the knowledge we have of the ‘other’ is through the linguistic realization of texts where the narrative element focuses on power relations and social constructions. To quote Stijn Jove:
Discourses create representations of the world that reflect as well as actively construct reality by ascribing meanings to our world, identities and social relations.
3
Social constructionist methodologies also require ‘discourse’ to be empirically dissected within its social context. In other words, “a discourse captures a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world).”4 CDA is to be seen as both the ‘method’
and ‘object.’ By analyzing structural relationships CDA reveals the real from the opaque and makes transparent issues that have the fog of uncertainty wrapped around them.
To establish a frame of reference to study Sino-‐Indian relations, this essay adopts a flexible experimental methodology where a primary condition is that of changes in one variable influencing change in another. Further, the variables display a tendency to morph into intervening variables. Supplementing this approach, the important correlates influencing discourse on Sino-‐Indian relations are ‘historical dimensions’, ‘sociopolitical contexts’,
‘ideological bases’, ‘power relations,’ ‘domestic politics,’ and ‘economic performance.’ These are in evidence as a constantly running sub-‐script to the narrative in this essay. There is no absolute and all-‐encompassing theoretical approach for a dynamic social science discipline like international relations and one shortcoming of CDA is that it perhaps overemphasizes the role of the ‘prevalent language’ influencing a discourse (political, popular and academic) and hence indirectly contributes to the creation of a construct or a “discursive structure” that dramatizes events socially, politically and lexically.5
II) Political Variables*
Boundary dispute
For most nation-‐states, especially China and India, a boundary is more than just a territorial extremity expressing the haloed virtues of sovereignty. To most countries, “boundaries demarcate physical space, enclose political identities and distinguish other categories such as ethnic identity and the prevalence of social groups.”6 A ‘boundary’ is not only the ‘frontier’ but
3 Stijn Joye, Ibid., p.590.
4 Marianne Jørgensen and Louise J. Philips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage, 2002), p.1.
5 See Michael Grenfell (ed.) Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts (Durham: Acumen, 2008) and Liu Yongtao, “Discourse, Meanings and IR Studies: Taking the Meaning of “Axis of Evil” as a Case” CONfines (Guadalajara) 6/11 Enero/Mayo 2010, pp.1-‐23.
* This section restricts itself to two salient issues. An expansion of this draft would consider other issues of a
‘political’ nature influencing Sino-‐Indian relations, namely – China’s views on India’s quest for permanent membership in the UNSC, China’s ‘claims’ on Arunachal Pradesh, China’s shifting position on Kashmir and the recent episode of ‘stapling visas.’
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also a liminal sphere where one idea of a nation tapers into another; one geographical feature blends into another; and one political culture reaches its extremities. The spatial nature of a
‘border’ or ‘boundary’ is such that it is a “privileged site for assessing the power and limitations of the nation-‐state” and the location where the “state repeatedly asserts physical and symbolic authority over its citizens.”7 I wish to argue that the boundary dispute between China and India is foremost a political issue with important strategic components subsumed within it – and not the other way around. To be resolved, the boundary dispute needs domestic political consensus in both the countries from respective stakeholders and domestic actors.
The ‘political’ nature of the boundary dispute for China stems from a desire to generate greater
‘political consciousness through national unification and regional stability.’8 The ‘borderland’ in China conflates geographical and hence political extent of authority and is a realm that shares
‘borderlines’ with adjacent countries. In Chinese history, the state, bureaucracy and financial system have functioned in a milieu where fear of external encroachment generated a process of borders having ‘as much influence on the center as the center did on the periphery.’9 In December 1995, the Research Project of China’s Borderland History and Geography proclaimed for the first time that “China’s borderland history is a political issue like the Tibetan separatist movement, the drug-‐trade in Yunnan-‐Guangxi provinces and the territorial claim over the Spratly islands”10 that need to be interpreted in terms of nation and history. In effect, a centralized process of amalgamating an area’s history, geography and people as one’s own history is helping rewrite Chinese interpretations to boundary disputes and claims this century.11 In contrast, during the early years of the reform period, Chinese approaches to resolving boundary disputes were characterized as a ‘cautious attempt to concurrently de-‐
escalate conflict along each of the PRC’s main borders and maintain China’s pre-‐existing stance
6 Nicola D. Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt (eds.) Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p.1.
7 Ravina Aggarwal and Mona Bhan, “Disarming Violence: Development, Democracy, and Security on the Borders of India” The Journal of Asian Studies (Ann Arbor, MI) Vol. 68, No.2, May 2009, p.521.
