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variation of the invalid vote in this electoral process has been lower than in the previous election of 2009, some supporters of invalid vote mentioned that the null vote had won over four political parties nationwide (Reina 2015).
5.3 Comparative Analyses
Table 9 shows the features of invalid vote campaigns in Latin America presidential elections from 1999 to 2019. I identify 21 invalid vote mobilizations in ten countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. The comparison shows that 8 (38%) out of the 21 movements were successful, which means that these movements were able to increase of invalid votes between elections. The comparison in Table 9 also shows that most of the invalid voting mobilizations champion for the anti-corruption cause (12 out of 21 cases) as well as those electoral processes were regulated by an enforced compulsory voting system (16 out of 21 cases). Likewise, the presidential election and lower chamber elections were held concurrently in 8 out of 21 studied cases; however, it didn't happen in any of the runoff cases.
Additionally, the majority of the successful cases occurred in the second round of the electoral process. A tentative explanation is that there's a lot at stake in a runoff than in a first-round election, especially when voters are not satisfied with the existing political parties or the traditional political elite, which often run for a second-round vote. That is arguable since, in general, the probability that any candidate will win the first round is relatively low, which decreases the opportunity of emergence invalid vote campaigns. However, in a straight runoff contest between the two highest vote winners where one of them must win, the potential costs of arising mobilizations for invalid vote likely increase when there is strong opposition against both candidates. As the well-known Brazilian politician, Enéas Ferreira Carneiro, emphasized during the second round of the 1989 Brazilian presidential election, "if there is no one [candidate]
that I like, I will vote null" (Moura and Ramos 2018).
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Table 9. Invalid Vote Campaigns in Latin America Presidential Elections (1999-2019)Country Year Election
Yes Institutional crisis and corruption
Yes Corruption Various groups/
Influential
Yes Corruption Various groups Yes
Brazil 2018 First Yes/
Enforced
Yes Corruption Various groups No
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Candidate quality Various Groups No
Chile 2005 Second Yes/
Colombia 2014 First No No Corruption/Negotiation
FARC
Guatemala 2015 First No Yes Corruption, influence
peddling, and illicit enrichment
Various Groups No
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Candidate quality Various groups No
Peru 2016 Second Yes/
Notes: * In this study, concurrent elections just involve when presidential and lower chamber election were held on the same date.
** Allegations of fraud in counting votes (BBC News 2019c)
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Table 10 displays the features of invalid vote campaigns in Latin America lower chamber elections from 2001 to 2018. Identify seven invalid vote campaign movements in five countries, including Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico. As shown in Table 10, the majority of the invalid vote campaigns in lower chamber elections were successful. Specifically, 5 out of 7 invalid vote campaigns have encouraged an increase of invalid votes. Besides, 4 out of 7 invalid voting cases were held under a compulsory voting system, and only one studied case (Ecuador) was in a concurrent election. Interestingly, there are only three campaigns that champion the cause for combating corrupt politicians, and all of them were held with mandatory voting laws. Over half of the campaigns were mobilized for expressing dissatisfaction with the political class.
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Table 10. Invalid Vote Campaigns in Latin America Lower Chamber Elections (2001-2018) Country Year Election
Round
Main Justification for the Campaign Leadership Result:
Invalid vote increase?
Argentina 2001 Single Yes/
Enforced
No Corruption, economic depression, and financial bankruptcy, inequality,
Yes Corruption/ traditional political parties
2018 Single No No Dissatisfaction with political class Influential individuals
Yes Mexico 2009 Single Yes/
Unenforced
No Dissatisfaction with political class, corruption, poverty, organized crime, a sclerotic school system, and
economic crisis
No Dissatisfaction with political class Influential individuals
No
* In this study, concurrent elections just involve when presidential and lower chamber election were held on the same date.
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The comparative analyses in Table 9 and Table 10 depict different pictures for invalid vote campaigns and their outcomes. While invalid vote campaigns might have different causes, my qualitative analyses suggest that the campaigns with the anti-corruption cause might matter more. To examine the effect of anti-corruption invalid vote campaigns, I conduct t-tests to analyze the relationship between anti-corruption invalid vote campaigns and the level of invalid vote (my original dependent variable). I did not include the campaign movement variable in the statistical models in the previous chapter largely because of insufficient number of cases, which would reduce the number of observations to the extent that would make estimation problematic.
Therefore, I choose to conduct t-tests as an alternative strategy for comparative analysis.
Table 11. T-Tests for Anti-Corruption Invalid Vote Campaigns and Levels of Invalid Vote
Election Presidential Without Anti-Corruption Invalid
Vote Campaigns
34 6.275 0.751 4.379
Presidential With Anti-Corruption Invalid Vote Campaigns
Without Anti-Corruption Invalid Vote Campaigns
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Table 11 shows the results of the t-tests. For the presidential elections, there are 42 cases in total, with 8 of them having anti-corruption invalid vote campaigns before the first-round election. The mean of invalid vote for the cases with anti-corruption invalid vote campaign movements is 9.5%, and the mean of invalid vote for the cases without anti-corruption invalid vote campaign movements is 6.3%. The t-test shows that the difference is statistically significant at p<0.1 level. For the lower chamber elections, there are 55 cases in total, with 12 of them having anti-corruption invalid vote campaigns before the election. The mean of invalid vote for the cases with anti-corruption invalid vote campaign movements is 15.9%, and the mean of invalid vote for the cases without anti-corruption invalid vote campaign movements is 10.3%. The t-test shows that the difference is statistically significant at p<0.05 level. Overall, the comparative analyses based on the t-tests show that invalid vote campaign movements that aimed to protest corrupt politicians tend to encourage more voters to cast invalid votes. This finding suggests that anti-corruption invalid vote campaign mobilization is a crucial mechanism that links regime anti-corruption and invalid vote.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion