檢視中國-印度關係: 從信心建立措施的角度

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期末報告

檢視中國-印度關係: 從信心建立措施的角度

計畫類別：個別型計畫計畫編號： NSC 101-2410-H-004-137- 執行期間： 101 年 08 月 01 日至 102 年 10 月 31 日執行單位：國立政治大學國際關係研究中心計畫主持人：那瑞維報告附件：移地研究心得報告出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文處理方式： 1.公開資訊：本計畫涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，2 年後可公開查詢 2.「本研究」是否已有嚴重損及公共利益之發現：否 3.「本報告」是否建議提供政府單位施政參考：否

中華民國 103 年 03 月 11 日

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兩國的命運受到文明程度、文化特性、地緣政治/地緣經濟抱負或足跡、權力與意圖等的影響，使學者在研究兩國關係時不免陷入困境。宏觀來看，學者必須面對維持兩國關係的考驗，而兩國關係實際上是不盡理想的，且這個狀況會在未來持續下去。由於兩國關係交織著基本性的緊張關係，本報告認為用來分析兩國關係的參數都有＇競爭＇、＇比較＇或＇衝突＇的成分。本報告的論點主要有三：首先、雙邊六十多年的邊界糾紛顯示出兩國＇內部政治僵局＇與＇制度性不妥協＇的特色。其次、中印關係裡新糾紛＇型態＇的出現—尤其是貿易與其衍生問題—很有可能遮蔽雙方邊界糾紛的現存差異。最後、缺少制度的途徑以及現存途徑薄弱的特性，會促使國内有力的選民壟斷雙方對話與意見，造成兩國外交政策的失敗。中文關鍵詞：中國崛起，中印關係，邊界糾紛英文摘要：英文關鍵詞：

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The ‘Rise of China’ and Sino-‐Indian Relations: Lacking Confidence, Looking Askance*

Raviprasad Narayanan

This article examines three issues influencing Sino-‐Indian relations -‐ the boundary dispute, trade issues and foreign policy decision making vis á vis each other. The paper adopts a critical tone bordering on the contrarian and highlights the lack of frameworks to situate this vital bilateral relationship. By establishing their differing styles, perceptions and behavior towards each other the article contributes new variables that will add to the growing literature on Sino-‐Indian relations.

Introduction

Pithily put, Asia’s largest countries, China and India, share a complicated relationship. As nations with a sense of historical destiny reflected in their civilizational spread, cultural attributes, geo-‐political/geo-‐economic aspirations and footprints, power capabilities and intentions, China and India pose a researchers dilemma. From a holistic prism of enquiry they have to face the reality of managing a relationship that for all purposes will always be less than ideal -‐ and shall remain so. Since there are “foundational tensions” woven into their bilateral fabric, it is advanced that every parameter used to analyze China and India has strong elements of ‘competition’, ‘comparison’ and ‘contrasting’ situated within. There are also aspects of ennui in the relationship with inexplicably large perceptual gaps on both sides.

This paper bases itself on the following three arguments:

first, the six decades old (and counting!) boundary dispute between the two countries is displaying characteristics of an ‘internal political deadlock’ and ‘institutional intransigence’ in both the countries;

second, the emergence of new ‘categories’ – especially trade and its derivatives -‐ in Sino-‐Indian relations have the potential to eclipse existing differences on the boundary dispute in bilateral priority; and,

third, the lack of institutional mechanisms and weakness of existing ones encourages powerful domestic constituencies to monopolize discourse and opinion-‐building on both sides thereby making for poor foreign policy decision making on both sides.

This draft paper is divided into five parts: Locating Sino-‐Indian relations, political variables, economic variables, strategic variables followed by a critical analysis of Sino-‐Indian relations.

*Dr. Raviprasad Narayanan is Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, and Assistant Professor at the International Doctoral Program of Asia-‐Pacific Studies, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. Comments on this paper are to be sent to <[email protected]>

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I) Locating Sino-‐Indian Relations

I begin this section by arguing that there are perhaps, no set frameworks to examine Sino-‐ Indian relations in their entirety as also specificity. One can surmise that this ‘vacuum’ exists as contemporary IR theory is very narrowly focused on “power” and its myriad attributes.1 Space for ideas, beliefs and values do not exist since the altar of ‘realism’ (imagined and otherwise) constricts other approaches and negates attempts to examine issues from other perspectives. Sino-‐Indian relations and the discourses surrounding their bilateral relations are more often than not reflective of a predetermined mindset that is stubborn to newer approaches and fresh perspectives.

Ontologically, a deconstruction of Sino-‐Indian relations to its bare bones is a project that awaits its day. Categories that go into this bilateral relationship are more than what is academically discussed and written. For instance, six decades ago when the two countries had ‘arrived’ on the global stage as new entities shaking off colonialism and civil war they had more in common with each other – large population, abysmal social indicators, shattered economic infrastructure, weak governance structures and the need for external aid to stimulate domestic economic production. Today, the only similarity the two countries share (apart from large populations and institutionalized graft!) is the focus on their domestic needs of development. Even this ‘commonality’ is not without its departures. By every other measurable indicator and variable China and India have little in common with each other in 2012 than in 1949.

