於權利之絕對支配，並不易成就，在相當的程度內，專利權人「釋放」排他權之行使與救濟權之主張，令權利發生「外溢」現象，方有助於技術改良與累積創新的進展，與專利所保護支配的技術，共同提升國家產業的發達。值得特別說明者，乃本諸專利權之行使，專利權人於民事訴訟保全程序之主張，例如：專利權人基於專利權侵害的情事，向法院聲請「定暫時狀態假處分」，以專利權侵權與有效性尚未經法院確定，恐確定後專利權人勢將蒙受不可回復之損害，故以此處分排除或預防侵權物進入市場。「定暫時狀態假處分」雖有其時效性，僅為訴訟前與當時保全權利之手段，非如專利法所賦予之侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，為終極之權利行使。然而，就法律的實質效果而言，定暫時狀態假處分並無異於侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之主張，一旦獲致法院准許之裁定，侵權物將無法進入市場行銷。因此，定暫時狀態假處分之聲請究竟就專利法而言有無其必要性，其相關利益衡量似應如法院審酌侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之主張，以專利法之立法意旨與目的作為檢視聲請必要性之核心標準。任何定暫時狀態假處分之聲請有違專利法鼓勵技術改良與累積創新之目標，將欠缺保權程序主張之正當性。三、專利權行使與專利劫奪危險依據專利法的立法意旨，其實可以直接導出何種情況下專利權人主張侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，或聲請定暫時狀態假處分，乃具有專利法的正當性。專利法除確保專利權人未來繼續研發之誘因外，同時要兼顧相關技術不會因專利

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10 權之保護而影響未來技術改良或累積創新的空間。由此而論，專利法之立法者最不樂見者，當為他人未經專利權人同意，完全實施申請專利範圍所載之技術構想，無論是以專利物形式或以專利方法投入製程，與專利權人從事不當的市場競爭，對於專利權人產生合法專利物或專利方法被替代之危險，衝擊專利權人正常利用專利技術尋求經濟利益的機會。前述所謂的「完全實施申請專利範圍」，包括以文義侵害與均等侵害等方式所為之「實施」。此等侵權人僅立於技術「複製者」的地位，未致力於專利技術的實質改良與再創新，其所投注之成本乃為複製專利內容且令之具體化，非花費於改良專利技術之缺失或突破專利技術有限的功能，對於專利相關技術的發展而言，技術的單純複製無法增進技術進展的福利，以實現專利法固有之目標。另由專利權人利用專利技術的角度析之，侵權人在未有提供超越專利技術之貢獻的情形下，以完全實施申請專利範圍所生之替代效果，不當瓜分專利權人實施專利內容的經濟利益，或破壞原先專利權人利用專利之經濟計畫，如此妄加於專利權人的成本，苦無對等的技術貢獻平衡之，在專利法制下，實欠缺「效率」可言。是故，專利法所規範之侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，或保全程序之定暫時狀態假處分，恰可阻斷侵權者無益於技術發展，又剝奪專利權人合法利益的技術複製行為。若侵害專利權非為完全複製專利技術以為實施，直接與專利物或方法為非法競爭者，則專利權人得否有充分的立場主張侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，或聲請保全程序之定暫時狀態假處分，則有相當的討論餘地。以下略舉三例說明之。第一種情形，若專利權人並無實施專利權之市場計畫，包括授權他人進行專利物之產銷或專利方法之投入製程，以為市場經濟行為或再研發。若專利法賦予專利權人絕對之侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，或確保其絕對保全程序保護，其結果將令公眾無法享有專利本身對於技術的貢獻成果，而專利權人又無實施專利權之意願，亦可能影響同業競爭者研發新技術的機會與成本。此時，侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之行使，以及定暫時狀態假處分之聲請，是否應受到某種程度的節制，或在何等條件下應受節制，均高度攸關專利法的政策目標，值得進一步討論。第二種情形，侵權人未授權實施專利之目的，不在與專利權人為非法的直接市場競爭與替代，而從事改良或再製原專利技術。若專利權人並無此技術改良或再製的研發計畫與市場產銷安排，絕對的侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，與當然的定暫時狀態假處分，對於專利法所鼓勵的技術改良與累積創新相關意旨，勢將產生相當程度的抵觸。是故，實施專利以為技術改良與再製之情形，在何種條件下侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之主張，或定暫時狀態假處分之聲請，當受節制，亦值得仔細推敲。第三種情形，若侵權人未授權實施專利，乃是製造最終消費物的元件，或為最終消費物增進特殊的功能，以利於最終消費物於市場之產銷。在此情形下，市場上所行銷者為最終消費物，而非僅是專利權所保護之專利物。亦即就最終消費物而言，除了被侵害的專利外，尚有其他技術貢獻或專利存在。一旦侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，或定暫時狀態假處分經

