A Jedi will come To destroy the Sith And bring balance to the Force1
The two scenes in Star Wars that leave lasting impressions are when Anakin Skywalker chose to ally himself with the Sith Lord in Episode III, and when Darth Vader—the name given to the fallen Skywalker—chose to sacrifice himself to save his son in Episode VI. Viewers are obsessed with these scenes, not only because they served the turning points of the whole story, but because they stimulate our deep concerns about choice. In the end, beneath the seemingly gratifying redemption of Anakin, there was turbulence ready to overthrow the tranquility. Recalling the prophecy, we wonder, ―Did he make the choices out of his free will, or was he
manipulated by the mysterious Force all his life?‖ The question is like a splinter in our mind, for free will is not only about the freedom to do things we want, but also about whether we can be responsible for ourselves, which is a crux for a meaningful life.
Jean-Paul Sartre is one of the most ardent advocators of free will. In his work Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre expounds his ideas about freedom, choice, and responsibility, which could serve as a starting point for the discussion of free will.
Existentialism and Humanism
Throughout his life, Anakin Skywalker made several crucial choices, each having profound and significant influences not only on himself, but also on others, especially those surrounding him. Human beings face the same situation. Choices are
1 Windham, Ryher. Star Wars Jedi vs. Sith: The Essential Guide to the Force. New York: Del Rey, 2007. 205.
inevitable, and one‘s choices are often not just about oneself.
The ability to choose, or more specifically, the ―freedom‖ to choose, is a
significant feature, as Jean-Paul Sartre contends, that marks humans as ―free‖ beings.
In his Existentialism and Humanism, the freedom of man is delineated under the premise that God doesn‘t exist. As Sartre articulates the tenet as thus, ―Dostoievsky once wrote ‗If God did not exist, everything would be permitted‘ . . . Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself‖ (33-4). Out of this atheistic premise derives the ―absolute freedom‖ of man. Freedom is vital in Sartre‘s philosophy because only on the ground of freedom can man become his own master, shaping his life and giving it meaning by himself. Having no predestined purpose or meaning to fulfill, man is free to choose and to make his life according to his will. As Julian Baggini puts it, ―If God does not exist, humanity has no creator, and if it has no creator it has no predetermined essence. Rather, humanity first exists, and then as its self awareness increases, the individual confronts herself, and is able to choose, to will for herself her own nature, purposes and values‖ (118). In other words, Sartre‘s absolute freedom is the absolute freedom ―of will.‖ Only with this absolute freedom of will can one choose what actions he would take.
When Sartre‘s says ―existence comes before essence‖ (26; emphasis original), he clearly has in mind this absolute freedom. He says, ―What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards‖ (28). Christine Daigle gives a more elaborate account, specifying man‘s infinite possibilities coming along with his absolute freedom. She explicates that, ―One can define a human being only provisionally as this human being lives. For, there is always a chance that this person will change radically. However, once life is over, once one ceases to exist, one can be
defined, and this definition will be true forever‖ (51). That is to say, man is always in the process of making himself. He continues to be an existence and only at the moment of death does he become an essence. The possibility of a change or changes, even if they are not ―radical,‖ indicates that no determined human nature is in an individual. Whatever and whoever he wills to be always depend upon his freedom to choose; his ―nature‖ is only created by himself.
According to Sartre, following the non-existence of God, not only is there no determined nature in individuals, but no universal human nature: ―[T]here is no
human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is‖ (28).
Therefore, human ―values,‖ including moral values, are created along with one‘s essence, rather than ―being there‖ for human beings to follow. For this reason, Sartre is against the so called ―secular morality,‖ which claims that even if God doesn‘t exist, there must always be a priori values inscribed in an intelligible heaven in order for this world to be moral and law-abiding. This is the view taken by the traditional humanists, who argue that ―though God did not exist, or is nor worth believing in, there could still be a prior moral values which society could follow. Removing God would thus leave our moral framework more or less intact‖ (Baggini 122).
However, Sartre believes that fading with God are also the a priori values, a point where his existential humanism differs from traditional humanism. He contends:
The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that ―the good‖ exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. (33)
Without any preset values to confine human beings‘ choices to a certain ground,
human beings, even if they don‘t like it, can only exercise their freedom to ―invent‖
the values most suitable for them. Values are connected with human essence; both are yet to be created by each individual. This ―subjectivity‖ in inventing values is crucial in Sartre‘s thoughts, for it distinguishes man from other objects. As Baggini says, ―It is the fact that humans possess a subjective life which marks them out from other things and places on them responsibility for what they are‖ (119).
