中國對台灣網路戰爭研究 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文. Master’s 治政 Thesis. 大. 立中國對台灣網路戰爭研究. ‧ 國. 學. A Study on Chinese Cyber Warfare on Taiwan. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. v. i Student:CAndrew Yi 易安祖 n U. hengchi. Advisor: Chien-min Chao, Ph.D. 趙建民教授. 中華民國 109 年 6 月 June 2020. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(2) Abstract Cybersecurity is one of the most pressing issues facing modern, technologically advanced states. Building cyber capabilities has allowed states to execute strategic tasks and achieve goals previously thought impossible in real time. Cyber is the domain of tomorrow and no country has better utilized those capabilities than China. Currently, Taiwan and the United States face the constant threat of cyberattacks from its adversaries, China being chief among those. Because of flaws and weaknesses in both countries' cybersecurity networks, foreign actors seek to utilize cyber capabilities to destabilize society in order to achieve strategic goals. The PRC has been utilizing its cyber capabilities first on Taiwan, and later against other foreign adversaries such as the United States. Experts frequently cite Taiwan as a testing ground for Chinese hacks because of its proximity to the mainland and its cultural similarities. In this thesis, I attempt to answer the. 政治大. question of: what is China’s Cyber Warfare Strategy against Taiwan? Taiwan is a strategic goal. 立. of the Chinese government, who is willing to go to any lengths short of war to subdue to the. ‧ 國. 學. island government to its force. The process of conducting this research paper was a daunting task, but I hope to help further the discussion and research of Chinese Cyber-activities by. ‧. contextualizing China’s Political Warfare campaign against Taiwan to better understand their. y. Nat. activities. This thesis will explain how the CCP is carrying out a coordinated political warfare. sit. campaign that utilizes cyber warfare in order to undermine Taiwan’s democracy. It utilizes what. er. io. publically available English resources are available regarding Taiwan and China’s cyber. n. a lsources from Chinese. Thei effectiveness v capabilities and relies on translations and extent of C. n. U for accuracy. h eresearch Chinese activities in Taiwan requires further h i study n c and. g. Keywords: Taiwan, Cyber Warfare, Cybersecurity, Cyber Strategy, Cross-strait Relations, CCP Politics, U.S.-Taiwan Relation. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(3) Table of Contents Chapter 1 Methodology ………………………………………………………………….........Page 1 Introduction ..…………….…………………………………………………….......Page 2 Chinese Views of Cyber ...…………………………………………………………Page 5 Chapter 2 – Importance and Need for Cyber Theory Political Warfare Re-Contextualized……………………...…………………….Page 16 China’s “Three Warfares” ………………………………………………………Page 22. 政治大 Chapter 3 – China’s Objectives and Tactics 立. Waldo’s Five Pillars for Societal Stability ………………………………….…..Page 24. ‧ 國. 學. Importance of the People’s Liberation Army to the Chinese Dream…………Page 29 Why is Taiwan Important to China?....................................................................Page 32. ‧. Chinese Tactics and Strategies: Public Opinion Warfare……………………..Page 33. Nat. sit. y. Chinese Social Media Activities………………………………………………….Page 37. a. er. io. Chinese Military Activities……………………………………………………….Page 43. n. v China’s Strategic Objective:l Taiwan’s Pillars of Societal n i Stability………...…Page 47 Ch. Chapter 4 – Taiwan’s Counter Strategy. engchi U. Notable Cyber-Attacks on Taiwan………………………………………………Page 52 What is Taiwan Currently Doing?........................................................................Page 53 What Can Taiwan Do? …………………………………………………….…….Page 57 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………...Page 60 Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………...Page 63. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(4) Chapter 1 – Methodology Research Question Taiwan and the United States face an ongoing security threat and the challenge of defending themselves against the CCP’s vast cyber capabilities. In its campaign to retake Taiwan by any means necessary, the CCP has resorted to the use of cyber warfare against Taiwan. In its counteroffensive campaign against the U.S., Beijing oftentimes utilizes Taiwan as a testing bed, later using those same techniques in other countries like the United States. Beijing sees cyber warfare as a method of executing a low risk-high reward political warfare campaign in order to subdue Taiwan. With cross-strait tensions at almost an all-time high, this raises the question of: What is China’s Cyber Warfare Strategy against Taiwan? How are they doing it and why?. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Research Method. 政治大. This thesis adopts qualitative research methods, specifically utilizing archival methods,. ‧. collecting and reviewing documents, news articles, and journal publications. Interviews were. y. Nat. conducted to provide accurate accounts from government security officials currently working on. io. sit. this issue. Because of the contemporary nature of the research question and hypotheses, this. a. er. thesis will concentrate mainly on Chinese cyber espionage efforts within the last two decades. n. i v this thesis relies heavily on (post-2000). Additionally, due to the lclassified nature of this topic,. Un. Ch. publicly available resources and will requiree future n g study c h i in order to update the results of this thesis.. China’s campaign of disinformation, cyber-attacks, and military exercise serve to target the independent and democratic pillars of Taiwanese society in order to eventually force it to submit to a foreign power. Disinformation can serve to undermine the legitimacy and authority of public officials while military activities can harm morale among citizens and government officials. It can also serve to undermine the current institutional strength that Taiwanese government currently upholds. The current COVID-19 Global Pandemic also leaves Taiwan vulnerable to the spread of misinformation due to the nature of the information sphere where accuracy is of utmost priority above all else.. 1 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(5) Introduction The Taiwan Strait has long been a flash point in the Asia-Pacific region since the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan after their defeat by the Communists. Since the 1950’s, tensions have cooled and boiled over the decades, with advancements in warfare and technology completely reshaping the landscape of the battlefield. Today, Taiwan is facing a major cybersecurity threat at the hands of the PRC. The internet has become ingrained in nearly every aspect of modern society; everything from e-commerce, social media, multinational corporations, even government institutions and bureaucracies are inextricably linked to the internet, leaving them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In 2011, the Center for a New American Security published a report stating “the ability to. 政治大 state actors can use this power to achieve financial, military, political, ideological or social 立 objectives in cyberspace or the physical world.” Both the United States and Taiwan have a long. leverage cyberspace is one of the 21st century’s most important sources of power. State and non1. ‧ 國. 學. history of cyber-attacks, with Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party’s website in particular being hacked twice. In 2013, The National Security Bureau (NSB) detected 7.2 million hacking. ‧. incidents alone, 239,000 of which were attacks. Additionally, in the first half of 2016 alone, the. sit. y. Nat. NSB itself was the target of 17,600 cyberattacks, averaging a total of 12 per day; most of which are believed to have originated in China.. er. io. n. Because of the widespread integration of the internet in nearly a v all facets of industry,. l. i. government, and military, countries likeCTaiwan U n States are under constant assault h and the United. engchi. in cyberspace. As these attacks grow in intensity, the risk of catastrophic incidents with consequential social effects rapidly increases. The same 2011 report by the Center for a New American Security emphasized three traits of cyber security that [American] leaders must grapple with in order to craft effective policies: speed and the collapse of distance; magnitude and intensity; and low barriers to entry. The capabilities within cyberspace were totally 1. Robert E. Khan, Mike McConnell, Joseph S. Nye, Peter Schwartz, Nova J. Daly, Nathaniel Fick, Martha Finnemore, Richard Fontaine, Daniel E. Geer, David A. Gross, Jason Healey, James A. Lewis, M. Ethan Lucarelli, Thomas G. Mahnken, Gary McGraw, Roger H. Miksad, Gregory J. Rattray, Will Rogers, and Christopher M. Schroeder, America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age, Center for a New American Security, 2011. 2031. