科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告
期末報告
東協在美國亞太戰略的地位：美國菁英認知的影響(第2年)
計 畫 類 別 ： 個別型計畫 計 畫 編 號 ： NSC 102-2410-H-004-165-MY2 執 行 期 間 ： 103年08月01日至104年07月31日 執 行 單 位 ： 國立政治大學國際關係研究中心 計 畫 主 持 人 ： 李瓊莉 計畫參與人員： 碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：黃仲歡 碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：劉莞青 碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：江瑜婷 博士後研究：王俊評 報 告 附 件 ： 移地研究心得報告 出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文 處 理 方 式 ： 1.公開資訊：本計畫涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，2年後可公開查詢 2.「本研究」是否已有嚴重損及公共利益之發現：否 3.「本報告」是否建議提供政府單位施政參考：否中 華 民 國 104 年 10 月 31 日
中 文 摘 要 ： 綜整美國歐巴馬政府第一任期間亞太政策輸出面資料，初步得以看 出美國在重返亞洲的戰略框架下，重視區域多邊途徑，因而提升了 東協在歐巴馬政府亞太戰略的地位，並強化了美國與東協的實質關 係。而在政策輸入端，歐巴馬第一個任期內，政策研究社群對東協 的研究，在質與量兩方面都有大幅進展，對東協在美國亞太戰略中 的地位也給予較多的重視，此一發展是否意味著政策社群對東協認 知有所轉變？而這些認知轉變與政策輸出是否有關？本案的研究透 過與智庫亞太研究學者的深度訪談，歸納綜整訪談結果，多數政策 研究菁英對東協的認知並沒有改變，但因議題處理所需的戰略佈局 ，建議美國政府強化與東協區域之政經關係。 中 文 關 鍵 詞 ： 東協、美國亞太戰略、歐巴馬政府、政策研究社群、區域多邊途徑 英 文 摘 要 ： During Obama’s first term, under the framework of
strategic “pivot” to Asia, the United States paid more attention to regional multilateral approaches than it did in the Bush administration. The policy outputs showed the imperative of ASEAN and the enhancement of U.S.-ASEAN relationship. Meanwhile, at the end of policy inputs,
quality and quantity of policy research outcomes from major think tanks seemed to be in line with the U.S. new
approaches toward Asia. The objective of this research to explore whether those policy suggestions are due to the perception shifts of ASEAN which then elevate ASEAN’s position in the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy? The tentative results from interviews with policy research elites show that most of them remain their original perceptions about ASEAN. However due to the demand of responding to issues in the region, the United States needs to enhance its
strategic ties with ASEAN.
英 文 關 鍵 詞 ： ASEAN, US Asia-Pacific Policy, Obama Administration, Policy Research Community, Regional Multilateralism
科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告
（□期中進度報告/■期末報告）
東協在美國亞太戰略的地位：美國菁英認知的影響
ASEAN in U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy: The Impact of American Elites
計畫類別：■個別型計畫 □整合型計畫
計畫編號：MOST 102－2410－H－004－165－MY2
執行期間：102 年 8 月 1 日至 104 年 7 月 31 日
執行機構及系所：國立政治大學國際關係研究中心
計畫主持人：李瓊莉（政大國際關係研究中心研究員）
共同主持人：
計畫參與人員： 黃仲歡、劉莞青、江瑜婷
本計畫除繳交成果報告外，另含下列出國報告，共 3 份：
■執行國際合作與移地研究心得報告
■出席國際學術會議心得報告
期末報告處理方式：
1. 公開方式：
□非列管計畫亦不具下列情形，立即公開查詢
■涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，□一年■二年後可公開查詢
2.「本研究」是否已有嚴重損及公共利益之發現：■否 □是
3.「本報告」是否建議提供政府單位施政參考 ■否 □是，
（請列舉提供之單位；本部不經審議，依勾選逕予轉送）
中 華 民 國 104 年 10 月 31 日
壹、中文摘要：
綜整美國歐巴馬政府第一任期間亞太政策輸出面資料，初步得以看出美國在重 返亞洲的戰略框架下，重視區域多邊途徑，因而提升了東協在歐巴馬政府亞太戰 略的地位，並強化了美國與東協的實質關係。而在政策輸入端，歐巴馬第一個任 期內，政策研究社群對東協的研究，在質與量兩方面都有大幅進展，對東協在美 國亞太戰略中的地位也給予較多的重視，此一發展是否意味著政策社群對東協認 知有所轉變？而這些認知轉變與政策輸出是否有關？本案的研究透過與智庫亞太 研究學者的深度訪談，歸納綜整訪談結果，多數政策研究菁英對東協的認知並沒 有改變，但因議題處理所需的戰略佈局，建議美國政府強化與東協區域之政經關 係。關鍵詞:
東協、美國亞太戰略、歐巴馬政府、政策研究社群、區域多邊途徑貳、英文摘要：
During Obama’s first term, under the framework of strategic “pivot” to Asia, the United States paid more attention to regional multilateral approaches than it did in the Bush administration. The policy outputs showed the imperative of ASEAN and the enhancement of U.S.-ASEAN relationship. Meanwhile, at the end of policy inputs, quality and quantity of policy research outcomes from major think tanks seemed to be in line with the U.S. new approaches toward Asia. The objective of this research to explore whether those policy suggestions are due to the perception shifts of ASEAN which then elevate ASEAN’s position in the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy? The tentative results from interviews with policy research elites show that most of them remain their original perceptions about ASEAN. However due to the demand of responding to issues in the region, the United States needs to enhance its strategic ties with ASEAN.