8 Lee Hee-‐Ok, “China’s Northeast Asia Project: Political Backgrounds and Implications” East Asian Review (Seoul), Vol.18, No.4, Winter 2006 pp.82-‐100.
9 Diana Lary (ed.), The Chinese State at the Borders (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), p.viii.
10 Lee Hee-‐Ok, p.90.
11 China’s expansive territorial claims, based on what it calls ‘historical,’ is not only controversial, but also goes against existing norms of international law. The fracas over ‘Goguryeo’ that witnessed North and South Korea repudiating Chinese versions of ‘Koguryo’ being a provincial state rather than an independent Korean kingdom is one such example. China’s diplomatic ally and economic client-‐state North Korea, went to the extent of accusing Chinese historians in the Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences of conceiving ancient China’s territorial extremities by matching it with its current size – something not supported by historical evidence.
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on the location of those borders.’12 To China, sovereignty remains the organizing principle of the international system and any hollowing of this cardinal principle is equal to apostasy.
Regarding the Sino-‐Indian boundary, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that passes for the ‘border’
between the two countries remains undefined, un-‐delineated and un-‐demarcated. It is a moot point as to when the two countries will display some sagacity to advance beyond current
‘claims’ based on historical angst, creative fiction and bureaucratic stonewalling. To China, the irresolution of the boundary dispute has two clear legacies – the historical and the contemporary. The ‘historical’ relates to the unfairness of treaties drawn up by colonial powers and the contemporary relates to India’s position on the boundary dispute being “Nehruvian.”
This leads to a supposition (rather, a falsifiable hypothesis) that as long as the Congress is in power in India (singly or in a coalition) there is little hope for resolution of the dispute and perhaps a non-‐Congress government offers better prospects for a resolution owing to two sub-‐
features: one, the inexperience of governance in external affairs of a non-‐Congress coalition playing to China’s advantage and; two, a non-‐Congress coalition in New Delhi looking to settle the boundary dispute in the interests of achieving closure to an issue that is a “leftover from history.”13
A paucity of institutional structures and bilateral mechanisms addressing the Sino-‐Indian boundary dispute is obvious. Perhaps, the only politico-‐institutional arrangement existing between India and China to address the boundary dispute is that of the Special Representatives.
During Indian former premier A.B. Vajpayee’s visit to China in June 2003, the two countries issued a Joint Declaration14 calling for the setting up of Special Representatives with the express brief of finding a political framework to settle the boundary dispute. As a political mechanism directly reporting to the Prime Minister in India and the Premier in China, an audit of the annual meetings (sometimes bi-‐annual) of the Special Representative would reveal that it has not fared better than the bureaucratic-‐institutional mechanism it succeeded – the Joint Working Group (JWG).15 The JWG was set up in 1988 during Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China and after fourteen meetings between the two sides in as many years, in 2002, it was yet to achieve
12 Allen Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World – Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 50-‐51.
13 This was the view presented by a few Chinese scholars during interviews conducted in Chengdu and Beijing in May 2010.
14 See “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. The Declaration stated:
“The two sides agreed to each appoint a Special Representative to explore form the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement.”
15 Fang Tien-‐tze, “The Sino-‐Indian Border Talks Under the Joint Working Group” Issues & Studies (Taipei) Vol.38, No.3, September 2002, pp.150-‐183 and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing Dong Yuan “Resolving the Sino-‐Indian Border Dispute – Building Confidence through Cooperative Monitoring” Asian Survey (Berkeley, CA) Vol. 41, No.2, pp.351-‐76.
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any institutional breakthrough in settling the boundary dispute and the forum had deteriorated to become a ritualized exercise in stating well established positions by either side.
To quote Satu Limaye:
On Nov. 21, 2002, India and China conducted the 14th joint working group meeting on their border dispute. From all indications, and notwithstanding the stated commitment to accelerate clarification of the disputed border and to exchange maps on the middle sector, progress on settling the border dispute is likely to inch along rather than accelerate ahead.