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06319.7. 2 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(6) unimaginable just decades ago, but now the speed and collapse of distance—something we had originally taken as a luxury—is now one of the most formidable security challenges not only to the United States, but to every nation. In cyberspace, foreknowledge is limited because information moves from origin to destination almost instantaneously. As a result, cyber-attacks are not constrained by geographic proximity. Targets remain constantly vulnerable to attacks and have little to no time to prepare for them.2 Magnitude and intensity emphasizes that small actions can have enormous effects. For the past decade, China has emphasized the strategic importance of cyberspace. In 2006, the PLA Daily called cyberattacks a serious threat to national security. Cyber operations reshape the security environment by eroding traditional, geographical boundaries.3 China believes that it. 治政大Kolton, a U.S. Army Foreign According to Michael. must seize strategic opportunities to ensure a stable security environment in what they consider the “fifth-dimension of the battlefield.”. 立. 4. Area Officer (FAO) specializing in China, some PLA theorists believe information age warfare. ‧ 國. 學. requires militaries to conduct a new hybrid-form of warfare that combines cyber power and firepower.5 By this argument, the PLA believes that a joint cyber force is necessary to fight and. ‧. win future wars as cyber operations are critical for national defense.. Nat. sit. y. Traditional Clausewitzian theory6 on warfare no longer applies to the current 21st century. er. io. battle ground. The shortcomings of Clausewitzian theory when applied to traditional military theory presents four challenges: anonymity, object permanence, measurable results, and rapid a. n. iv l C n digital execution. In short, cyber technology for theU execution of decisive operations h eallows hi n c g never previously thought possible. Cyber-attacks and offense have the complete advantage of 7. anonymity; gaining measurable results; at an extremely fast rate; with minimal consequences and. 2. Ibid. Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54. www.jstor.org/stable/26267405. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Carl Philipp Gottfried Von Calusewitz (1780-1831) was a Purssian general and military theorist whose theories on war are frequently studied and researched by military historians and strategists 7 Jan Kallberg, "Strategic Cyberwar Theory - A Foundation for Designing Decisive Strategic Cyber Operations," The Cyber Defense Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 113-28. www.jstor.org/stable/26267302. 3. 3 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(7) costs. In many ways, cyber capabilities have evolved faster than the frameworks leaders rely on to employ them. The past decade has seen China and the United States lead the discussion on how states should govern their citizens online. Chinese and American views of military deterrence differ, and divergent theories of cyber warfare underscore the importance of ongoing U.S.-China efforts to build norms of behavior in cyberspace.8 Today’s embryonic military cyber doctrines carry risks of bilateral misunderstandings, especially when militaries operationalize cyber deterrence strategies.9 The Taiwan Strait has historically been a flash point, and any conflict between China and Taiwan almost certainly involves America due to the Taiwan Relations Act, which obligates the White House to provide defensive arms and services to Taiwan, and to maintain U.S. military. 治政大 by the mainland in its effort to mutual defense treaty). Cyber tactics are just another tool utilized 立 reclaim Taiwan. There is growing evidence that Taiwan has long been a testing ground for capacity to respond to any Chinese use of force against the island (though it is not a binding. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese cyber capabilities before eventually being turned on the United States.10 For at least a decade, Taiwanese internet security specialists have observed a recurring pattern: innovative,. ‧. highly targeted data theft attacks appear in both government and industry systems in Taiwan, and. y. Nat. within a few months, these same methods frequently turn up in the wake of attacks against the. er. io. sit. United States and other large countries.11. Though China has had an extensive history of cyberwarfare, the threat and concern seems a. n. iv l C n to be higher than ever. Beijing feels an immense with Taipei’s democracy right at its h e n anxiety hi U c g doorstep. China’s ballistic missile buildup has been attributed to an attempt to discourage the. island nation from taking steps towards independence, and to deny U.S. military presence in that area of the Pacific; specifically, the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s most strategic ally happens to be Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54. www.jstor.org/stable/26267405. 9 Ibid. 10 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. 11 Harry Krejsa, and Hannah Suh. Report. Center for a New American Security, 2017. Accessed March 26, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06143. 8. 4 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(8) the United States, the one state that China sees as challenging its supremacy in Asia. China seeks to undermine Taiwan’s democracy and civil society on all fronts, including its international relationships. Only once it has exhausted all options (or when an opportune moment presents itself) will the PLA proceed with a full scale invasion.12 Since the beginning of the COVID19 global pandemic, China has been ramping up its pressure against Taiwan with military exercises and threating rhetoric.13 This research project comes at a timely manner and will be focusing on China’s cyber campaign against Taiwan. As interstate conflicts evolve, it is important that we assess what China’s cyber capabilities and strategy are moving forward in order to better fortify defenses in the event of future attacks.. 政治大. Chinese Views of Cyber. 立. In order to analyze China’s cyber warfare strategies, we must first understand how the. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese and the Chinese Communist Party view cyber. Chinese definitions of cyber and cybersecurity to this day remain vague and broad, much like the majority of other cyber-related. ‧. terms and concepts in Western academic literature. According to Michael D. Swaine of the. y. Nat. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, authoritative Chinese sources do not provide a. sit. detailed definition of cybersecurity with PRC government statements largely referring in general. er. io. terms to the growth of the Internet, the increasing dependence of many nations on cyber-based. n. al activities, the dangers posed by cyber-attacks, and the need for governments to provide more iv n. C. h ebynsaying supervision over the internet.14 He continues i Usuch general statements, combined g c hthat with more detailed discussions from non-authoritative sources, suggest that most Chinese conceive of cybersecurity in a similar manner to observers in other countries.15 Essentially, many Chinese citizens share the same concerns as their Western, democratic counter parts in regards to cybersecurity such as: “efforts to crash, slow, or paralyze vital cyber based infrastructure; the Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia. (Manchester: Eastbridge Books, 2019). 13 Bonnie Glaser, and Matthew P. Funaiole. “China's Provocations Around Taiwan Aren't a Crisis,” Foreign Policy, May 15, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/15/chinasprovocations-around-taiwan-arent-a-crisis/. 14 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 20, 2013. 15 Ibid. 12. 5 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(9) promulgation of information or images harmful to polity, society, or the economy (such as pornography, false or misleading commercial information, and the advocacy of violent political revolution); espionage; the theft of proprietary commercial data or information; and specific actions designed to weaken the capacity of the state to defend itself through military and other means.16 Beyond these general concerns, the PRC, for many years, has placed a strong emphasis on the challenges posed by cyber activities that threaten existing domestic social and political stability, as well as the sovereignty of the nation-state. Both Swaine and Kolton mention how many non-authoritative sources, especially military, introduce the concept of “cyber sovereignty,” and advocate the need for a government to identify the boundaries and constraints in which a state can protect itself against cyber threats.. 治政 Military Science’s (AMS) describes cyber sovereignty as the大 foundation for a new international 立 code of conduct for cyberspace (wangluo kongjian xingwei zhunze) in which the principle of Dr. Lu Jinghua of the Center of U.S.