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11 主張或聲請發生法律效果，便發生單一專利之侵害卻排除包含專利物之最終消費物進入市場的不公平現象。此時，侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之主張，以及定暫時狀態假處分之聲請，是否必要？是否應再考量各專利人之意願與市場產銷計畫？是否亦應衡諸侵權人除非法實施專利外，其於最終消費物製成之技術貢獻，如前述第二種情形？實有充分討論的空間與需要。如前所強調，不當主張侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，或聲請定暫時狀態假處分，其結果可能產生專利法固有意旨貫徹之障礙。其實，前述權利與救濟不當主張，其負面效果的影響，未必僅能由判決或裁定的結果傳遞，更有可能轉換成「劫奪危險」，直接干涉專利授權契約或侵權和解契約的對價正當性。「劫奪危險」的發生乃是法院過度「概念化」與「機械化」詮釋專利排他權的產物，只要認定專利權確實存在，未有無效抗辯事由，且專利權之侵害正在進行或有發生之可能性，即允可侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之主張，或定暫時狀態假處分之聲請，無慮及專利權人是否已實施專利，侵害的樣態是否為專利技術之改良，或侵權物除專利技術外是否存在其他專利或技術的貢獻等權利行使之衡平因素。假使此種非衡平的詮釋繼續存在於司法實務，當侵權人非立於以完全複製而非法替代專利物或方法之立場時，為確保其投資於專利實施的成本得以回收，或遂行其實施專利之市場經濟計畫，即有可能藉由對於授權契約或和解契約不當條件 (特別是不符合公平對價的授權金)的妥協，而換取專利權人放棄主張除去請求權與侵害防止請求權，或聲請定暫時狀態假處分的承諾，以解除侵權物全面退離市場或無法進入市場的巨大損失。「劫奪危險」的威脅便在於專利權人洞悉侵權人無法承受侵權物無法進入市場所生的經濟損失，則以與專利非法實施程度不相稱的契約條款，迫使侵權人接受和解，從中「劫奪」專利法所不允許之超額利益。為了預防「劫奪危險」的實現，法院在判定侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之行使範圍時，以及裁定定暫時狀態假處分聲請之准否時，除應考量專利無效與侵權的可能性外，尚有責任慮及前述權利主張與保全程序聲請之必要性。此「必要性」的概念，得由權利濫用之衡平限制出發，以專利法同時兼顧發明人未來研發誘因之確保，以及相關技術改良與累積創新之可能性，所固有之立法意旨為經緯，探求權利與救濟之界限。必要性之審酌實質上給予法院消弭專利權任意主張權利以遂「劫奪」目的之危險。當然，如何令「必要性」的利益衡量受有法源而於專利侵權訴訟具有正當性，乃各國專利法所面臨的技術問題。立法的直接規範似對大陸法系的國家而言，似為較為妥當的模式。在無相關規範下，若欲於司法判決中導入前述權利行使與保權程序聲請必要性之審酌，則必須藉憑「誠實信用原則」，以防止權利濫用為理由，調節相關權利與救濟之必要性。相對而言，英美法系的判例法傳統易於發展「必要性」的審酌，縱然現今各國專利法大多已成文法化。

