Chapter 3 – China’s Objectives and Tactics
As previously stated, China is at ideological odds with the West when it comes to how a state should govern its citizens online. In this section I will be covering how China’s ideological odds with the West is significant in its cyber warfare campaign, as it ties into the Public Opinion Warfare aspect of the “Three Warfares” principle.109 Beijing has been able to leverage
international influence to campaign for a “states-rights” approach to internet governance while the United States has support a multi-stakeholder model.110 The Atlantic Council’s Jason Healey describes this divergence in ideology as “a bifurcation between east and west” that allows little room for compromise.111 Beijing rejects the model of an open Internet which the United States and its allies are in support of. On December 16, 2015, Xi Jinping called upon the international community to “respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development and model of cyber regulation and participate in international cyberspace governance on an equal footing.”112 Additionally, in a critique of the U.S., Xi said, “Existing rules governing cyberspace hardly reflect the desires and interests of the majority of
countries.”113
Chinese foreign policy has shifted in recent years to adopt two key stances: defending China’s core interests (核心利 益), and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (中华民族 伟大复兴), or often referred to as the “China Dream (zhongguomeng).”114 According to the RAND corporation, the adoption by China of the “core interests” framework focused on three basic goals: preserving China’s basic state system and national security; protecting China’
sovereignty and territorial integrity; and continuing the stable development of China’s economy
109 Emilio Iasiello, "China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities," Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 2 (2016): 45-69.
www.jstor.org/stable/26466776.
110 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54. Accessed May 22, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/26267405.
111 Ibid.
112 Huaxia, ed., “Highlights of Xi's Internet speech,” Xinhua, December 16, 2015, http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/16/c_134923855.htm.
113 Ibid.
114 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019).
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and society.115 From those core interests, we can begin to understand where the utilization of political warfare, and cyber warfare come into play; and why China feels that carrying out a political warfare campaign against Taiwan is necessary and aligns with its core interests. Both stances have overlapping goals, and interpretations on how to achieve those goals by Chinese scholars and observers. To support this statement, the RAND Corporation states:
In practice, the first core interest is largely consonant with the preservation of the ruling status of the CCP while the second and third interests serve as means to this end through the retention of control over Xinjiang and Tibet; the defense of China’s claims in the South and East China seas; and the prevention of Taiwan independence, leading to the island’s ultimate absorption. By contrast, the “China dream,” while necessarily entailing the retention and/or integration of territories that Chinese leaders regard as theirs, looks further afield to a more ambitious set of goals. These include domestic economic goals such as achieving the “two 100s”
which are linked to the centenaries of the founding of the CCP, in 2021, and of the PRC itself, in 2049; reducing social inequality; cleaning up the environment;
developing national morals; and achieving the “strong nation dream” (强国梦) of returning the country to a position of region and global preeminence.116
The “Chinese Dream” helps guide all facets of the Chinese government towards a single overarching goal.117 In 2012, Xi Jinping described the Chinese dream as the collective
rejuvenation-a revival of prosperity, unity and strength; and in a 2015 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Xi explained that in order to understand the Chinese Dream “one needs to fully appreciate the Chinese nation’s deep suffering since modern times and the profound impact of such suffering on the Chinese minds.”118 Within these two frameworks, it stands to reason that the CCP would be engaged in a political warfare campaign aimed at Taiwan. If the eventual strategic goal is the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, then Beijing will employ
whatever means it has at its disposal, in order to undermine Taiwan’s democracy and prevent the
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54.
www.jstor.org/stable/26267405.
118 Ibid.
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Taiwan independence movement from gaining momentum.119 Additionally, this means preventing any third party intervention in that effort, most notably by causing rifts in foreign relations with states like the U.S., Australia, Japan, and South Korea. As previously emphasized by President Xi, China seeks to “democratize” international society, by advocating for a “state-rights” approach where individual states can choose their social, political, and economic systems, free from criticism.120 China is determined to achieve its ultimate goal of rejuvenating the state from its “Century of Humiliation” and will incorporate strategic political warfare tactics to spread its influence and hold in territories like Hong Kong and Taiwan. Chinese citizens believe that under the guidance of the CCP, the state can pursue the “Chinese Dream” through its growing international strength free from foreign interference.
Importance of the People’s Liberation Army to the Chinese Dream As the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is tasked with safeguarding the national strategic goal of the “Chinese Dream.” From this perspective, the PLA must fulfill its mandate (luxing shiming) as the Party’s army, and the armed forces must always obey the Party.121 According to Kolton, the CCP expects the PLA to
guarantee “a stable external environment for continued economic development,” and ties its success to the political success of the state. As the armed wing of the party, and because the PLA is tasked with carrying out the ideology of the party, military strategy must coincide with the CCP’s strategic goals.
In May 2015, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) published a white paper articulating the country’s military strategy. According to Kolton, this document reimagined military power and called for the PLA to abandon its traditional emphasis of land warfare.