While being absolute free means human beings can choose without limits, it at the same time makes them have nothing to lean upon except for themselves. This state of ―abandonment‖ puts human beings in ―despair,‖ the state in which human beings can find no one to rely upon and no a priori values to follow; they can only ―act without hope‖ (39). ―Hope‖ here means the ―hope that things will come to pass
without our making them so‖ (Baggini 125). Human beings cannot rely upon any kind of such hope, since there is no God and no universal human nature—since they are absolutely free. The seemingly paradoxical result is that, human beings must ―limit‖
themselves to things he can be sure of, that is, what one can achieve through one‘s action.
While the argument that one has to limit oneself even though he has absolute freedom sounds paradoxical, it in fact is not. The point is, it is true that with absolute freedom, one can definitely choose to depend upon people or things that are not completely known to him, but beyond this ―choosing,‖ none is sure to him anymore.
To spend one‘s freedom on people or things one has no complete control is to waste one‘s freedom. The freedom ought to be spent on what one can be sure of, and that is one‘s action. As Sartre articulates, ―[O]ne does not rely upon any possibilities beyond those that are strictly concerned in one‘s action. Beyond the point at which the
possibilities under consideration cease to affect my action, I ought to disinterest myself‖ (39). Here we can see the link between the absolute freedom of will and
actions. It is because one has the freedom of will that his actions are under his control.
Without the absolute free will, even what one does cannot be what one is sure of.
That is the situation human beings face in this world: absolute freedom within oneself, with nothing and no one to cling to. Thus, when Sartre claims ―man is condemned to be free‖ (34), it has at least two layers of meaning. One the one hand,
―we are born without any say in the matter (hence condemned), but thereafter free to choose our own destiny‖(Baggini 122). On the other hand, no matter we like it or not, freedom is something we cannot deny, which is a real trouble for those who are used to the guidance of God. As Daigle puts it, ―freedom is not something that we can escape. It is a fundamental structure of the for-self: we are as free‖ (49).
Coming along with the absolute freedom is the ―absolute responsibility,‖ which concerns not just oneself, but also to other men. Sartre argues,
If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. (29)
How is it that man is responsible for all men? Because, according to Sartre, when one chooses for himself, he simultaneously chooses for all men. The reason is, when a person chooses what actions he will take and what values he will endorse in order to make himself the man he wants to be, he is also shaping an ―image of man‖ in
accordance to his ideal image. His responsibility thus spreads out to all men. As Sartre says,
If, moreover, existence precedes essence and we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire
epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole. . . . I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man. (29-30) Facing several options, why we choose one way rather than the other is because we affirm the value of what is chosen. Although we cannot hope that all the other persons would do as we did when facing similar situations since there is no universal human nature, al least we can hope that our chosen actions would set up examples, examples that may have ripple effects.
What ensues from the absolute responsibility is ―anguish,‖ which is the anxiety one feels when facing a choice, owing to the realization that when he chooses he chooses for all. Sartre claims, ―When a man commits himself to anything, fully
realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole mankind—in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility‖ (30). The realization of the thorough responsibility causes anguish, and furthermore, since no one can ever avoid choices, no one can ever be rid of anguish. Those who do not show such anxiety are either ―disguising their anguish or are in flight from it‖ (30), according to Sartre.
Sartre cites the story of Abraham, called ―the anguish of Abraham‖ by Kierkegaard, to exemplify the unavoidable anguish. Abraham hesitated upon the message from an angel who told him to immolate his son. This was God‘s command;
the angel told him so. Not knowing whether the angel was really an angel, whether the message was really from the divine, and whether he was really ―that‖ Abraham to perform this task, Abraham could only decide all by himself. He must choose. The anguish derives not only from the fact that his choice would change his son‘s life, but also from the fact that in choosing he would be setting examples for all the mankind
to follow. As Sartre puts it,
If a voice speaks to me, it is still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel. If I regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who choose to say that it is good and not bad. There is nothing to show that I am Abraham: nevertheless I also am obliged at every instance to perform actions which are examples. Everything happens to every man as though the whole human race had its eyes fixed upon what he is doing and regulated its conduct accordingly‖ (31-2).