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12 關於「劫奪危險」之預防，西元 2006 年美國聯邦最高法院的 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.一案為各國專利法於侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之必要性審酌，建立可資參考的法理。在類似我國專利法所規範之侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權的「永久禁制令」方面，美國聯邦最高法院導入衡平利益的思考，強調永久禁制令除專利之有效性與侵權之可能性外，專利權人尚須證明其因侵權已受到不可回復的傷害，且金錢的損害賠償或其他救濟已不適合補償前述商害。此外，再考量禁制令准許時侵權人所面臨的困境，以及禁制令被拒絕時專利權人所接受之難處，取其利益平衡下仍傾向有利於禁制令之主張。最後，禁制令的主張不得排擠公共利益。在此衡平測試的承認下，其實已再確認專利權排他權的行使並無絕對，永久禁制令之主張否必要，留待法院進一步就個案所存在的客觀事實，作衡平的分析。在專利法立法意旨的主導下，本案將衡平利益的觸角延伸到本身並未實施專利而依賴授權以為收入來源的專利權人，於專利權侵害的情形，得否聲請永久禁制令排阻或預防侵權物進入市場銷售散布。雖然美國聯邦最高法院並未概念化地解釋，所有未自行實施專利以謀利之專利權人，均不得主張永久禁制令，為學校研發單位與個人發明者等「非實施專利權之個體」，預留被授予永久禁制令的可能性，但本判決已明確呈現專利權實施與否，與專利權法鼓勵專利技術改良與累積創新的立法政策之關係，衡平的斟酌下，判斷准予永久禁制令對於前述的立法目標之達成究竟有無正面的效益，答案若為否定，則此永久禁制令之聲請便欠缺必要性。其實，本判決的協同意見書，亦提及若非法實施專利之侵權物僅為最終消費物的一個元件之情形，在此情形下除專利技術貢獻外尚有其他的貢獻，專利權人得否基於專利權之侵害，而聲請永久禁制令，排除最終消費物進入市場。其中涉及公共利益的考量。足資證明永久禁制令之衡平考量已逐漸擴張至與本案有關之其他類型。有趣的是，協同意見書針對本案的系爭專利 (商業方法專利)，認為商業方法專利本身的效力正當性可議，而商業方法專利實為科技發展下的自然結果，因此，永久禁制令之衡平考量亦可調節商業方法專利權之主張，所可能產生對於專利法制之負面效果。四、專利權侵害之損害賠償與權利金堆疊以衡平的考量介入審查侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之主張，或定暫時狀態假處分之聲請，此為各國專利法逐漸匯集的共識，令法院有更彈性的空間確認相關權利或救濟主張之必要性。然而，專利之權利金堆疊問題雖在學說與司法實務都已獲得關注，特別是電信產業或半導體產業因研發實務的發展，在專利之申請與所有上常呈現「專利叢林」的現象，但此問題至今未來獲致明確的解決。權利金堆疊問題主要是來自當複數專利於一專利物或方法併合時，各專利的技術貢獻的評價與區分不明，附著之專利恣意評價，以致單一專利物之價格無限上綱，甚至超過專利物上所有技術於市場上得以承認之總貢獻價值，形成訂價之扭曲。一旦侵權人無經授權製造行銷此專利物或使用此專利方法，縱然主張侵權救濟者