I supplement my above arguments by listing out a few variables for both the countries and these are to be juxtaposed with their six-‐decade old bilateral relationship as the constant.

Politically, China has transited from individual totalitarianism to collective authoritarianism. This shift in political temperament has coincided with China’s reform program and is to be seen as a pragmatic choice made by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to retain its relevance and legitimacy. As a political system, India began its newly independent journey with experienced individuals who strived to build institutions. These ideals got blurred when in the realm of foreign policy decision making in its early decades, India made choices that reflected ‘individualism’ over ‘institutionalism.’ As a system, democracy has entrenched itself over the decades and the country has evolved to be governed by coalitions that offer alternating periods of crises and stability.

Economically, China has moved from a centralized command economy model to one where entrepreneurship – by the state and the individual -‐ is celebrated. India has transited from the experiment of Nehruvian socialism and ‘mixed economy’ to that of a largely free market where regulatory mechanisms function as ‘referees.’ It has to be added though that individual

1_{The
classic
texts
on
‘realism’
and
‘neo-‐realism
by
Kenneth
N.
Waltz,
Theory
of
International
Politics
(Reading,
MA:}

Addison-‐Wesley, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY, Norton, 2001); Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) are illustrations of this approach.

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entrepreneurship in India was never constrained by the state as was the case in China from 1949 to 1979.

Socially, China has forged far ahead of India in every possible manner – life expectancy, education, primary health care, access to amenities etc. and India faces the ignominy of being one of the ‘underperformers’ stalling the noble aims of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. (See Appendix 1)

Ideologically, China has abandoned its doctrinaire postures it had adopted in the first few decades of its existence and adopted a more or less agnostic approach on ideology designed to derive benefits, both domestic and external. In the realm of foreign policy however, this agnostic temperament morphs into the arbitrating of power and influence. India has made the transition where it underplays its past foreign policy shibboleths – ‘Non-‐alignment’ – but is cautious to not be labeled as a ‘camp follower’ of the prevailing order – ‘liberal institutionalism.’ ‘Autonomy’ in decision-‐making is India’s new mantra of practicing foreign policy.

Globally, China is one of the pillars of the international structures of governance and has the necessary heft and voice to have its interests accommodated. India on the other hand is an aspirant to those very forums where heft counts, yet falls short primarily owing to its own lack of clarity as to what it wants.

Psychologically, China behaves as an ‘actor’ well conditioned to the ways of the international system and assiduously prepares itself to be part of constructive solutions to ensure stability and spread its influence. India follows an approach where it seeks to maximize its influence in global forums and its views taken seriously. In its bilateral relations with China, the catharsis of ‘1962’ motivates its policy makers.

These listed variables are neither exclusive nor comprehensive but are to be seen as contributing to the making of ‘categories’ that could be used to frame an ontological approach to study Sino-‐Indian relations.

Epistemologically, Sino-‐Indian relations need to define or ascribe ‘values’ – to themselves, each other and the rest -‐ and this kind of an approach is most suitable while examining specific issues – such as their respective political systems. Challenging as it is to locate Asia’s two largest countries within a theoretical framework, this paper attempts to base itself by adopting a ‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA) approach that interprets Sino-‐Indian relations by delineating ‘categories’ in the narrative on the two countries. CDA with its multi-‐disciplinary characteristics enables the study and interpretations of power and power asymmetries, as also the manipulation and domination inherent in language that describes the ‘other.’2_{In
many
ways}

2_{Stijn
Joye,
“News
discourses
on
distant
suffering:
a
Critical
Discourse
Analysis
of
the
2003
SARS
outbreak”} Discourse & Society (London), Vol. 21, No.5, p. 590.

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4

the knowledge we have of the ‘other’ is through the linguistic realization of texts where the narrative element focuses on power relations and social constructions. To quote Stijn Jove:

Discourses create representations of the world that reflect as well as actively construct reality by ascribing meanings to our world, identities and social relations.3

Social constructionist methodologies also require ‘discourse’ to be empirically dissected within its social context. In other words, “a discourse captures a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world).”4_{CDA
is
to
be
seen
as
both
the
‘method’} and ‘object.’ By analyzing structural relationships CDA reveals the real from the opaque and makes transparent issues that have the fog of uncertainty wrapped around them.

