Confucius practices what he teaches, he is considered by some scholars to be an artist himself.220 Kant on the contrary, as Christian Wenzel likes to say, never teaches his own philosophy, but only ideas of others in the academia: there are notes of Kant's lectures by his students on anthropology or logic, but there are no such notes on transcendental philosophy. Confucius is without doubt a musician. Thus, it is not a wonder that many specialists in Confucian aesthetics claim the unity of beauty and ethics in the Analects.221 Kant on the contrary wants only ''a possible pedagogical link between aesthetics and ethics.''222 Wenzel sees the distinction between beauty and ethics in the Analects through the conception of mei (beauty).223 Fu and Wang separate beauty in Confucius through the conception of music (yue).224
220 Chi Yun Chang (2013), Confucianism: A Modern Interpretation, (tr) Orient Lee, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co, Zhejiang University Press, p. 196.
221 Fu and Wang present the views by scholars who see the convergence of beauty and good in Confucius' thought. Fu and Wang oppose this view, and it seems quite reasonable. See Fu Xiaowei and Wang Yi (2015), ‘Confucius on the
Relationship of Beauty and Goodness’ in The Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 49 (1), pp. 68-69.
222 Zvi Tauber (2006), ‘Aesthetic Education for Morality: Schiller and Kant’ in The Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 40 (3), p. 23.
223 Christian H. Wenzel (2006), ‘Beauty in Kant and confucius: A first step’ in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 33 (1), p. 99.
224 Fu Xiaowei and Wang Yi (2015), ‘Confucius on the Relationship of Beauty and Goodness’ in The Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 49 (1).
According to the opponents of Wang, Wenzel and Fu, goodness and beauty are merged in Confucianism as ''the supposed unity of beauty and goodness, or meishan
heyi (美善合—).''
225 In a sense, such an idea has a deep root in Confucian deontology:accordingly to the Analects one must not only be moral but also practice arts. Thus, 8: 8, for example, says:
子曰，興於詩。立於禮。成於樂。
The Master said, "It is by the Odes that the mind is aroused. It is by the Rules of Propriety that the character is established. It is from Music that the finish is received."
In Kant, only ethical cultivation is a must and aesthetic cultivation is optional. In Confucianism, according to Eric C. Mullis, arts “were seen as instrumental in actualizing two interrelated social ends: self-cultivation and social harmony.” For Confucius, nobody can be moral (junzi 君 子 ) without practicing fine arts. For Kant nobody can be sure he is moral and any deed leaves enough space for a doubt. Allison's indirect 'beauty duty' is not nearly so strong as the ethico-aesthetic obligation in the
Analects.
Commonsensically, people do not demand of others to be both, moral and artistic.
The creative abilities, strong enough for fine arts, are not something everyone has.
Confucius is not interested in the whole of the humanity, but only in the noble ones (junzi). Originally his morality is not for everyone. It is hard to find a commoner in the
Analects. In fact the opposition of the noble one, junzi and a base one, xiaoren 小 人
225 Fu Xiaowei and Wang Yi (2015), ‘Confucius on the Relationship of Beauty and Goodness’ in The Journal of Aesthetic Education, 49 (1), p. 68.
(literally 'a little man')226 reminds us of feudal Europe, where ethical negativity is linked with the lower social strata: the word villain comes from the Latin villanus, which designates someone who works at the villa (as opposed to 'good' or 'chivalrous' knight).227 The same usage of xiaoren as a commoner can be found in the Analects, 12: 19:
季康子問政於孔子曰: 「如殺無道，以就有道，
何如？」孔子對曰: 「子為政，焉用殺？子欲 善，而民善矣。君子之德風，小人之德草。草 上之風，必偃。」
Yan Yuan: Ji Kang asked Confucius about government, saying, "What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?"
Confucius replied, "Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass.
The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it."
Xiaoren 小人 is translated as the 'inferiors' by Legge, which is logical in a context
of a political advise in 12: 19. Perhaps, there are other ways to understand it. Thus, Edward Slingerland, for example, translates xiaoren as 'petty person', but this translation contradicts the context of a political advise.228226 There are a lot of places where junzi is ethically contrasted with xiaoren: 2: 14, 4: 11, 4: 16, 6: 13, 7: 37, 12: 16, etc.
227 See the entry ‘villain’ in Oxford Concise Dictionary of English Etymology (ed) Terry F. Hoad (2000), Shanghai:
Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, p. 526.
