Chyungly LEE, Ph.D.
Institute of International Relations National Chengchi University
Since U.S. proclaimed her “back to Asia” in 2009, the Obama administration has engaged in regional institutions far more actively than the Bush administration. The establishment of the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting, the accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and then to the East Asia Summit (EAS), the involvements in ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), and the initiative of U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) have all suggested the increased strategic value of ASEAN and ASEAN-centered institutions in the U.S. "pivot" to Asia. Would this be a case of Ikenberry's theory of liberal hegemony?
Will the U.S. be able to use regional institutions to obtain the hegemonic legitimacy?
Would ASEAN-extended mechanisms be the best venues for the U.S. to deliver its willingness and capability to lead?
This paper will first analyze contents of key U.S. official documents, especially speeches given by high ranking officials in the Obama administration to shed light on the strategic value of regional multilateralism in Obama's Asia policy. The second section
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address issues in economic dimensions as alternatives to expand U.S. leverages over regional institutional building.
Regional Multilateralism in U.S. "Pivot" to Asia
Asia’s strategic imperative to the United States has been repeatedly addressed by the Obama administration. Numerous discussions have been taken place to define or interpret the term "pivot" (or "rebalancing") toward Asia. It seems fairly acceptable now that Obama's Asia strategy does not aim at either "countering" China’s increasing influence in the region or tend to trade off US strategic interests in other parts of the world (such as Middle East or Europe). The "pivot" indeed is a result of reassessing strategic investments as the United States can not afford not to engage Asia in sustaining its global leadership in the future.
One of Obama's sensible policy shifts from the Bush administration was U.S.
"return" to regional multilateralism to enhance US leverage over regional institutional building. The instrumental role of regional institutions in US rebalancing strategy toward Asia has been addressed in various official sources (including speeches delivered by high-ranking officials, fact sheets provided by governments, and statements issued after events).
Hillary Clinton made her first visit abroad as secretary of state to Asia. Her visit in Northeast Asia – to Japan, Korea, and China – represented continuity, but her trip to Indonesia signaled change. She became the first secretary of state to visit the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta. In her trip in July 2009, she also signed Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and resumed US participation in ASEAN Regional Forum after several years' absence from former secretary Rice. Clinton’s address before the visit in Asia Society indicated that US future would be closely tied to Asia.
Obama made his first major Asia policy address in Tokyo on November 14, 2009 and attended APEC informal leaders’ summit in Singapore. Both delivered a clear message that America is back! The basic lines of his speech are the centrality of the US alliance network, the need for a cooperative and constructive relationship with China, and the growing importance of ASEAN in general and multilateral cooperation in particular.
He also expressed support for Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions and recognized US disengagement in those institutions in the past. In Singapore, Obama met with leaders of 10 ASEAN members, including Burma. It was considered the first US-ASEAN summit.
Principles and priorities of America's back to regional multilateralism were specified in the Clinton's address on regional architecture in Asia at the East-West Center in Honolulu on January 12, 2010. Five guiding principles that the Obama administration would use in examining East Asian regional and America’s role in the process were
specified: 1) the US alliance relationships are the cornerstone of our regional involvement;
2) regional institutions and efforts should work to advance our clear and increasingly shared objective. In addition to the process, substance matters; 3) our institutions must be effective and be focused on delivering results. It is more important to have organizations that produce results, rather than simply producing new organizations; 4) we must seek to maintain and enhance flexibility in pursuing the results we seek. Where it makes sense, we will participate in informal arrangements targeted to specific challenges, and we will support sub-regional institutions that advance the shared interests of groups of neighbors.
Thus coalitions of the willing, trilateral dialogues are all valuable; 5) we need to decide, as Asia-Pacific nations, which will be the defining regional institutions. The goal was “to build an institutional architecture that maximizes our prospects for effective cooperation, builds trust, and reduces the friction of competition.”