16
Ironically, the Special Representatives have met each other fifteen times, the last being in January 2012 and there have been no political breakthroughs on the boundary dispute. If there have been any breakthroughs or “understandings” they are not talking. An earlier meeting of the Special Representatives scheduled for 28 November 2011 in New Delhi was called off at the last moment.17 According to media reports, the postponement of the Special Representatives meeting was induced by China ever since it learnt about the Dalai Lama being invited to deliver a valedictory address at a Buddhist congregation in New Delhi. This event, co-‐organized by the Public Diplomacy Division of the Ministry of External Affairs and a private religious trust, initially involved the presence of leading political personalities at the occasion and a reconfiguring of the itinerary did not appease Beijing.18 In the absence of any new initiatives to resolve the boundary dispute, the two countries, it appears, are interested in maintaining ‘peace and tranquility along the LAC’ according to the agreement signed in 1993 and do not want to advance any further.19 With China going through a leadership transition next week and India heading to the polls in 2014, it could be advanced that no breakthrough is likely in Sino-‐Indian relations to settle the boundary dispute in the coming years. The “trap” both the countries face and have to acknowledge regarding the non-‐resolution of their boundary dispute is one of the issue getting “entrenched” – a situation where the very maturity of the problem has set in process multiple dynamics each of which coalesce to prevent the emergence of an acceptable solution.20
16 Satu P. Limaye, “The Weakest Link, But Not Goodbye” Comparative Connections (Washington D.C) Vol. 4, No.4, January 2003, pp.6-‐7.
17 Sandeep Dikshit and Ananth Krishnan “India, China border talks put off at last minute” The Hindu (New Delhi/Beijing) 25 November 2011. Accessible at:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2660348.ece?homepage=true#.TtA8c2JZgHU.email (Accessed on 26 November 2011)
18 “India-‐China border talks cancelled over Dalai Lama row: Report” Times of India (New Delhi) 26 November 2011.
Accessible at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-‐11-‐26/india/30443969_1_india-‐china-‐border-‐talks-‐
special-‐representatives-‐dai-‐bingguo (Accessed on 26 November 2011)
19 An agreement consisting of nine articles to maintain Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the China-‐Indian border areas was signed on 7 September 1993. Despite regular infractions, this agreement has held.
20 Ron E. Hassner, “The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes” International Security (Cambridge, MA) Vol.31, No.3, Winter 2006/07, p.112. Also see Barbara F. Walter, “Explaining the
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For China, settling the boundary dispute with India is an issue motivated by several caveats.
First, as part of its ‘periphery’ policy it has concluded boundary agreements with most of its
neighbors excepting Bhutan and India. Unless a border demarcation agreement is signed with India, its ‘periphery’ policy cannot be termed a success. Second, for both countries – especially India -‐ the 1962 conflict is a template of national vulnerability. The spate of recent articles in the Indian media on the fiftieth anniversary of the war with China seems to reiterate and reinforce this vulnerability more than ever. Third, to China, an undefined border to its south is an anomaly. Its swift victory in the 1962 war with India did not lead to a border agreement – rather it pushed an eventual settlement to the indeterminate future. Fourth, to the leadership in Beijing, as long as the boundary dispute persists, it has to pander to the influential voice of the military on relations with India. Fifth, China’s geographical insecurities regarding Tibet will remain as long as the Sino-‐Indian border is not demarcated. To quote Zhao Gancheng, leading expert on South Asian security at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies:
China has accomplished the demarcation work with most land neighbors except India and Bhutan. After, decades long efforts, China has achieved progress with far-‐reaching significance in its periphery which will impact the security situation in the region, and also the stability in China’s border areas.
21
Tibet and the Dalai Lama
The primary connective to the boundary issue is the question of Tibet and China’s unrelenting propaganda and vicious personal attacks on the Dalai Lama.22 The Tibet issue from the outset has been closely related to China’s relations with India. 23 It could be stated that ‘Tibet’ is an
‘overlap’ issue involving China and India with the Tibetans making up an important third vertex.
Unlike the boundary dispute where a politico-‐institutional mechanism (however incipient and stodgy) in the form of the Special Representatives is in place, there are no ‘official’ frameworks between India and China to discuss Tibet and Tibetan issues. China would not countenance the existence of such a theme in its bilateral relations with India and India has been unsuccessful in convincing China that it indeed has no hidden agenda or levers to play as regards the Tibet issue.
Tibet is not only a politico-‐strategic problem for China but also one with contesting political
Intractability of Territorial Conflict” International Studies Review (Storrs, CT), Vol.5, No.4, December 2003, pp.137-‐
53.
21 Zhao Gancheng, “Features and Changes of Geopolitical Situation in China’s Periphery” Foreign Affairs Journal
(CPIFA, Beijing), Issue 91, Spring 2009, p. 87.
22 During the 2008 riots, Zhang Qingli, Party Secretary for the TAR, had described the Dalai Lama as a “wolf wrapped in monk’s robes, a devil with a human face and a best’s heart.” For the Party Secretary of Tibet to say this indicates Beijing’s attitude towards the Dalai Lama.
23 Chen Jian, “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union,”
Journal of Cold War Studies (Cambridge: MA), Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, p.100.