The case study have shown that category 2, the approval of exports of defensive arms only, is not pursued in any of the cases, therefore the related to the goals of promoting regional stability and security for the importing state was only of medium important for Germany in all three cases. Why has this strategy not been pursued? Possibly because it doesn’t support the bilateral foreign policy goals associated with the other two categories, approving export of offensive arms, or denying them. In the case of Israel and Saudi-Arabia, these were goals that realist theory would have predicted, such as increased political influence and strengthening of strategic alliances, in order to get access to strategic resources of the importing states. In the case of Saudi-Arabia, access to its market for export and access to its oil were the more important goals, which increase Germany’s economic and energy security. For the case of Israel, the more important goals are access to intelligence and military technology, increasing Germany’s military power. The rationale of the German government may have been that the goal of providing security for a particular state can be pursued by approving export of both offensive arms and defensive arms, while getting the additional benefits of political influence.125 However, if arms races are triggered due to the availability of too many offensive arms, as realist theory predicts, the goal of security is negated, and the impact for
125 Agence France-Presse. “Merkel: Rüstungsexport dient dem Frieden“ (Merkel: Arms exports serve peace), Handelsblatt Online. 22 October 2012, http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundeswehrtagung-merkel-ruestungsexport-dient-dem-frieden/7285108.html
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Saudi interventions in Bahrain and Yemen. Aggressive behavior will eventually cause retaliation. If the aggressor is militarily superior, this retaliation comes in asymmetrical forms like terrorism. This is what we see in the Middle Eastern region today. It is a consequence of permissive arms export policies with regard to offensive arms, because they ultimately enable aggressive behavior. The cases of Israel and Iran therefore confirm some of the predictions of realist theory.An important insight of the three cases is that the promotion of adherence to international norms is not a universal principle of high importance to German foreign policy, as is claimed by leading politicians in public statements.126 Rather, norms are promoted very selectively, depending on the state in question. The norm of nuclear non-proliferation is promoted as a priority in the case of Iran, but not in the case of Israel. The norm of liberal political reform is promoted in the case of Iran as well, but only as a low priority in the cases of both Israel and Saudi-Arabia.
The case of Iran is more ambiguous with regard to liberalist and realist predictions. Through category 3 of arms export behavior, the denial of all arms to Iran, Germany joined the
126 David Bosold and Christian Achrainer, “Die normativen Grundlagen deutscher Außenpolitik“ (The
Normative Basis for German Foreign Policy), in Deutsche Außenpolitik. Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und Normen (Second Edition), ed. Thomas Jäger and others (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011) 451.
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international effort to effect changes in Iran’s behavior towards the international norms of nuclear non-proliferation and respect for political rights and the rule of law. In this case, economic goals of using Iran’s resources in order to increase its power seemed to be of less importance to Germany. This could be interpreted as following the predictions of liberalist theory. However, it should be noted that the normative goals associated with this restrictive arms export behavior have not been realized yet, and negotiations have been dragging on for years. Does this mean that Germany is pursuing a strategy with regard to its most important foreign policy goals which is ineffective in practice? If one does not take this view, Germany’s behavior also makes sense from a realist point of view. By denying Iran all arms exports while supplying Israel and Saudi-Arabia with arms, Germany also affects the balance of power in the Middle East, against Iran and in favor of its competitors Israel and Saudi-Arabia. This would confirm realist predictions of states forming strategic alliances and being concerned with the regional balance of power. While the motivation to strengthen Israel’s power in the region is hinted at by other scholars when they discuss Germany’s foreign policy towards Israel, influencing the relative regional power of Saudi-Arabia and Iran is not identified as a foreign policy goal by other scholars. If it indeed is an overlooked German foreign policy goal, then it is of high importance to Germany. The reason is that Germany’s arms export behavior is highly consistent with it. In this case, the liberal goals of attempting to change Iran’s behavior on nuclear non-proliferation and political reforms is a justification for the arms embargo but not the underlying reason.
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Since liberal goals do not have a high priority in the case of Israel and Saudi-Arabia, it would be a consistent pattern for the whole region if they weren’t for Iran either. Other scholars should therefore pay attention if balance of power considerations are more prevalent in Germany than statement of public officials would suggest, who instead stress the goals predicted by liberalist theory.
To summarize, evidence supports the realist prediction that Germany coordinates arms export policy with foreign policy in a rational manner, that it uses arms exports to increase its wealth and military capabilities, and that it seeks to increase strategic cooperation with arms importing states. On the other hand, Germany trusts importing states on the future end-use of arms more than realist theory would suggest. Evidence supports the liberalist prediction that decisions on arms exports in Germany are the result of the interaction of multiple political actors, in the case of Germany these actors are high-level officials within the executive. The influence of other political actors is very limited. This is evidence that arms exports and foreign policy are closely coordinated. Evidence also supports the liberalist prediction that Germany’s economic processes are integrated in international trade, which is why access to strategic resources that the German economy depends on is one of Germany’s most important foreign policy goals towards Israel amd Saudi-Arabia, arms are exported to these states irrespective of their status as crisis regions, which is evidence against the continuing claim of Germany as a moral great power with historic responsibilities. It appears that the political self-identify is in the process of changing in this regard, and other goals take higher
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importance. Denial of arms exports to Iran is highly ambiguous and can be explained by both realist theory (power balancing in the region) and liberalist theory (promoting adherence to international norms). With regard to the concessions towards international institutions, we see only limited influence of EU policies on Germany, but adherence by Germany to the UN Security Council arms embargo towards Iran, even though the embargo appeared to be consistent with existing German foreign policy. Overall the permissive arms export policies of Germany towards Israel and Saudi-Arabia contribute to the deadliness of existing conflicts, and supply regional arms races between Israel, Saudi-Arabia and Iran. More restraint towards export of offensive arms in particular would help the region’s security while still allowing some of German foreign policy goals to be reached by exporting defensive arms.
Through categorization of Germany’s arms export behavior in the three cases of Israel, Saudi-Arabia and Iran, I was able to measure the relative importance of each foreign policy goal identified by other scholars. I was able to resolve many contradictions between foreign policy goals that other scholars had identified, by constructing a simple hierarchy of foreign policy goals.
These hierarchies are presented once again in Figure 13 for convenience.
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Figure 13:The hierarchies of Germany’s foreign policy goals towards Israel, Saudi-Arabia and Iran
Israel
Saudi-Arabia
Iran
Because my method makes clear predictions for the importance of foreign policy goals, it can be applied to other cases, both for the exporting state and the importing state, and can be checked for plausibility independently. Other EU member states with a competitive arms industry, such as France and the United Kingdom, where reliable data on arms exports is also available, would be good candidates for further study. As long as the identified conditions,
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which are informed by realist and liberalist theory, are present, then my methodology can b papplied and new insights into the importance of these states’ foreign policy goals can be achieved.
I conclude by expressing my hope that other people will benefit from my research and that it will contribute to the understanding of contemporary state behavior.
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