The concept of "forward deployed diplomacy" was stressed Clinton's speech
"America's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific" in Honolulu on Oct. 28, 2010. It emphasizes
“one overarching set of goals to sustain and strengthen US leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and to improve security, heighten prosperity, and promote our values.” The US was practicing “forward deployed diplomacy” along three key tracks: shaping the future Asia-Pacific economic, understiring regional security, and supporting stronger democratic institutions and the spread of universal human values. Three main tools are:
alliance, emerging partnerships, and regional institutions. Important “mini-laterals”
included the Lower Mekong Initiative and the Pacific Island Forum.
The principles and priorities of US engagement in regional institutions were again well manifested in the aforementioned speeches and an article America's Pacific Century published in Foreign Policy in November 2011. While bilateral alliances remain as the cornerstone of US regional involvement, the United States is willing to work with Asian partners “to build an institutional architecture that maximizes our prospects for effective cooperation, builds trust, and reduces the friction of competition.” In sum, firstly, emphasizing regional multilateralism would not trade off US bilateral relationship with its treaty alliances; secondly, emerging partners, especially China, would also be important to the building of regional architecture; thirdly enhancing effective cooperation and result-based projects under existing organizations, rather than simply producing new regional mechanism, would be more appropriate.
In terms of the practice of “forward deployed diplomacy”, regional institutions,
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US rebalancing in his speeches at CSIS on November 2012 and at Asia Society on March 11, 2013. US high ranking officials continue to attend meetings in the region to reflect the forward deployed diplomacy in regional multilateralism.
In terms of regional security arrangements, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) are currently three most active intergovernmental mechanisms in the region. Although there are overlapping membership and designated agenda among these three mechanisms, they have distinctive organizational objectives and institutional dynamics.
Until recently ARF was the only multilateral security forum in Asia Pacific for Asian countries to exchange views on their common security concerns and initiate projects to prepare for collective responses to security challenges at the regional level. It was first launched in 1994 based on consensus reached from the 1993 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting. ASEAN members and its dialogue partners invited non-ASEAN members in wider geographical area to discuss security concerns. Different from the European model such as OSCE, the ARF approach to security is through diplomatic consultation without pre-agreed institutional commitments. The ARF Concept Paper, adopted in the second ARF meeting, however, specifies three stages of institutional evolution. Members started the first stage of confidence building through dialogues and meetings; and agreed to move toward the second stage of developing preventive diplomacy measures few years later. Nevertheless, the diplomatic approach with consensus decision-making rules impeded it from moving to the third stage: elaboration of approaches to conflicts.
ADMM Plus is an extension of ADMM which was also launched in recent. In the fourth ADMM in 2009, ASEAN ministers of defense agreed to invite ministers of Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the United States, and Russia to exchange views on the role of defense in regional security and explore possibilities of functional security cooperation. ADMM Plus was launched in 2010. The second one was held three years later in 2013. ADMM Plus does not aiming at forming military alliance, instead it is a venue of defense diplomacy with characteristics of ASEAN way. In the second ADMM Plus, ministers agree to meet every other year. So far, ADMM Plus conduct more non-traditional security drills than other regional mechanisms.
East Asia Summit (EAS), a comprehensive strategic national leaders’ forum established in 2005, strengthened its security agenda only after the United States joined in 2011. East Asia Summit was established in order to realize East Asia Community, an initiative from the East Asia Study Group under the ASEAN Plus Three process. The agreed membership requirements of EAS allowed ASEAN in the driver seat of institutional building. Only those ASEAN dialogue partners with substantial ties with ASEAN member states and sign TAC would be eligible to apply for EAS membership.
New Zealand, India and Australia were the first three to join. The United States and
Russia joined in 2011. Before U.S. involvements, EAS only explored very few political or security agenda. Nevertheless, because of the nature of Summit, consensus reached in EAS does have high strategic implications.