參、研究背景
2009 年美國歐巴馬政府上任後，大幅提升亞洲戰略地位，歐巴馬本人、國務 卿柯琳頓、前國防部長蓋茲等國安事務高級官員頻訪亞洲，並多次揭示「重返亞 洲」的政策意圖。然而，回顧美國亞太政策，尼克森宣言後，美政府雖擬淡出東 南亞事務，但事實上仍保持與亞洲盟友間的經貿暨安全承諾，持續參與亞洲事務， 並扮演重要角色；1997 年亞洲金融風暴之後，中國大陸崛起效應席捲東亞，美國 雖未提出回應性的亞太政策，但透過國際貨幣基金（International Monetary Fund, IMF），試圖參與受災國之危機處理與經濟復甦計畫；2001 年 911 恐怖攻擊事件 後，東南亞在美國全球反恐行動中，被視為第二防線並積極佈署，因此，歐巴馬 政府所謂的「重返亞洲」應不是指美國在亞洲「消失」後的重新出現。 不論美國是否真曾離開亞洲，小布希政府在亞太/東亞地區多軌、多層次之多 邊主義進程中，並未積極主導情勢發展，對區域建制的參與，遠不若中、日等區 域強權，尤其忽略了以東協為核心所延伸出來的區域機制如：「東協加三」（ASEAN Plus Three, APT）與「東亞高峰會」（East Asia Summit, EAS），因而在亞洲區域建 制發展進程中錯失霸權領導優勢。歐巴馬上任後的美國亞太政策，與小布希時期 明顯不同之處即在於對區域多邊途徑的重視，在經濟議題上，企圖主導「跨太平 洋戰略經濟合作夥伴協定」（Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP）之談判，擬重振自 1997 年亞洲金融風暴後，美國在亞太地區因中國崛起而相對式微的經濟影響力。而在 安全議題上，2009 年 7 月 21 日柯琳頓在曼谷與泰國副總理 Korbsak Sabhavasu 會晤時提到美國重返亞洲，維持對亞洲盟友的承諾，翌日簽署《東南亞友好合作 條約》（Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, TAC），準備正式加入合作 領域與對話範疇囊括政治、經濟、安全議題，頗具戰略縱深的東亞高峰會，2010 年 參 加 首 屆 東 協 擴 大 國 防 部 長 會 議(ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus,ADMM Plus)，2011 年正式以會員身份，參加東亞高峰會。肆、研究目的
從官方文獻與政策觀察分析中，東協在美國亞太戰略中的地位確實有所提 升，目前國內討論歐巴馬重返東南亞的論著，也多從政策輸出面來凸顯美國的戰 略轉移，而少有從政策輸入面探究美國提升東協在亞太戰略地位的動力來源，然
而，對政策變動的動力來源進行研究，有助瞭解此一政策轉變是否能持續穩定， 進而有效掌握區域局勢，其重要性應被重視。在諸多政策輸入面因子中，政策變 化的動力往往源自政策菁英的認知轉變。小布希政府後期，諸多美方政策研究社 群雖普遍意識到小布希政府對區域多邊機制不夠重視，相對於中國對區域機制的 經營，美國失去區域建制主導地位，對區域發展的影響力銳減，但美國政策研究 社群對東協的認知，仍多將其視為鬆散、沒有效率的機制、並不看好東協在區域 的影響力。在建議美國重視區域參與時，並沒有把東協視為一個切入點。而當前 東協被視為一個推進美國區域利益的工具，若美國對東協的認知仍停留在無能的 階段，那麼東協未必是一個加分的工具，美國重返區域多邊途徑，爭取區域建制 主導權的政策實踐未必要需經過東協，或者，就算重視東協，也是一時權宜之計， 無心發展進一步實質關係。東協既已成為一個政策選項，是否意味著政策社群對 東協認知有所改變。 過去美國學界對東協深入研究的學者並不多，但各大智庫對東南亞與東協的 研究，在歐巴馬第一個任期內，在質與量兩方面都有大幅進展，從部分的研究報 告內容，可以看出美國政策研究社群對東協的認識有所強化，對東協在美國亞太 戰略中的地位也給予較多的重視，此一發展是否意味著研究菁英對東協認知有所 轉變？這些研究是否有官方經費支助？其研究成果是否有適當管道可提供政策建 議？影響力又如何？本案的研究目的即在透過與華府智庫研究社群的深度訪談， 釐清這些問題。
伍、研究執行
一、持續觀察並彙整與本研究相關發展資料：除了主要媒體之外，官方資料亦是 104 年 7 月 31 日所記錄美國與東協地區重要官方互動情報告已上傳繳交。 三、移地研究：如計畫書所規劃，已完成前往美國華府的移地研究，除本案研究 經費之外，本人亦利用其他前往華府之機會進行本案，截至本報告繳交限期， 共約有 26 個資料項目分析（與每一位菁英之意見交換視為一個資料項目）。 移地研究報告已上傳繳交。 四、論文發表與出版情形：如計畫中所規劃，於兩項國際學術會議中發表論文初 稿，唯在論文題目上依研究進度與獲得結果稍做修改，與原計畫書不完全相 同。分別為Implications of U.S. “Pivot” to Asia for Regional Institutional Building; 一是ASEAN in America’s “Pivot” to Asia.正在將兩篇論文整併修改，預定在 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies 中先行發表後希 望能出版期刊論文。
陸、初步研究結果
一、智庫菁英對東協之研究興趣大致有兩大類，一是長期以來就對東協有所關注， 原就屬於東南亞研究學者專家；另一類則是因中國崛起後的對東協地區的魅 力攻勢、及南海緊張情勢升高後，才從美中戰略競逐角度去瞭解東協。前者 對東協能限的評估分兩極；後者則多視東協為戰略工具。 二、多數智庫菁英對東協能限的認知維持原來看法，並沒有改變。而認為提升東 協在美國亞太政策地位的主要因素係回應中國崛起後的區域情勢可採取的有 利策略。 三、從菁英認知似乎不足以解釋東協在美國亞太戰略的地位提升，從Ikenberry 的 自由霸權觀(liberal hegemony)或許更能解釋，因此，近期將整併已發表的兩篇 會議論文，加上Ikenberry 的論述，從戰略層次探討東協角色。科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表
請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價 值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合 在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現（簡要敘述成果是否有嚴重損及公共利益 之發現）或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估
■ 達成目標
□ 未達成目標（請說明，以
100 字為限）
□ 實驗失敗
□ 因故實驗中斷
□ 其他原因
說明：
2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：
論文：□已發表 ■未發表之文稿 □撰寫中 □無
專利：□已獲得 □申請中 □無
技轉：□已技轉 □洽談中 □無
其他：（以
100 字為限）
3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術
或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發
展之可能性），如已有嚴重損及公共利益之發現，請簡述可能損及
之相關程度（以
500 字為限）
本研究鎖定政策研究社群菁英（而非政策決策者）為訪談對象，在
執行可行度上大幅提昇，主要目的在探討智庫（而非政執政者立場）
對東協在美國亞太再平衡政策地位提升之影響，屬創新途徑及研究
範圍，當前尚未有相關研究成果被提出。
移地研究報告(MOST 102-2410-H-004-165-MY2)
專題研究：【東協在美國亞太戰略的地位：美國菁英認知的影響】
計畫主持人：李瓊莉（政治大學國際關係研究中心研究員）
地點：美國華府
時間：2013 年 7-8 月、2015 年 6 月 20-29 日、2015 年 9 月 1-15 日
主要目的：
1) 針對本案內容與智庫研究人員進行訪談，訪談內容請參考原研
究計畫
2) 出席智庫主辦會議與座談，在會中提問相關問題
3) 資料分析
移地研究經過：
2013 年 7-8 月間得知本計畫獲得補助時，本人即在華府，因此立
刻展開訪談與資料整理。共取得 11 項可分析的資料項目。
（與每一位
菁英之意見交換視為一個資料項目）
2015 年 6 月 20-29 日利用本案經費前往華府，但經費非常有限，
且受限於受訪者的時間，一週內僅取得 5 個可分析資料項目。
2015 年 9 月 1-15 日，利用其他在華府的蹲點計畫，同時進行本