To establish a frame of reference to study Sino-‐Indian relations, this essay adopts a flexible experimental methodology where a primary condition is that of changes in one variable influencing change in another. Further, the variables display a tendency to morph into intervening variables. Supplementing this approach, the important correlates influencing discourse on Sino-‐Indian relations are ‘historical dimensions’, ‘sociopolitical contexts’, ‘ideological bases’, ‘power relations,’ ‘domestic politics,’ and ‘economic performance.’ These are in evidence as a constantly running sub-‐script to the narrative in this essay. There is no absolute and all-‐encompassing theoretical approach for a dynamic social science discipline like international relations and one shortcoming of CDA is that it perhaps overemphasizes the role of the ‘prevalent language’ influencing a discourse (political, popular and academic) and hence indirectly contributes to the creation of a construct or a “discursive structure” that dramatizes events socially, politically and lexically.5

II) Political Variables*

Boundary dispute

For most nation-‐states, especially China and India, a boundary is more than just a territorial extremity expressing the haloed virtues of sovereignty. To most countries, “boundaries demarcate physical space, enclose political identities and distinguish other categories such as ethnic identity and the prevalence of social groups.”6 A ‘boundary’ is not only the ‘frontier’ but

3_{Stijn
Joye,
Ibid.,
p.590.}

4_{Marianne
Jørgensen
and
Louise
J.
Philips,
Discourse
Analysis
as
Theory
and
Method
(London:
Sage,
2002),
p.1.}

5_{See
Michael
Grenfell
(ed.)
Pierre
Bourdieu:
Key
Concepts
(Durham:
Acumen,
2008)
and
Liu
Yongtao,
“Discourse,}

Meanings and IR Studies: Taking the Meaning of “Axis of Evil” as a Case” CONfines (Guadalajara) 6/11 Enero/Mayo 2010, pp.1-‐23.

* This section restricts itself to two salient issues. An expansion of this draft would consider other issues of a ‘political’ nature influencing Sino-‐Indian relations, namely – China’s views on India’s quest for permanent membership in the UNSC, China’s ‘claims’ on Arunachal Pradesh, China’s shifting position on Kashmir and the recent episode of ‘stapling visas.’

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also a liminal sphere where one idea of a nation tapers into another; one geographical feature blends into another; and one political culture reaches its extremities. The spatial nature of a ‘border’ or ‘boundary’ is such that it is a “privileged site for assessing the power and limitations of the nation-‐state” and the location where the “state repeatedly asserts physical and symbolic authority over its citizens.”7_{I
wish
to
argue
that
the
boundary
dispute
between
China
and
India} is foremost a political issue with important strategic components subsumed within it – and not the other way around. To be resolved, the boundary dispute needs domestic political consensus in both the countries from respective stakeholders and domestic actors.

The ‘political’ nature of the boundary dispute for China stems from a desire to generate greater ‘political consciousness through national unification and regional stability.’8 The ‘borderland’ in China conflates geographical and hence political extent of authority and is a realm that shares ‘borderlines’ with adjacent countries. In Chinese history, the state, bureaucracy and financial system have functioned in a milieu where fear of external encroachment generated a process of borders having ‘as much influence on the center as the center did on the periphery.’9 In December 1995, the Research Project of China’s Borderland History and Geography proclaimed for the first time that “China’s borderland history is a political issue like the Tibetan separatist movement, the drug-‐trade in Yunnan-‐Guangxi provinces and the territorial claim over the Spratly islands”10 that need to be interpreted in terms of nation and history. In effect, a centralized process of amalgamating an area’s history, geography and people as one’s own history is helping rewrite Chinese interpretations to boundary disputes and claims this century.11 In contrast, during the early years of the reform period, Chinese approaches to resolving boundary disputes were characterized as a ‘cautious attempt to concurrently de-‐ escalate conflict along each of the PRC’s main borders and maintain China’s pre-‐existing stance

6_{Nicola
D.
Cosmo
and
Don
J.
Wyatt
(eds.)
Political
Frontiers,
Ethnic
Boundaries,
and
Human
Geographies
in
Chinese} History (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p.1.

7_{Ravina
Aggarwal
and
Mona
Bhan,
“Disarming
Violence:
Development,
Democracy,
and
Security
on
the
Borders
of}

India” The Journal of Asian Studies (Ann Arbor, MI) Vol. 68, No.2, May 2009, p.521.

8_{Lee
Hee-‐Ok,
“China’s
Northeast
Asia
Project:
Political
Backgrounds
and
Implications”
East
Asian
Review
(Seoul),}

Vol.18, No.4, Winter 2006 pp.82-‐100.

9_{Diana
Lary
(ed.),
The
Chinese
State
at
the
Borders
(Vancouver:
UBC
Press,
2007),
p.viii.}

10_{Lee
Hee-‐Ok,
p.90.}

11_{China’s
expansive
territorial
claims,
based
on
what
it
calls
‘historical,’
is
not
only
controversial,
but
also
goes}

against existing norms of international law. The fracas over ‘Goguryeo’ that witnessed North and South Korea repudiating Chinese versions of ‘Koguryo’ being a provincial state rather than an independent Korean kingdom is one such example. China’s diplomatic ally and economic client-‐state North Korea, went to the extent of accusing Chinese historians in the Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences of conceiving ancient China’s territorial extremities by matching it with its current size – something not supported by historical evidence.

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6

on the location of those borders.’12_{To
China,
sovereignty
remains
the
organizing
principle
of} the international system and any hollowing of this cardinal principle is equal to apostasy.