119 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019).
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. Also available in print form.
120 Ibid.
121 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54.
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Several authoritative Chinese sources described the white paper as an accurate indicator of the PLA’s strategy and a call for it to adapt to new political warfare strategies to adapt to the modern military landscape.122 Anthony Cordesman and Steven Colley of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also accept what this white paper means for understanding PLA strategic thinking.123 It is important to note, however, that publications that reveal this amount of information usually fail to confirm which concepts the PLA operationalize and which ones they reject.124 As such, it is difficult to determine which particular areas the PLA places a strategic importance on, oftentimes referring to these concepts in vague or abstract terms. Additionally, PLA texts do not necessarily reflect the views of the CCP, nor the entire Chinese government.
Nevertheless, Kolton believes that the MND white paper is helpful when it comes to
understanding PLA thinking.125 The 2015 Military Strategy explains, “China’s armed forces take their dream of making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream. Without a strong
military, a country can be neither safe nor strong.”126 Using this logic, China identifies the need for an advanced military in order to achieve its strategic goals. According to Kolton:
As the country aims for the “Chinese Dream,” the strategic end-state for the PLA can be expressed in three sub-objectives: sovereignty, modernity, and stability.
These goals translate into enduring themes for the military: (1) Protect the Party and Safeguard Stability, (2) Defend Sovereignty and Defeat Aggression, (3) Modernize the Military and Build the Nation. To accomplish these end, the MND assigns its armed forces strategic tasks (zhanlu renwu), which guide the
employment of resources to accomplish objectives.127
122 Ibid.
123 Anthony H. Cordesman and Steven Colley, “Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (October 10, 2015), 121.
124 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54.
www.jstor.org/stable/26267405.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.; David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 103.
127 Ibid.
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In meeting these objectives, China has set two decisive milestones called the “two centenaries”
(liang ge yibai nian) that Western scholars frequently cite as deadlines for Chinese overseas activities in the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.128 The first centenary is set in 2021, one hundred years after the founding of the CCP and the second in 2049, making the
one-hundred-year anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. At this point, the CCP hopes and plans to achieve its goal of returning China to a “prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” society.129 In October 2015, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central Committee reaffirmed the two centenaries in its 13th Five-Year Plan.130
Additionally, Xi identified international stability as one necessary condition for the Chinese Dream. President Xi evaluates the success of the CCP in terms of achieving the Chinese Dream with the centenaries set as deadlines to meet certain accomplishments. Thus, the Chinese Dream and the two centenaries orient and pace the PLA as it operationalizes the national military strategy.131
In the case of cyber, members of the CCP have unique ways and means of interpreting and pursuing the use of cyber and how to implement cyber warfare strategies to achieve their goals. In the case of Taiwan, one retired PLA lieutenant general believes cyber operations enable China to pursue reunification with Taiwan and to realize the Chinese Dream without lethal military conflict.132 In the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), this general argued that the PLA must develop sophisticated cyber capabilities in order to “defeat its adversaries without fighting,” emphasizing the low
128 Michael D. Swaine, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major- Power Diplomacy with Chinese
Characteristics,” China Leadership Monitor 46 (March 19, 2015); David M. Finkelstein,
“China’s National Military Strategy,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 103.
128 Ibid.
129 Michael Kolton. "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence." The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54.
www.jstor.org/stable/26267405.
130 Ibid.; Yin Pumin, “Mapping Out Success: New five-year blueprint lays down specific objectives for a prosperous China,” Beijing Review 45 (November 5, 2015),
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/Current_Issue/Editor_ Choice/201511/t20151102_800041696.html.
131 Ibid.
132
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high reward factor associated with cyber.133 From this logic we can deduce that China favors cyber tactics in order to avoid armed military conflict, and to minimize risk and condemnation from the international community. As previously mentioned, the ability of cyber warfare to enhance an existing political warfare campaign, such as undermining democratic legitimacy, coincide with the CCP’s larger strategic goals of reuniting Taiwan with the mainland.
Why is Taiwan Important to China?
The CCP has long placed strict restrictions on the information related to their plans on Taiwan in order to ensure that any publications released serve as propaganda and psychological warfare. As a result, it has been nearly impossible for American scholars to use open source to understand Chinese military thinking regarding Taiwan. To make the issue more frustrating, the most readily available Chinese sources regarding Taiwan are intended to spread misinformation.
The CCP goes to great lengths to assure its audience that victory is inevitable no matter what. Its intent is for Taiwan and the U.S. to believe that every effort to defend the island is futile.134
Ian Easton, in his book The Chinese Invasion Threat, argues that the CCP is funneling massive amounts of resources into creating a powerful military machine in order to acquire the capabilities needed to annex or conquer Taiwan135. As previously mentioned, this goal is part of its greater objective of “achieving national unification.” Though, it is important to note that the rapid expansion of China’s military power does not necessarily mean war is imminent or even likely.136 According to Easton:
The PRC has long sought the annexation of Taiwan under its “one China” principle.