案資料蒐集，約取得 10 個可分析資料項目。
三次前往華府，僅第二次是使用本案經費。
資料項目來源（受訪菁英）包括：
Alan Romberg (Stimson Center)
Bonnie Glaser (CSIS)
Richard Cronin (Stimson Center)
Robert M. Hathaway (Wilson Center)
Satu Limaye (East West Center, Washington)
Richard
Bush
(Brookings)
Douglas Paal (Carnegie)
Murray Hiebert (CSIS)
Mathew Goodman (CSIS)
Anthony Nelson (US-ASEAN Business Council)
Scot Marciel (US Department of State)
Vincent
Wang
(UR)
Thomas J. Christensen (Princeton University)
Caroline Atkinson (National Security Council)
Kim Beazley (Australia Embassy in US)
David Dreier (Brookings)
Patrick Cronin (CNAS)
Andrew Scobell (RAND)
Pek Koon Heng (American University)
Joseph Chinyong Liow (Brookings)
J. Stapleton Roy (Wilson Center)
Meg Lundsager (Wilson Center)
Gregory B. Poling (CSIS)
訪談總結：
一、智庫菁英對東協之研究興趣大致有兩大類，一是長期以來就對東
協有所關注，原就屬於東南亞研究學者專家；另一類則是因中
國崛起後的對東協地區的魅力攻勢、及南海緊張情勢升高後，
才從美中戰略競逐角度去瞭解東協。前者對東協能限的評估分
兩極；後者則多視東協為戰略工具。
二、多數智庫菁英對東協能限的認知維持原來看法，並沒有改變。而
認為提升東協在美國亞太政策地位的主要因素係回應中國崛起
後的區域情勢可採取的有利策略。
出席國際學術會議報告 (NSC 102-2410-H-004-165-MY2)
專題研究：【東協在美國亞太戰略的地位：美國菁英認知的影響】 計畫主持人：李瓊莉（政治大學國際關係研究中心研究員）
壹、會議說明
會議名稱：
The 2103 Annual Conference for the International Security Studies Section of International Studies Association and International Security and Arms Control Section of the American-Political Science Association (The 2013 ISA-ISSS / APSA-ISAC Annual Conference)
會議時間：2013 年 10 月 4-6 日 會議地點：美國華盛頓
主辦單位：Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University 國際關係研究學會（International Studies Association, ISA）依議題組成不同 小組，國際安全研究小組（International Security Studies Section, ISSS）係其中之 一。美國政治學學會(American Political Science Association, APSA)中亦有國際安 全暨武器管控研究小組(International Security and Arms Control Section, ISAC)，兩 小組在研究議題、成員組合上都也重疊，為更能促進國際安全研究專家學者之交 流，兩個研究小組長期以來舉辦聯席會議，但 ISA-ISSS 所扮演的角色較多。
這次會議在華府舉辦，吸引諸多學者前來，共有 90 個研討場次，加上兩個 活動，一是討論學術出版問題，一是專書發表 The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed by Marvin Kalb. 整個會議分兩整天進行，約有 350 位學者專家出席。
這次會議本人在會中發表一篇論文：Implications of U.S. “Pivot” to Asia for Regional Institutional Building, 被安排在 Sa-C03: Saturday 1:45pm-3:30pm 的 Security Cooperation in East Asia 場次，由 Dr. Dawn Murphy (George Washington University) 擔任主持及評論。其他論文發表人尚有來自美國、挪威、韓國、越南、 及印度之學者，分別就美國重返亞洲戰略對各地區安全合作的意涵。
Washington: Dynamics and Implications for Security Architecture in Asia-Pacific Region”。主要討論美國與印度在亞太區域安全合作上的演進、危機及可能性。 美國在「重返亞洲政策」主導之下更加重視與印度，雙方在面對中國崛起有相似 的利益，因此近年合作密切。冷戰結束後到 2000 年，美印開始發展新友好關係， 美國視印度為制衡中國的關鍵。因此，2005 年雙方政府發表共同宣言，提出核 能、反恐、防禦和科技層面的合作，此時美印夥伴關係逐漸嶄露頭角。 然而美印戰略合作關係仍有阻礙，如印度不依照美國總統歐巴馬要求修改 「核能事故責任法案」（India’s Nuclear Liability Act），造成雙方核能經濟合作層 面的挫折。再者，在軍事安全層面，作者提到 1991 年美國開始提出與印度軍事 合作，隨時間發展逐步簽定防禦合作協定、舉行軍事演練、軍事武器貿易等。然 而美國希望印度更開訪軍事貿易市場，印度則企盼美國官方鬆綁軍事科技轉讓， 雙方尚未達成共同願景。第三，從 2009 年開始的美印戰略對話長期關注海盜問 題、海軍安全等，但對最近中國在印度洋及阿拉伯海的戰略性侵入行動尚未採行 一致回應。除中國，印度周邊國家也牽動印美合作關係，如巴基斯坦從 1963 年 維持並加深與中國友好關係。美印雙方也對伊朗態度不一，因印度視伊朗為重要 石油經濟命脈，但美國視之為流氓國家。最後是阿富汗問題，美印是否能共同維 繫阿富汗政治及經濟發展穩定，也關乎美印之間的外交合作。最後作者認為僅管 這些挑戰，美印奠基於強大共同利益及安全上的相同挑戰，雙方仍有極大機會在 亞太區域建立新的安全架構。 二、美歐在東亞的安全合作
由 Daewon Ohn (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)教授提出論文”EU-US Security Cooperation in East Asia”，旨在探討歐盟與美國在東亞區域安全合作的可 能性。多數學者認為歐盟相對於其經濟影響力，在亞洲的外交政策上的影響力較 小，但藉由近 20 年美國的霸權力量轉移到中國的權力轉移現象，是歐盟融入東 亞區域的安全架構的機會。首先講者先以權力轉移理論（Power Transition theory） 分析中國崛起與美國衰退，認為由於衰退的強權選擇規避風險，中美兩國在權力 轉移中，美國會盡量避免預防性戰爭和衝突。同時衰退的美國近年因財政緊縮而 刪減國防預算及減少東亞軍力部署，需要依賴歐盟及東亞盟友國來維持其在東亞 的策略。此外，歐盟有必要在中國成為霸權前增加其在東亞安全議題上的融入程 度，預防轉移的不穩定性影響歐盟經濟。 如前所述，歐盟在國際權力位置中屬中小型區域力量，無法獨立在區域安全架 構中行動，因此需要仰賴盟友（尤其是美國）。但由於歐盟不在東亞安全議題內， 仍受東亞區域國家尊重為具規範性且溫和的力量。這種特質正是美國所缺乏的， 且可以成為歐盟在東亞增加軍事化力量的暫時緩衝。然而雖有種種優點，歐盟還 是需要解決對中國武器禁運等問題。 歐盟增加在東亞軍事安全議題上的地位優勢包含四點：一、在權力轉換過程中 歐盟進入東亞安全架構的壁壘會降低。二、對歐盟共同外交政策 共同安全
（CFSP）和防務政策（CSDP）有促進效應。三、區域性變化（ASEAN 等區域 機制的出現）有利於歐盟在東亞安全議題上的融入。四、歐盟近十年已改善其安 全議題上的機構和機制。最後講者認為歐盟具有多種資源可以協助其他國際角色 解決特殊問題，其與東亞國家的雙邊夥伴關係也可促進有效的多邊主義，進而推 近區域規範及秩序。 三、歐洲對美國重返亞洲的反應