-China Defense Relations at the PLA Academy of. ‧ 國. 學. sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter extends to cyberspace.17 While the West applauds freedom on the Internet, the CCP worries about its latent potential to destabilize social and. ‧. political order. To support their contention that the internet poses a major threat to the sovereign. sit. y. Nat. authority of nation-states, many Chinese academic researchers frequently cite the disruptive impact on Middle Eastern governments of social networking websites such as Twitter, as well as. io. n. a. er. various blogging websites.18 The supposedly negative impact of such activities in the aftermath. v. l social unrest in Xinjiang, of the Iranian presidential elections and n i is often offered as specific. Ch. U. e n gleads examples.19 According to Swaine, this viewpoint c htoi a more state-centric orientation. towards cybersecurity compared to Western democratic nations; and reflects the long-standing. 16. Ibid.. 17. Lü Jinghua, [吕晶华], “Gongtong goujian heping anquan kaifang hezuo de wangluo. kongjian,” [共同构建和平安全开放合作的网络空间] (Jointly building a peaceful and safe cyberspace through open cooperation) PLA Daily, October 18, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-10/18/content_126334.htm. 18 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 20, 2013. 19 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54. www.jstor.org/stable/26267405. 6 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(10) Chinese concern with social disorder, along with the related need for a strong, supervisory state to uphold societal norms and to preserve social harmony.20 Research by the RAND Corporation suggests that the Color Revolutions and Arab Spring fueled the CCP leadership’s growing concern over the battle of hearts and minds and brought back memories of the fall of the Soviet Union.21 In October 2011, then-President Hu Jintao said, “We must clearly see that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration.”22 This is where views regarding internet governance begin to diverge between China and the West. To the Chinese, foreign policy begins at home, and the majority of the PRC’s efforts over recent decades to use information in order to achieve political goals and to shape public opinion through propaganda has been focused first on defending the regime and secondarily on swaying. 政治大. foreign audiences.23 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, expert on China’s digital politics and media policy for. 立. the Mercator Institute for China Studies, characterizes the Chinese system of rule as “governance. ‧ 國. 學. through information control,” and argues that “the Chinese government has recognized that its needs a comprehensive social media strategy if it is to win the ‘battle for public opinion.’”24. ‧. These differing perspectives and opinions lead the Chinese government to see itself in perpetual competition (or even constant war), with the United States and greater Western community in the. y. Nat. sit. ideological space.25 Although the U.S. and China agree on the importance of cyberspace, they. n. al. er. io. fundamentally diverge on the prerogatives a country should enjoy in the virtual world.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations.” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 20, 2013. 21 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, “Governance Through Information Control,” China Monitor, No. 26, Mercator Institute for China Studies, (January 19, 2016). 25 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. 20. 7 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(11) Both authoritative and non-authoritative sources emphasize the “ideological” dimension of cyber and its impact on the stability of society. Cyber capabilities have the potential to disrupt societal stability, and undermine regime legitimacy and the PRC is extremely aware of this fact. According to Swaine, for many Chinese, and especially authoritative and quasi-authoritative observers, the government should take a more direct, activist, and ideological role when governing their citizens online.26 One observer in the Liberation Army Daily stated, “raising the ideological and moral standard of the citizens [is] a basic standard for achieving the unification of cyber freedom and cyber self-discipline.”27 Essentially, the ideology and authority of the PRC government must also be reflected in China’s digital landscape. In order to protect China’s sovereignty, the internet in China must reflect socialist “cyber culture” and resist “ideological infiltration by political instigation.”28 Beijing remains firm on its position that individual states. 政治大. should have the right to independently choose their system of cyber governance, and rejects the. 立. idea of an open internet. On December 16, 2015, Xi Jinping called upon the international. ‧ 國. 學. community to “respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development and model of cyber regulation and participate in international cyberspace. ‧. governance on an equal footing.”29 Additionally, in a critique of the U.S., Xi said, “Existing rules governing cyberspace hardly reflect the desires and interests of the majority of countries.” 30. y. Nat. io. sit. Kolton cites Colonel Ye Zheng of AMS who explains the Chinese perspective of cybersecurity:. n. a. er. To achieve cybersecurity requires ‘cyber rules.’ Rules are the basis of order, and. v. order is the basis of security.l The core of cybersecurity n iis to establish cyber rules. Ch. U. n gactivities and implement them. Without cybererules, c h i in cyberspace will be out of. control, cybercrimes will be rampant, and cybersecurity will be harmed. Cyberspace is now in a disordered state because no actions have been taken to. Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 20, 2013. 27 Ibid.; Jing Nanxiang, “Cyber Freedom and Cyber Self-Discipline,” Liberation Army Daily, December 20, 2011, from “Summary: JFJB on Cyber Freedom and Cyber Self-Discipline for PRC Netizens,” translated by OSC, CPP20111221088010. 28 Ibid. 29 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54. www.jstor.org/stable/26267405. 30 Ibid. 26. 8 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(12) develop cyber rules and there is no international consensus about how to work out the rules.31 China has incorporated political, economic, diplomatic, and military tactics to defend its sovereignty; oftentimes at ideological odds with the greater Western community. In hopes of retaining control and establishing stability among its populace, China has built up one of the world’s most sophisticated capacities for human- and machine-enabled key-word blocking and censorship and has also used such new technologies and platforms in innovative ways to shape the domestic and foreign flow of information.32 While many observers had hoped that the wider exposure to information that the internet and social media provides would lead China down a less state-centric path of internet governance, the CCP has doubled down on its control of its. 治政大 with the negative perception conflicting perspective in regards to internet governance, coupled 立 that China paints of the West, has led many Chinese thinkers to assume that China is in a zerocitizens online and incorporated new technologies in order to expand its influence. This. ‧ 國. 學. sum ideological competition with the West.33. This perspective of constantly being at odds with one another, has led to antagonistic. ‧. sentiment aimed at each other from both China and the West. Though China has been widely. sit. y. Nat. accused of engaging in cyber espionage tactics by the international community, it has typically met such accusations with a defensive posture, usually by denying allegations. From the Chinese. io. n. a. er. perspective, the U.S. government has already engaged in a massive propaganda campaign. v. l April 2013, President Xin iasserted in a secret document against China and other countries.34 In. Ch. U. e n g cwithin h i the country are still constantly that “Western forces hostile to China and dissidents. infiltrating the ideological sphere” specifically arguing that regime opponents “have stirred up trouble about disclosing officials’ assets, using the Internet to fight corruption, media controls. Ibid.; Ye Zheng, “From Cyberwarfare to Cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond,” translated by Yang Fan, China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, (London: Oxford Scholarship Online, April 2015), 132, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190201265.001.0001. 32 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 31. 