228 See The Essential Analects: Selected Passages with Traditional Commentary, (tr) Edward Slingerland (2003),
On the other hand, there are passages which do not line up with meishan heyi ('the supposed unity of beauty and goodness'). Wenzel shows how Confucius separates beauty and goodness in 3: 25229. The notion of 'beauty' se 色 is separated from virtue de 德 in the passages 9: 18 and 15: 13. There Confucius complains that he has not seen one who loves virtue as he loves se.230 In Kantian perspective a better understanding of se can be not 'beauty' but an 'interested satisfaction' since se seems to be necessary related to an interest. Se is originally related to a healthy color of a face, but already in the Analects it has an additional meaning of sexual attractiveness, like in haose ( 好 色 , 'be fond of women').231 An extrapolation of the distinction of (1) 3: 25 and that in (2) 9: 18 and 15:
13 can give a structurally higher distinction between free beauty and unfree satisfaction which is so important for Kant and for modern aesthetics in general.
Is the distinction between ethics and aesthetics necessary? Wenzel compares ethics and aesthetics to two human legs, which are both important to walking. Moreover, ''[i]f we have two separate sources there is more chance for reflection, correction, and mutual enrichment.''232 On the other hand, it seems to be crucial for us not to take as merely subjectively relevant things of absolute value. Ecology is a good example. This is why ethical matters should not be taken for aesthetic ones. On the other hand, one should not force another subject to decide what is up to another subject as an autonomous being.
So, one should not force someone else to accept something as beautiful. It is why aesthetic matters should not be taken for ethical ones.
However, the reading of 3: 25, 9: 18 and 15: 13 as a fundamental separation of good
Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, p. 134.
229 Christian H. Wenzel (2006), ‘Beauty in Kant and confucius: A first step’ in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vpl. 33 (1), p. 98.
230 Legge translates se in both passages as 'beauty'.
231 See entry ‘sè’ in ABC Etymological Dictionary of Old Chinese, (ed) Axel Schuessler (2006), Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p. 451.
232 Christian H. Wenzel (2019), ‘Aesthetic Education in Confucius, Xunzi, and Kant’ in Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy, (eds) Hans Feger, Xie Dikun, and Wang Ge, Berlin: de Gruyter, p. 69.
and beautiful contradicts the spirit of Confucianism: the demand to be artistic in order to be worthy. The good and the beauty are separated but linked as a cause and an effect.
From a Confucian standpoint, without art people cannot be moral. Thus, passage 8: 8 teaches that only from music 'the finish is received'. A cause is not an effect, but such relations between art and beauty limit the autonomy of taste. If one must be moral, and morality is unequivocal, only one unequivocal standard of beauty is possible. Thus, the melodies of Zheng (鄭聲) should be banished (15: 11). A complete distinction of ethics and aesthetics cannot be found in Confucius, and it is an important feature of the
Analects.
However, if the complete distinction of ethics and aesthetics in the Analects is dubious, the beginning of such a distinction is palpable. If aesthetics of the Analects isn't autonomous, ethics definitely reaches this level. Thus, even if Confucius directly demands 'do not violate ritual in any way' (12: 1), he also stresses that 'becoming a person of associated humanity is self-originating (youji 由 已 ). How could it originate from another?' (12: 1).233
There are also moments, when the Analects are close to the autonomy of taste. Thus, there is an analogy of Confucian harmony (he 和 ) and free play. In Wenzel's account, harmony as a ground of beauty in the 1: 12 mirrors the ''image of the harmony in the free play of our cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding, which Kant points out and upon which he builds his aesthetic theory.''234 The same can be said in regard of the universal communicability of the state of mind, a necessary element for Kantian aesthetics. Thus, Behuniak claims that ''so long as one's sentiment remains consonant with the fund of recognizable human sentiments, one can be vigorous in one's
233 Quoted as in James jr. Behuniak (2008), ‘Confucius on form and uniqueness’ in Confucius Now: Contemporary Encounters with the Analects, (ed) David Jones, Chicago: Open Court, p. 52.
234 Christian H. Wenzel (2006), ‘Beauty in Kant and confucius: A first step’ in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 33 (1), p. 100.
uniqueness without swerving into perversity or insignificance. As Confucius says:
'Although the songs are three hundred in number, they can be covered in one expression:
'Go vigorously without swerving' (2: 2)''.235
However, Confucius views the art of the Zhou dynasty as an ideal and deviations from it should not be tolerated. Confucius demands the melodies of Zheng ( 鄭聲) to be banished (15: 11). Moreover, according to Shiji, Confucius demands a brutal punishment of the musicians for the performance of ritual music that differs from the standard of the Zhou dynasty.236 All these lead to the conclusion that the idea of beauty in the Analects is not completely pure in the Kantian sense, but that Confucian beauty is, instead, adherent to the moral ideal.