娜威學者 Magnus Peterson (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies)提出論文 European Reactions to the U.S. Pivot to Asia 討論美國與歐洲從二次戰後作為長期 盟友（北大西洋公約組織）關係在美國「重返亞洲」之後所產生變化。 美國與歐洲在文化、民主及人權價值觀都相近，是以成為美國外交資源和指 引；然而 2011 年的利比亞戰爭卻凸顯美國在北大西洋公約組織的角色生變。美 國將政治重點放在「重返亞洲」政策，此舉引起學者猜測美國對歐洲或領導北大 西洋公約組織興趣減低，建議歐洲自身負起領導歐洲事務或聯盟的責任。儘管美 國在與歐洲與大西洋國家的關係面臨「危機」，美國政府仍試圖安撫這些言論， 如美國防部長海格 2013 年 6 月重申「美國的亞洲再平衡策略並不代表從其他區 域撤退。」 作者從三方面分析：1) 從派遣軍事人力比率來看，近年來亞洲的軍事人力比 率漸超越歐洲，顯示美國優先策略轉變。但從軍事基地和投資多寡來看，則較看 不出亞洲與歐洲比率上的差距。2) 就 NATO 國家反應來看，普遍對美國亞洲政策 沒有熱情回應。學者 Timo Noetzel 和 Benjamin Schreer 認為北大西洋公約組織的 成員國分為改革派、維持現狀派和新傳統主義派，新傳統主義派國家如波蘭、匈 牙利等國，尤其擔心美國從北大西洋公約組織撤離後會帶來權力真空，對於北大 西洋公約組織以外的事物興趣較低。德國和英國也因為缺乏政治意願和軍事能 力，不願幫助美國在亞洲安全事務。3) 對歐洲安全的啟示，從 2011 年利比亞戰 爭來看，歐洲似乎如美國所願，能獨立處理區域事務，但長期而言，歐洲是否真 能獨立維持大西洋區域和平仍有疑慮，歐洲安全事務上是否會分崩離析是歐洲現 存及永久的問題。 作者最後結論美國「重返亞洲」政策的真實性，但認為美國尋求歐洲協助是 不可能的，應尋求在亞洲盟友國支持，但歐洲對全球的影響力則將被邊緣化。
境尚未凝聚共同目標。 作者從下列脈絡分析北大西洋公約組織國家在「重返亞洲政策」的角色： (一)北大西洋公約組織夥伴關係的演變：NATO 從 1994 年建立和平夥伴關係 (PfP)，就扮演多重角色。原本這樣的夥伴機制只在歐洲中心或東歐，但 911 事件 和北大西洋公約組織於 2003 年通過的駐阿聯軍任務，加深該組織對非歐洲夥伴 關係的興趣。因此於 2006 年組織決議建立更大範圍的夥伴關係，將歐洲其他國 家納入政策決定一環。2011 年北約通過「柏林決議」，鼓勵建立雙邊夥伴關係， 讓未參與組織的國家討論共同議題。他們發展出多種夥伴機制，包含 IPCP、IPP、 ICP 等。這樣政策演變讓組織的夥伴關係不再受限於地理因素，更加深與新崛起 國家如印度、中國的關係，雖然他們並沒有在組織正式夥伴框架中，卻可產生實 質關係。 （二）「柏林決議」的夥伴關係政策執行上仍有困難，例如如何與與國際安全 援助部隊（ISAF）的其他參與國如澳洲、紐西蘭、日本、南韓在任務結束後建 立恆久的夥伴關係？儘管有多項協議機制，組織還是沒有發展出一個正式、永久 和多邊的對話框架。一旦結束與北約以外國家實際上的業務合作，彼此關係可能 隨之減弱。如何與實際上更親近、合作更深的國家建立更特殊的夥伴關係？在冷 戰時期到 1990 年代，民主價值觀在北約夥伴關係中是不可或缺的核心，但經 911 事件後，北約國家發現應與其他非民主新進國家建立關係，才能維持國際安全和 穩定，但如何與非民主國家如中國建立關係？ （三）夥伴關係與重返亞洲政策：北約組織現在作為「全球安全網絡」的樞 紐，是重返亞洲政策的理想工具。北約與亞洲的夥伴關係先於重返亞洲政策，儘 管部分參與國堅持歐洲中心主義，大部分國家都認為建立多元合作夥伴關係是北 約面對國際威脅不可或缺一環。北約議會更建議應從美國重返亞洲政策更進一步 推廣北約與亞洲自身的關係。此外，北約是否繼續依賴美國利益前進成為當前的 議題。儘管美國與歐洲經濟和民主價值上有很深的關聯，他們如何共同在現今安 全策略不斷變化的世界推廣自由民主、或利用亞洲國家維持區域秩序尚未明確。 最後作者建議美國應網羅與北約組織核心價值相似的區域夥伴，擴大自由安全秩 序，重視北約夥伴關係在區域與亞洲地區的潛力。
參、參與心得
這個研討場次雖以東亞安全合作為主題，但除了越南研究生 Bao Chau Nguyen 與我的論文談到東亞安全合作機制之外，其他論文內容多與東亞安全合 作無關，而主要會中討論也都聚焦在歐洲國家、歐盟、北約等安全行為者受美國 重返亞洲政策之影響。這個情形反映出參與 ISSS-ISAC 的學者專家對亞太安全 研究的興趣與深度仍有諸多發展空間。但對鑽研亞太安全的學者而言，這個場次 提供了一個新研究視野，美國重返亞洲戰略除了對亞太安全直接有所影響之外， 對美歐關係、北約角色皆有所啟示。附件：Paper Summary
Implications of US “Pivot” to Asia for Regional Security Institutional Building*
Chyungly LEE, Ph.D.
Institute of International Relations National Chengchi University
Since Obama assumed office, Asia’s strategic imperative to the United States has been repeatedly addressed by the administration. Numerous discussions have been taken place to define or interpret the term "pivot" (or "rebalancing") toward Asia. It seems fairly acceptable now that Obama's Asia strategy does not aim at either "countering" China’s increasing influence in the region or tend to trade off US strategic interests in other parts of the world (such as Middle East or Europe). The "pivot" indeed is a result of reassessing strategic investments. The United States can not afford not to engage Asia in sustaining its global leadership in the future.
One of Obama's sensible policy shifts from the Bush administration to enhance US leverage over regional developments was US "return" to multilateralism. The instrumental role of regional institutions in US rebalancing strategy toward Asia has been addressed in various official sources (including speeches delivered by
high-ranking officials, fact sheets provided by governments, and statements issued after events). US active participation in regional security mechanisms has shaped new dynamics in the region's politico-security cooperation.
The principles and priorities of US engagement in regional institutions were well manifested in several remarks o former Secretary of States Hillary Clinton: Regional
Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities delivered in Honolulu on January 12.
