“It was said that you would destroy the Sith, not join them. It was you who would bring balance to the Force, not leave it in Darkness”7
Anakin Skywalker was believed to be the Chosen One to end the Sith once and for all. Yet, in order to acquire the method to prevent the one he loved from death, he made his choice between Jedi and Sith—and the most powerful Sith knight in the universe he became. While it seemed that there must be something wrong about the prophecy—either that it was false or that Anakin was not the Chosen One—the death of the Sith Lord in the hands of Anakin restored the faith to the prophecy. Perhaps it was really as what Yoda suggested: The prophecy itself might not be wrong, but
―misread.‖ Despite the turbulent process, the prophecy was nevertheless fulfilled in the hands of Anakin Skywalker. Shouldn‘t this fact pleasing and satisfying enough?
Although the witnesses and bystanders of the whole event may be more than willing to accept and welcome this ending, when we think more carefully upon the life and death of Anakin, we might not feel so peaceful about it. We would wonder, if all of his choices and actions were inevitable, were ―determined,‖ how could we hold him responsible for his deeds, even his sacrifice in the end? And if we couldn‘t hold him responsible for all he had done, what was he? A tool for a specific purpose? We don‘t feel comfortable about this idea, not only because this would imply emptiness of Anakin‘s life, but also because this makes us wonder if human beings are just like him, never really possessing ―free will.‖
Sartre asserts, ―[T]here is no sense in life a priori. Life is nothing until it is lived, but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that
7 Quoted from Obi-Wan Kenobi in Star Wars Episode III: Revenge of the Sith. Dir. George Lucas.
Screenplay by George Lucas. Twentieth Century Fox, 2005.
you choose‖ (54). To freely choose your life, to make your own choices, is how your life would be meaningful, for in that way you are the master of yourself. But if free will really doesn‘t exist, as the skeptics claim, would Sartre‘s point still be valid?
Contrary to Sartre‘s view, skeptics contend that it is impossible for a man to be his own master, to be the ―cause of himself.‖ In that way, not only couldn‘t a man ever be held responsible for himself, for what he has done and who he has become, but he couldn‘t be said to possess free will. Actually, the inseparable relationship between free will and responsibility is mutual; one cannot be without the other. To say one has free will, it follows that he must be responsible for himself. To say one is responsible for himself, it is required that he has free will; otherwise the manipulated or behavior engineered people would also be regarded as ―responsible‖ for themselves. In short, the threats brought out by skeptics undermine Sartre‘s view thoroughly: even if God doesn‘t exist, it is still probable that human beings are not free, and if human beings are not free, how can they be responsible for their lives? How can they make their lives meaningful?
Living Without Free Will
While some scholars keep endeavoring to prove that genuine free will exists, their theories are not yet fully tenable against challenges from determinism.8 On the other hand, although contending it is impossible to live with free will in this world, many skeptics argue that living without free will is not as dreadful as many claim it to
8 One example of these inspiring theories is Kane‘s attempt to bring in the modern science of ―chaos.‖
He argues that the combination of chaos and quantum physics in the brain would lead to the temporary screening off from influences of the past when we face difficult ―soul-searching moments,‖ and thus we would be the ultimate cause of our choices in such cases, resulting in our ultimate responsibility for our choices and the following outcomes. However, aren‘t the neurons, as parts of the body, also subject to determinism? If that is the case, how can we ever be sure that we are completely separated from determinism in those soul-searching moments? Despite the problems to be solved, Kane‘s theory still provides a possibility for genuine free will; one should never conclude too hastily. For the detailed discussion, please see: Kane, Robert. ―Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth.‖ The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Ed. Robert Kane. New York: Oxford UP, 2002. 406-37.
be, and they even provide various ways to live meaningfully without free will. The following are three different responses proposed by Ted Honderich, Saul Smilansky, and Derk Pereboom. Their attentions are especially paid to the meaning of life and treatment of crimes.
Ted Honderich9, one of the skeptics, suggests that in the face of the
non-existence of free will, human beings have to give up some important ―life-hopes,‖
such as regarding our successes and accomplishments as being up to us and believing wonderful virtues to be derived from our natures, to the extent that, as Kane puts it,
―we had such characteristics, we would have to admit that we were merely lucky in our heredity and formative circumstances‖ (74). After all, they are never really in our control and thus we can never be responsible for having them. However, some life-hopes still remain. The remaining life-hopes are most of our everyday life-hopes, like desires to fulfill one‘s dream, to meet one‘s true love, to set up a home, and so on.
These hopes that make life meaningful, from the viewpoint of Honderich, ―would not be undermined by the belief that we are not the ‗originating‘ causes of our own characters‖ because ―[w]hat these everyday life-hopes require is only that, if we make the appropriate voluntary efforts, there is a good chance that nothing will prevent us from realizing our cherished goals. Even if our behavior is determined, we cannot know in advance how things are destined to turn out‖ (74). In other words, Honderich urges people to go on living in the same way as they would if free will in the
libertarian sense does exist, for that‘s how the life could still be meaningful.