Regarding the Sino-‐Indian boundary, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that passes for the ‘border’ between the two countries remains undefined, un-‐delineated and un-‐demarcated. It is a moot point as to when the two countries will display some sagacity to advance beyond current ‘claims’ based on historical angst, creative fiction and bureaucratic stonewalling. To China, the irresolution of the boundary dispute has two clear legacies – the historical and the contemporary. The ‘historical’ relates to the unfairness of treaties drawn up by colonial powers and the contemporary relates to India’s position on the boundary dispute being “Nehruvian.” This leads to a supposition (rather, a falsifiable hypothesis) that as long as the Congress is in power in India (singly or in a coalition) there is little hope for resolution of the dispute and perhaps a non-‐Congress government offers better prospects for a resolution owing to two sub-‐ features: one, the inexperience of governance in external affairs of a non-‐Congress coalition playing to China’s advantage and; two, a non-‐Congress coalition in New Delhi looking to settle the boundary dispute in the interests of achieving closure to an issue that is a “leftover from history.”13

A paucity of institutional structures and bilateral mechanisms addressing the Sino-‐Indian boundary dispute is obvious. Perhaps, the only politico-‐institutional arrangement existing between India and China to address the boundary dispute is that of the Special Representatives. During Indian former premier A.B. Vajpayee’s visit to China in June 2003, the two countries issued a Joint Declaration14 calling for the setting up of Special Representatives with the express brief of finding a political framework to settle the boundary dispute. As a political mechanism directly reporting to the Prime Minister in India and the Premier in China, an audit of the annual meetings (sometimes bi-‐annual) of the Special Representative would reveal that it has not fared better than the bureaucratic-‐institutional mechanism it succeeded – the Joint Working Group (JWG).15_{The
JWG
was
set
up
in
1988
during
Indian
premier
Rajiv
Gandhi’s
visit
to
China
and} after fourteen meetings between the two sides in as many years, in 2002, it was yet to achieve

12_{Allen
Carlson,
Unifying
China,
Integrating
with
the
World
–
Securing
Chinese
Sovereignty
in
the
Reform
Era}

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 50-‐51.

13_{This
was
the
view
presented
by
a
few
Chinese
scholars
during
interviews
conducted
in
Chengdu
and
Beijing
in}

May 2010.

14_{See
“Declaration
on
Principles
for
Relations
and
Comprehensive
Cooperation
between
the
Republic
of
India} People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. The Declaration stated:

“The two sides agreed to each appoint a Special Representative to explore form the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement.”

15_{Fang
Tien-‐tze,
“The
Sino-‐Indian
Border
Talks
Under
the
Joint
Working
Group”
Issues
&
Studies
(Taipei)
Vol.38,}

No.3, September 2002, pp.150-‐183 and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing Dong Yuan “Resolving the Sino-‐Indian Border Dispute – Building Confidence through Cooperative Monitoring” Asian Survey (Berkeley, CA) Vol. 41, No.2, pp.351-‐76.

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7

any institutional breakthrough in settling the boundary dispute and the forum had deteriorated to become a ritualized exercise in stating well established positions by either side.

To quote Satu Limaye:

On Nov. 21, 2002, India and China conducted the 14th joint working group meeting on their border dispute. From all indications, and notwithstanding the stated commitment to accelerate clarification of the disputed border and to exchange maps on the middle sector, progress on settling the border dispute is likely to inch along rather than accelerate ahead.16

Ironically, the Special Representatives have met each other fifteen times, the last being in January 2012 and there have been no political breakthroughs on the boundary dispute. If there have been any breakthroughs or “understandings” they are not talking. An earlier meeting of the Special Representatives scheduled for 28 November 2011 in New Delhi was called off at the last moment.17_{According
to
media
reports,
the
postponement
of
the
Special
Representatives} meeting was induced by China ever since it learnt about the Dalai Lama being invited to deliver a valedictory address at a Buddhist congregation in New Delhi. This event, co-‐organized by the Public Diplomacy Division of the Ministry of External Affairs and a private religious trust, initially involved the presence of leading political personalities at the occasion and a reconfiguring of the itinerary did not appease Beijing.18_{In
the
absence
of
any
new
initiatives
to
resolve
the} boundary dispute, the two countries, it appears, are interested in maintaining ‘peace and tranquility along the LAC’ according to the agreement signed in 1993 and do not want to advance any further.19_{With
China
going
through
a
leadership
transition
next
week
and
India} heading to the polls in 2014, it could be advanced that no breakthrough is likely in Sino-‐Indian relations to settle the boundary dispute in the coming years. The “trap” both the countries face and have to acknowledge regarding the non-‐resolution of their boundary dispute is one of the issue getting “entrenched” – a situation where the very maturity of the problem has set in process multiple dynamics each of which coalesce to prevent the emergence of an acceptable solution.20

16_{Satu
P.
Limaye,
“The
Weakest
Link,
But
Not
Goodbye”
Comparative
Connections
(Washington
D.C)
Vol.
4,
No.4,}

January 2003, pp.6-‐7.