2010; America’s Engagement in the Asia Pacific delivered on October 28, 2010; and
partners, especially China, would also be important to the building of regional architecture; thirdly enhancing effective cooperation and result-based projects under existing organizations, rather than simply producing new regional mechanism, would be more appropriate.
Clinton further elaborated the practice of “forward deployed diplomacy” as means of resuming US leadership in the region. Regional institutions, along with alliance and emerging partnership, are main venues of practicing US rebalancing strategy.
Commitments of US high-ranking officials to the participation in regional institutions has been well demonstrated by numbers of trip taken by the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The statistics would continue to increase. In addition to the region's traditional diplomatic forum (such as ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC), on the defense front, the two newest ASEAN-extended mechanisms: ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) and East Asia Summit have become important venues for the United States to practice its rebalancing strategy.
In response to the region’s anxiety about whether US would be able to sustain the commitment of “rebalancing” toward Asia in Obama’s second term, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon defined and reaffirmed the goals and means of US rebalancing in his speeches at CSIS on November 2012 and at Asia Society on March 11, 2013. US participation in regional institutions remains a critical agenda for the rebalancing strategy. Secretary of State Kerry and Secretary of Defense Hagel both attended ARF and ADMM Plus have again reflected the forward deployed diplomacy in regional multilateralism.
Until recently ARF was the only multilateral venue for Asian countries to exchange views on and initiate collective responses to common security concerns. East Asia Summit (EAS), a comprehensive strategic national leaders’ forum established in 2005, strengthened its security agenda after the United States joined in 2011. The ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM +), the newest regional security mechanism, hold its second meeting in August 2013, three years after its first one. These three regional institutions to some extent share common security cooperation agenda. Nevertheless their institutional dynamics are quite distinctive.
The five principles of US engagement with EAS manifested by Clinton when she was invited to sit in the meeting in October 2010 could also be applied to understand US participation in other regional mechanisms. They are US enduring commitment; the support for ASEAN centrality; the pursuit of an active agenda, including hard security
issues; complementariness among regional forums; and the continuity of US bilateralism in the region.
Three institutional implications of US "return" to regional multilateralism are highlighted.
First, while principle of non-intervention and consensus decision making remain essential, efforts of moving regional institutions from talk shops toward more result-oriented mechanisms have been made. The United States has a longtime record of criticizing the ineffectiveness of ASEAN-way in the process of regional institutional building. Producing effective outcomes became a working goal of US return to regional multilateralism. It has supported approaches of achieving “real, tangible solutions to shared problems" with emphasis of capacity building of regional partners. For instance, the first live field exercise ever conducted in ARF was the Voluntary Demonstration of Response on Disaster Relief in the Philippines on May 4-8, 2009. It was originally a US initiative. In ARF Vision paper adopted in 2009, ministers did pledge to make the ARF “an action-oriented mechanism that develops concrete and effective responses to the common challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region.
Secondly, US leverage over agenda-setting is still under a test. The US tried to bring out real security issue, such as South China Sea tension, into discussion in ARF, ADMM+, and EAS. Even many member countries followed up and echoed US positions, issues with great sensitivity were still not able to be inked in the final official documents. For instance, Clinton’s remarks on South China Sea at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum and other following regional meetings has intensified discussions of hard security issues in regional security forums. At the first ADMM Plus, although China sought to keep discussions of the South China Sea off the agenda, the conflict was constantly mentioned by ministers of the US, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam and several other Southeast Asian states. Nevertheless, the consensus rule of modus operandi in regional mechanism still prevented the topic of South
setting agenda. The ASEAN Secretary-General Surin echoed Clinton's remarks at the 2010 ARF and announced that ASEAN would convene multilateral talks on the South China Sea and seek China’s participation. The effect of Clinton’s ARF remarks extended to resume talks between China and ASEAN on implementing DOC. This development suggests that Beijing has abandoned its insistence on bilateral negotiations with individual claimants and at the same time, raises ASEAN’s regional security role. In a press statement by the Department of State on August 3, 2012, it further endorsed ASEAN efforts to build a principles-based mechanism for managing and preventing disputes.
In sum, the United States would need ASEAN's support to push forward its interests in the region. ASEAN, however, would not fully support the US without taking China's position into account. As a result, functional cooperation of non-traditional security issues has been commonly acceptable agenda to all parties, while hard security issues can only be addressed in speeches of individual countries or off-record discussions. Nevertheless, projects regarding capacity building have to be in line with the non-intervention principle and on a voluntary base. A full scale of regional preparedness to cope with transnational security threats remains a policy challenge.
出席國際學術會議報告(NSC 102-2410-H-004-165-MY2)
專題研究：【東協在美國亞太戰略的地位：美國菁英認知的影響】
計畫主持人：李瓊莉（政治大學國際關係研究中心研究員）
壹、會議說明
會議名稱:
The 2014 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association – South (ISA-South) 會議時間: 2014 年 10 月 25-26 日
會議地點:Richmond, Virginia, USA
會議主題: Bridging Theory and Practice: International Studies in the 21th Century
國際關係研究學會在美國依地域分有 ISA-South, ISA-Northeast, ISA-West, ISA-Midwest 四個分會，其中 ISA-South 包括 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia 以及 Puerto Rico。
今年會議共有 33 個研討場次，分兩天進行，其中包括四個開放給大學生的 論文發表場次。共約 150 人參加。ISA 主席 Amitav Archaya 前來專題演講，是整個 會議的亮點。議程可參考
http://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Media/Conferences/SouthRichmond2014/South%20Richmond% 202014%20-%20Full%20Program.pdf
2
貳、會議討論
在 International Relations in the Asia-Pacific 場次中，除了我的論文之外，由 Thomas Badey 教授（Randolph-Macon College）發表論文 Korean Unification: Is it too late? 討論南北韓的統一問題；Sebra Yen 博士（George Washington University) 發表與 Peter Furia 教授(University of Virginia)合著論文 Finally Ripe for Rivalry? Nationalism and War Willingness Among East Asian Mass Publics 探究東亞一般大眾 對民族主義與戰爭意願的看法；由 Sarah Rose-Jensen 博士候選人（George Mason University)全球化對柬埔寨當地居民土地權益的影響。皆由 Monti N. Datta
(University of Richmond)擔任論文評論。四篇文章研究主題差異性頗大，但皆在處 理國際衝突問題
在 International Cooperation 場次中，主要討論 Roger A Coate 教授(University of South Carolina)等人所提論文 Inter-organization theory and International Cooperation in Response to AIDS。作者挑戰過去認為 AIDS 防制多由非國家行為者投入較多的 迷思，指出諸多過去透過 NGO 途徑的個人最後都投入以國家為主體的國際組織來 抗 AIDS，文章中提出解釋並擬發展國際合作理論。
參、參與心得
這次會議所發表的論文多與我的研究沒有直接相關，因此參與時所得到的回 饋並不多。相對的，在討論南北韓統一問題、柬埔寨問題、及愛滋防制的國際合作 問題上與作者交流不少。然而，非論文發表人的參與者多為大學部學生，對這些議 題的瞭解有限，因此，整個研討場次多在回答基本問題，學術討論情形並不熱絡， 也些可惜。時任 ISA 主席的 Archaya 教授(University of America)以 Bridging the
Academia-Policy Gap in Global International Relations 為題發表演說。認為當前國際 關係研究側重西方觀點，不具真正涵蓋性，以至於各地區皆有理論與實踐的反思， 企圖找群區域性的國關理論。他呼籲新的全球國際關係研究視野應認知各地異質性 後尋求共同基礎，而非強調以一蓋全的普遍性理論，如此一來亦能改善過去側重普 遍性的國際關係理論與地域性政策研究之間的差距。
肆、附件
Draft. Do NOT Quote.ASEAN in America’s “Pivot” to Asia
*Chyungly LEE, Ph.D. Institute of International Relations
National Chengchi University
Since U.S. proclaimed her “back to Asia” in 2009, the Obama administration has engaged in regional institutions far more actively than the Bush administration. The establishment of the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting, the accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and then to the East Asia Summit (EAS), the involvements in ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), and the initiative of U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) have all suggested the increased strategic value of ASEAN and ASEAN-centered institutions in the U.S. "pivot" to Asia. Would this be a case of Ikenberry's theory of liberal hegemony? Will the U.S. be able to use regional institutions to obtain the hegemonic legitimacy? Would ASEAN-extended mechanisms be the best venues for the U.S. to deliver its willingness and capability to lead?
