武器出口與外交政策: 以德國為例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University. 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. Government Arms Exports Behavior as a Predictor of Importance 治 of Foreign Policy Goals:. 政. 大. The Case of Germany's 立 Arms Exports to the Middle East. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 武器出口與外交政策: 以德國為例. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. JOACHIM HORSCHITZ Advisor: ARIEL KO. 30 June 2015.

(2) Abstract Informed by realist and liberalist theory, conditions for a logical relationship between arms exports and the relative importance of foreign policy goals are evaluated as part of a case study of Germany’s arms export behavior to three Middle Eastern states. Apparent contradictions between foreign policy goals are resolved, using only data of arms export behavior and constructing a gradient of importance of different policy goals, some consistent with realist predictions, some consistent with liberal predictions. Overall, no theoretical. 治政大 of being able to make reliable framework describes German government behavior to a degree 立 ‧ 國. 學. predictions for future action. Therefore usage of empirical data including actions with significant political ramifications, such as arms export behavior, is highly suggested for future. ‧. research on German foreign policy instead.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 2. i n U. v.

(3) Table of Contents. 1. Introduction ............................................................................... 5 2. Research questions .................................................................... 6 3. Argument .................................................................................. 7 3.1 Variables ............................................................................... 7 3.2 Assumptions .......................................................................... 9. 治. 政 3.3 Theory of Realism ............................................................... 10 大. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 3.4 Realist predictions for arms exports and foreign policy ...... 11 3.5 Theory of liberalism ............................................................ 14. ‧. 3.6 Liberalist predictions for arms exports and foreign policy .. 15. sit. y. Nat. 4. Case study ............................................................................... 21. er. io. n. al 4.1 Case selection...................................................................... 21 iv n U engchi 4.2 Arms export decision-making in Germany.......................... 24. Ch. 4.2.1 The legal framework ...................................................... 24 4.2.2 The executive as the main decision-maker ..................... 28 4.2.3 Influence of other political actors ................................... 32 4.2.3.1 The Legislative .......................................................... 32 4.2.3.2 NGO’s, the press, individual citizens ...................... 33 4.2.3.3 Influence of International Institutions........................ 35 3.

(4) 4.2.4 Germany’s policy to prevent arms proliferation .......... 38 4.3 The political situation of the Middle East............................ 40 4.4 Comments on data ............................................................... 42 4.5 Case One: Israel .................................................................. 43 4.5.1 German foreign policy goals towards Israel ................... 43 4.5.2 German-Israeli arms export behavior ............................. 48 4.5.3 Implications for foreign policy goals.............................. 50. 政治大 4.6 Case Two: Saudi-Arabia ..................................................... 52 立. ‧ 國. 學. 4.6.1 German foreign policy goals towards Saudi-Arabia ....... 52 4.6.2 German-Saudi arms export behavior .............................. 56. ‧. sit. y. Nat. 4.6.3 Implications for foreign policy goals.............................. 58. er. io. 4.7 Case Three: Iran .................................................................. 60. n. a l policy goals towardsi vIran ..................... 60 4.7.1 German foreign n Ch. engchi U. 4.7.2 German-Iranian arms export behavior ............................ 64 4.7.3 Implications for foreign policy goals.............................. 65 5. Conclusion .............................................................................. 67 6. References ............................................................................... 74. 4.

(5) 1. Introduction This paper is a practical contribution to the foreign policy analysis of states. For researchers, finding reliable data about the relative importance of known foreign policy goals is difficult. This is because state agencies selectively publish information about their foreign policy goals in order to influence audiences, rather than inform them. While foreign policy goals can usually be identified by sources containing certain biases inherent in strategic communication,. 政治大. their real relative importance remains unknown. This data problem may have motivated in. 立. part the development of different systemic frameworks of analysis of international relations,. ‧ 國. 學. each defining a uniform, overarching foreign policy goal for all states. These overarching. ‧. goals may include increasing the state’s own military or economic power to defend itself. sit. y. Nat. (realism), 1 or dealing with commercial interdependence and promoting liberal values. er. io. (liberalism)2. I will test the expectations of both realism and liberalism in a case study for the. al. n. v i n foreign policy goals and the processC ofh controlling arms export of Germany. At the same time, engchi U I use data on past German arms export behavior to infer the relative importance of Germany’s foreign policy goals towards three Middle Eastern states. Therefore the thesis serves both as a practical test of the applicability of the realist and liberalist frameworks to contemporary German foreign policy, as well as an analysis of the role of arms exports for Middle Eastern. 1. Charles L. Glaser, “Realism”, in Contemporary Security Studies (Third Edition), ed. Alan Collins (Oxford:. Oxford University Press, 2013), 18. 2. Patrick Morgan, “Liberalism”, in Contemporary Security Studies (Third Edition), ed. Alan Collins (Oxford:. Oxford University Press, 2013), 30-31.. 5.