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13 僅有其中一專利權人，無論是採何種損害賠償計算方法，若無法正確掌握各專利於專利物之價值分配，即可能以整個專利物的價值作為損害賠償之計算基礎，令該專利權人獲致專利法所允可外之超額利益，或就同樣附著專利物之其他技術貢獻者，包括其他專利權人，構成民法上之不當得利。其實，權利金堆疊的問題不僅會發生於專利權侵害之損害賠償方面，亦可能凸顯於專利權之授權實務，更可能有激化藉由侵害除去請求權與侵害防止請求權之主張，與定暫時狀態假處分之聲請，所引發之劫奪危險。然而，以專利價值的分配以解決權利金堆疊問題，理論上固為可行，亦為審判實務所認知，但價值分配應如何為之，仍無一致的見解與立場，更無明確與客觀的原理法則得為司法實務遵循，以評價探求專利複合時的各專利之技術貢獻與價值。因此，在個案的爭議上，專利價值的分配恐流於主觀的評價。假設最終消費物 Pt 同時附著 Pa1 至 Pa10 等 10 個專利。當侵權者未經專利權人同意，實施上述 10 個專利而非法製造侵權物 Ft，並於 Ft 加置 Pt 所未有之特殊功能 T1，於市場上銷售 Ft。暫不論 Ft 於消費者的購買決策中，是否為 Pt 之市場替代物，而對 Pt 產生市場替代之威脅。亦不提及以何種方式計算本案專利權侵害之損害。於本案，最終若僅 Pa1 之專利權人對於 Ft 之非法產銷，依專利法主張損害賠償，則應以 Ft 整個侵權物作為計算損害之基礎？抑或以 Pa1 所對應之元件或技術作為損害賠償之基礎？後者雖考量技術價值分配，但若 Pa1 所對應之元件或技術並無明確之市場價值，以之為計算損害之基礎勢必面臨相當的困難。此種情況，是否得以 Ft 整體作為計算損害之基礎，再導入專利與其他技術貢獻概念，以估計專利價值的分配？若為可行之法，則進一步的問題在於如何確定 Pa1 至 Pa10，甚至 T1 對於 Ft 的技術貢獻？似有二種方法可供思考，首先可採行的方法，得先以 Ft 的技術貢獻總和與先前技術作為比較，尋求 Ft 優於先前技術的技術價值所在，再由此價值分配給 Pa1 至 Pa10，與 T1，至於分配的基礎究竟為平均分配，或以貢獻差異作為分配原則，仍有進一步討論之空間。特別是貢獻差異分配，如何確定 Pa1 至 Pa10，與 T1 間各技術的貢獻差異，亦為一大難題。另一種方法，似可由 Pa1 至 Pa10，與 T1 個別專利或技術，比較先前技術，取得技術價值，以確定該等專利或技術個別的貢獻價值，作為專利價值分配之指標。此法以個別的技術比較求得貢獻價值，固為困難，本身能否有助於權利金堆疊之現象，亦值得懷疑。美國專利判例法發展出「完全市場價值法則」，以因應專利物僅為最終消費物之元件時的專利權侵害案件，或專利物與非專利物併合銷售時的相關專利權侵害，二者之損害賠償計算問題。暫不論前述合併銷售的問題，依判例所發展之通說，乃是以「顧客需求」為中心衡量究竟是否應以最終消費物作為損害賠償計算的基礎？或以可資計算之最小單位為基礎？後者亦可能即為專利物。一旦被證明顧客購買最終消費物的原因是基於專利物所呈現的功能或技術特徵，本於此因果關係即可推知，專利物乃影響顧客消費決策之核心，故而，專利權人得以最終消費物為基準計算專利權侵害的損害賠償。然而，前述的因果關系未能獲得證明，縱然專利物仍具特殊之功能或技術特徵，專利權人亦僅得尋就專利物或其他可資計算之最小單位，計算損害賠償。其實，「完全市場

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14 價值法則」向來在美國專利判例法發展的定位上，並非原則性之概念，而為損害賠償計算之例外，其存在雖然切中市場消費者之決策行為的意向，當最終消費物非為專利物，而是以專利物為其元件時，對專利權人而言，不失為一個簡便的專利權侵害下之損害賠償計算方法，但該法實質上背離專利權損害賠償之基本原則，易將非專利所貢獻之價值計入損害賠償範圍內，形成超額賠償，不僅學術界對此方法多有質疑，甚至美國司法實務亦戒慎為之，近年來似無在專利權侵害之爭議中獲成功適用的例子。若仔細解析「完全市場價值法則」之內涵，除了以「顧客需求」決定專利價值貢獻的廣度以計算損害賠償，實難具有正當性外，該法則並未真正解決專利價值分配於損害賠償之問題。似僅以單一專利附著最終消費物的邏輯進行解釋適用，忽略了最終消費物亦可能存在複數的專利。當以「顧客需求」決定損害賠償的基礎，而被主張侵害的專利卻有影響最終消費物之顧客決策時，損害賠償是依最終消費物計算之，其中未能考量其他專利，甚至侵權人本身，對於最終消費物之技術貢獻價值，全然將他人的價值收納於自身之損害賠償當中，顯無慮及專利價值分配之重要環節。不可否認，若經「顧客需求」的測試，令主張專利權侵害的專利權人，僅能就專利物或其他可資計算之最小單位以計算損害，此種情形或有專利價值分配的思維，但專利物並不當然具有直接的市場價值，且其他可資計算之最小單位亦有專利複合或其他技術貢獻之現象，因此，「完全市場價值法則」仍面臨著固有的盲點，似未必能完全解決損害賠償計算中所涉及得專利價值分配的問題。第二部分：標準技術規格下關鍵專利的「公平合理無歧視」授權

