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spect to human rights while still having low expectation of the impact of such condi-tionality on democracy and human rights in their country. What this information somehow indicates is that respondents do not have enough faith in the transparency of their leaders and since there are no sufficient mechanisms for accountability, condi-tional aid remains one undesirable option to ensure accountability. As such, most view these conditionalities as accountability mechanisms instead of effective democracy consolidation and human rights promotion tools. This keeps resonating in their re-sponse to why recipient countries should prefer either of the two. While some think aid without conditions might not be transparent, others expressed concerns of the bad records of accomplishment of developing countries concerning the utilizations of aid fund. The table on the appendix I page 102 /give a detail of the responses.
5.4 A COMPARISON OF THE GAMBIA AND BENIN
Successful cases of democracy promotion in Africa are very few if any. Most of the
often-referenced successful cases in Africa are in real sense only superficially demo-cratic with only the basic tenets of democracy. Most will fit the label of Dahl’s
anoc-racy -description of states that have incoherent autocratic-democratic mix (Dahl, 1982).
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Many efforts have been focused on building democracy and respect of human rights
in Africa by the western liberal countries and international organisations, unfortu-nately such efforts’ dividend are minimal. While some of the aid recipients made
some gainful improvement, some like Mali has skewed to the dismay of many ob-servers. Benin, however remains among the very few where international aid particu-larly European Union aid has favourably helped consolidate democracy and adher-ences to human rights.
Thus, it presents a better contrast to the role of foreign aid in the promotion of de-mocracy and human rights. This provides an insight of why aid to some extent suc-cessfully consolidates democracy in Benin and yet seems to abysmally fall short in The Gambia. Development aid according to Resnick (2011) provides much support to democracy through the exercise of leverages that attach political conditionalities on aid. This is further enhanced by the country’s dependence on aid, increased aid coor-dination and the growing domestic dissatisfaction. This development aid leverage greatly impacted on the consolidation of democracy that subsequently influenced hu-man rights improvement in Benin.
Benin like The Gambia receives huge aid from the European Union. Since her break away from communist Russia’s camp, Benin has remained highly dependent on
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France’s support. Nonetheless, Benin and The Gambia have different historical paths.
Apart from being colonised by distinct colonial powers (France and Great Britain re-spectively), both countries became independent without much struggle for liberations.
However while The Gambia for thirty years since independence was ruled by mul-ti-party democracy at least by name, Benin on the other hand experienced its first mil-itary coup just three years after independence and had since been embroiled in coups and countercoups until 1972 when Kerekou took over and was able to stabilize the country under a single-party military dictatorship.
Interestingly, events have turned over and the two countries according to data on de-mocracy and human rights have changed positions. While Benin has matured or con-solidated its democracy since 1998, The Gambia on the other hand shrunk its long democratic history and in 1994 experienced the first successful military coup. Unlike Benin, The Gambia did not have a number of military rulers, nonetheless after two year of transition to democracy and now two decades into its second republic, the country’s democratic and human rights records still remain way off the early inde-pendence gains. A closer study of the data below in figure 4 shows the change of events in the two countries. While Benin emerged democratic after a long period of autocracy, The Gambia’s past experience of democracy has little impact in the
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solidation of democracy after a brief relapse into military rule. Figure 5.1 below shows a stark comparison of the shift in the trend of authority between the two coun-tries since their respective independence to date.
Figure 5.1: a comparison of Benin and The Gambia trend of authority since independence
Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
Stark comparison of the Polity data of the two countries indicates an interesting con-trast of events in the two countries. Did aid contribute to the consolidation of democ-racy in Benin and not in The Gambia, are there other factors such as perception and the presence or absence of other sources of fundings.
The wave for democratization in Benin began in 1989 after seventeen years of mili-tary dictatorship. After a long period of Marxist-Leninist dictatorship under one-party led by General Kerekou, the collapsed of Soviet Union; Benin’s major sponsor, worsened economic conditions that ultimately triggered series of demonstration by
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students and public workers (Gazibo, 2012). Demand for democracy by the public and France’s aid suspension pressured General Kerekou to abolished Marxist-Leninism, legalized political parties and called for national conference to discuss the path to democratization. The conference delegates consisting of professors, civil servants,
political parties’ leaders, women groups, human rights organisations, religious groups and the army drafted a constitution against Kerekou’s wish and organized elections in
1991.
