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表3 統計概況

樣本數 平均值 標準差 最小值 最大值

帳面有效稅率 8168 0.1625 0.1186 0.0000 0.9992 現金有效稅率 8168 0.1314 0.1417 0.0000 0.9933 永久性財稅差異 8168 0.0463 0.0622 -0.0607 0.3077 裁量財稅差異 8168 0.0281 0.0641 -0.1254 0.2722 自願揭露CSR 報告書 8168 0.0288 0.1672 0.0000 1.0000 商業策略 8168 17.6254 3.7631 7.0000 30.0000

穩健者 8168 0.0810 0.2729 0.0000 1.0000

先驅者 8168 0.0671 0.2502 0.0000 1.0000

資產報酬率 8168 0.1164 0.0929 0.0037 0.4873 長期負債比率 8168 0.0709 0.0992 0.0000 0.4406 境外營運所得 8168 5.6866 6.0332 0.0000 16.4617

無形資產 8168 0.0049 0.0127 0.0000 0.0866

企業規模 8168 15.0908 1.2893 12.8706 19.4158 存貨密集度 8168 0.1526 0.1738 0.0000 0.9902 裁量性財稅差異絕對值 8168 0.0727 0.0777 0.0011 0.4323 法人持股比率 8168 36.8648 22.3386 1.0584 90.9248 權益所得 8168 0.0182 0.0403 -0.0506 0.1991

市帳比 8168 1.8055 1.1710 0.4200 7.0506

研發密集度 8168 0.0265 0.0366 0.0000 0.1923 資本密集度 8168 0.2337 0.1910 0.0013 0.8404 營業虧損虛擬變數 8168 0.1169 0.3213 0.0000 1.0000 註:帳面有效稅率(book ETR)為總所得稅費用除繼續營運部門稅前純益;現金有效稅率(cash

ETR)為年度支付稅額除繼續營運部門稅前純益;永久性財稅差異 (PermBTD) 係衡量永久性 的財務所得與課稅所的差異 (Manzon and Plesko 2002),亦即總財稅差異減暫時性財稅差 異。Frank et al. (2009) 指出暫時性財稅差異通常是管理階層操縱應計項目的結果,永久性財 稅差異才能反映真實的避稅行為。總財稅差異定義為繼續營業部門稅前純益與課稅所得差異 除以期初總資產。其中,課稅所得為所得稅費用除以當年法定稅率估計;其次,裁量財稅差 異 (discretionary BTD) 係調整總財稅差異中屬於盈餘管理的部份。Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 係以總財稅差異對總應計數迴歸,以總財稅差異中無法被總應計數解釋的部份,亦 即以迴歸之殘差項衡量企業的避稅活動。自願揭露CSR 報告書(CSR)企業 i 在 t 年度自願揭 露CSR 報告書時 CSR 為 1,否則 CSR 為 0;先驅者(PROSPECTOR)企業被分類為先驅者(商 業策略為24-30)為 1,否則為 0;穩健者(DEFENDER) 企業被分類為穩健者(商業策略為 6-12)為 1,否則為 0;商業策略(STRATEGY)Miles and Snow (1978, 2003)建立。採用研究與發 展費用對銷貨比、員工數對銷貨比、歷史成長(採用年度總收益變動百分比衡量)、銷管費用 對銷貨比率、員工數波動 (採用總員工數標準差衡量)及資本密集度(財產、廠房與設備淨額 除總資產),分年度-產業排序後加總後計得;資產報酬率(ROA)為企業的稅前所得除期初總 資產;長期負債比率(LEV)為企業的長期債務除以期初總資產;境外營運所得(FI)為境外所 得除以期初總資產;無形資產(INTAN)為無形資產除以期初總資產;企業規模(SIZE)為總資 產取自然對數;資本密集度(CINT)為固定資產淨額除以期初總資產;存貨密集度(INVINT) 為存貨除以期初總資產;研發密集度(RDINT)為研究發展費用除以銷貨淨額;裁量應計數 (ABS_DA)為裁量應計數取絕對值,裁量應計數採用修正 Jones 模型計算;法人持股比率(IO) 為公司流通在外股票被法人機構持有的百分比;權益所得(QUINC)為權益所得除以期初總資 產;市帳比(MKTBK)為年度權益市值除以權益帳面值;營業虧損虛擬變數(D_NOL)有營業 虧損後抵餘額時D_NOL 設為 1,否則設為 0。

