國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
4. Chapter Four: Flanders 4.I Introduction
4.I.A Political Background
The region covering what is today called Flanders, has historically consisted of three smaller units: the County of Flanders, the Dukedom of Brabant and the Dukedom of Limburg. The collection of these three regions was at different periods of modern history under consecutively Spanish, Austrian and French occupation, with intermezzos of making up a part of the larger Netherlands.
The emergence of the Flemish Movement is best understood in the light of the formation of the Belgian state. Starting from 1795 Napoleon’s occupation of contemporary Belgium – he received what was then called the Southern Netherlands after a victory over Francis II of Habsburg - intensively disseminated and implemented the French political system and culture. Consequently, many of the elites in these parts studied in France. After Napoleon’s defeat, the Southern Netherlands (including Flanders) were forced by means of the Congress of Vienna to once again become part of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands under King Willem I, who promoted the use of Dutch in administration.
Despite the fact that the majority of the population spoke Dutch, the elites were almost exclusively francophone, also the lion’s share was Catholic unlike the northern Netherlands who were typically Protestant. These elites, following the example of the Second French Revolution of 1830, successfully organised a Belgian Revolution. The newly instated Belgian National Congress chose constitutional monarchy as the preferred political system and chose Leopold of the House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha (a German dynasty) to be the first Belgian King. The Kingdom of Belgium was a fact;
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
French was chosen as the only official national language and was to be dominant in matters public ranging from education to justice and the state in general. After all, French was the language of modernity and the Enlightenment. It was expected to naturally rub out inferior languages.116 The unity of ‘nation’ and state was projected by the choice for the Jacobin state model with centralised unilingual institutions, despite the linguistic and cultural divisions that existed.
The Flemish Movement for equal rights thus emerged in a unilingual francophone Belgian state where the elite in both Flanders and Wallonia (the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking regions of modern day Belgium) spoke French. Running throughout the major ideological division that divided Belgium between liberals, socialists and clericalists, the movement was concerned with achieving equal language and cultural rights for Flemings. Between 1830 and 1914 the movement was mostly led by writers and artists and did not have a wider political basis. In the first half of this period it was difficult for the nationalists to gain influence in parliament as tax suffrage excluded most of the poor Flemish population. Six years after the introduction of general multiple suffrage117, finally, in 1898 Dutch was recognised as a language formally equal to French. 118 This was a first step towards socio-political emancipation of the Flemings. The Flemish nationalists in the traditional parties did not manage to push through territoriality which would imply determining the local administrative language based on the majority language used by the population.
116 Kenneth McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies. Belgium, (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), 22.
117 This meant that every grown man over 25 years of age had at least one vote. Men with a higher level of education or paying more taxes were allowed multiple votes.
118 De Vriendt-Coremans Law of 1898.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
However, due to the rejection of the principle of territoriality in the 1914 law on primary education and the failure to secure the creation of Flemish regiments in the army on the eve of the First World War, the Flemish Movement radicalised. During the German occupation a more radical faction within the Flemish Movement called the Activisten decided to collaborate with the Germans. Their only achievement was the administrative division of Flanders and Wallonia. Most of the Activisten were killed in 1918 by angry mobs, sentenced to death by the returning Belgian Government, or fled abroad.
During the inter-bellum the Flemish nationalist Frontpartij (later re-named Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond, VNV [Flemish National
Union]) was electorally rather successful as Belgium introduced general suffrage (one man one vote) for male citizens. Consequently they achieved the application of territoriality in the use of Dutch for administrative matters in
Flanders and in 1930 the University of Ghent became fully Dutch-speaking.
Throughout the Second World War Nazi occupation of Belgium certain splinter groups such as Verdinaso and DeVlag did much to damage the image of the Flemish Movement through close connections and collaboration with the German occupier.