(6) security. I rely on the work of other scholars to establish a link between arms export behavior and the importance of foreign policy goals, as well as to identify German foreign policy goals to the importing states of my case study. With data of arms exports, I establish a coarse gradient of the relative importance of Germany’s foreign policy goals towards these states, while testing which predictions from realist and liberalist theory are reflected in the actual cases.. 2. Research questions. 立. 政治大. How can contradictions between two identified foreign policy goals of a state be resolved. ‧ 國. 學. objectively? How can the relative importance of a particular foreign policy goal of a particular. ‧. state be objectively measured? To what degree can realist and liberalist theories predict. n. er. io. al. sit. y. Nat. contemporary German foreign policy and arms export behavior?. Ch. engchi. 6. i n U. v.

(7) 3. Argument My main argument is that categories of arms export behavior can provide information about the importance of a state’s foreign policy goals.. 3.1 Variables Other scholars have identified a set of foreign policy goals that are influenced by arms exports. Some goals are related to others. The importance of these foreign policy goals is my. 立. dependent variable.. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Each goal is most consistent with a particular general category of arms export behavior. I. ‧. n. al. Ch. i n U. Category 3: Denial of exports of offensive and defensive arms. engchi. er. io. Category 2: Approval of exports of defensive arms only. sit. Nat. Category 1: Approval of exports of offensive and defensive arms. y. identify three general categories. These categories are my independent variable:. v. I base my working definition for offensive arms on the concept of “war weapons” as defined by German law.3 To make the definition more robust, I remove the conditions of pre-installed weapons systems for vehicles and include them even if they are merely designed to have them installed later. I also add to the definition all parts identified to be used to improve the. 3. Kriegswaffenliste (War Weapons List), available at. http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/legislation/export_control_cwc_p_war_weapons_list.pdf. 7.

(8) function of these arms and any equipment for producing them. The working definition of offensive arms includes the following categories:. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Missiles, Rockets, Launch Equipment Jet Fighters and Assault Helicopters Combat naval vessels, submarines and small vessels designed for weapon systems Combat tanks, armored combat vehicles, vehicles designed for weapon systems Machine guns, submachine guns, assault rifles, grenade launchers, artillery weapons. 政治大. RPGs, portable anti-tank weapons, flame-throwers, land mine launchers. 立. Torpedoes, mines, bombs, hand grenades explosive devices. ‧ 國. 學. Laser weapons causing permanent blindness. Ammunition, parts and production equipment for the above-mentioned items. ‧ y. Nat. n. al. Ch. engchi. 8. er. io. commonly controlled by states or the international level.. sit. Defensive arms are defined as all other goods with preferential military use, which are. i n U. v.

(9) 3.2 Assumptions Some assumptions are required for linking arms export behavior and foreign policy goals.. I assume that each state’s behavior is unique to a certain extent, making consideration for structures data at the state level of analysis necessary to reach meaningful conclusions.. I also assume that political decision-makers are bound by their oaths of office to serve the interests of their people, allowing me to neglect analysis at the personal level of decision-. 治政大pressures by the arms industry. makers, as well as to neglect political corruption and lobbying 立 ‧ 國. 學. Researchers on the arms trade claim that many states export arms exclusively to pursue. ‧. foreign policy goals. Considering that the effectiveness of these strategies have often been. io. sit. y. Nat. questioned by the same authors, 4 and considering that exports of goods across national. er. borders is an economic phenomenon that occurs in states with less ambitious foreign policy. al. n. v i n strategies just the same, I make the C lesser that arms exports are at least controlled h eassumption ngchi U in a way so as to not undermine a state’s most important foreign policy goals.. 4. Andrew Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, (Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 1982), 14-24.. 9.