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表4 相關係數

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R

自願揭露CSR 報告書 A 1

穩健者 B -0.0350* 1

先驅者 C -0.0344* -0.0796* 1

自願揭露CSR 報告書

*穩健者 D 0.1575* 0.0913* -0.0073 1

自願揭露CSR 報告書

*先驅者 E 0.1286* -0.0066 0.0825* -0.0006 1

資產報酬率 F -0.0001 -0.0893* 0.0654* 0.0136 0.0122 1

長期負債比率 G 0.0247* -0.0252* 0.0150 -0.0158 -0.0085 -0.1500* 1

境外營運所得 H 0.1163* -0.0699* -0.0182 -0.0247* -0.0109 0.1426* 0.0951* 1 無形資產 I 0.0571* -0.0452* 0.0657* 0.0098 0.0094 0.0199* 0.0030 0.0097 1 企業規模 J 0.2127* -0.0364* -0.0701* 0.0211* 0.0168 -0.0678* 0.2283* 0.3227* 0.0017 1 存貨密集度 K -0.0751* 0.0197* 0.0104 -0.0029 -0.0154 0.0264* 0.0282* -0.1955* -0.0758* -0.0359* 1 裁量性財稅差異絕對值 L -0.0446* 0.0135 0.0377* -0.0048 0.0118 0.1952* -0.0212* -0.0150 -0.0494* -0.0764* 0.1373* 1 法人持股比率 M 0.1650* 0.0147 0.0090 0.0332* -0.0019 0.1524* 0.0231* 0.0986* -0.0159 0.3548* -0.0772* 0.0269* 1 權益所得 N 0.0643* -0.0368* -0.0160 -0.0067 0.0080 0.2456* 0.0612* 0.7048* -0.0165 0.2064* -0.2209* 0.0154 0.1003* 1 市帳比 O 0.0358* -0.0913* 0.0868* 0.0073 0.0030 0.6766* -0.0621* 0.0653* 0.0598* -0.0500* 0.0230* 0.1612* 0.1942* 0.1170* 1 研發密集度 P -0.0056 -0.2046* 0.1761* -0.0174 0.0168 0.2530* -0.1416* 0.0068 0.1239* -0.2267* 0.0224* 0.0334* -0.1030* -0.1160* 0.2938* 1 資本密集度 Q -0.0189* 0.0518* -0.0213* 0.0164 -0.0047 -0.0684* 0.2965* -0.2165* 0.0782* -0.0515* -0.0010 -0.1459* -0.0033 -0.1737* -0.0529* -0.0679* 1 營業虧損虛擬變數 R -0.0307* -0.0061 0.0227* -0.0099 0.0092 -0.1736* 0.0712* -0.0354* -0.0587* 0.0180 -0.0085 0.0127 0.0150 -0.0387* -0.0933* -0.0393* 0.0086 1 註:* 表示 P 值 < 0.1。

其中,自願揭露CSR 報告書(CSR)企業 i 在 t 年度自願揭露 CSR 報告書時 CSR 為 1,否則 CSR 為 0;先驅者(PROSPECTOR)企業被分類為先驅者(商業策略為 24-30)為 1,否則為 0;