Some elements in these groups supported the creation of a larger German empire of all Germanic peoples, some of a Pan-Dutch republic and others simply wanted Flemish independence. In the aftermath of the war again many of the collaborators were persecuted by the state and the people.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
In the 1960s the Flemish Movement managed to shed some of its negative connotations thanks to the popularity of the Volksunie (VU, People’s Union), an explicitly democratic Flemish nationalist party. Under pressure from the Volksunie, in 1962 traditional parties agreed upon the establishment of the modern-day Belgian language border between north and south. The 1968 escalation of the struggle of Flemish students to restore the exclusive use of Dutch at the Caltholic University of Leuven, eventually caused the 1970s’ political crisis that led to the division of Belgium into four linguistic territories (Dutch in Flanders, French in Wallonia, the bilingual Brussels capital region, and a German-speaking area in the east of Wallonia);
and three cultural communities. It was also in the 1970s that the Christian democrat, liberal, socialist, green and communist political parties in Belgium split along linguistic lines.
The constitutional federalisation of Belgium was effectuated in 1980. Belgian federalism contains two types of federal units: communities and regions. There are three communities (Dutch, French and German-speaking) which have legislative power over ‘personalised matters’ involving interaction between public servants and the public such as education, culture, sports, welfare and language. Additionally, there are three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels) which deal with more territorial policy areas such as environment, transport, infrastructure, and economic development. Social policy (together with the other remaining policy areas) generally remains under federal jurisdiction. In the original plan, each community and each region had its own parliament and executive, however, the predecessor of the Flemish Parliament voted to merge community and regional powers into one Flemish government. In federal elections – as is the case in regional and European elections – voters can only vote for parties based on their side of the administrative and language
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
borders, this means there are no truly national politicians. This among other things causes political crises related to community issues to erupt frequently throughout the 1980s and 1990s.119 Each region has its own politicians, public opinion, media; and public culture that flows from it.
The political embodiment of Flemish nationalism since the 1970s has been rather complex as the mother-party Volksunie has produced several spin-off parties. The most infamous of these, Vlaams Blok ([Flemish Bloc] later renamed Vlaams Belang or Flemish Interest) was founded in 1978 after the more radical wing was unhappy with the VU leadership’s decision to participate in government. This far right explicitly separatist party’s success rose as the Volksunie regressed. From winning one seat out of a total 212 in the federal parliament in 1978, they won 18 out of 150 seats in 2003, whereas VU went from holding 22 seats out of 212 in 1974 to holding no more than 5 out of 150 at their last election under that name in 1995. Since their great election victory in the Flemish Parliamentary elections of 2004 receiving 24% of the popular vote, the party has been losing elections ever since and now stands at 3 out of 150 seats on the federal level and just under 6% of the vote in the Flemish Parliamentary elections of May 2014.
Several progressive splinter parties participated in elections throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but today none remain active. The biggest remaining political party whose roots lie in the Volksunie is the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA, New Flemish Alliance). The N-VA was founded in 2001 by the more traditionalist wing of the VU.
This will be the party considered where nationalist discourse in Flanders is concerned.
119 Béland & Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy, 160.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
4.I.B Flemish Language and Culture
As has become clear from the detailed overview of Belgium’s political background, the linguistic and cultural divide between Flanders and Wallonia (and to some extent Brussels) is quite deep.
Dutch, sometimes referred to as Flemish Dutch or Belgian Dutch, is a West-Germanic language developed under Frankish influences (as was German). It is the sole official language of Flanders today, and has been spoken in different variants and stages of development since the 6th century.120 Its literary history is generally said to have begun in the 12th century. The dominant language of science and the church remained Latin until the mid-eighteenth century; however Dutch was used in many administrative documents from the 13th century. Throughout the period of foreign domination by consecutively Spanish, Austrian and French overlords from 1585 and 1815 the region’s elites and administration were subject to Frenchification. This continued until deep into the 20th century.