17_{Sandeep
Dikshit
and
Ananth
Krishnan
“India,
China
border
talks
put
off
at
last
minute”
The
Hindu
(New}

Delhi/Beijing) 25 November 2011. Accessible at:

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2660348.ece?homepage=true#.TtA8c2JZgHU.email (Accessed on 26 November 2011)

18_{“India-‐China
border
talks
cancelled
over
Dalai
Lama
row:
Report”
Times
of
India
(New
Delhi)
26
November
2011.}

Accessible at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-‐11-‐26/india/30443969_1_india-‐china-‐border-‐talks-‐ special-‐representatives-‐dai-‐bingguo (Accessed on 26 November 2011)

19_{An
agreement
consisting
of
nine
articles
to
maintain
Peace
and
Tranquility
along
the
Line
of
Actual
Control
in
the}

China-‐Indian border areas was signed on 7 September 1993. Despite regular infractions, this agreement has held.

20_{Ron
E.
Hassner,
“The
Path
to
Intractability:
Time
and
the
Entrenchment
of
Territorial
Disputes”
International} Security (Cambridge, MA) Vol.31, No.3, Winter 2006/07, p.112. Also see Barbara F. Walter, “Explaining the

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8

For China, settling the boundary dispute with India is an issue motivated by several caveats. First, as part of its ‘periphery’ policy it has concluded boundary agreements with most of its neighbors excepting Bhutan and India. Unless a border demarcation agreement is signed with India, its ‘periphery’ policy cannot be termed a success. Second, for both countries – especially India -‐ the 1962 conflict is a template of national vulnerability. The spate of recent articles in the Indian media on the fiftieth anniversary of the war with China seems to reiterate and reinforce this vulnerability more than ever. Third, to China, an undefined border to its south is an anomaly. Its swift victory in the 1962 war with India did not lead to a border agreement – rather it pushed an eventual settlement to the indeterminate future. Fourth, to the leadership in Beijing, as long as the boundary dispute persists, it has to pander to the influential voice of the military on relations with India. Fifth, China’s geographical insecurities regarding Tibet will remain as long as the Sino-‐Indian border is not demarcated. To quote Zhao Gancheng, leading expert on South Asian security at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies:

China has accomplished the demarcation work with most land neighbors except India and Bhutan. After, decades long efforts, China has achieved progress with far-‐reaching significance in its periphery which will impact the security situation in the region, and also the stability in China’s border areas.21

Tibet and the Dalai Lama

The primary connective to the boundary issue is the question of Tibet and China’s unrelenting propaganda and vicious personal attacks on the Dalai Lama.22_{The
Tibet
issue
from
the
outset} has been closely related to China’s relations with India. 23_{It
could
be
stated
that
‘Tibet’
is
an} ‘overlap’ issue involving China and India with the Tibetans making up an important third vertex.

Unlike the boundary dispute where a politico-‐institutional mechanism (however incipient and stodgy) in the form of the Special Representatives is in place, there are no ‘official’ frameworks between India and China to discuss Tibet and Tibetan issues. China would not countenance the existence of such a theme in its bilateral relations with India and India has been unsuccessful in convincing China that it indeed has no hidden agenda or levers to play as regards the Tibet issue. Tibet is not only a politico-‐strategic problem for China but also one with contesting political

Intractability of Territorial Conflict” International Studies Review (Storrs, CT), Vol.5, No.4, December 2003, pp.137-‐ 53.

21_{Zhao
Gancheng,
“Features
and
Changes
of
Geopolitical
Situation
in
China’s
Periphery”
Foreign
Affairs
Journal}

(CPIFA, Beijing), Issue 91, Spring 2009, p. 87.

22_{During
the
2008
riots,
Zhang
Qingli,
Party
Secretary
for
the
TAR,
had
described
the
Dalai
Lama
as
a
“wolf}

wrapped in monk’s robes, a devil with a human face and a best’s heart.” For the Party Secretary of Tibet to say this indicates Beijing’s attitude towards the Dalai Lama.

23_{Chen
Jian,
“The
Tibetan
Rebellion
of
1959
and
China’s
Changing
Relations
with
India
and
the
Soviet
Union,”} Journal of Cold War Studies (Cambridge: MA), Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, p.100.