The role foreign aid played prior to this event apart from the collapsed of the Soviet Union and France’s aid suspension was minimal. However, the absence of a major source of income particularly from two key donors is the causality of the defiance and
subsequent change of government policy in 1989. Donors’ support came at the begin-ning of reforms and it is today credited for Benin’s democratic success (Gazibo, 2005).
According to Gazibo (2012), aid does not only help the new regime gain social peace, avoid instability and prevent the rise of non-democratic elements such as popular up-rising or military coup but also help solidified the internal cohesion of Benin’s politi-cal and civil society and their confidence in the democratic process.
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A survey by Afrobarometer conducted in 200820 that polled over 1,200 people found out that 81% of Beninese respondents prefer democracy than another form of gov-ernment and 79% of the respondents agree that political leaders should be elected through regular, open and honest elections. On freedom of opinion, about 83% agree that people should be able to express their opinion about politics free of government influence no matter how unpopular her views maybe. This survey reflects that Beni-nese have a strong belief in democratic values and the importance of political freedom such as freedom of opinion.
European Union is the major multilateral donor to Benin. Like The Gambia, Benin is signatory to the earlier Lomè Convention and later on the Cotonou Agreement. This
agreement signed in Beninese capital Cotonou is the current framework of EU – Benin’s relations.
European Union aid flow to the Benin follows the EU-ACP agreements. Benin as ACP member signed. Cotonou Agreement as the framework of EU Benin relations that obliged Benin to adhere to democratic principles and respect human rights in re-turns for continuous EU aid and cooperation. Funding of the European Union to Be-nin targets budgets supports focused on improved governance, enhanced local
20 Afrobarometer publications are available on line at http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications.html.
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en-gaged in improving competiveness, furthering social cohesion, protecting the envi-ronment and boosting civil societies (EU country strategy paper for Benin, 2008-2013).Since 1991 democratic transition in Benin, EU has view Benin as a barometer for democracy promotion in Africa. As such it has devoted huge resources to strengthen democracy through the provision of substantial amount for budget support and other democratic institutions such as the National Electoral Commission (CENA), parlia-ment and the judiciary (Gabizo, 2012). This support according to Gabizo (2012) was crucial to avoiding Benin from sliding to undemocratic tendency.
Figure 1.2: comparison of EU aid received by Benin and The Gambia
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REF_TOTALOFFICIAL(Created by knoema.com)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
US Dollar, millions
UNAIDS - Gambia UNAIDS - Benin EU Institutions - Gambia EU Institutions - Benin
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EU spends much more in Benin as compared to The Gambia from the period of dem-ocratic transition to consolidation. This is not to say that EU aid was responsible for the democratization of Benin; however, the aid was instead crucial for the survival of democracy in Benin. Thus, EU aid to Benin was successful in strengthening democ-racy and respect of human rights because there was already a demand by the people from their government for democratization. Unlike The Gambia, thirty years of mul-ti-party democracy did not do much to change the economic and social welfare of people, therefore undemocratic change of government became welcomed by the peo-ple. The new government’s rapid transformation of the economic with the help of al-lies such as Taiwan and Kuwait in particular created a modest support for the regime.
Another important element that was present in Benin but absent in The Gambia was
the role civil societies played. From 1960-1972, Benin had the most vibrant civil so-cieties in Africa. During the military dictatorship in Benin, Kerekou’s government
was able to mobilize all civil societies into the structure of his one-party dictatorship.
These groups became the very spark for reforms in the government and subsequent demonstrations especially when the government was faced with economic huddles.
The Gambia on the other hand, never had vibrant civil groups and until today, local civil groups are not active in the political arena to check on government. In Benin also
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the constitutions drafted during the transition was drafted by cluster of delegates rep-resenting every interest group in Benin, thus a democratic constitution was set up based on the demand and aspirations of the people. The Gambia on the other hand had a nine-member commission selected by the junta to serve as constitutional review commission to draft the constitution that was submitted to the junta for approval be-fore final endorsement by the people through referendum (National Democratic Insti-tute Report on Gambia, 1995).
All the above elements that were present in Benin but absent in The Gambia coupled with huge EU support for Benin contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Be-nin. It can however be argued that EU aid to Benin is more because, Benin unlike The Gambia have laws abolishing the death penalty and there is tacit acceptance of homo-sexual rights. The Gambia unlike Benin did not have vibrant civil societies and EU aid to The Gambia apart from being suspended was minimal. This pushed The Gam-bia to find new alliance elsewhere and therefore ignored EU’s calls for democratiza-tion and respects of human rights.
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CHAPTER SIX