(10) 3.3 Theory of Realism First, realist theory claims that states are the most relevant actors in international politics.5 Second, it predicts that states will behave rationally, and will formulate foreign policy goals according to their interests, while also considering the effects of their actions on other states.6 Third, it predicts that states will attempt to increase their wealth and military capabilities in order to maximize their power. 7 Fourth, it claims that there is little authority to enforce. 政治大. agreements between states or prevent the use of force between states.8 Fifth, it predicts that. 立. states will form alliances as external balancing, in order to draw on other state’s resources.. ‧ 國. 學. Sixth, the actions of groups of states within a region will often naturally result in a balance. ‧. their power relative to each other.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 5. Glaser, “Realism”, 15.. 6. Glaser, “Realism”, 14-15.. 7. Glaser, “Realism”, 14.. 8. Glaser, “Realism”, 14.. Ch. engchi. 10. i n U. v.

(11) 3.4 Realist predictions for arms exports and foreign policy If states are the most relevant actors in international politics, we would expect that the arms trade is ultimately controlled by states. In reality, this is a rather recent trend of the twentieth century only, but nonetheless holds true for the present.9. If states behave rationally and consider the effects of their actions on other states, we would expect that approving or denying arms exports happens with consideration for its effects on. 政治大. foreign policy. Approving arms exports in particular is an irreversible decision that affects. 立. foreign relations with the importing state.. ‧ 國. 學. If states attempt to increase their wealth and military capabilities in order to maximize their. ‧. power, we would expect increases in the arms trade, growing as a function of available. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. technology. This is because arms exporting states are able to increase their wealth, while arms. i n U. v. importing states are able to increase their military capabilities through arms transfers. This. Ch. engchi. increase in the arms trade is also confirmed for the twentieth century.10. If there is little authority to enforce agreements between states or prevent the use of force between states, importing arms is a means to increase the ability to defend itself for importing states, while exporting states would have to be careful about uncontrolled arms proliferation, as agreements on end-use based on trust might be violated. Therefore we would expect that 9. Suzette Grillot, “The Defence Trade”, in Contemporary Security Studies (Third Edition), ed. Alan Collins. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 321. 10. Grillot, “The Defence Trade”, 321.. 11.

(12) the exporting state has the capacity and political will to prevent the uncontrolled proliferation of the exported arms to other state or non-state actors.11 Apart from an interest in avoiding the negative effects on regional security posed by arms proliferation, the end-user of the arms needs to be predictable for the exporting state in order to judge the effects of approved arms exports accurately. Proliferation of arms undermines this judgment.. If states form alliances as external balancing, in order to draw on other state’s resources, we. 政治大. would expect that access to other states’ resources and improving political cooperation are. 立. some of a state’s most important foreign policy goals. Andrew Pierre has indeed identified the. ‧ 國. 學. following related foreign policy goals as influenced by approving arms exports:. ‧. Political influence in the importing state, in the form of access to political and military elites;. y. Nat. er. io. sit. providing quid-pro-quo in negotiations with importing state; acquiring consent to construct intelligence gathering facilities or military bases in importing state. 12. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The goal of access to intelligence or military infrastructure can be reached as part of negotiations, therefore from the goal of providing quid-pro-quo in negotiations. It can also be reached from agreements, resulting from the goals of political influence, related to access to decision-makers.. 11. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, 22.. 12. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, 14-22.. 12.

(13) We would expect these goals to be pursued by approving the export of both offensive and defensive arms, as offensive arms are usually in higher demand and shorter supply internationally, increasing the political influence from their export.. If the actions of groups of states within a region often result in a balance of power, we would expect to see arms races as one way of attaining this balance of power, especially if large amounts of offensive weapons are available in the region through exports.13 Arms exports can. 政治大. be part of the supply base for these arms races and therefore affect international security in a. 立. profound way. If the exporting state has a political interested in the region of the importing. ‧ 國. 學. state, we would expect the exporting state to approve arms exports if it wants to influence the. ‧. balance of power in favor of the importing state, otherwise we would expect the exporting. Nat. sit. y. state to deny the exports. Andrew Pierre has identified influencing the balance of power. er. io. within a region as a foreign policy goal affected by arms exports. 14 A publication of the. al. n. v i n C h claims that approving Council on Foreign Relations additionally arms exports can create a engchi U political presence in a region and is an alternative to military involvement.15. 13. Glaser, “Realism”, 21.. 14. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, 14-22.. 15. Anne Hessing Cahn and Joseph Kruzel, Controlling Future Arms Trade, ed. Thomas Quinn and Michael. Hennelly (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997), 46-47.. 13.