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9

narratives since the conflict over Tibet’s status is a conflict over history.24_{By
seeking
to} constantly build an ‘internal political fence’ around the Tibet issue, China would want the rest of the world to ignore the impact Tibet’s occupation had on the collective conscience of the world in 1959. Although largely forgotten today, even the United Nations had passed resolutions that touched upon Tibet’s right to self-‐determination.25

For China’s political leadership and intellectual elite, the mere questioning of the legitimacy of Tibet’s incorporation with China is akin to challenging the very acceptability of the idea that is the PRC as constructed by the CCP.26 Even Chiang Kai-‐shek’s Nationalist government – the Kuomintang (KMT) -‐ had at one time “sought to use military force to settle the long-‐standing Tibetan question for good and thereby bring the de facto independent Tibetan territory into China’s effective jurisdiction.”27 The version China wants the rest of the world to accept, as regards Tibet, is a ‘political product’ that celebrates Han sovereignty over Tibetan – negating cultural and ethnic determinants to place ‘political’ triumphalism at the forefront.28 To the CCP, Tibet’s long theocratic tradition coupled with the charismatic appeal of the current Dalai Lama is at one level an ideological conundrum where religious sanction (‘spiritual’) coexists with political legitimacy (‘temporal’). It has been pointed out that the appeal of Tibetan Buddhism as religious anchor to a society that has battled ideological campaigns in the past and rapid modernity in the contemporary period is an aspect the party cannot countenance. 29

For China, control over its land borders is demonstrative of the territorial integrity of the country and two parallel realities – generating internal legitimacy for the CCP and projecting China externally as a sovereign country.30_{The
recurrent
influence
of
Tibet
in
an
overall
bilateral} perspective especially since the March 2008 riots in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet could in the

24_{Elliot
Sperling,
“The
Tibet-‐China
Conflict:
History
and
Polemics,”
Policy
Studies
7,
East-‐West
Center,}

Washington,D.C, 2004, p.3

25_{See
United
Nations
General
Assembly,
“Question
of
Tibet”
Res.
1723
(XVI
Session),
1085}th_{Plenary
Meeting,
20}

December 1961. Accessible at:

http://daccess-‐dds-‐ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/76/IMG/NR016776.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed on 22 November 2011)

26_{Elliot
Sperling,
Ibid.,
p.5.}

27_{Lin
Hsiao-‐ting,
“War
or
Strategem?
Reassessing
China’s
Military
Advance
towards
Tibet,
1942-‐1943”
The
China} Quarterly (London). No.186, June 2006, p.446.

28_{Carole
McGranahan,
“Tibet’s
Cold
War:
The
CIA
and
the
Chushi
Gangdrug
Resistance,
1956–1974”

Journal
of} Cold War Studies (Cambridge, MA), Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, p. 128.

29_{Yueh-‐Ting
Lee
and
Hong
Li,
“Spiritual
Beliefs
and
Ethnic
Relations
in
China:
A
Cross
Cultural
and
Social}

Psychological Perspective” in Zhiqun Zhu (ed.) The People’s Republic of China Today: Internal and External

Challenges (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011) p.252.

30_{Chien-‐peng
Chung,
Domestic
Politics,
International
Bargaining
and
China’s
Territorial
Disputes
(London:}

RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p.2.

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10

near to middle term be a factor exercising strains in bilateral relations. In the near future, the choosing of a spiritual successor to the Dalai Lama could also test the Sino-‐Indian relationship as both countries are stakeholders in this dispute.

The complexity of the Tibet issue has intensified with the Dalai Lama recently declaring that the “Tibetans need a leader, elected freely by the Tibetan people, to whom I can devolve power.”31 In his annual address to the Tibetan Parliament in exile on 14 March 2011 he further stated his desire to “devolve formal authority to …an elected leadership,” and seeking to be “completely relieved of formal authority.”32 This announcement by the Dalai Lama has cleared the way for Lobsang Sangay,33 an alumnus of the Harvard Law School to become the popularly elected Prime Minister of the Tibetan government in exile based in Dharamsala, India. As head of government he will marshal the popular will of the Tibetan community in exile while the Dalai Lama will remain the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people and faith.34

Politically this subtle transition is not going to influence China’s attitude towards the Tibet issue, but it does create an institutional platform for negotiations to be conducted in the future. The Dalai Lama’s astute decision to hand over political power to an elected leadership is a challenge to China as the ‘exile parliament’ will function independently of Beijing and in the future will importantly have a say in choosing the next Dalai Lama, thereby reducing Beijing’s influence on the process.35 It is for Beijing to acknowledge that the Tibet issue does have a political solution, if handled with sensitivity – and that solution lies within the capabilities of Beijing’s polity. Dialogue is the best way to ensure an accommodation and not whole sale repression of a people politically and culturally.36 Beijing (represented by the United Front Work Department of

31_{“Legal
Issues
Implicated
by
the
Dalai
Lama’s
Devolution
of
Power,”
Memorandum
prepared
by
the
Tibet
Justice} Center, May 2011, p.4. Available at: http://www.tibetjustice.org/dalailamadevolution/DevolutionMemo.pdf

(Accessed on 22 August 2011)

32_{Ibid.,
p.4.}

33_{Lobsang
Sangay
is
the
first
Tibetan
to
earn
the
Doctor
of
Laws
(SJD)
from
the
Harvard
Law
School.
His}

dissertation was titled Democracy in Distress: Is Exile Polity a Remedy? A Case Study of Tibet’s Government in Exile

34_{In
an
interview
to
a
popular
Indian
weekly,
Lobsang
Sangay
made
an
interesting
observation.
“Before
1959,}

there was a border between India and Tibet, and there was no requirement for such kind of huge defence budget (for India).” See Ashish Kumar Sen’s Interview with Lobsang Sangay, Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government in Exile), Outlook (New Delhi), 16 May 2011.