9 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(13) and other sensitive topics, to provoke discontent with the party and government.”35 That paradigm had a dramatic shift in 2013, when China assumed a more assertive stance, now directing accusations against the West, particularly the United States, for its global surveillance efforts.36 In 2013, Edward Snowden leaked highly classified information from the National Security Agency (NSA) regarding the United States’ global surveillance program, many of which were run by the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance; ultimately putting the spotlight on the United States’ cyber activities abroad. Kolton argues that China and Russia exploited the global controversy surrounding the Snowden leaks in order to push their own agenda and model of internet governance.37 Beijing now points the finger at the United States for its cyber activities and has demanded explanations over reports of the NSA spying on Huawei.38 Additionally, in 2012, the White House conducted its own security review of Huawei, but found now clear. 政治大. evidence of Huawei spying on behalf of the Chinese government; further contributing to the. 立. controversy surrounding the U.S. cyber activities.39 Emilio Iasiello, a private strategic cyber. ‧ 國. 學. intelligence analyst, argues that “while the U.S. seemed to have an upper hand and international support regarding suspected Chinese cyber espionage, China has successfully regained some of. ‧. its public facing pride. China continues to promote itself as a cyber victim as well as a cyber security partner.”40 As China further solidifies its role as an international super power, the. y. Nat. sit. struggle to control information about the CCP has extended to global public opinion, and the. n. al. er. io. internet is only the latest battlespace.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 35. Ibid. Emilio Iasiello, "China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities," Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 2 (2016): 45-69. www.jstor.org/stable/26466776. 37 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54. www.jstor.org/stable/26267405. 38 Emilio Iasiello, "China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities," Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 2 (2016): 45-69. www.jstor.org/stable/26466776. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 36. 10 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(14) Yet, despite all this effort and devotion of resources, China’s information operations today are immature compared with those of the United States.41 Though China is believed to have threatening cyber capabilities already at its disposal, there are many challenges that come with developing cyber security. Cyber warfare encompasses far more areas than just military and intelligence gathering, therefore it is logical to measure a country’s cyber capabilities based on additional factors. These factors include but are not limited to: technological research and development (R&D) and innovation capabilities; information technology industry companies; internet infrastructure scale; influences of internet websites; internet diplomacy and foreign policy capabilities; cyber military strength, and comprehensiveness of cyberspace strategy. 42 If evaluated based on these criteria, then China’s cyber power largely lags behind that of the U.S., especially in terms of R&D.43 Shi-Kupfer states that “China’s leadership struggles with. 政治大. credibility in social media,” and believes China is still learning how to convey propaganda online. 立. in a way that is less stilted and more effective.44 The CCP’s Central Discipline Inspection. ‧ 國. 學. Commission confirmed this finding in June 2016 when it heavily criticized the Party’s Propaganda Department for distributing news propaganda that was poorly targeted and. ‧. insufficiently effective.45 According to the ICT Development Index (IDI), a composite index that combines 11 indicators that monitor and compare developments in information and. y. Nat. sit. communication technology which is utilized to compare developments in ICT over time, China. er. io. ranked 80th, 81st, and 82nd among 176 states in 2017, 2016, and 2015 respectively. China. n. struggles with low influence on theaglobal internet partially due itov the fact that its primary. l C hengchi Un. Jon R. Lindsay. “Exaggerating the Chinese Cyber Threat.” Belfer Center For Science and International Affairs, May 2015. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/linsday-china-cyber-pb-final.pdf. 42 Liu. Jinghua, “What Are China's Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?” IPI Global Observatory, (March 22, 2019). https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/03/what-are-chinas-cyber-capabilitiesintentions/. 43 Ibid. 44 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, “Governance Through Information Control,” China Monitor, No. 26, Mercator Institute for China Studies, (January 19, 2016). 45 “China’s Propaganda Department Not Good Enough at Propaganda—Gov’t,” Hong Kong Free Press, (June 9, 2016). https://hongkongfp.com/2016/06/09/pin-desktop-chinas-propagandadepartment-not-good-enough-propaganda-govt/. 41. 11 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(15) languages are not widely used on the internet outside the country.46 Chinese languages are only used by 1.7 percent of all websites, while 53.9 percent use English.47Additionally, according to multiple sources, China has weak network security and is vulnerable to frequent cyber-attacks such as distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) attacks.48 A frequently cited report published in February 2019 by Beijing Knownsec Information Technology found; China suffered the highest rate of DDoS attacks in the world in 2018 – an average of over 800 million a day, with scanning and backdoor intrusions making up the majority of the attacks.49 About 97 percent were conducted by domestic hackers with a growing percentage coming from overseas, mostly from the U.S., South Korea, and Japan.50 Accurately assessing China’s cyber capabilities is crucial in a time where information accuracy is in question. Comprehensive and objective assessment of China’s cyber power is in urgent need in order to properly build a fortified cyber defense.. 治政 Though China’s cyber capabilities may not be on par大 with its Western counterparts, there 立 is room for improvement and the CCP appears to have resolved to redouble its efforts and devote ‧ 國. 學. even more resources to information control and messaging.51 This suggests that China’s has the potential to become increasingly sophisticated in their cyber capabilities and messaging in the. ‧. years ahead. Under Xi Jinping, China appears to have identified the improvement of propaganda. sit. y. Nat. content, delivery, and reception as increasingly important goals.52 Hostile Social Manipulation, a report published by the RAND Corporation researching and documenting the role of targeted. io. n. a. er. social media campaigns, sophisticated forgeries, cyberbullying and harassment of individuals,. v. i approaches to cause damage distribution of rumors and conspiracyl theories, and other toolsnand. Ch. engchi U. Liu Jinghua, “What Are China's Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?” IPI Global Observatory, (March 22, 2019). https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/03/what-are-chinas-cyber-capabilitiesintentions/. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.; Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 20, 2013. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. 52 Ibid. 46. 12 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(16) to a target state, places a particular emphasis on the role of Taiwan when discussing China’s hostile social manipulation activities stating: Taiwan has often borne the brunt of China’s foreign propaganda, and it appears that the Chinese government may be targeting Taiwan with its most aggressive and most advanced social manipulation efforts. Taiwan has been subjected to the PLA’s clearest intimidation, the most likely case of Chinese disinformation, the most obvious case of Chinese netizens supporting CCP propaganda on foreign social media, and China’s first extrajudicial punishment for social media posts outside of China (levied against a citizen of Taiwan). China is likely to expand the use of some or. 治政大 and cooperation government could benefit from increasing its dialogue 立 with its Taiwanese counterparts on countering Chinese social all of these tactics beyond Taiwan in the coming years. The U.S.. ‧ 國. 