U.S. “Pivot” to ASEAN-Extended Mechanisms ASEAN Regional Forum
The most salient effect of US return to ARF was on tensions in the South China Sea. In Clinton’s remarks made, she pointed out that “the US, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” “Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims of land features.” ARF Ministers did not avoid talking about the issue, rather, stressing “the importance of maintaining peace and stability while reaffirming the continuing importance of the DOC as a milestone document between ASEAN member states and China, embodying their collective commitment to ensuring the peaceful resolution of disputes in the area. They also called for the “eventual conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.” Clinton proposed multilateral discussions under ASEAN auspices. But the idea did not appear in the US-ASEAN summit communiqué in Sep. 2010.
China responded with diplomatic condemnations and military drills. However, at the same time China was willing to resume Joint Working Group Meetings. In 2011 ARF, ASEAN and China agreed Guidelines for the Implementation of Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin echoed Clinton's remarks at the 2010 ARF and announced that ASEAN would convene multilateral talks on the South China Sea and seek China’s participation.
East Asia Summit
As an observer in the 2010 EAS in Hanoi, Clinton outlined five key principles that will guide US engagement with the EAS: 1) making an enduring commitment to this institution; 2) ASEAN should continue to play a central role as a fulcrum for the region’s emerging regional architecture; 3) EAS should pursue an active agenda that involves the
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Before the trip, Clinton spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC on Sept. 8. She highlighted that the US will be “encouraging its development into a foundational security and political institution for the region, capable of resolving disputes and preventing them before they occur.” The theme reoccurred in Clinton’s speech in Honolulu on October 28, 2010. Two core principles that the administration would take in its approach to the East Asia Summit were ASEAN’s central role, and US desire to see EAS emerge as a forum for substantive engagement on pressing strategic and political issues, including nuclear nonproliferation, maritime security and climate change.”
Before Obama’s first attended to EAS, a press briefing given by NSC Senior Director Danny Russell on November 9, 2011 stated that Obama hoped to transform the existing East Asia Summit into a venue where the leaders can not only discuss but provide guidance and leadership to other regional institutions. The US acknowledges that ASEAN is the core for institution building in Asia and sees the EAS as an ASEAN-based expansion for regional security. Obama’s participation in EAS underscored the Administration’s commitment to deepening engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and playing a leadership role in its emerging institutions. In addition to original EAS agenda, Obama called for broadening the dialogue to include strategic and security challenges.
Issues suggested by the U.S. include maritime security, nonproliferation, disaster responses and humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, what the U.S. stressed were not included in the five priority areas (energy and environment, finance, disaster management, education, and global health issues and pandemic diseases) for EAS cooperation listed in the 2011 EAS Chairman’s Statement.
The intent for the U.S. to transform EAS into a political and security institution was again shown in the White House Fact Sheet on East Asia Summit in 2011. It identified EAS as “the region’s premier forum for Asia-Pacific leaders to discuss pressing political and strategic issues,” and “maritime security as priority issue”. Obama took the opportunity to reiterate U.S. positions on the South China Sea. He reaffirmed US national interests in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and freedom of navigation. The fact sheet also notes that President Obama “encouraged the parties to make progress on biding code of conduct in the south China Sea to provide a framework to prevent conflict, manage incidents when they occur, and help resolve disputes. But the EAS Chairman’s Statement, while noting that the assembled leaders welcomed the regional efforts to enhance cooperation in promoting maritime cooperation in the region including sea anti-piracy, search and rescue at sea, marine environment, maritime security, maritime connectivity, freedom of navigation, fisheries and other areas of cooperation”, did not include any specific reference to the South China Sea or the DOC or COC.
ADMM Plus
The establishment of ADMM Plus reaffirmed ASEAN’s central role in any institutional initiative and stressed that any mechanism should abide by “ASEAN principles of respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of member states, consultation and consensus and moving at a pace comfortable to all parties. Five expert working groups were set up: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (co-chaired by Vietnam and China), maritime security (Malaysia and Australia), military medicine, counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping operations (co-chaired by the Philippines and New Zealand). An ASEAN Defense Senior Officials Meeting Plus was set up to monitor progress.