By the time we enter the late 20th century, however, the status of Dutch was firmly enshrined in law as the only official language in Flanders, and one of the official languages of Brussels and Belgium. Although language may still serve as a marker of identity – it is hard not to when the other language involved is so different – the salience of the issue has decreased over time.
4.I.C General Development of Social Policy in Belgium
The law that allowed for the evolution of social policy as it exists in Belgium today was the 1851 law which created the possibility and conditions for the foundation
120 Joop van der Horst and Arend Quak, Inleiding Oudnederlands, (Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 2002), 2.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
self-help associations (called mutualities) with legal personality.121 The regulations for these organisations were relaxed considerably and they were declared eligible for state subsidy in 1894. The mutualities, unions and pension funds tended to follow the ideological divides found in Belgium at the time, with the Catholic and socialist pillars each spawning their own organisations. The fragmented nature of the social welfare system was due to the predominantly Catholic politicians’ rejection of the statist social welfare system developed in Germany around the same time.122 Preferable to the Catholics was a system of subsidised freedom.123 Although resisted by labour unions afraid to lose their power throughout the beginning of the twentieth century, by 1925 Belgian law contained compulsory old-age insurance schemes for manual workers, miners, and service workers.124 In 1930 there is a further expansion of social welfare when Parliament approved of universal family allowances for all employees. Although regional inequalities were not generally debated before the Second World War and the issue never became crucial, in the area of family allowances some Francophone voices did bring up ‘unfair’ transfers from south to north due to Flanders’ high fertility rate.125
The modern post-war universal social policy system that we see today still largely reflects the original architecture of the first century of social legislation. The four main types of social insurance schemes – old-age insurance, family allowances, health insurance, and unemployment insurance – are for the most part still administered by
121 Béland and Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy, 151.
122 Ibid, 151.
123 Guy Vanthemsche, La sécurité sociale : Les origines du systeme belge. Le présent face a son passé (1994), 19.
124 Béland and Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy, 151.
125 Ibid, 151.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
mututalities, and labour and business officials. This despite the fact that the state determines levels and conditions, raises the budget, and finances the different social provisions. Labour unions are responsible for distribution of unemployment benefits;
mutualities are the middle-man between citizens and health care providers; and the various child benefit funding agencies allocate family allowances. As the state is just one of the actors involved in social welfare in Belgium, the term ‘welfare state’ is usually replaced by the phrase Social Security.126
The fragmented nature of the social policy landscape in Belgium makes it slightly more difficult for the Belgian state to “use social policy to foster and promote competing national solidarities and identities”.127
4.II Discourse and Social Policy
In this section of the case study we engage in a detailed analysis of party discourse as found in political and election programmes. More specifically, the analysis will focus on instances of discourse where the political party in question – in this case, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie) – establish a connection between social policy preferences or interpretations of obligations to co-nationals on the one hand, and national identity or distinctiveness on the other hand. In other words, we are interested in discourse which attempts to establish a link between social and national citizenship. As we go over the different documents the thesis will indicate key political, economic or other structural conditions and events possibly relevant to the
126 Béland and Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy, 153.
127 Ibid, 19.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
discourse. This section will cover discourse published in the period between 2003 and 2014. This is the whole period of political activity of the N-VA, the discursive data only includes national and regional election manifestos as there is little place for nationalist discourse in local council elections and European elections.
For the analysis we have divided the chapter into two periods (2003-2007 and 2009-2014) within which we will look at the discourse theme per theme.
4.II.A The Evolution of the Flemish Nationalist Political Agenda towards Social Policy
Where the Flemish nationalist demands used to focus straightforwardly on linguistic and cultural aspects of national identity for mobilisation, in the 1980s the nationalist political agenda began to include an increasing number of references to social and economic policy. There are three factors which could help explain this shift. First, over the decades preceding and following the 1970s transformation of Belgium to a more pluralist state, the economic balance shifted in favour of Flanders. This caused Flemish parties, organisations and academics to start paying attention to elements such as financial redistribution and structural differences of the two economies.