35_{Robert
Barnett,
“The
Dalai
Lama’s
‘Deception:’
Why
a
Seventeenth
–Century
Decree
Matters
to
Beijing”
The
New} York Review of Books, 6 April 2011.

36_{The
sensitivity
shown
by
Beijing
towards
Tibet
also
extends
to
the
internet
and
a
landmark
initiative
by
Wang}

Lixiong, prominent Chinese intellectual on Tibet to conduct an internet dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Chinese citizens on 21 May 2010, generated 282 questions, till the authorities stepped in and the Google Moderator web page was shut down by Chinese internet censors. See, Perry Link, “Talking About Tibet: An Open Dialogue Between Chinese Citizens and the Dalai Lama,” The New York Review of Books Blog, 24 May 2010. Available at:

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11

the CCP) and Tibetan representatives do have channels of communication and have been meeting each other since 2002. Even after the 2008 riots in Tibet the two sides had met in November of that year where the Tibetans had put forward a “memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” – a proposal that called for genuine autonomy for Tibetans within the parameters of the PRC’s constitution.37_{China
has
ignored
this
proposal
as
it
does
not} want any concessions given to the Tibetans to be interpreted by the restive Uighurs of Xinjiang to make similar, if not more demands. Unlike the Tibetans, the Uighurs have been waging a sporadic but violent campaign against Beijing.

The ‘democratic’ hue to the Tibetan government in exile will also (it is hoped) deflect Beijing’s propaganda about the “Dalai clique” being representative of a feudal, exploitative structure that encouraged serfdom and thrived on superstition. By attacking the person of the Dalai Lama, Beijing has only contributed to making the Dalai Lama and his cause more celebrated. To quote Wang Lixiong:

Beijing has undertaken an impossible task in trying to break the Tibetan political-‐religious cycle by bringing down the Dalai Lama, and their effort has only worked to intensify the Tibetans’ hatred.38

While most countries will acknowledge Beijing’s demands (including South Africa recently) to not entertain the Dalai Lama, the reality remains that powerful stakeholders in the international system recognize ‘Tibet’ as being one of China’s weak points and will keep the issue alive in human rights forums, minority rights forums and political freedom campaigns. The current phase of self-‐immolations in Tibet and Sichuan39_{and
the
knee
jerk
reactions
of
the} Chinese authorities lead to the question whether China has “locked itself into a position”40_with little room for maneuver on the Tibet issue in a year when Beijing will be witness to a political transition.

Currently the Tibet issue is being handled by China at multiple levels. At the ‘economic’ level, Beijing has accelerated the process of economic development in Tibet and laid emphasis on creating large infrastructure projects, such as railways, roads and airports. Justifying this is the insistence by the government that “historical inevitability of Tibet’s modernization… is an

37_{Dick
Gupwell
and
Radu-‐Victor
Ionescu,
“Dalai
Lama
Hands
Over
Temporal
Powers
–
Impact
on
China-‐Tibet}

Relations” European Institute of Asian Studies (EIAS) Paper (Brussels), August 2011, p.7.

38_{Wang
Lixiong,
“A
True
“Middle-‐Way”
Solution
to
Tibetan
Unrest”
China
Security
(Beijing),
Vol.4,
No.2,
Spring}

2008, p.30.

39_{Sharon
LaFenniere,
“3
Tibetan
Herders
Self-‐Immolate
in
Anti-‐Chinese
Protest,”
New
York
Times,
5
February
2012.}

Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/asia/3-‐tibetan-‐herders-‐self-‐immolate-‐in-‐anti-‐chinese-‐ protest.html (Accessed on 27 February 2012)

40_{Thomas
Abraham,
‘Little
Can
Be
Achieved
through
Negotiations
on
Tibet,”
Economic
and
Political
Weekly}

(Mumbai), Vol.43, No.14, 5-‐11 April 2008, p.11.

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12

inseparable part of China’s modernization.”41_{To
increase
the
productive
capacities
of
the} region, Han migrants are encouraged to settle down in Tibet and subsidies are provided.42_If Beijing were to expect that material prosperity would be sufficient inducement for Tibetans to turn their backs on their identity, it is mistaken. Politically, Beijing has upper hand as it has systematically restructured its decision-‐making processes managing Tibet. The importance of Tibet for the leadership can be gauged by the setting up of a Leading Small Group (LSG) headed by the chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The LSG comprises the head of the United Front Work Department, ministers of Public Security, State Security, the Foreign Minister and the military. This institutionalized process reflects not only the importance of the issue but also the broad nature of the internal consultation processes. Complementing these are a network of party related research centers and think tanks working on Tibet and Tibetan social issues providing specialized opinion and representing a more diversified information gathering system. It is to be hypothesized that the synergies between all these ministries, party organs and research centers must have taken into account a plethora of scenarios regarding the current situation in Tibet and its future.43