Because of this the absolute responsibility for mankind, when making a choice, one should always ask oneself what would happen if everyone does the same as one is doing, rather than deceiving oneself that his choice has only to do with himself. In other words, being free, a person must always ask himself, ―Am I really a man who has the right to act in such manner that humanity regulates itself by what I do?‖(32).
Only by keeping one‘s absolute freedom in mind and facing one‘s anguish can one be a truly responsible person.
However, this anguish is too heavy a burden that many seek to cut themselves from it by denying its source: absolute freedom. They deny their freedom by claiming that their acts and choices are determined by factors beyond their control. In Sartre‘s words, they appeal to ―bad faith,‖ embracing values prescribed by God, for instance, or seeking excuses from determinism. While Sartre has articulated the non-existence of God to ensure man‘s freedom in the very beginning, how about determinism, the belief, in short, that every thing has a cause and nothing can escape the cause-effect relation, including human beings? As he denies the existence of God, Sartre simply denies determinism. ―[T]here is no determinism—man is free, man is freedom‖ (34;
emphasis original). Sartre doesn‘t think anything would undermine man‘s absolute freedom, and thus he despises those who attempt to hide from it. Such people are
―cowards‖ in his eyes. He says, ―Those who hide from this total freedom, in a guise of solemnity or with deterministic excuses, I shall call cowards‖ (52).
To this point, Sartre‘s main ideas are linked in this way: since God and
determinism don‘t exist, human beings have absolute freedom (of the will); deriving from the absolute freedom is absolute responsibility, in the sense that when one chooses, one chooses for all; this responsibility for all men causes anguish, the necessary pain for free men to endure. However, Sartre‘s freedom isn‘t without boundaries. Some argue that, even if it is true that human beings possess the absolute freedom of the will so that we can choose without constrains, there are still limits put on us, limits that are not under our control—namely, the ―condition‖ that humans are born with. The external limitations caused by the human condition can be divided into two kinds. There are variable historical limitations, such as being born as a slave or as a king, a proletarian or a bourgeois, and born on a country or a desert. And there are invariable ones like our mortality and physical needs.
But is the human condition ―obstacle‖ to our freedom? Not necessarily. One must note that, while these external limitations are beyond our control so that they define each man‘s fundamental situation a priori, this doesn‘t mean that they are completely foreign matters to us and thus invade and threaten our freedom. According to Sartre, the human condition, or the limits put on humans, is not only objective, but also subjective. ―Objective, because we meet with them everywhere and they are everywhere recognizable; and subjective because they are lived and are nothing if man does not live them—if, that is to say, he does not freely determine himself and his existence in relation to them‖ (46; emphasis original). In other words, these limits are objective because they apply to everyone, and subjective because our freedom of the will has to work in relation with them. It is the latter—the subjectivity of the human condition—that make human beings inseparable from the limits, either in a
good way, or in a bad way.
Because of these limits on us, our choices of how to live them can be totally different. One the one hand, we can be more positive in pursuing our purposes if we
―choose to‖. It‘s true that there are external limitations on us, but our will is still absolutely free; we can still be masters of ourselves. If one chooses to surpass the limits, not only would his condition be no hindrance to him, but it can be a drive pushing him further toward his purposes. For example, though young Anakin was born a slave and lived on a desert planet, he never gave up his dream to become a Jedi.
Rather, these limits make him a person who seized every opportunity, and that‘s the major reason why his encounter with Qui-Gon became ―fatal.‖ On the other hand, not every one has the resolution to exercise his freedom on the limits; some just choose to succumb to them and give up pursuing his purposes, either from an early stage of life, or from a later occasion of thwarting. They disclaim their freedom in this way.
Therefore, what those limits would be to an individual‘s freedom hinges on what he ―chooses‖ to live them. They can be impetus or impediment, all depending on human beings‘ freedom of the will. Sartre says, ―[E]very human purpose presents itself as an attempt either to surpass these limitations, or to widen them, or else to deny or to accommodate oneself to them‖ (46). The human conditions themselves don‘t deprive human beings of their absolute freedom; it‘s humans themselves who would choose to surrender it to the limitations, just as some surrender it to God or determinism.
Bringing out the human condition, Sartre‘s absolute freedom becomes more realistic and understandable. After all, even with the absolute freedom of the will, one still cannot do whatever he wills to do. While the various historical limitations could
Bringing out the human condition, Sartre‘s absolute freedom becomes more realistic and understandable. After all, even with the absolute freedom of the will, one still cannot do whatever he wills to do. While the various historical limitations could