Remedies of Standard Essential Patents and Patent Abuses in terms of FRAND Licensing

Chung-Lun Shen

I. Introduction

The phenomenon of “patent thickets” has been well recognized by the economists and legal scholars, especially in the industries of semi-conductor, communication and information. It is a common thought in practice that cross-licensing and patent pool are both playing significant roles in alleviating the

_{The first draft is made for the 2014 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting. It is noted that}

the article has not been completed, and the further argument as well as notes will be added for supplement later.

_{Associate Professor, College of Law, National Chengchi University in Taiwan; S.J.D., Maurer School of}

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problem of patent thickets, which often brought about patent blocking and prohibitive transaction cost in implementing a specific technological process. Certainly, the availability of cross-licensing and patent pool depends upon the well development of Stand Setting Organizations (SSOs). In order to make technological standards available for practitioners to access, not only does SSOs request its members to disclose any owned patents essential to the standard(Standard-Essential Patents, SEP), but it also made an agreement with its members to promise a obligation for licensing such the patents to third parties under a “Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory” terms (FRAND). In the past, the dispute about SSOs occurred under competition law when a member concealed the essential patents and asserted them against its competitors later. Another dispute is involved in the refusal to license essential patents under a patent pool.

Recently, the issues of FRAND interacting with SEP are emerging under patent law in various jurisdictions, inclusive of U.S., European countries, Japan and Korea. Based upon the FRAND-SEP issues, this article attempts to raise academic thoughts according to the gist of patent law, and to propose an optimal legal model to examine and resolve some core disputes for the future reference of judicial cases or case law in the various jurisdictions.

Firstly, we should probe into the real meaning of SEP and FRAND in patent law. In other words, we ask whether the jurisprudence of patent law would oblige the patentee to license the SEP with FRAND terms provided that SEP and FRAND licensing terms are relevant to the expectation of technological improvement and cumulative innovation which patent law always cherishes. And we are also concerned about how to define SEP and FRAND under patent law.

Secondly, if the answer for the above-said question is affirmative, what effects that the failure to comply with such the implicit obligation would put upon the exercise of exclusive rights owned by the patentee of SEP? As the observation over the development of U.S., European countries, Japan and Korea, it seems that the patentee would be deprived of the right to apply for the permanent injunction under patent law owing to the failure to offer the FRAND licensing. In addition, when the third parties infringed upon SEP but they were not provided any opportunity for negotiation about FRAND licensing terms, this fact led to a retrained calculation of damages for patent remedy that would be subject to reasonable royalties under the FRAND terms.

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Finally, if the FRAND Licensing serves a precondition for the SEP patentees to ask for a complete remedy against the infringer, what authority we would rely upon to carry out the thought. One possible approach is to take advantage of third-party benefits under contract law. Competition law is also a feasible approach to limit the non-proportionate exercise of exclusive rights enjoyed by the SEP patentee. However, due to some deficiencies in implementing contract law or competition law on this issue, this article proposes the thought of co-ownership to reconcile the conflicting interests between what the SEP patentee enjoys under patent law and what the public obtains from the FRAND licensing. Simultaneously, it is expected to settle the long-term controversies of patent hold-up and royalty-stacking through the proposed model of co-ownership. Also, royalty calculation under the model of co-ownership for FRAND licensing is another focus of the article.