But this doesn‘t mean that we should deceive ourselves that everything is the same despite the non-existence of free will. As Kane points out,
How does this skeptical view of Honderich‘s differ from compatibilism?
9 The following theory of Ted Honderich is taken from Robert Kane‘s discussion in his A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. 74-75.
Honderich says that compatibilists try to convince us that if determinism were true, nothing of importance would be lost in the way of freedom and responsibility. But this, Honderich thinks, is mistaken. Life-hopes that depend on believing that we are the undetermined originators of our
characters and actions are important to our self-image. We are in fact giving up something important when we take a hard determinist or hard
compatibilist position. We should be honest and not deceive ourselves about that. But enough life-hopes remain . . . to permit us to go on living in
meaningful ways. (75)
Human beings do lose some important life-hopes, especially those in which we consider ourselves to be the ―undetermined originators of our characters and actions.‖
This is inevitable, and we should not pretend nothing has changed.
An insightful point in Honderich‘s theory is worth mentioning: Even though our choices and actions are determined, what lies before us is still unknown. Indeed, unlike fatalism, which suggests that whatever is going to happen will definitely happen no matter what we do, determinism doesn‘t prescribe this consequence. The future is influenced and formed by the agent‘s choices and actions, and there is no definite future waiting for the agent. The fact that what an agent does is determined by the past and laws of nature only entails that what the agent does is inevitable, never that he is determined for a future, for no future would be formed until the agent arrives at the moment concerned. Most significantly, what an agent would do at a moment depends on the interweaving chains of cause and effect; one can only
―experience‖ what happens when the moment comes, never ―foretelling.‖ Anakin‘s case can serve as an example. Even if his wish to save his wife from death was determined by his character and actions, no one, even Anakin himself, would ever know in advance what he would do when he had to choose between the Jedi and the
Sith. It is only from retrospection that we understand his joining the Sith was inevitable.
A direct question toward the acceptance of the skeptical view of free will is that, how can we deal with criminal behavior if it is agreed that no one can ever be
responsible for his actions? Honderich contends, we have to give up the ―retribution theory of punishment,‖ which suggests ―punishment of criminal behavior is right because it is deserved. The criminal has done wrong and must repay in kind for the wrong inflicted‖ (Kane 75; emphasis original). This retribution theory of punishment must be abandoned, because how would anyone truly ―deserve‖ the punishment for his actions if no one could be considered ultimately blameworthy for his wrongdoing?
But criminal behavior is still a problem, even if everyone concedes that no one is ultimately responsible for his deeds. After all, crimes threaten lives of others, and a society in which anyone can harm whoever he wants to with no consequences to face is just too ridiculous. According to Honderich, while we have to give up the
retribution theory, it doesn‘t signify we have to stop punishing criminals as well.
Punishment has every reason to exist. We should not punish criminal for retribution‘s sake, but we should punish them to ensure safety and peace. Whereas retribution is not a legitimate motive where there is no free will, there are alternative justifications of punishment that remain valid and effective. The most common two alternative justifications are ―deterrence‖ and ―reform‖ (or ―rehabilitation). Deterrence puts the emphasis not only on preventing criminal from committing crimes in the future, but also on preventing other people from committing similar crimes. As Kane puts it, ―We also punish criminals to discourage them from committing future crimes and, even more important, we punish them to deter other persons from committing similar crimes‖ (75). For similar purposes, reform or rehabilitation is, as its name suggests, to do the best to change the thoughts and attitudes of the criminals so that they would be
productive members of the society once they are released from prison.
Both deterrence and reform are legitimate motives for punishment even if free will doesn‘t exist, according to Honderich. ―So we need not fear that our prisons would be emptied if everyone came to believe that people lack free will‖ (75). It is Honderich‘s idea that once we accept the truth that human beings do not possess free will, we would make more efforts on the prevention of crimes via deterrence and reform rather than try to amend for what has already happened via revenge. Contrary to the worries that no society would be appropriate to live without the belief in free will, societies could actually be better with our putting emphasis on proper notions.
While Honderich suggests that human beings should live as if free will exists, Saul Smilansky takes a more radical position, claiming that human beings must live with the illusion of free will to ensure the integrity of responsibility.