穩健者(DEFENDER) 企業被分類為穩健者(商業策略為 6-12)為 1,否則為 0;商業策略(STRATEGY)由 Miles and Snow (1978, 2003)建立。以研究與發展費用對銷貨比、員工數 對銷貨比、年度總收益變動百分比衡量、銷管費用對銷貨比率、總員工數標準差及財產、廠房與設備淨額除總資產,分年度-產業排序後加總後計得;資產報酬率(ROA)為企業 的稅前所得除期初總資產;長期負債比率(LEV)為企業的長期債務除以期初總資產;境外營運所得(FI)為境外所得除以期初總資產;無形資產(INTAN)為無形資產除以期初總資產;

企業規模(SIZE)為總資產取自然對數;資本密集度(CINT)為固定資產淨額除以期初總資產;存貨密集度(INVINT)為存貨除以期初總資產;研發密集度(RDINT)為研究發展費用 除以銷貨淨額;裁量應計數(ABS_DA)為裁量應計數取絕對值,裁量應計數採用修正 Jones 模型計算;法人持股比率(IO)為公司流通在外股票被法人機構持有的百分比;權益所得 (QUINC)為權益所得除以期初總資產;市帳比(MKTBK)為年度權益市值除以權益帳面值;營業虧損虛擬變數(D_NOL)有營業虧損後抵餘額時 D_NOL 設為 1,否則設為 0。

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刮號()內為標準誤。且標準誤以公司設定 cluster。採用樣本有 8168 個觀察值,在 2002-2013 年 度。

其中,帳面有效稅率(book ETR)為總所得稅費用除繼續營運部門稅前純益;現金有效稅率(cash ETR)為年度支付稅額除繼續營運部門稅前純益;永久性財稅差異 (PermBTD) 係衡量永久性的 財務所得與課稅所的差異 (Manzon and Plesko 2002),亦即總財稅差異減暫時性財稅差異。Frank et al. (2009) 指出暫時性財稅差異通常是管理階層操縱應計項目的結果,永久性財稅差異才能反 映真實的避稅行為。總財稅差異定義為繼續營業部門稅前純益與課稅所得差異除以期初總資 產。其中,課稅所得為所得稅費用除以當年法定稅率估計;其次,裁量財稅差異 (discretionary BTD) 係調整總財稅差異中屬於盈餘管理的部份。Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 係以總財稅差異 對總應計數迴歸,以總財稅差異中無法被總應計數解釋的部份,亦即以迴歸之殘差項衡量企業 的避稅活動。自願揭露CSR 報告書(CSR)企業 i 在 t 年度自願揭露 CSR 報告書時 CSR 為 1,否 則CSR 為 0;先驅者(PROSPECTOR)企業被分類為先驅者(商業策略為 24-30)為 1,否則為 0;穩 健者(DEFENDER) 企業被分類為穩健者(商業策略為 6-12)為 1,否則為 0;商業策略

(STRATEGY)Miles and Snow (1978, 2003)建立。採用研究與發展費用對銷貨比、員工數對銷貨 比、歷史成長(採用年度總收益變動百分比衡量)、銷管費用對銷貨比率、員工數波動 (採用總員 工數標準差衡量)及資本密集度(財產、廠房與設備淨額除總資產),分年度-產業排序後加總後計 得;資產報酬率(ROA)為企業的稅前所得除期初總資產;長期負債比率(LEV)為企業的長期債務 除以期初總資產;境外營運所得(FI)為境外所得除以期初總資產;無形資產(INTAN)為無形資產 除以期初總資產;企業規模(SIZE)為總資產取自然對數;資本密集度(CINT)為固定資產淨額除以 期初總資產;存貨密集度(INVINT)為存貨除以期初總資產;研發密集度(RDINT)為研究發展費用 除以銷貨淨額;裁量應計數(ABS_DA)為裁量應計數取絕對值,裁量應計數採用修正 Jones 模型 計算;法人持股比率(IO)為公司流通在外股票被法人機構持有的百分比;權益所得(QUINC)為權 益所得除以期初總資產;市帳比(MKTBK)為年度權益市值除以權益帳面值;營業虧損虛擬變數 (D_NOL)有營業虧損後抵餘額時 D_NOL 設為 1,否則設為 0。

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