Kant's theory of the sublime

It is not an exaggeration to say that Avant-garde art theory is founded on Kantian aesthetics. The two classical works in this field, The Theory of the Avant-garde by Renato Poggioli and Peter Bürger's Theory of the Avant-Garde show a Kantian influence. The latter is built on Kantian, Hegelian and Marxist grounds, while the former is more influenced by Nietzsche. Interestingly, the structure of the book by Poggioli consists of 'four moments'. Pogiolli literally repeats the four-moments structure from the

Analytic of the Beautiful from the third Critique. Even earlier, Greenberg in Modernist Painting views Kant as an origin of the whole of Modernism through an analogical

In the more recent literature, Lyotard has revived the interest in the Kantian approach to the Avant-garde art in Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime (1991). Moreover, Kant occupies an important position in modern comparative aesthetics, a young discipline aiming at explaining the aesthetic beauty across the borders. For example, such scholars as Heinz Kimmerle, Antoon Van den Braembussche, Nicole Note,⁴⁴ and Henk

43 Paul Crowther (1985), ‘Greenberg's Kant and the Problem of Modernist Painting’ in The British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 25 (4), p. 317.

44 Antoon Van den Braembussche, Heinz Kimmerle, and Nicole Note (2009), ‘Intercultural Aesthetics: An Introduction’ in Intercultural Aesthetics A Worldview Perspective, (eds) Antoon Van den Braembussche, Heinz Kimmerle, and Nicole Note, New York: Springer. In particular, see the comparison of Indian conception of rasa and Kantian sensus communis in the introduction, pp. 2-3, however, they make a mistake by claiming that according to Kant ''all others should share our aesthetic judgments.'' (p. 2). For Kant it is only ''as if''.

Oosterling⁴⁵ use a Kantian sensus communis for their comparative studies. Since the interpretation of Kant's aesthetics by Derrida and Lyotard, the third Critique receives more and more attention. According to David Ingram,⁴⁶ because of Lyotard's interpretation, Kant's heritage occupies the central role in the debates related to postmodernism in general.

Kant presents his theory of the sublime in §§ 23-29 of the Critique of the Power of

Judgment. He begins it with the transition (Übergang) from the beautiful to the sublime.

The two seem to be close to each other, but also different – the beautiful possesses a special quality of being purposive despite having no particular purpose, while the sublime is 'counter-purposive' or 'inappropriate' (zweckwidrig). It isn't necessary to read Kant to feel that something is sublime, for example Andy Warhol writes that:

[s]ome kind of beauty dwarfs you and makes you feel like an ant next to it. I was once in Mussolini Stadium with all the statues and they were so much bigger than life and I felt just like an ant. I was painting a beauty this afternoon and my paint caught a little bug. I tried to get the paint off the bug and I kept trying until I killed the bug on the beauty's lip. So there was this bug, that could have been a beauty, left on somebody's Up [sic]. That's the way I felt in Mussolini Stadium. Like a bug.⁴⁷

The beautiful strengthens our cognitive powers, while the sublime paralyzes them. It isn't the ocean, which is sublime, but a feeling created by the ocean. The sublime is in

45 Sensus communis in Multi- and Intercultural perspective. On the Possibility of Common Judgements in Arts and Politics, (eds) Heinz Kimmerle and Henk Oosterling (2000), Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann.

46 David Ingram (1992), ‘The Postmodern Kantianism of Arendt and Lyotard’ in Judging Lyotard, (ed) Andrew Benjamin, Warwick: Warwick Studies in Philosophy and Literature, pp. 119-120.