At the first ADMM Plus, although China sought to keep discussions of the South China Sea off the agenda, the conflict was mentioned by the US, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam and several other Southeast Asian states. However, the final statement made no mention of the disputes. Surin indeed echoed Clinton’s proposal at the 2010 ARF gathering announced ASEAN would convene multilateral talks on the South China Sea and see Chin’s participation. One of the effects of Clinton’s ARF remarks was that China and ASEAN resumed talks on the implementation of DOC signed in 2002. Beijing has abandoned its insistence that all SCS discussions be exclusively bilateral. This development has raised ASEAN’s regional security role. Focus was shifted to more non-traditional cooperation in the second ADMM Plus. The first humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and military medicine exercise was held in Brunei in June. An ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action was established.
US membership in ADMM Plus demonstrates ASEAN's desire to include the US formally in Asia’s newly developing security infrastructure. (Ernest Bower) The ADMM Plus agenda replicates the ARF’s focusing on nontraditional security concerns of humanitarian and disaster relief, maritime security broadly defined, counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. The one traditional security issue and ASEAN’s most contentious issue: the South China Sea, was omitted from the official agenda despite ministers raised the issue in their remarks. The ADMM Plus is not a military alliance nor is it designed to cope with traditional security issues such as bilateral conflicts or territorial disputes. But ADMM Plus adds an important dimension absent from the ARF, which is a gathering dominated by foreign ministers. (Barry Desker). The ADMM Plus could become the key institution in the region promoting practical cooperation among armed forces, including meetings of defense and intelligence chief.
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The first challenge came from China. China welcomes the U.S. to join EAS but it reserves the idea of focusing too much on strategic issues. Beijing prefers bilateral discussions of traditional security issues and has never been keen to see them discussed in a regional multilateral context. Functional cooperation, such as ASEAN connectivity, gives China more leverage over regional developments without creating image of being a threat to regional stability.
Sino-U.S. geostrategic competition in regional mechanisms, however, creates strategic dilemma for other regional members. A common solution to this dilemma is that On security issues, ASEAN member states welcome the involvement of the US to counter balance China; and that on economic issues, ASEAN member states can not neglect China. The situation is likely to be exacerbated if the Untied States tries to impose a rule-based order that might upset the existing equilibrium of ASEAN way as the modus operandi in regional institution.
By inviting all the major powers in EAS, will the idea of ASEAN centrality remain valid? Or the role of ASEAN in EAS will be marginalized? EAS probably will become another venue for Sino-US geostrategic competition if both China and the United States prioritize EAS in their regional strategy. The issue is now how ASEAN handles the new settings it agrees. Some argue that the US membership of the EAS serves to fulfill ASEAN’s fundamental objectives, both to engage with outside power and to strengthen its position as the core organization in Southeast Asia.
Getting a balance between functional and strategic agenda in EAS might be an answer to mitigate U.S.- China competition in pursuing rivalry liberal hegemonies. The US interests in South China Sea have been raised in many occasions since Clinton’s speech in 2010 ARF. The issue was openly discussed in multilateral setting now. If the EAS is expected to be the primary Asia-Pacific body for strategic consultations; and if it turns into a venue involving all the powers that intend to impose their liberal hegemony, the role of ASEAN matters probably only as a process manager of a forum for reconciling divergent interests among regional powers.
Nevertheless, US leverage over agenda-setting is still under a test. The United States tried to bring out real security issue, such as South China Sea tension, into discussion in ARF, ADMM Plus, and EAS. Even many member countries followed up and echoed US positions, issues with great sensitivity were still not able to be inked in the final official documents. For instance, Clinton’s remarks on South China Sea at the
Nevertheless, US leverage over agenda-setting is still under a test. The United States tried to bring out real security issue, such as South China Sea tension, into discussion in ARF, ADMM Plus, and EAS. Even many member countries followed up and echoed US positions, issues with great sensitivity were still not able to be inked in the final official documents. For instance, Clinton’s remarks on South China Sea at the