Smilansky begins with the aspect of moral innocence to describe how a civilized moral order would be undermined if the fact that no one has free will becomes a widespread belief. He says, ―Even in a world without libertarian free will, the idea that only those who deserve to be punished in light of their free actions may be punished is a condition for any civilized moral order‖ (498). Punishment for those who does not deserve to be punished—such as those who didn‘t perform the act and those who did without control over their acts (with a gun pointing at the head, for instance)—are on the other hand considered unfair. The senses of justice and injustice don‘t require the idea of libertarian free will; what they need is the idea that
punishment should only be for those who deserve it, just as what the retribution theory of punishment prescribes. It is this idea that makes any moral system function well, not the libertarian free will. However, if our lacking the libertarian free will is internalized, the moral system would be in serious danger, for no one would ever be responsible for his wrong doing, since no one could ever be responsible for himself.
―Guilt‖ would lose its meaning.
The effects would be that notions of ―good and evil,‖ ―right and wrong,‖ and
―innocent and guilty‖ would serve no purposes once the view of hard determinism is prevalent. Morality would then only exist in name. For every civilized society, the sense of morality is a necessity; otherwise how could a society be ―civilized‖?
Therefore, to preserve morality, responsibility has to be first upheld; and to uphold responsibility, the idea that no one can ever be really responsible for their acts must be absent. Smilansky points out, ―Psychologically, the attribution of responsibility to people so that they may be said to justly deserve gain or loss for their actions requires (even after the act) the absence of the notion that the act is an unavoidable outcome of the way things were—that it is ultimately beyond anyone‘s control‖ (498; emphasis original). This is what he calls the ―Present Danger of Future Retrospective Excuse.‖
And he further contends:
To put it bluntly: people as a rule ought not to be fully aware of the ultimate inevitability of what they have done, for this will affect the way in which they hold themselves responsible. . . . We often want a person to blame himself, feel guilty and even see that he deserves to be punished. Such a person is not likely to do all this if he internalizes the ultimate hard determinist perspective, according to which . . . he could not strictly have done anything else except what he did do (498-99).
Smilansky‘s point is that, if most people take the hard determinist view, while some may become more humane and considerate in treating others on account of
understanding that no one could be ultimately responsible for their deeds, most people would just become more selfish and take ultimate hard determinist perspective as an excuse for their immoral actions. Without the ethical foundation, the stability of civilized societies would be in severe danger. As Kane indicates, ―Only force and fear
of punishment would keep people from breaking the law. As one of America‘s founders, James Madison, argues in Federalist Paper 10, if society has no ethical foundation, the law alone will not protect us‖ (78).
In addition to threat to responsibility and thus to the society, Smilansky points out another danger which is associated with the individual. People seek to find meanings in their lives, but with hard determinist view, this vital purpose is
impossible to achieve. Not only would all people, regardless of the efforts and pains and sacrifices, be morally equal and in no way to generate any ―real‖ moral values, but the notion of moral self-respect would also die out under the ultimate hard determinist perspective:
There is a sense in which our notion of moral self-respect, which is intimately connected with our view of our choices, actions, and
achievements, withers when we accept the ultimate perspective. From the latter any sense of moral achievement disappears, as even the actions of the
―moral hero‖ are simply an unfolding of what he happens to be. No matter how devoted he has been, how much effort he has put in, how many tears he has shed, how many sacrifices he has willingly suffered. (Smilansky 499;
emphases original)
If whatever a person has done and will do is just a determined product, how can anyone say there is meaning in his life? The same feeling strikes us while Anakin‘s free will is in doubt. If all of his efforts, sacrifices, sufferings, tears and blood are mere determined products, even though he saved his son and even restored the
balance of the Force, nothing makes his life ―worthy,‖ for nothing can be attributed to him. ―True appreciation, deeply attributing matters to someone in a sense that will make him worthy, is impossible if we regard him and his efforts as merely determined products‖ (499). This loss of moral value and moral self-respect is called by him as
the ―Danger of Worthiness.‖ Compared with being moral agents, finding one‘s
meaning in life is no less vital for anyone. As Smilansky puts it, ―[T]he concern is not only to get people to function adequately as moral agents; it also has to do with the very meaning we can find in our lives‖ (499).
The third danger that would follow the internalization of hard determinism is related to the individual as well. This time, the attention is paid to a significant notion:
remorse. Unlike Sartre, who considers remorse to be an irresponsible reaction to one‘s free choice, Smilansky contends remorse is actually connected with one‘s sense of moral responsibility. ―Feelings of remorse are inherently tied to the person‘s self-perception as a morally responsible agent‖ (499). That‘s why to think a person would still feel remorse once he realizes all of his choices in life are beyond his control is unreasonable: to feel remorse for things that one is not responsible for just doesn‘t make sense. ―In retrospect, her life, her decisions, that which is most truly her own, appear to be accidental phenomena of which she is the mere vehicle, and to feel moral remorse for any of it, by way of truly owning up to it, seems in some deep sense to be misguided‖ (499; emphases original).
To be a man of integrity, therefore, the feeling of repentance must be maintained.
To be a man of integrity, therefore, the feeling of repentance must be maintained.