學. manipulation operations, both to support Taiwan’s democracy and to better understand and prepare for future Chinese efforts around the. ‧. world.53. Nat. sit. y. In the wake of the hysteria caused by the COVID19 global pandemic, misinformation has. er. io. become rampant online. A variety of conspiracy theories have emerged with some even being promoted by government officials in a the United States and China. Zhao Lijian, a Chinese foreign. n. iv l C n ministry spokesman, has repeatedly promoted idea that U COVID-19 might have originated in h e the hi n c g the United States with a number of Chinese embassies and social media users amplifying and. echoing his claims.54 Likewise, several U.S. politicians such as Republican senators Tom Cotton and Ted Cruz have supported other baseless claims about the origin of the virus. Additionally, new reports in Taiwan have claimed that organizations like the National Security Bureau in Taiwan have dealt with misinformation regarding COVID-19. The issue of cyber-security in Taiwan is of upmost priority to in order to ensure the legitimacy of its democracy.. 53. Ibid. Shayan Sardarizadeh, and Olga Robinson, “Coronavirus: US and China Trade Conspiracy Theories,” BBC News. BBC, April 26, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52224331. 54. 13 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(17) Chapter 2 – The Importance and Need for Cyber Theory The advancement of technology and cyber in the 21st century has led the international community into uncharted territory in nearly every sense. Everything from e-commerce, cryptocurrency, smart phones, 5G, and even cyber warfare, is leading to an age of uncertainty in the world. The internet has the advantage of delivering information nearly instantaneously while also providing anonymity. States over the last decade have learned to weaponize the internet through with the ability to execute covert operations with measurable results. According to Dr. Jan Kallberg, Cyber Policy Fellow at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point: In a militarized internet, it is convenient to rely on traditional military theory transposed into cyber. It works as an intellectual short cut, but the. 政治大 cyber. Traditional military 立 theory applied to cyber conflict has four. traditional military thinking fails to acknowledge the unity tenets of. ‧ 國. 學. challenges: anonymity, object permanence, measurable results, and rapid digital execution. In a Clausewitizian world, these challenges were non-. ‧. existent.55. y. Nat. Kallberg firmly believes that there is a need for theory in order to understand the unknown and. sit. uncertain; cyber is no exception. Current theories surrounding political warfare and assessing an. er. io. adversary’s capabilities do not account for the advantages that cyber provides compared to. n. a l knowledge that computers traditional warfare methods. It is common i v are not limited to human n. C. speeds, computing millions upon millionsh ofereal i UEven if we solved the challenges of n gtime c hdata. anonymity, the lack of object permanence, and the absence of measurable results, computerized machine speed would eradicate any influence of human leadership.56 In reality, the cyber-attacks would be over before any leadership personnel were able to understand the strategic landscape. To conquer this massive hurdle of predicting something that is instantaneous, Kallberg believes that there must be a fundamental rethinking of cyber warfare theory in order to better understand the extremely dynamic landscape. Theory is an overarching way of combining ideas,. 55. Jan Kallberg, "Strategic Cyberwar Theory - A Foundation for Designing Decisive Strategic Cyber Operations," The Cyber Defense Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 113-28. www.jstor.org/stable/26267302. 56 Ibid. 14 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(18) phenomena, and facts, in a generalized form, in order to try and explain specific outcomes.57 Theory’s strongest tenant is predictability; theory can serve as guidance to prepare for future events and ensure these outcomes are favorable; theories are created to better understand the world.58 In recent decades, the public discourse surrounding cyber warfare has created an atmosphere of uncertainty and the belief that everyone is vulnerable to cyberattacks.59 Additionally, the downplaying of cyber-attacks and data breaches increases the belief that a cyber war is unlikely to happen; creating an almost paradoxical climate. Western states are anxious about their vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks yet they downplay the economic and social damage it can have on their societies. The notion that cyber cannot be a tool for war is itself. 治政大 years to prevent the possibility that the study of cyber warfare theory be expanded in the coming 立 or at least limit the destructive ability of one. According to Kallberg, strategic cyber discourse in dated and naïve. The international community has not witnessed a cyber war; therefore, it is vital. ‧ 國. 學. recent years has a limiting central theme that cyber can only support and enable existing military and geopolitical operations.60 Existing cyber theory is simplistic and doesn’t account for. ‧. capabilities that could possibly develop in 30 to 40 years, and instead bases its analysis on. sit. y. Nat. current capacities. Kallberg states, “the main risk in the current cyber discourse focuses on cyber as purely an enabler of joint operations.” This is a result of traditional perceptions of war, and in. io. n. a. er. order to advance the discussion of cyber warfare theory, then the shortcomings of current theory. v. i warfare theory: l shortcomings in currentncyber must be addressed. Kallberg lists some. Ch. engchi U. 1. Lacking understanding of the reserved asymmetry of the conflict, where a state can attack domestic public entity and individual citizens, 2. Ignoring the absence of object permanence, 3. The belief that cyber conflicts solely will be match between military networks, 4. That digital interchange is conducted according to our concept of ethics and norms, 57. Ibid. Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 58. 15 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(19) 5. Absence of acceptance of the rapid time frame interchanges will occur, 6. Reliance of non-existent measure of effectiveness (MOE), 7. Weak. comprehension. of. the. imminent. future’s. automated. computational speed conducted harvest of vulnerabilities and execution of attacks, and 8. The impact of artificial intelligence in combination with automated harvest vulnerabilities61 Cyber capabilities offer a strategic opportunity that will grow in coming decades. Cyber effects will be limited if subordinated to enabler status, and by doing so provide democracies reduced military options. In order to craft a cyber theory that encompasses the characteristics Chinese. 治政大section, we will be exploring how them to account for 21 century cyber capabilities. In the next 立 modern state actors have utilized modern political warfare capabilities that incorporate elements cyber activities, we must look to classical theories regarding political warfare and how to update st. sit. y. Nat. Political Warfare Re-Contextualized. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. of cyber warfare to carry out their goals.. Cyber Espionage and Political Warfare. er. io. n. In the wake of the 2016 United a States Presidential election,v two areas within the cyber. l. ni. domain have attracted a large amount ofCmedia espionage and political U h e attention:i cyber-enabled 62. ngch. warfare. While espionage and political warfare are not entirely new concepts, recent cyber capabilities and technological advancements have made political warfare campaigns more pervasive and successful due to the advantages that cyber can provide.63 Cyber has allowed agents of political warfare direct access to their targets, as well as the ability to disguise their identity and intent. As a result, this has had a damaging effect on democracies who require. 61. Ibid. Thomas Paterson & Lauren Hanley. (2020). Political warfare in the digital age: cyber subversion, information operations and ‘deep fakes’. Australian Journal of International Affairs. 1-16. 10.1080/10357718.2020.1734772. 63 Ibid. 62. 16 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(20) legitimacy and a certain level of transparency in order to function properly.64 A study published by the Australian Journal of International Affairs outlines how the proliferation of the internet means that states are increasingly able and willing to use political warfare tactics against one another in order to achieve strategic goals.65 Additionally, democratic states are more vulnerable to cyber-enabled political warfare tactics than their autocratic counterparts, in part because of their personal freedoms and civil liberties given to their citizens.66 According to the study, cyberenabled espionage and information theft is extremely damaging because it can be used to assist and augment existing political warfare campaigns.67 The act of engaging in espionage to obtain state secrets has been around for thousands of years, gradually evolving over time, and being further enhanced in the age of cyber. Cyber-. 治政大 has a history of engaging in both state and non-state actors to gather information. The CCP 立 cyber-enabled espionage because it favors the low risk-high reward factor associated with cyberenabled espionage has been occurring for decades and has now become the favored method for 68. ‧ 國. 