This paper will first analyze contents of key U.S. official documents, especially speeches given by high ranking officials in the Obama administration to shed light on the strategic value of regional multilateralism in Obama's Asia policy. The second section
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address issues in economic dimensions as alternatives to expand U.S. leverages over regional institutional building.
Regional Multilateralism in U.S. "Pivot" to Asia
Asia’s strategic imperative to the United States has been repeatedly addressed by the Obama administration. Numerous discussions have been taken place to define or interpret the term "pivot" (or "rebalancing") toward Asia. It seems fairly acceptable now that Obama's Asia strategy does not aim at either "countering" China’s increasing influence in the region or tend to trade off US strategic interests in other parts of the world (such as Middle East or Europe). The "pivot" indeed is a result of reassessing strategic investments as the United States can not afford not to engage Asia in sustaining its global leadership in the future.
One of Obama's sensible policy shifts from the Bush administration was U.S. "return" to regional multilateralism to enhance US leverage over regional institutional building. The instrumental role of regional institutions in US rebalancing strategy toward Asia has been addressed in various official sources (including speeches delivered by high-ranking officials, fact sheets provided by governments, and statements issued after events).
Hillary Clinton made her first visit abroad as secretary of state to Asia. Her visit in Northeast Asia – to Japan, Korea, and China – represented continuity, but her trip to Indonesia signaled change. She became the first secretary of state to visit the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta. In her trip in July 2009, she also signed Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and resumed US participation in ASEAN Regional Forum after several years' absence from former secretary Rice. Clinton’s address before the visit in Asia Society indicated that US future would be closely tied to Asia.
Obama made his first major Asia policy address in Tokyo on November 14, 2009 and attended APEC informal leaders’ summit in Singapore. Both delivered a clear message that America is back! The basic lines of his speech are the centrality of the US alliance network, the need for a cooperative and constructive relationship with China, and the growing importance of ASEAN in general and multilateral cooperation in particular. He also expressed support for Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions and recognized US disengagement in those institutions in the past. In Singapore, Obama met with leaders of 10 ASEAN members, including Burma. It was considered the first US-ASEAN summit.
Principles and priorities of America's back to regional multilateralism were specified in the Clinton's address on regional architecture in Asia at the East-West Center in Honolulu on January 12, 2010. Five guiding principles that the Obama administration would use in examining East Asian regional and America’s role in the process were
specified: 1) the US alliance relationships are the cornerstone of our regional involvement; 2) regional institutions and efforts should work to advance our clear and increasingly shared objective. In addition to the process, substance matters; 3) our institutions must be effective and be focused on delivering results. It is more important to have organizations that produce results, rather than simply producing new organizations; 4) we must seek to maintain and enhance flexibility in pursuing the results we seek. Where it makes sense, we will participate in informal arrangements targeted to specific challenges, and we will support sub-regional institutions that advance the shared interests of groups of neighbors. Thus coalitions of the willing, trilateral dialogues are all valuable; 5) we need to decide, as Asia-Pacific nations, which will be the defining regional institutions. The goal was “to build an institutional architecture that maximizes our prospects for effective cooperation, builds trust, and reduces the friction of competition.”
The concept of "forward deployed diplomacy" was stressed Clinton's speech "America's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific" in Honolulu on Oct. 28, 2010. It emphasizes “one overarching set of goals to sustain and strengthen US leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and to improve security, heighten prosperity, and promote our values.” The US was practicing “forward deployed diplomacy” along three key tracks: shaping the future Asia-Pacific economic, understiring regional security, and supporting stronger democratic institutions and the spread of universal human values. Three main tools are: alliance, emerging partnerships, and regional institutions. Important “mini-laterals” included the Lower Mekong Initiative and the Pacific Island Forum.
The principles and priorities of US engagement in regional institutions were again well manifested in the aforementioned speeches and an article America's Pacific Century published in Foreign Policy in November 2011. While bilateral alliances remain as the cornerstone of US regional involvement, the United States is willing to work with Asian partners “to build an institutional architecture that maximizes our prospects for effective cooperation, builds trust, and reduces the friction of competition.” In sum, firstly, emphasizing regional multilateralism would not trade off US bilateral relationship with its treaty alliances; secondly, emerging partners, especially China, would also be important to the building of regional architecture; thirdly enhancing effective cooperation and result-based projects under existing organizations, rather than simply producing new regional mechanism, would be more appropriate.
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US rebalancing in his speeches at CSIS on November 2012 and at Asia Society on March 11, 2013. US high ranking officials continue to attend meetings in the region to reflect the forward deployed diplomacy in regional multilateralism.
In terms of regional security arrangements, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) are currently three most active intergovernmental mechanisms in the region. Although there are overlapping membership and designated agenda among these three mechanisms, they have distinctive organizational objectives and institutional dynamics.
Until recently ARF was the only multilateral security forum in Asia Pacific for Asian countries to exchange views on their common security concerns and initiate projects to prepare for collective responses to security challenges at the regional level. It was first launched in 1994 based on consensus reached from the 1993 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting. ASEAN members and its dialogue partners invited non-ASEAN members in wider geographical area to discuss security concerns. Different from the European model such as OSCE, the ARF approach to security is through diplomatic consultation without pre-agreed institutional commitments. The ARF Concept Paper, adopted in the second ARF meeting, however, specifies three stages of institutional evolution. Members started the first stage of confidence building through dialogues and meetings; and agreed to move toward the second stage of developing preventive diplomacy measures few years later. Nevertheless, the diplomatic approach with consensus decision-making rules impeded it from moving to the third stage: elaboration of approaches to conflicts.