47 Andy Warhol (1975), The Philosophy of Andy Warhol: From A to B and Back Again, New York and London: Harcourt, p. 63.

the eye of the beholder but not completely subjective. ''[T]he sublime – or rather a judgment about it – has a twofold structure, which includes a negative and a positive aspect. The first aspect is unpleasant and contrapurposive (too big, too forceful) for the operation of the imagination, whereas the second aspect (the discovery of the sublime in us) is pleasant and purposive for reason and our moral vocation as a human being.''⁴⁸ It is an important moment to stress, since ''[w]hile moral readings of Kantian sublimity figure prominently in post-Kantian Continental philosophy, none of these readings captures its systematic moral functions, and some of the most influential Continental interpretations of Kantian sublimity ignore or misconstrue its moral dimensions."⁴⁹

Kant separates two kinds of the sublime, the mathematically and the dynamically sublime (5: 248).⁵⁰ The difference is that the mathematically sublime is too big for our cognition, while the dynamically one is too powerful. But the mathematically sublime is not just simply too big, it is absolutely great in a non-comparative way. Or, as Kant puts it: “[t]hat is sublime which even to be able to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses” (5: 251).

The dynamically sublime is also not just powerful in a commonsensical way. For Kant power is a 'capacity' to subdue great obstacles. Dynamically sublime is nature considered in aesthetic judgment as a terrible power, that inflicts no fear, because it is observed from a safe distance (5: 261). By this, nature helps us to discover our higher principles. With these principles for Kant, we can be above any dangerous forces of the physical world. Kant also comments on theology, he tries to show how the virtuous man fears God without being afraid of him (5: 261-262).

Kant discusses sublime phenomena of human psychology. He regards bravery as a

48 Christian H.Wenzel (2005), An Introduction to Kant's Aesthetics: Core Concepts and Problems, Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, p. 107.

49 Joshua Rayman (2012), Kant on Sublimity and Morality, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, pp. 146-147.

50 Unless otherwise noted, the quotes are from Critique of the Power of Judgment, (tr) Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (2000), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

sublime phenomenon (5: 263). Later he introduces his conception of 'enthusiasm,' defined as an idea of the good with an affect. Enthusiasm is another sublime 'state of the mind' (Gemütszustand). Kant excludes from enthusiasm passions as interested. Rage (Zorn) is sublime, but hatred (Haß) is a passion and is not sublime. So-called tender emotions are not sublime, while 'brave emotions' belong to sublimity (5: 273).

Discussing the sublime, Kant does not speak much about the art of his time. It is hard to find other examples than St. Peter's cathedral in Rome and the Egyptian pyramids (5: 253). Instead, Kant discusses nature. However, this fact doesn't endanger the idea of the Avant-garde art as a transition to the aesthetics of the sublime, because Kant simply doesn't know the art of this type. Art at his age is centered around the aesthetics of the beautiful. Avant-garde art, to use Clive Bell's phrasing, shakes hands across the ages, and, in a sense, it is much closer to the pyramids than to the Renaissance and Renaissance-influenced art. Maybe, a transition to the aesthetics of the sublime is a return. If the art of scarification and tattoo which are used to make a human being look like a warrior (5: 231) is sublime, sublime rage of Avant-garde art (or what Poggioli calls the agonist moment of the Avant-garde)⁵¹ truly finds a connotation in the ancient time.

There is a discussion whether such a thing as a 'sublime object' is possible. Thus, Eric Baker denies this possibility because for him ''the essence of sublimity lies in the necessary failure of any attempt at its positive objectification or representation.''⁵² Or, as Derrida puts it ''there cannot, it seems, be a parergon for the sublime''⁵³. But Kant gives objects as examples of the sublime, the Pyramids for instance (5: 253). Baker himself

51 Renato Poggioli (1981), The Theory of the Avant-Garde, (tr) Gerald Fitzgerald, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harward University Press, p. 26.

52 Eric Baker (1998), ‘Fables of the Sublime Kant, Schiller, Kleist’ in MLN, vol. 113 (3), p. 524.

53 Jacques Derrida (1987), The Truth in Painting, (tr) Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 127.

names the two lofty objects central to Kant: starry sky above the subject and moral law inside the subject. For Backer the fact that Kant calls the starry sky and the moral law ''two things'' is a paradox. Because ''neither of which can be taken as objects in any unqualified sense.''⁵⁴ However, Baker's criteria for being an object is not presented.