學. attacks.69 China feels the need to invest in cyber espionage because of the economic returns it can gain from activities such as intellectual property theft. The resulting reward is advancements. ‧. in technology to help contribute to economic success, to support the CCP’s legitimacy at home,. sit. y. Nat. and influence policy aboard. While cyber espionage results in informational, technological and financial loss, it is important to note that it does not damage democratic legitimacy in the same. io. er. way that political subversion does.70. al. n. iv n C Subversion is a sub-category of political and seeks to undermine institutional h e nwarfare hi U c g legitimacy and authority as part of a broader political warfare campaign.71 Political subversion 64. Ibid.; note that the extent of which political subversion causes damage to democratic legitimacy requires further study. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid, pp. 3-4 68 Ibid. 69 Jan Kallberg, "Strategic Cyberwar Theory - A Foundation for Designing Decisive Strategic Cyber Operations," The Cyber Defense Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 113-28. www.jstor.org/stable/26267302. 70 Thomas Paterson & Lauren Hanley, “Political Warfare in the Digital Age: Cyber Subversion, Information Operations and ‘Deep Fakes,’” Australian Journal of International Affairs. 1-16. 10.1080/10357718.2020.1734772. 71 Ibid. 17 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(21) poses a greater threat compared to cyber-enabled espionage because it serves to undermine the sovereignty and democratic principles of the target state and represents an existential threat to that state’s government.72 It challenges the values, beliefs, and societal stability of states, something that Kallberg emphasizes is at risk to cyber-attacks.73 Political subversion campaigns have the potential to undermine the democratic process, causing voters to lose trust in their government and constitution.74 Damage to a democracy’s legitimacy is an even greater loss than economic and monetary loss because it is an immeasurable factor. Additionally, a subversive political warfare campaign may never be fully uncovered; and even if it is, the damage to a state’s democracy cannot easily be undone.75. Political Warfare. 立. 政治大. In 1942, during the Second World War, the Political Warfare Executive of the British. ‧ 國. 學. Government compiled a brief but wide-ranging manual titled, The Meaning, Techniques and Methods of Political Warfare.76 The manual understood political warfare as the “indispensable. ‧. component of Total War” and a “systemic process” that employs both publicity and propaganda. y. Nat. in order to “influence the will and so direct the actions of peoples in enemy and enemy-occupied. sit. territories, according to the needs of higher strategy.”77 In 1948, at the outset of the Cold War,. er. io. U.S. diplomat George Kennan defined political warfare as, “the logical application of. n. a l 78 According to the RANDi vCorporation: Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. Ch. n engchi U. 72. Ibid. Jan Kallberg, "Strategic Cyberwar Theory - A Foundation for Designing Decisive Strategic Cyber Operations," The Cyber Defense Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 113-28. www.jstor.org/stable/26267302. 74 Thomas Paterson & Lauren Hanley, “Political Warfare in the Digital Age: Cyber Subversion, Information Operations and ‘Deep Fakes,’” Australian Journal of International Affairs. 1-16. 10.1080/10357718.2020.1734772. 75 Ibid. 76 Antonios Nestoras. “Political Warfare: Competition in the Cyber Era.” Martens Centre For European Studies, April 2019. https://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publicationfiles/cyber-warfare-politics-era.pdf. 77 Ibid. 78 Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva, The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare. 73. 18 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(22) Political warfare is the employment of all means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (such as the Marshall Plan), and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.79 By this definition, the key point is short of war, referring to the current state of competition, which is just short of the state of armed conflict. The term “warfare” should be limited to the “physical conduct of war or the fighting and violent aspects of war” but fails to encompass the. 治政大covert operations such as public employ tactics through non-violent means, utilizing overt and 立 diplomacy, propaganda, terror, and psychological warfare.. current conditions at the given time.80 During a state of competition or open hostility, states can 81. ‧ 國. 學. According to a research brief by the RAND corporation, political warfare consists of the. ‧. intentional use of one or more of the implements of power to affect the political compositions or decision-making in a state.82 Those implements of power are shown below in a chart illustrated. Nat. sit. y. on the research brief. Based on research focused on three case studies – two state actors (Russia. er. io. and Iran) and one non-state actor (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant aka. ISIL) – the study attempted to derive common characteristics of modern political warfare from each of these a. n. iv l C n cases. In Estonia, Russia has capitalized h on the sentimentsUof Russian minorities and mobilized engchi them to carry out protests, a sustained cyber-attack, and later sanctions.84 The Russian 83. government has maintained a hostile stance in order to destabilize Estonia and other Baltic. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10071.html. 79 Ibid. 80 Antonios Nestoras, “Political Warfare: Competition in the Cyber Era.” Martens Centre For European Studies, (April 2019). https://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publicationfiles/cyber-warfare-politics-era.pdf. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 19 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(23) states.85 Iran has engaged in political warfare in Syria as part of its efforts to extend its influence in the region and to ensure a pro-Iranian government in Damascus.86 To achieve this goal, Iran has attempted to indoctrinate the National Defense Force militias with Islamic revolutionary ideology, appealed to foreign Shi’a fighters’ desire to protect Syria’s holy shrines, taken advantage of Syria’s economic dependency to increase Tehran’s influence over the Damascus government, and engaged in public diplomacy to draw Syrians to the Islamic Republic.87 When researching these three case studies, the study was able to list key attributes that broadly describe how political warfare is carried out in these modern-day case studies. What was found is that political warfare: . Employs diverse elements of power, including a preponderance of nonmilitary means;. . Relies heavily on unattributed forces and means;. . Uses information warfare, which works by amplifying, obfuscating, and, at times,. ‧. ‧ 國. persuading;. 學. . 政治大 Is increasingly waged in the information arena, where success can be determined by the 立 perception rather than outright victory; Is employed with cyber tools to accelerate and compound effects;. . Increasingly relies on economic leverage as the preferred tool of the strong;. . Often exploits shared ethnic or religious bonds, as well as social divisions or other.  . sit. er. al. n. . io. internal seams;. y. Nat. . iv. n achieve effects at lower cost; C Extends, rather than replaces, traditional conflict andUcan hengchi. Is also conducted by empowered non-state or quasi-state actors; and Requires heavy investment in intelligence resources to detect it in its early stages. From these characteristics, one can see that the importance of information stands out among others. The RAND Corporation calls this the information space and emphasizes that this area can profoundly affect all other lines of effort, and that it must be considered at the highest levels of government.88 The transformation of technology has completely revolutionized the way we. 85. Ibid. Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 86. 20 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(24) obtain and consume information, therefore new models and theories encompassing political warfare, cyber warfare, and the ever changing landscape must be developed. China is keenly aware of the power information can have when controlling narratives and influencing public opinion abroad, making their political warfare tactics all the more threatening. The next section explores “Hybrid Warfare,” which is a similar concept to political warfare but is described as using a belligerent use of irregular tactics used to describe a new generation of warfare that could be utilized to describe China’s strategy against Taiwan.