ADMM Plus is an extension of ADMM which was also launched in recent. In the fourth ADMM in 2009, ASEAN ministers of defense agreed to invite ministers of Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the United States, and Russia to exchange views on the role of defense in regional security and explore possibilities of functional security cooperation. ADMM Plus was launched in 2010. The second one was held three years later in 2013. ADMM Plus does not aiming at forming military alliance, instead it is a venue of defense diplomacy with characteristics of ASEAN way. In the second ADMM Plus, ministers agree to meet every other year. So far, ADMM Plus conduct more non-traditional security drills than other regional mechanisms.
East Asia Summit (EAS), a comprehensive strategic national leaders’ forum established in 2005, strengthened its security agenda only after the United States joined in 2011. East Asia Summit was established in order to realize East Asia Community, an initiative from the East Asia Study Group under the ASEAN Plus Three process. The agreed membership requirements of EAS allowed ASEAN in the driver seat of institutional building. Only those ASEAN dialogue partners with substantial ties with ASEAN member states and sign TAC would be eligible to apply for EAS membership. New Zealand, India and Australia were the first three to join. The United States and
Russia joined in 2011. Before U.S. involvements, EAS only explored very few political or security agenda. Nevertheless, because of the nature of Summit, consensus reached in EAS does have high strategic implications.
U.S. “Pivot” to ASEAN-Extended Mechanisms ASEAN Regional Forum
The most salient effect of US return to ARF was on tensions in the South China Sea. In Clinton’s remarks made, she pointed out that “the US, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” “Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims of land features.” ARF Ministers did not avoid talking about the issue, rather, stressing “the importance of maintaining peace and stability while reaffirming the continuing importance of the DOC as a milestone document between ASEAN member states and China, embodying their collective commitment to ensuring the peaceful resolution of disputes in the area. They also called for the “eventual conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.” Clinton proposed multilateral discussions under ASEAN auspices. But the idea did not appear in the US-ASEAN summit communiqué in Sep. 2010.
China responded with diplomatic condemnations and military drills. However, at the same time China was willing to resume Joint Working Group Meetings. In 2011 ARF, ASEAN and China agreed Guidelines for the Implementation of Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin echoed Clinton's remarks at the 2010 ARF and announced that ASEAN would convene multilateral talks on the South China Sea and seek China’s participation.
East Asia Summit
As an observer in the 2010 EAS in Hanoi, Clinton outlined five key principles that will guide US engagement with the EAS: 1) making an enduring commitment to this institution; 2) ASEAN should continue to play a central role as a fulcrum for the region’s emerging regional architecture; 3) EAS should pursue an active agenda that involves the
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Before the trip, Clinton spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC on Sept. 8. She highlighted that the US will be “encouraging its development into a foundational security and political institution for the region, capable of resolving disputes and preventing them before they occur.” The theme reoccurred in Clinton’s speech in Honolulu on October 28, 2010. Two core principles that the administration would take in its approach to the East Asia Summit were ASEAN’s central role, and US desire to see EAS emerge as a forum for substantive engagement on pressing strategic and political issues, including nuclear nonproliferation, maritime security and climate change.”
Before Obama’s first attended to EAS, a press briefing given by NSC Senior Director Danny Russell on November 9, 2011 stated that Obama hoped to transform the existing East Asia Summit into a venue where the leaders can not only discuss but provide guidance and leadership to other regional institutions. The US acknowledges that ASEAN is the core for institution building in Asia and sees the EAS as an ASEAN-based expansion for regional security. Obama’s participation in EAS underscored the Administration’s commitment to deepening engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and playing a leadership role in its emerging institutions. In addition to original EAS agenda, Obama called for broadening the dialogue to include strategic and security challenges. Issues suggested by the U.S. include maritime security, nonproliferation, disaster responses and humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, what the U.S. stressed were not included in the five priority areas (energy and environment, finance, disaster management, education, and global health issues and pandemic diseases) for EAS cooperation listed in the 2011 EAS Chairman’s Statement.
The intent for the U.S. to transform EAS into a political and security institution was again shown in the White House Fact Sheet on East Asia Summit in 2011. It identified EAS as “the region’s premier forum for Asia-Pacific leaders to discuss pressing political and strategic issues,” and “maritime security as priority issue”. Obama took the opportunity to reiterate U.S. positions on the South China Sea. He reaffirmed US national interests in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and freedom of navigation. The fact sheet also notes that President Obama “encouraged the parties to make progress on biding code of conduct in the south China Sea to provide a framework to prevent conflict, manage incidents when they occur, and help resolve disputes. But the EAS Chairman’s Statement, while noting that the assembled leaders welcomed the regional efforts to enhance cooperation in promoting maritime cooperation in the region including sea anti-piracy, search and rescue at sea, marine environment, maritime security, maritime connectivity, freedom of navigation, fisheries and other areas of cooperation”, did not include any specific reference to the South China Sea or the DOC or COC.
The establishment of ADMM Plus reaffirmed ASEAN’s central role in any institutional initiative and stressed that any mechanism should abide by “ASEAN principles of respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of member states, consultation and consensus and moving at a pace comfortable to all parties. Five expert working groups were set up: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (co-chaired by Vietnam and China), maritime security (Malaysia and Australia), military medicine, counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping operations (co-chaired by the Philippines and New Zealand). An ASEAN Defense Senior Officials Meeting Plus was set up to monitor progress.
At the first ADMM Plus, although China sought to keep discussions of the South China Sea off the agenda, the conflict was mentioned by the US, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam and several other Southeast Asian states. However, the final statement made no mention of the disputes. Surin indeed echoed Clinton’s proposal at the 2010 ARF gathering announced ASEAN would convene multilateral talks on the South China Sea and see Chin’s participation. One of the effects of Clinton’s ARF remarks was that China and ASEAN resumed talks on the implementation of DOC signed in 2002. Beijing has abandoned its insistence that all SCS discussions be exclusively bilateral. This development has raised ASEAN’s regional security role. Focus was shifted to more non-traditional cooperation in the second ADMM Plus. The first humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and military medicine exercise was held in Brunei in June. An ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action was established.
US membership in ADMM Plus demonstrates ASEAN's desire to include the US formally in Asia’s newly developing security infrastructure. (Ernest Bower) The ADMM Plus agenda replicates the ARF’s focusing on nontraditional security concerns of humanitarian and disaster relief, maritime security broadly defined, counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. The one traditional security issue and ASEAN’s most contentious issue: the South China Sea, was omitted from the official agenda despite ministers raised the issue in their remarks. The ADMM Plus is not a military alliance nor is it designed to cope with traditional security issues such as bilateral conflicts or territorial disputes. But ADMM Plus adds an important dimension absent from the ARF, which is a gathering dominated by foreign ministers. (Barry Desker). The ADMM Plus could become the key institution in the region promoting practical cooperation among armed forces, including meetings of defense and intelligence chief.
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The first challenge came from China. China welcomes the U.S. to join EAS but it reserves the idea of focusing too much on strategic issues. Beijing prefers bilateral discussions of traditional security issues and has never been keen to see them discussed in a regional multilateral context. Functional cooperation, such as ASEAN connectivity, gives China more leverage over regional developments without creating image of being a threat to regional stability.