Moreover, 'an object' does not by default equate with a 'physical object'. The object which evokes the sublime feeling in a viewer is different from the expression of the infinity it creates.

On the other hand it is important not to 'overobjectify' the sublime. Thus, Joshua Rayman in his critique of Backer writes that ''Kant and Schiller both refer at times to an objective sublime, to degrees of sublimity and to the human experience of sublimity.''⁵⁵ Rayman's ''objective sublime'' is not something possible in my reading of Kant, although in other places Rayman mentions ''Kant’s view that sublimity is a subjective phenomenon''⁵⁶. To shorten the argument, ''[t]he object that occasions the sublime''⁵⁷ will be called here 'a sublime object'. But such an object is sublime only in this narrow special sense of an acronym.

For Kant, the sublime demands culture. Otherwise, people will not understand it. To show this, Kant presents a Savoyard peasant's opinion from Voyages dans les Alpes by Horace-Bénédict de Saussure (1740-1799). This peasant has no hesitation in calling all interested in the mountains fools (5: 266). Demand of culture gives rise to a problem, because the sublime judgment should be universal, that is, for everyone. Kant tries to avoid the conflict: the sublime needs culture, but it isn't generated by culture. Instead, the sublime is based on natural, healthy understanding and a predisposition for the moral (Ibid.). This link with morality is crucial. Although the sublime, in contrast to the

54 Eric Baker (1998), ‘Fables of the Sublime Kant, Schiller, Kleist’ in MLN, vol. 113 (3), p. 525.

55 Joshua Rayman (2012), Kant on Sublimity and Morality, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p. 147.

56 Ibid., p. 180.

57 Jean-François Lyotard (1994), Lessons on the Analytic of the sublime: Kant's Critique of judgment, sections 23-29, (tr) Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 237.

beautiful, pleases through resistance to the interest of the senses, they both are meaningful for our 'beauty duty', to use Allison's expression, to the ethical development of the human being. The beautiful prepares us to love and the sublime to esteem (5:

268). At the same time the sublime and beauty push us in opposite directions:

[t]hus, subjective (aesthetic) as well as objective (teleological) purposiveness reveal to us that we are part of nature. The sublime, by contrast, pushes us out of (outer, physical) nature and instead forces us to look into ourselves and our inner nature.⁵⁸

In The Analytic of Sublime Kant also shows how the aesthetic helps us to be less selfish through our sacrifices (Aufopferungen) of interests (5: 272). At the highest theoretical level of Kant's theory of the sublime it has something to do with the negative presentation (negative Darstellung). Kant believes negative presentation to be the only way the moral law can be presented without the danger of 'visionary rapture' (Schwärmerei) (5: 276). Maybe because of this, Kant speaks about the style of nature in the sublime, it's simplicity. But a simplicity of Robinsonades, novels inspired by Daniel Defoe and his Robinson Crusoe (1719), is not accepted (5: 277). In the understanding of Avant-garde art as a transition to the aesthetics of the sublime this simplicity can be viewed as an example to be imitated by the avant-gardists. Avant-garde artists often come close to the poetics of a Robinsonade in imitation of the 'noble savage', like in Dadaist actions or Cubist artwork with African or Austronesian inspiration. Avant-garde art theory based on the sublime has a problem with balancing these two elements: (1) did Avant-garde art succeed in imitating the simplicity of the style of nature in the sublime? Or (2) should they be viewed as 'Robinsonades' and kitsch? These questions

58 Christian Helmut Wenzel (2005), An Introduction to Kant's Aesthetics: Core Concepts and Problems, Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, p. 111.

are presented in the second chapter.

At the end of The Analytic of Sublime, Kant argues with his predecessor in the theory of the sublime, Edmund Burke (1729-1797) (5: 278), and tries to show that Burke's analysis of the sublime needs an a priori principle. Otherwise for Kant judgments of taste cannot have the modality of necessity and its aesthetics will be completely subjective (5: 279).