Second, the process of federalisation and the succeeding state reforms have drawn increased attention to the issue of which level of government should be in charge of which policy areas. And third, the traditional Flemish nationalist objective of linguistic and cultural recognition, protection and equality had been largely achieved.128
128 Béland and Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy, 161.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
The Flemish case certainly seems to fit the description of our object of study, namely a nationalist movement which seems to persist despite the fact that concerns over essential elements of national identity have already been assuaged. Following our theoretical hypothesis the persistence (and in some cases political or societal growth) of this movement could be partially understood through the fact that some nationalist movements will view or represent national identity as incorporating an ethical component. More specifically according to the theory this would entail distinct interpretations of obligations owed to others and certain ideas on social citizenship.
These are things that can possibly be found in the way nationalists describe or frame national identity or distinctiveness and the need for increased autonomy. In this case we would expect to see political discourse framing the nationalist goal in terms of social policy preferences.
The first indicators pointing to a connection between Flemish nationalism and social policy came with a series of studies of Flemish organisations and academics, calculating the financial flows in the Belgian social insurance system and the state at large. These types of research are interesting because they are mostly useful from a political point of view and not so much from a scientific one. Therefore they seem aimed at questioning the legitimacy of the social insurance system, or at least how it is financed. One of the early studies on inter-regional financial transfers was authored by Michel Dethée in 1984, and came to the conclusion that per capita Social Security expenditures in Wallonia were 19 per cent higher than they were in Flanders.129 A similar study published by the Centrum voor Sociaal Beleid (Centre for Social Policy)
129 Michel Dethée, "Een Regionale Analyse van de Sociale Zekerheid in België", GERV-Berichten (1984): 45.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
in 1989-1990 found an even higher discrepancy at close to 30 per cent.130 On the Francophone side of the debate there were obviously fewer such papers published as they potentially had much to lose from precise numbers being published repeatedly.131 Nonetheless the Walloon government commissioned a report of their own in 1988, which produced similar figures but with a different explanation. The Walloon study suggested that the discrepancies could be explained by structural differences in the relative number of disabled people, pensioners, and widows living in Wallonia and Flanders.132 Over the years, studies such as these have informed the debate on the federalisation or split of the social insurance system in Belgium. And as we will see similar arguments are made in political discourse of nationalist parties such as N-VA.
From their first participation in the 2003 Federal Elections until their 2014 triple election victory on the regional, federal and European levels, the N-VA has sustained the focus on socio-economic arguments by incorporating them into their nationalist project. Generally, we see three major recurring themes throughout the N-VA’s discourse. First, the N-VA draws attention to a contradiction in political vision and policy preferences where social policy, public health, justice and immigration. Second, N-VA repeatedly stresses important differences in structural conditions where the economy is concerned, these distinct conditions are then said to require their own specific approach on the regional level. The third and last theme is that of the inter-regional financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia (and to a lesser extent to
130 Herman Deleeck, Lieven De Lathouwer, and Karel Van den Bosch, "Verschillen in Sociale Zekerheid tussen Wallonië en Vlaanderen, Feiten en Oorzaken,"Economisch en Sociaal Tijdschrift (1989), 1.
131 Béland & Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy, 163.
132 Loumaye Reman, De la régionalisation de la sécurité sociale à la communication des soins de santé, IRES, Final report, 9 May 1988.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Brussels). Where transfers are concerned the argument seems to be that the current transfers do not conform to the definition of solidarity. N-VA repeatedly puts forward a specific interpretation of what solidarity is and what it should look like institutionally. Seen as these three major elements return throughout the political
Brussels). Where transfers are concerned the argument seems to be that the current transfers do not conform to the definition of solidarity. N-VA repeatedly puts forward a specific interpretation of what solidarity is and what it should look like institutionally. Seen as these three major elements return throughout the political