II. The Distortion of Patent Remedies—The Risks of Hold-Up and Royalty-Stacking

A. Damages and Injunctive Relief under Patent Law

The remedies under patent law are established to cure or avoid the disadvantageous economic status of the patentee caused by patent infringement. Generally speaking, both damages and permanent injunction are inherent and popular within patent remedies in the various jurisdictions. The former functions to return the patentee to the economic status where the patent infringement would not have happened in the market. It is certain that damages usually are not a perfect tool to cure patent infringement because sufficiency of evidence has much influence over calculation of damages under patent law. As to permanent injunction, meaning the right to prevent the current patent infringement or the risk of patent infringement in the legal system of continent, its legislative purpose is to keep the accused products or processes out of the market to secure the patentee's economic interests from interference of patent infringement, either by driving the accused products or processes out of market, or by preempting them in the market. Compared with damages as a liability basis that provide the accused products or processes with an chance to enter the market but seek the objective price to recover the economic losses caused by patent infringement, permanent injunction serves as a property basis to comply with the subjective will of the patentee in the marketing scheme to exclude completely any possibility of marketing of accused products or processes.1

1_{See Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 C}

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Although the remedies of damages and permanent injunction are nominally admitted or stipulated under international or domestic patent law, the enforcement of patent rights through them would be still subject to the scrutiny of patent law's legislative gist, rather than is as an necessary outcome of patent infringement. The ultimate purpose of patent law is not to favor any specific inventor by granting the exclusive rights to merely save its incentive on future research and development. Instead, patent law works to create the room for potential inventors' improvement and cumulated innovation over current inventions to promote industrial development.2 In other words, without too much negative impact upon normal exploitation of the patentee on its patent, patent law would tolerate the release of part monopoly protected by the exclusive rights to lead to sufficient technological competition for the purpose of improvement and cumulative innovation.3 As a result, patent law doesn't only favor the patentee, but also any potential inventors in the same or analogous field of technology. The gist of patent law may be reflected in the determination of requirements of subject matter and patentability. Relatively, when a patent was granted, the exercise of exclusive rights, including patent licensing and assertion of patent infringement, also should be checked by such the gist. If the exercise of exclusive rights will impede the technological improvement and cumulated innovation of claimed inventions, and the benefits such exercise brought about cannot compensate the costs borne in the technological improvement and cumulated innovation, it is justified under patent law to establish the exceptions and limitations of patent rights.

As above-mentioned determination of patentability and exercise of exclusive rights, the remedies of patent infringement never go beyond the governance of patent law's gist promoting technological improvement and cumulative innovation. Under a optimal status, the value that patent remedies produce under patent law results from the patent's surpassing contribution over prior art and the patentee's due diligent on practicing the patent.4 Patent remedies are usually stipulated by patent law without an indication about their boundaries corresponding to the legislative purpose, but a mechanical practice on patent remedies would take risks in bringing about excessive compensation to the patentee or prohibited costs to the

2

See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75TEX.L.REV.989, 1068-72 (1996).

3_{See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 C}

OLUM.L.REV. 257, 282-84 (2007).

4

See Roger D. Blair and Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX.INTELL.PROP.L.J. 1, 77 (2001); Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &HIGH TECH.L.J. 725, 742-44 (2011).

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potential competitive inventors. An permanent injunction may be admitted to block the accused products from entering the market, but such the products were made with reference to the combination of the patent and other extra technological contributions that is economically indivisible. Under this situation, if the patentee has no plan to practice its patent as a way the accused products were made, the above-mentioned injunction would unquestionably prevent the competitors from adopting new ideas to improve the use of the patent in the market.5 And the new ideas have no chance to be efficiently implemented merely because of the patentee's idle attitude on the practice of the patent. As a consequence, the benefits from the permanent injunction to excluding from the accused products are not conducive to the technological improvement and cumulative innovation of the patent. The remedy of permanent injunction here is thought of as excessive and unnecessary compensation to the patentee. The result of remedy is a deadweight loss to the society. The remedy of patent damages also shares the same miserable suffering if the patentee could have the damages beyond the contribution of the patent and the extended coverage of technologies is not within its marketing plan.

It is certain that insufficient remedies available are also against the gist of patent law. In the situation where the necessary permanent injunction is denied, or the damages are not adequately calculated, not only would the incentive of the patentee on further innovation be harmed, but the free-load reality is also easy to distract the potential inventors from the dedication of technological improvement and cumulative innovation.6

B. Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking

According to the development of patent law in various jurisdictions, the issues of "hold-up" and "royalty stacking" on patent remedies have been watched carefully in both judicial practice and academic debate. "hold-up" and "royalty stacking" are usually seen as main forces driving patent remedies out of reasonable governance of patent law.7 Traditionally, it is argued that the absolute grant of permanent injunction would endow the patentee with stakes to coerce the infringer to accept an unfair settlement under which the excessive compensation is not based upon free bargain but subject to prohibited transaction costs the infringer could bear

5_{See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 T}

EX.L.REV.1991, 2036 (2007).