In Beijing’s view, Taiwan’s de facto independence and democratic system of government pose existential threats to the CCP’s right to rule China. Taiwan is thus portrayed in Chinese propaganda as a “splittist regime.” Legitimacy across the
133 Ibid.
134 David Shambaugh appears to be the first American “China Hands” to recognize and record this phenomenon. See his book, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 307-311.
135 Ian Easton. The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia.
(Manchester: Eastbridge Books, 2019).
136 Ibid.
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Taiwan Strait is viewed as something political scientists typically refer to as a
“zero-sum game” because only one side can win, and that will necessarily mean that the other side must be vanquished. China’s stated goal is Cross-Strait unification under a formula called “One Country, Two Systems.” This approach envisions the ROC government in Taiwan surrendering sovereignty to the PRC authorities, allowing them to transform the island nation in to an occupied, authoritarian administrative territory like Hong Kong.137
Under the long-term objective of achieving the “Chinese Dream,” under the “one China”
principle, the PLA under the CCP has been driven to bolster its military for future war in the Taiwan strait. Invading Taiwan is something that is at the heart of the PLA’s desire to “liberate”
Taiwan; it is something that has been indoctrinated and instilled into the minds of all high-ranking officers.138 Easton emphasizes that, to the PLA, the interests of the regime (the CCP) are paramount over the interests of the people of China, and its “main strategic direction” is to annex Taiwan.139 Chinese leadership understands and recognizes the roadblocks ahead and will
continue to invest heavily in “strategic deception, intelligence collection, psychological warfare, joint training and advanced weaponry.”
Chinese Tactics and Strategies: Public Opinion Warfare
When talking about Chinese political warfare strategies, it is impossible to ignore the CCP’s weaponization of Public Opinion Warfare and in the cyber age. According to a study by the RAND Corporation, “thought work” or the information operations of the Party, the state, and the PLA are often collectively referred to as “public opinion management” when undertaken inside China and “overseas propaganda work” when conducted outside of the PRC.140 The overall goal of these public opinion operations is to defend the ruling status and interests of the
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019).
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CCP while expanding its ability to shape the international context regarding China. Reshaping context and narrative allows more room for the CCP to pursue its objectives of the “Chinese Dream.” Domestic efforts to control public opinion primarily seek to distract and disperse discussions that carry the potential to undermine regime legitimacy.141 As previously mentioned, the CCP and Chinese scholars are highly aware of the impact cyber and social media can have on the mobilization of anti-regime sentiment. Public opinion warfare at home means influencing society so that it remains stable and does not question the ruling status of the CCP. External operations are often aimed at specific targets such as ethnic minorities (Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols, and others), democracy advocates in Hong Kong, and Taiwan independence activists.
Additionally, at both the regional and global levels, Chinese academics, think-tank analysts, and even top leaders have highlighted the roughly 60 to 65 million overseas ethnic Chinese who could be potentially utilized to spread economic, diplomatic and political influence.142 For this reason, Beijing places an extremely high priority on controlling as many international Chinese-language media outlets as possible, from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, all the way to the United States and Australia, where millions of ethnic Chinese reside. This is not something entirely new to China as author and prominent Chinese social critic Murong Xuecun has
noted.143 Since its establishment in 1949, the PRC has been utilizing tactics such as propaganda to influence public opinion with some activities even dating to the CCP’s founding in 1921.144 For China, foreign policy begins at home, and the majority of the PRC’s efforts over recent decades to use information for political goals and to shape public opinion through propaganda has been focused first on defending the regime and secondarily on swaying foreign
audiences.”145
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Murong Xuecun, “The New Face of Chinese Propaganda,” New York Times, December 20, 2013.
144 Ibid.
145 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019).
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html.
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Public Opinion/Media Warfare
Public Opinion Warfare is utilized to influence domestic and international public opinion in order to build support of China’s actions and to dissuade adversaries from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interest; something that China has been able to leverage strategically in recent years. Through the use of various mediums such as the internet, television, news publications, movies, etc., the CCP’s goal is to preserve a positive morale and generate public support at home and abroad.146 China has, to a large extent, successfully utilized its media warfare by promoting a narrative of being a cyber-ally while tempering bad press when it is accused of conducting cyber espionage.147 Dean Cheng, in another article, identifies four themes that are inherent in Chinese writings on public opinion:
Follow Top- Down Guidance – Senior leadership will dictate courses of action based on strategic objectives.
Emphasize Preemption – Chinese analyses of public opinion warfare emphasize that “the first sound grabs people, the first to enter establishes dominance (xian sheng douren, xianru weizhu).”
Be Flexible and Responsive to Changing Conditions – Use of different propaganda activities depending on the audience. “One must make distinctions between the more stubborn elements and the general populace.”
Exploit All Available Resources – Civilian and commercial news assets such as
Exploit All Available Resources – Civilian and commercial news assets such as