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consequence of the inculcation of virtues,viz. the particularity and individuality of character,is overlooked,and this is well illustrated by Kupperrnan(1991: 9-10):
Character has much to do, we might say, with the particularity of a person's life, with making it the possibly distinctive life of this person.
This suggests a more continuous and less impersonal role for character than that of, s呵， the virtue of being honest. What matters in the virtue of honesty will be pretty much shared by all honest people, and its importance will be largely limited to those special moments when we are offered a chance to be dishonest. What matters in your character may well be important, continuously, as shaping your life and the way you experience it,and it also will set you apart from at least some other people of good character.
Thus characterised, character education presents itself as if moral agents,by being educated, would ultimately tum into virtuous people of the same kind, i.e.
perfectly virtuous people. Thus,the individuality of (moral) character as anecessa可
result of this educational business is unduly brushed off in the existing simple-minded discourse about fully inculcating all the virtues indiscriminately in people.
Character education thus portrayed is very likely to convey a misleading, or rather mistaken message to the effect that the ideal moral character is singular,and one and the same for all,and that,through education, all people are expected and presumed to be able to develop and possess all virtues equally and fully at long last.To debunk the unreality ofthis view,I shall argue that,it is imperative for character education to fully take into account a more personal dimension of character development and certain decisive factors which are unavoidably involved in the educational process,
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(當代教育研究〉季刊第三十卷第三期 相同~京~l r:r.r.l l:悶悶恥叫儡露露:“and consequently, conducive to the individualisation of (moral) character. These include the influence of temperament, the assuming of different social roles and occupations,and the pursuit of different good lives,to name some. After taking full account of this issue, I submit, we are ready to accept Flanagan's notion of the varieties of moral personality,and this raises a further question about how to set an appropriate and defensible goal of character education for real people.
On balance, addressing this more personal aspect of character development helps to highlight both the individual's active role and the limits of one's agency in constructing character. In terms of the former, this theme may act as a healthy antidote to the predominant instrumental argument for character education- by shedding light on the significance of character building for personal flourishing. As to the latter,highlighting the inevitable influence that temperament may exert on the inculcation of virtues acts as an important counter-weight to an exaggerated claim on
C)I have argued elsewhere that the relevant literature on character education is permeated by a means-end argument,according to which,contemporary character education is proposed to be a remedy against perceived social ills and moral decline(Arthur,2005; Lockwood, 1997; McLaughlin & Halstead, 1999; Molnar, 1997; Rusn此， 1998). Put different旬， a healthy dose of character education is seen to be a panacea to prevent the young from causing disturbing problems (Rusnak, 1998). This instrumental argument is at risk of misconceiving character education as being nothing more than an effective means of reducing social problems. More seriously,its仕esses the social benefits which are likely to be generated by character education at the cost of articulating its intrinsic value,i.e. the significance of character development for the individual. If it is fair to say that character education is worthwhile,not only in its own right,but also for the many desirable results it may produce (Pritchard, 1988), evidently enough, the existing discourse is one-dimensional and not sufficiently profound,since the intrinsic value of character education is inappropriately downplayed,or even entirely ignored. For thatrna仕er，a sound argument which maintains an appropriate balance between instrumental value versus intrinsic value, and social benefits versus personal flourishing,is badly needed.
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behalf of deliberate self-making with regard to character(Jacob, 200 I). This is the case because it is shown that our inherited temperaments unavoidably set limits to our disposition toward certain virtues,and away from others. For example, in the cases of fortune's favourites,their temperamental dispositions endow them with a salutary breeding ground for certain virtues,the cultivation of which thereby appears less difficult,or relatively easy.· Also,since people are simply passive recipients of the blessing or misfortune of their temperament,we cannot be held responsible for having, or lacking, certain temperamental dispositions, nor can we be accountable for the way in which temperament figures in the inculcation of virtues, and thus contributes to the individualisation of character. Briefly,this educational business in question is not wholly within one's control.
Further, the thesis of the individualisation of character encourages people to consider the development of character as a whole, and to think about the proper place of each virtue,and the relative importance and priority of the various virtues in one's life. On that score,it helps to remedy a defect made clear by Davidson (2005:
226):
I would suggest that character education has broken character down into its composite elements, but has failed to present an adequate vision of character in its wholeness--especially forpre闡adolescents and adolescents who require a deeper rationale of what it is and why it's important.
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Aristotle touched on this idea briefly in his concept of“natural virtue." It is well known that natural virtue is notAristotle's major concern,since natural dispositions are simply an inclination to act in certain ways,and without the guidance of reason,they are liable to lead people astray and are,therefore,harmful.Briefly,natural virtue without reason is like a strong body which may stumble badly without sight(Aristotle,1998)152 (當代教育研究〉季刊第二十卷第三期 各黨主義
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In summa句， I begin with NECE, which is generally understood to be the inculcation ofvirtues. Itis argued that,firstly,to distance it from the
“
bag of virtues"approach, it is imperative to elaborate on the nature of virtue, and illustrate the relationship among the virtues. Secondly,in order to forestall the misconception that virtuous people must be of the same sort,the missing piece of the individualisation of character as a necessa可 corollary of the inculcation of virtues must be brought into the present puzzle of character education.