6

See Damien Geradin, Reverse Hold-Ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced by Innovators in Standardized Areas (November 12, 2010). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711744

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if the permanent injunction were enforced in the market. The result of hold-up from such a permanent injunction possibly is either that the infringer accepts the settlement under hold-up to overcompensate the patentee or that the accused products are kept out the market forever. Fortunately, in 2006, U.S. Supreme Court case eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC. established a milestone on consideration in the grant of permanent injunction, implicitly showing an example in international patent law to assuage the rigid effects of hold-up resulting from the arbitrary assertion of exclusive rights.8 Although the court admitted that non-practice entities (hereinafter NPE s) are excluded from applying for a permanent injunction when patent infringement occurs, the four-factor test should be considered equitably to determine if such the injunction would be granted or not. When a patentee has no corresponding patented products or related licensing to the accused products, the motion for the permanent injunction against accused products might be questioned, on the one side. On the other side, the eBay case actually creates a legal room for the competitors of the patentee to develop further improvement or innovation on the technologies protected by the patent notwithstanding that the damages are still unavoidable. It may be observed that when the equitable consideration in place of the absolute brief on the determination of an injunctive relief, the risk of hold-up on patent infringement will be reduced accordingly. The patentee is losing the unfair advantages on the grant of the permanent injunction during the settlement of patent infringement. To some extent, the royalties under the settlement may be protected from taking the factor of hold-up caused by the injunction relief into calculation to become excessive and distorted.

The problem of royalty stacking often happens in the high technology industries. It is possibly attributable to the internal integration of research and business resources conducted by one entity. In terms of vertical integration, such the entity has patents covering the technologies from the up-stream research tools to the down-stream product manufacture and technical process. Also, under horizontal integration, patents are granted to dominate the product or process, as well as related ingredients, components, the combination, the compound or the derivative. As a consequence, if patent infringement occurs, the manufacture of the accused products or the practice of the accused process may involve the implementation of more than a patent.9 On calculating damages, it is disputed whether damages would be reflected in all related patents collateral to the above-mentioned accused product or process, as a basis of accumulation. Or we should distinguish the

8_{eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).} 9_{Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1993.}

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contribution of each patent to the patented product or process to ensure that the damages could represent a fair compensation to unauthorized manufacture of the accused product or practice of accused process, under the precondition of no overlapping value exists in the relate patents.10 That is one form of royalty stacking rarely mentioned in the academic discussion and judicial decision. The overlapping contribution of all the patents relate to the patented product or process is evitable to lead to excessive damages not expected by patent law.

Comparatively, another form of royal stacking is more popular than mentioned above, and has been drawing much concern in the various jurisdictions of patent law. We usually consider such the phenomenon of royalty stacking correlated to "patent thickets".11 Under this situation, no one is capable of dominating all technologies involved in the manufacture of a product or practice of a process, but the contributions to the components or steps contained in the above-mentioned product or process are separately made by more than a party. As soon as such contributions are protected by patents, anyone can't be free from the actions of patentees on the manufacture of the patented product or the practice of the patented process, without the authorization of all patentees. Besides the transaction cost for licensing is high due to lack of integration of scattered technologies and difficulty in recognizing all patentees, how to apportion damages over each patentee according to its technological contribution to the whole patented product or process admitted by patent law is a controversial issue. However, it seems that nether the legislation of patent law nor the development of related judicial decisions definitely has instructed us a feasible approach to deal with the issue of damages apportionment. Although the rule of entire market value has been recognized or accepted under patent law, its application is receiving restrict scrutiny to avoid excessive compensation to a specific patent among the contributions to the patented product or process. For example, the test of custom demand serves a mainstream thought to decide whether the rule of entire market value would be launched. In 2009, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

case Lucent Techs, Inc. v. Gateway held that the base of royalty calculating for

damages should not established to be subject to a computer as a unit.12 Even the arbitrary calculation of damages through the entire market value rule has been watched by judicial practice, it may be argued that the test of custom demand can be

10_{Id. at 2011; Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex,}

Multi-Patent Products, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &HIGH TECH.L.J. 763 (2011).