III Economic variables

Paradoxically, it took the nuclear tests of May 1998 for China and India to realize that the best way to give a façade of normality to bilateral relations was to encourage trade between them. The days following the nuclear test were tense with China playing an active role in the UN Security Council to pass resolution 1172 condemning India and Pakistan for conducting the nuclear tests.44

From negligible bilateral trade of less than USD 2 billion in 2000, Sino-‐Indian trade has grown beyond expectations with China becoming India’s second largest trading partner in 2010. In 2010 India became China’s 10th_{largest
trading
partner.
Although
the
volume
of
bilateral
trade} is small when compared to China’s trade with the European Union, the United States or Japan, the two countries have set for themselves an ambitious target of achieving a bilateral trade of USD 100 billion by 2015 during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to India in December 2010.45_{In
the
first
half
of
2011
(January-‐June),
Sino-‐Indian
trade
had
crossed
USD
35.27
billion}

41_{See,
Tibet’s
March
Towards
Modernization,
Information
Office
of
the
State
Council
of
the
People’s
Republic
of}

China, Beijing, November 2001.

42_{Melvyn
C.
Goldstein,
“Tibet
and
China
in
the
Twentieth
Century,”
Ch.6
in
Morris
Rossabi
(ed.)
Governing
China’s}

Multiethnic Frontiers (Seattle/London), University of Washington Press, 2004, p.207.

43_{Tashi
Rabgey
and
Tseten
Wangchuk
Sharlho,
“Sino-‐Tibetan
Dialogue
in
the
Post-‐Mao
Era:
Lessons
and
Prospects”} Policy Studies 12, Washington: East-‐West Center Washington, 2004, pp.31-‐33.

44_{See
UNSC
S/Res/1172
(1998)
6
June
1998.}

Available at: http://daccess-‐dds-‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed on 3 September 2011).

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13

registering a year-‐on-‐year increase of 16.1percent.46_{In
sum,
Sino-‐Indian
trade
volumes
in
2011} were USD 73.90 billion, an increase of around 20 percent from 2010.47_{Chinese
imports
into} India were to the tune of USD 50.49 billion while Indian exports to China were USD 23.41 billion. The glaring and growing trade deficit for India is most apparent.

The table below is in indicator of Sino-‐Indian trade for three years 2008 through 2010.

Table 1

2008 2009 2010 2011 (till August)

Indian exports to

China 20.34 13.70 20.86 15.68

Growth % 38.76 -‐ 32.63 52.19 7.37

China’s exports to

India 31.52 29.57 40.88 32.49

Growth % 31.12 -‐ 6.17 38.25 26.33

Total India-‐China

Trade 51.86 43.28 61.74 48.17

Growth % 34.02 -‐16.55 42.66 19.47

Trade Balance for

India -‐ 11.18 -‐15.87 -‐20.02 -‐16.80

Source: “India-‐China Relations” – Ministry of External Affairs, India, January 2012.

Apart from trade, there needs to be direction and focus regarding bilateral investments. For the growing nature of their bilateral trade, Sino-‐Indian investments are a weak link. China’s investments in Pakistan and Myanmar annually for the last three years (2008-‐2010) successively, exceed its total investments in India.48_{China’s
investments
in
Pakistan
and
Myanmar
have} strong shades of a strategic element to it – infrastructure, telecom, nuclear energy etc. – and raises concerns in India that these investments are part of its grand strategy to keep India

Available at: http://www.business-‐standard.com/india/news/india-‐china-‐to-‐raise-‐bilateral-‐trade-‐to-‐100-‐bn-‐by-‐ 2015/119428/on (Accessed on 4 September 2011)

46_{“Sino-‐Indian
bilateral
trade
maintains
strong
momentum
into
2011”
NDTV
Profit,
25
August
2011.
Accessible
at:}

http://profit.ndtv.com/news/show/sino-‐india-‐bilateral-‐trade-‐maintains-‐strong-‐momentum-‐into-‐2011-‐174516 (Accessed on 14 November 2011)

47_{“Sino-‐Indian
trade
shows
downward
trend,
says
Chinese
envoy”
Economic
Times
(New
Delhi)
27
July
2012.}

Accessible at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-‐07-‐27/news/32889512_1_sino-‐indian-‐trade-‐ bilateral-‐trade-‐volume-‐chinese-‐envoy (Accessed on 18 September 2012)

48_{See
Nargiza
Salidjanova,
“Going
Out:
An
Overview
of
China’s
Outward
Foreign
Direct
Investment”
U.S.-‐China} Economic & Security Review Commission Research Report, 30 March 2011.

檢視中國-印度關係: 從信心建立措施的角度

期末報告

檢視中國-印度關係: 從信心建立措施的角度

中 華 民 國 103 年 03 月 11 日

中華民國 103 年 03 月 11 日