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. . Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Fig. 1: Implements of Power (Listed in order clockwise): diplomatic/political, information/cyber, military/intelligence, and economic.89. 89. Ibid. 21 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(25) In the wake of the COVID-19 global pandemic, China is active in its political warfare campaign not only against Taiwan but in the international area too. China is currently trying to shape the world’s perception of COVID-19; and the narrative surrounding its role in it by denying any responsibility for the rise of the global pandemic and shifting blame towards the United States.90 When China is trying to influence public opinion, it utilizes its “three warfares” principles, a political warfare strategy. According to Dean Chang of the Heritage Foundation, in the context of their activities during COVID-19, “it’s essential to recognize that when the Chinese Communist Party talks about ‘public opinion warfare,’ wages the ‘three warfares,’ or thinks about political warfare, in each instance it’s doing so as warfare, period.”91. 政治大. China’s “Three Warfares”. 立. The CCP introduced the concepts of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and. ‧ 國. 學. legal warfare when it revised its Political Work and Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army doctrine in 2003.92 The main goal of the “Three Warfares” is to essentially generate political. ‧. power on all fronts; Public Opinion Warfare influences domestic and international public opinion. y. Nat. to build support of China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions. sit. contrary to China’s interests; Psychological Warfare undermines an enemy’s ability to conduct. er. io. combat operations by deterring, shocking, and demoralizing the enemy’s military personnel and. n. a l and Legal Warfare seeks toi vbuild legal justification and supporting their civilian populations; n. C. h eLegal context for Beijing’s actions.93 Additionally, n g Warfare c h i Uis intended to build international. support and manage possible political repercussions for China’s military actions.94Media warfare incorporates mechanisms for messages that are delivered, while legal warfare provides the. Dean Cheng, “For the Chinese, Political Warfare Is War by Other Means,” The Heritage Foundation, Report April 2, 2020. https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/the-chinesepolitical-warfare-war-other-means. 91 Ibid. 92 Peter Mattis, “China's 'Three Warfares' in Perspective,” War on the Rocks, January 30, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/. 93 Emilio Iasiello, "China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities," Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 2 (2016): 45-69. www.jstor.org/stable/26466776. 94 Ibid. 90. 22 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(26) justification for why actions are permissible. Psychological warfare provides the necessary nuance in leveraging the dissemination capability of the media and the more formalized legal mechanisms to substantiate its activities to domestic and international audiences. When the three are utilized to optimal capacity, China able to influence an international narrative while facing little to no consequences.95 Emilio Iasiello, a strategic cyber intelligence analyst, in his article China’s Three Warfares and Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage, theorizes and analyzes why China has faced few consequences over cyber espionage activities, and offers insight into Chinese Cyber Warfare tactics and strategy.96 Iasiello believes that the negative press received from these activities are feeding into the perception that China’s global “rise” is predicated on. 治政大 that China has leveraged its international order. To combat this perception, this article suggests 立 “Three Warfares,” a three-prong information warfare approach composed of Media, Legal, and. intellectual property theft and cyber espionage in order to overtake the United States’ place in the 97. ‧ 國. 學. Psychological components to influence the international community; and forestall the development and implementation of any effective counter strategy.98 Iasiello states:. ‧. The key takeaway here is that cyber warfare is directly related to ‘information. Nat. sit. y. advantage’ and not military advantage, suggesting that peacetime cyber activities. er. io. are more about bolstering China’s development in strategic areas and less about establishing military superiority a vis-a-vie reconnoitering a future battle space.99. n. iv l C n This research will be focusing on China’s h public e n opinion/media g c h i U warfare campaign against Taiwan. The CCP is constantly trying to undermine Taiwan’s democratic legitimacy in order to weaken its institutional stability by influencing the public opinion of its citizens through the dissemination of misinformation.100 The case of the COVID-19 global pandemic is no different. As previously stated by Dean Chang, China is attempting to shape the world’s view of COVID-. 95. Ibid. Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Anonymous source from an Associate Research fellow on Taiwan’s National Security Council. Interview conducted on May 2, 2020. 96. 23 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(27) 19, deflecting accusations associated with the virus and shifting blame towards the United States.101 Earlier evidence of China trying to influence public opinion abroad includes Taiwan’s 2018 local elections and 2020 Presidential election, where fake news articles were frequently cited and are suspected to have originated from mainland China.. Waldo’s Five Pillars for Societal Stability In his article, Strategic Cyberwar Theory - A Foundation For Designing Decisive Strategic Cyber Operations, Dr. Jan Kallberg argues that there is a need for cyber theory in order to deal with the uncertainty of the future. Traditional military theory cannot account for modern. 政治大. advantages and capabilities cyber technology provides, such as anonymity, object permanence, measurable results, and rapid digital execution.102. 立. By following the logic and principles of political science and international relations. ‧ 國. 學. theory, societies are upheld by their institutions, and institutional resilience varies from state to state and in different contexts. If institutions fail, then society will destabilize, and a destabilized. ‧. society is vulnerable to be subdued by a foreign power. These challenges could be said to be. sit. y. Nat. relevant for Taiwan and the United States, as both states are currently the targets of cyber-attacks. io. er. by the mainland. China is currently engaged in a political warfare campaign against Taiwan, attempting to undermine Taiwan’s democratic process, attacking its institutions to destabilize its. n. a. v. l C will.103 Kallberg states: society and subjugate the state to Beijing’s ni. hengchi U. Following the stated known, strategic cyberwar theory seeks to explain how an adversarial society can be destabilized and subdued by a major cyber campaign. Cyber War has to be quickly executed, shocking the targeted society, and at the. Dean Cheng, “For the Chinese, Political Warfare Is War by Other Means,” The Heritage Foundation, (April 2, 2020). https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/the-chinese-politicalwarfare-war-other-means. 102 Jan Kallberg, "Strategic Cyberwar Theory - A Foundation for Designing Decisive Strategic Cyber Operations," The Cyber Defense Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 113-28. www.jstor.org/stable/26267302. 103 Thomas Paterson & Lauren Hanley, “Political Warfare in the Digital Age: Cyber Subversion, Information Operations and ‘Deep Fakes,’” Australian Journal of International Affairs. 1-16. 10.1080/10357718.2020.1734772. 101. 24 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(28) same time avoid adaptive behavior that mitigates the damages from the attacks. The rapid execution denies the targeted nation the opportunity to create defensive measures and eliminate any possibility to strategically lead a coherent cyber defense.104 If a nation state seeks to conduct a decisive cyberwar, it will be through launching systematic destabilization attacks on the targeted society; in the case of Taiwan, cyber-attacks and the spread of misinformation attempting to undermine its democracy.105 Kallberg introduces Dwight Waldo’s Five Pillars for Society Stability to support the claim that, if any major cyber-attack undermines these pillars, then the targeted state is weakened and risks implosion. Legitimacy – Waldo believed in the Lockesian theory that citizens must have faith. 政治大 promise and deliver a better立 life for its citizens. A cyberattack seeking to damage. in their government; that in order for a government to have legitimacy, it must. ‧ 國. 