Sino-U.S. geostrategic competition in regional mechanisms, however, creates strategic dilemma for other regional members. A common solution to this dilemma is that On security issues, ASEAN member states welcome the involvement of the US to counter balance China; and that on economic issues, ASEAN member states can not neglect China. The situation is likely to be exacerbated if the Untied States tries to impose a rule-based order that might upset the existing equilibrium of ASEAN way as the modus operandi in regional institution.
By inviting all the major powers in EAS, will the idea of ASEAN centrality remain valid? Or the role of ASEAN in EAS will be marginalized? EAS probably will become another venue for Sino-US geostrategic competition if both China and the United States prioritize EAS in their regional strategy. The issue is now how ASEAN handles the new settings it agrees. Some argue that the US membership of the EAS serves to fulfill ASEAN’s fundamental objectives, both to engage with outside power and to strengthen its position as the core organization in Southeast Asia.
Getting a balance between functional and strategic agenda in EAS might be an answer to mitigate U.S.- China competition in pursuing rivalry liberal hegemonies. The US interests in South China Sea have been raised in many occasions since Clinton’s speech in 2010 ARF. The issue was openly discussed in multilateral setting now. If the EAS is expected to be the primary Asia-Pacific body for strategic consultations; and if it turns into a venue involving all the powers that intend to impose their liberal hegemony, the role of ASEAN matters probably only as a process manager of a forum for reconciling divergent interests among regional powers.
Nevertheless, US leverage over agenda-setting is still under a test. The United States tried to bring out real security issue, such as South China Sea tension, into discussion in ARF, ADMM Plus, and EAS. Even many member countries followed up and echoed US positions, issues with great sensitivity were still not able to be inked in the final official documents. For instance, Clinton’s remarks on South China Sea at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum and other following regional meetings have intensified discussions of hard security issues in regional security forums. At the first ADMM Plus, although China sought to keep discussions of the South China Sea off the agenda, the conflict was constantly mentioned by ministers of the US, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam and several other Southeast Asian states. It seems that the consensus rule of modus
operandi in regional mechanism still prevented the topic of South China Sea from being addressed in either the chairman statement or the joint statement of the meetings.
While principle of non-intervention and consensus decision making remain essential, progresses of moving regional institutions from talk shops toward more result-oriented mechanisms have been made. The United States has a longtime record of criticizing the ineffectiveness of ASEAN-way in the process of regional institutional building. Producing effective outcomes became a working goal of US return to regional multilateralism. It has supported approaches of achieving “real, tangible solutions to shared problems" with emphasis of capacity building of regional partners. For instance, the first live field exercise ever conducted in ARF was the Voluntary Demonstration of Response on Disaster Relief in the Philippines on May 4-8, 2009. It was originally a US initiative. In ARF Vision paper adopted in 2009, ministers did pledge to make the ARF “an action-oriented mechanism that develops concrete and effective responses to the common challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region.
In terms of dynamics of regional institutional building, ASEAN has indeed been consolidated in preventing U.S.-China interests rivalry from turning into tensions. The United States acknowledges that ASEAN is the core of institution building and modifies its opinions about ASEAN way in recent. America started to soften its longtime criticism on ASEAN's efficacy. Instead, the U.S. now recognized that ASEAN's consensus rules of decision-making indeed empower ASEAN's dominant role in setting agenda. In a press statement by the U.S. Department of State on August 3, 2012, it further endorsed ASEAN efforts to build a principles-based mechanism for managing and preventing disputes.
Concluding Remarks
Some argue that US never left Asia why emphasizing its returning to Asia? The United States only need an Asian Strategy to promote its interests in the region. It will be helpful to clarify that what the US missed was the participation in regional institutional building, not the political or security presences or influence. With US’s more active participation, new elements can be found in Asian regionalism, but it is clear that it is not New Regionalism yet.
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On economic agenda, ASEAN and is partners have established pathways which link trade liberalization and facilitation with regulatory reform, and economic integration to narrowing development gaps. This is most clearly illustrated in the Comprehensive Asian Development Plan and the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan. In other words, the agenda is about regional integration, not trade. It is concerned with establishing regional rules and processes that give assurance that cross-border business generates regional economic welfare. The US has to adapt to this ASEAN-led approach to trade and economic integration in order to be influential in regional integration.
The United States certainly welcome ASEAN's support to push forward its interests in the region. ASEAN, however, would not fully support the US without taking China's position into account. As a result, functional cooperation of non-traditional security issues has been commonly acceptable agenda to all parties, while hard security issues can only be addressed in speeches of individual countries or off-record discussions. Nevertheless, projects regarding capacity building needed for functional security cooperation have to be in line with the non-intervention principle and on a voluntary base. With that, a full scale of regional preparedness to cope with transnational security threats remains a policy challenge.
科技部補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表
日期:2015/10/29科技部補助計畫
計畫名稱: 東協在美國亞太戰略的地位：美國菁英認知的影響 計畫主持人: 李瓊莉 計畫編號: 102-2410-H-004-165-MY2 學門領域: 國際關係無研發成果推廣資料
102年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表
計畫主持人：李瓊莉 計畫編號：102-2410-H-004-165-MY2 計畫名稱：東協在美國亞太戰略的地位：美國菁英認知的影響 成果項目 量化 單位 備註（質化說明 ：如數個計畫共 同成果、成果列 為該期刊之封面 故事...等） 實際已達成 數（被接受 或已發表） 預期總達成 數（含實際 已達成數） 本計畫實 際貢獻百 分比 國內 論文著作 期刊論文 0 0 100% 篇 研究報告/技術報告 0 0 100% 研討會論文 0 0 100% 專書 0 0 100% 章/本 專利 申請中件數 0 0 100% 件 已獲得件數 0 0 100% 技術移轉 件數 0 0 100% 件 權利金 0 0 100% 千元 參與計畫人力 （本國籍） 碩士生 3 4 75% 人次 博士生 0 0 100% 博士後研究員 1 1 100% 專任助理 0 0 100% 國外 論文著作 期刊論文 0 0 100% 篇 研究報告/技術報告 0 0 100% 研討會論文 2 2 100% 專書 0 0 100% 章/本 專利 申請中件數 0 0 100% 件 已獲得件數 0 0 100% 技術移轉 件數 0 0 100% 件 權利金 0 0 100% 千元 參與計畫人力 （外國籍） 碩士生 0 0 100% 人次 博士生 0 0 100% 博士後研究員 0 0 100% 專任助理 0 0 100% 其他成果 （無法以量化表達之 成果如辦理學術活動 、獲得獎項、重要國 際合作、研究成果國 際影響力及其他協助 產業技術發展之具體 效益事項等，請以文 無成果項目 量化 名稱或內容性質簡述 科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目 測驗工具(含質性與量性) 0 課程/模組 0 電腦及網路系統或工具 0 教材 0 舉辦之活動/競賽 0 研討會/工作坊 0 電子報、網站 0 計畫成果推廣之參與（閱聽）人數 0