11

Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2010; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA.L.REV. 1575, 1614-15 (2003).

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merely considered a defense against the entire market value but never extend to resolution on disputes of damages apportionment. The risk of excessive compensation brought by royalty stacking is still exposed to the cases of patent infringement.

II. Limited Remedies of Essential Patents at Lever of FRAND Licensing

A. Formation of the Technical Standard Embedding Essential Patents

As technologies' evolution tends to be complicated and diversified, it is impossible for a single inventor to conceive complete thoughts to manufacture technological products or handle technological processes. Many fragmentary technological contributions often converges on a process to form a specific technical standard for leading to efficient and effective operations and functions. Such the phenomenon may be well shown in information industries, especially on telecommunication technologies. In order to support wireless mobile internet access under a ultra-broadband basis, the fourth generation of mobile communication technologies attempts to take advantage of a method encoding digital data, named by orthogonal frequency division multiple access, to break through the application of the third generation's technologies and to approach along with the development of cloud computing environment. The 4G technologies are expected to function to make available the telecommunication capacity of from 100 megabits to 1 gigabit per second. As the formation of technical standards under the 3G technologies, the 4G technologies' technical standards are getting clearer under the technological competition among participants' proposals set forth in the standard development organizations.13

As a matter of fact, the technical standards are positive to efficient establishment of the core process functioning as a technological benchmark, compared with existed technologies. Based on participants' consensus in the standard development organization, the technical standards are made according to discussion and decision over the various technical proposals raised. As soon as the technical standards are finalized, future innovation, regardless of focusing upon their application to down-stream manufacture of technological products or up-stream improvement for a more advanced technical standard, always follow the agreed model presented by the aforesaid standards, at least, among the participants of the

13_{See Eric Stasik, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies for Essential Patents on LTE(4G)}

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SSO. The overlapping research and development costs on the substantially same technical standards would be reduced to an anticipated extent where the technical standards set up in the SSO has bound the participants' capital investment on the future standard application. Moreover, theoretically, the establishment of technical standards in the SSO also makes a more definite subject for management of the technological contributions embedded in the standards. The implementers of the technical standards outside of the SSO won't spend too much unreasonable transaction cost to check the availability of technologies practiced in the standards. However, the organization of technological contributions to form a technical standard doesn't mean that patents corresponding to aforesaid contributions are sure to go the same track. Usually, the SSO, the collection of technical experts, is not responsible for any negotiation and decision about assembly of related patent portfolios, and the management of related patents, and never attempts to promote the model of patent-pool for access of participants to the technologies supported by the technical standard. Merely through the disclosure of participants about the patents protecting any technological contribution made to a specific technical standard, the essential patents about the technical standard are admitted by the SSO.14 Due to lack of a patent policy to aggregate all essential patents for licensing , and to divide each patent value among essential patents, the incentive of applying for essential patents held by participants seems to secure their economic monopoly about the technological contributions to the technical standard, as it is reflected in the cases of other patent applications other than essential patents mentioned here.

B. Implementation of the Technical Standard and Hold-up Risk

Since the patents fixed in the technical standard are not evaluated according to their respective contributions, the patents disclosed by the participants at the SSO seem to be considered essential patents. It is difficult to understand that the patents actually bind the technical standard but are not essential patents for such the standard. Those essential patents substantially produces the effect of "patent thickets" when any implementer would like to work on the technical standard to manufacture the applied product or make technological improvement. The effect of patent thickets means that were if for sufficient patent licensing from all the

14

See Jonas Hein, The Recent DOJ and FTC policy Suggestions for Standard Setting Organization—The Way out of Standard Essential Patent Hold-up?, 2 N.Y.U. J.INTELL.PROP.&ENT.L.339, 351-52 (2013) (the author argued that the pure disclosure policy can't completely resolve the problem of patent hold-up.)