學. state legitimacy could attempt to create an assumption that state leadership is unable to govern its country.. ‧. Authority – Authority is accountability for any persons in leadership or. y. Nat. organization. If there is no accountability, then any organization or politician could. er. io. sit. fall into entropy and anarchy.. Institutional Knowledge – Knowledge management poses one of the major. n. a. v. i challenges for a state when lgoverning its citizens. Ifnpublic administrations are C. i U. he. n g c hcitizens are left with the impression unable to organize knowledge and information, that the government is incompetent. In this information age, the sheer overwhelming amount of data can create massive difficulties in data management. According to Kallberg, if a lack of knowledge and coordination directly affects citizens, it undermines their perception of how well the government is working.. 104. Jan Kallberg. "Strategic Cyberwar Theory - A Foundation for Designing Decisive Strategic Cyber Operations." The Cyber Defense Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 113-28. www.jstor.org/stable/26267302. 105 Anonymous source from an Associate research fellow on Taiwan’s National Security Council. Interview conducted on May 2, 2020. 25 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(29) Cyber-attacks on institutional knowledge management could cripple the bureaucracy, creating or emphasizing inefficiencies and angering the population. Bureaucratic Control – A large bureaucracy requires an extensive degree of coordination by a state’s government. As bureaucracy expands, so do issues of control and regulation. And if control is lost, then corruption, favoritism, and public theft could ensue, leading to popular discontent. Confidence – According to Waldo, when people feel secure, they have confidence and are optimistic about the future; therefore, they trust their government will provide necessary support. In this scenario, confidence is trust in the government to deliver to the society what was promised. The difference between confidence. 政治大 looking. Signs of systematic 立failure will harm the citizenry’s ability to maintain. and authority is that authority is defined in the present while confidence is forward-. ‧ 國. 學. confidence in government.106. If China is able to exploit these five pillars, Taiwan risks societal collapse at the hands of. ‧. Beijing’s cyber campaign. Societies are constantly engaged in conflicts and the cornerstone of. y. Nat. any society is its institutions. The institutional resilience varies from state to state, from stable. sit. democracies to totalitarian states on the brink of entropy. If institutions fail, society will be. er. io. destabilized and weakened. A destabilized society collapses or is subjugated to foreign powers,. n. and strategic cyberwar theory seeksato l explain how an adversariali vsociety can be destabilized and. n. C. U of shocking the target society, h e n gmust subdued by a major cyber campaign.107 Cyberwar c hbei capable which then causes disarray and denies the development of an effective counter-strategy.108 A. cyber-attack that undermines institutional legitimacy has the potential to destabilize a society and greatly harm democratic states who rely on that legitimacy. In the next chapter, I will be exploring Chinese strategic cyber objectives and tactics.. 106. Jan Kallberg, "Strategic Cyberwar Theory - A Foundation for Designing Decisive Strategic Cyber Operations," The Cyber Defense Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 113-28. www.jstor.org/stable/26267302. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 26 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(30) Chapter 3 – China’s Objectives and Tactics As previously stated, China is at ideological odds with the West when it comes to how a state should govern its citizens online. In this section I will be covering how China’s ideological odds with the West is significant in its cyber warfare campaign, as it ties into the Public Opinion Warfare aspect of the “Three Warfares” principle.109 Beijing has been able to leverage international influence to campaign for a “states-rights” approach to internet governance while the United States has support a multi-stakeholder model.110 The Atlantic Council’s Jason Healey describes this divergence in ideology as “a bifurcation between east and west” that allows little room for compromise.111 Beijing rejects the model of an open Internet which the United States and its allies are in support of. On December 16, 2015, Xi Jinping called upon the international. 治政大 in international cyberspace of cyber development and model of cyber regulation and participate 立 governance on an equal footing.” Additionally, in a critique of the U.S., Xi said, “Existing community to “respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path 112. ‧ 國. 學. rules governing cyberspace hardly reflect the desires and interests of the majority of countries.”113. ‧. Chinese foreign policy has shifted in recent years to adopt two key stances: defending. sit. y. Nat. China’s core interests (核心利益), and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (中华民族. er. io. 伟大复兴), or often referred to as the “China Dream (zhongguomeng).”114 According to the. n. RAND corporation, the adoption bya China of the “core interests” framework focused on three iv basic goals: preserving China’s basicl state system and nationalnsecurity; protecting China’ C U h e n thehstable sovereignty and territorial integrity; and continuing development of China’s economy i. gc. Emilio Iasiello, "China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities," Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 2 (2016): 45-69. www.jstor.org/stable/26466776. 110 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54. Accessed May 22, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26267405. 111 Ibid. 112 Huaxia, ed., “Highlights of Xi's Internet speech,” Xinhua, December 16, 2015, http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/16/c_134923855.htm. 113 Ibid. 114 Michael J. Mazarr, Abigail Casey, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Luke J. Matthews, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and James Sladden, Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html. Also available in print form. 109. 27 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.

(31) and society.115 From those core interests, we can begin to understand where the utilization of political warfare, and cyber warfare come into play; and why China feels that carrying out a political warfare campaign against Taiwan is necessary and aligns with its core interests. Both stances have overlapping goals, and interpretations on how to achieve those goals by Chinese scholars and observers. To support this statement, the RAND Corporation states: In practice, the first core interest is largely consonant with the preservation of the ruling status of the CCP while the second and third interests serve as means to this end through the retention of control over Xinjiang and Tibet; the defense of China’s claims in the South and East China seas; and the prevention of Taiwan independence, leading to the island’s ultimate absorption. By contrast, the “China dream,” while necessarily entailing the retention and/or integration of territories that Chinese leaders regard as theirs, looks further afield to a more ambitious set of. 政治大. goals. These include domestic economic goals such as achieving the “two 100s”. 立. which are linked to the centenaries of the founding of the CCP, in 2021, and of the. ‧ 國. 學. PRC itself, in 2049; reducing social inequality; cleaning up the environment; developing national morals; and achieving the “strong nation dream” (强国梦) of. ‧. returning the country to a position of region and global preeminence.116. Nat. sit. y. The “Chinese Dream” helps guide all facets of the Chinese government towards a single. er. io. overarching goal.117 In 2012, Xi Jinping described the Chinese dream as the collective. n. rejuvenation-a revival of prosperity,a unity and strength; and in a 2015 v interview with the Wall. l. i. n Dream “one needs to fully C toh understand the U Street Journal, Xi explained that in order Chinese engchi. appreciate the Chinese nation’s deep suffering since modern times and the profound impact of such suffering on the Chinese minds.”118 Within these two frameworks, it stands to reason that the CCP would be engaged in a political warfare campaign aimed at Taiwan. If the eventual strategic goal is the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, then Beijing will employ whatever means it has at its disposal, in order to undermine Taiwan’s democracy and prevent the. 115. Ibid. Ibid. 117 Michael Kolton, "Interpreting China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and Its Views on Cyber Deterrence," The Cyber Defense Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 119-54. www.jstor.org/stable/26267405. 118 Ibid. 116. 28 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000853.