(14) 3.5 Theory of liberalism First, liberalism predicts that state behavior will be shaped by multiple actors, their power, their preferences and their interactions within the political system of a state. Consequently, each state is unique and analysis at the state level of analysis is imperative to understand state behavior. 16 Second, liberalism predicts that states will implement policies that encourage international trade and export-oriented economic processes, 17 as well as participation in. 政治大. international markets for goods and investments, in order to benefit from comparative. 立. advantages. 18 Third, liberalism predicts that states will be motivated to spread their own. ‧ 國. 學. norms of state behavior towards other states which are not adhering to them. Fourth,. ‧. liberalism predicts that states will concede sovereignty decision-making to international. io. sit. y. Nat. institutions in order to reduce transaction costs. 19 Fifth, liberalism predicts that there is no. n. al. er. security dilemma in international politics, security is attainable with some effort, and cooperation between states is easy.. 16. Morgan, “Liberalism”, 29.. 17. Morgan, “Liberalism”, 30-31.. 18. Morgan, “Liberalism”, 30.. 19. Morgan, “Liberalism”, 33.. Ch. engchi. 14. i n U. v.

(15) 3.6 Liberalist predictions for arms exports and foreign policy If state behavior is shaped by multiple actors, their power, their preferences and their interactions within the political system of a state, we would expect arms export behavior to be a result of bureaucratic decision-making. To suggest a coordination between arms export behavior and foreign policy goals then requires that the power to make arms export decisions (approval or denial of contracts) and the power to implement foreign policy goals must either. 政治大. be united in the same decision-makers or distributed within a group of decision-makers that. 立. have either a motivation or duty to coordinate their policies. Additionally, influences by. ‧ 國. 學. political actors that may not support a close coordination between arms exports and foreign. ‧. policy, such as the legislative, the press, NGO’s and individual citizens must be limited.. Nat. io. sit. y. Otherwise they would interfere with implementation of (sometimes controversial) foreign. er. policy and arms export decisions. The legislative can constrain decision-makers in the. al. n. v i n executive branch by passing more C restrictive or may have a veto-right on arms export U h e n laws, i h gc decisions. NGOs and the press can disseminate information about arms export decisions to citizens, increasing transparency. With this information, citizens can pressure decision-makers to overturn specific arms export decisions that citizens consider to be against their own values or interests. Citizens can pressure the executive immediately through public demonstrations and communication with their elected representatives, or in a delayed manner by voting officials into public office which support their preferences.. 15.

(16) Should rules for arms exports be proscribed in laws, the rules must be vague enough to give political decision-makers room for their own interpretations. The laws must allow the export of many types of arms that are in international demand, but at the same time allow for a selective denial of exports by political decision-makers based on foreign policy considerations.. If states implement policies that encourage international trade and export-oriented economic processes, we would expect the economic processes of these states to eventually become. 政治大. embedded in international trade. Some processes would become dependent on imports of. 立. goods and resources from abroad, either for production or consumption. Other processes. ‧ 國. 學. become dependent on foreign markets for export of domestically produced good (see Figure. ‧. 1). As political cooperation is usually required for stable access to these foreign resources,. Nat. io. sit. y. foreign markets and safe transport routes, it becomes a foreign policy issue. Keith Krause. n. al. er. points out that approving arms export can provide this access to strategic resources in the importing state.. 20. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 1: Economic foreign policy goals (green) related to international economic processes.. 20. Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade. (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge. University Press, 1995), 97-98.. 16.

(17) Related foreign policy goals to secure these economic processes from interruption also include providing security to states in control of transport routes or that contain important markets to the exporting state.. If states are motivated to spread their own norms towards other states, we would expect that states try to influence other states to take over the same norms. These norms would include promotion of a wide range of individual rights, such as political rights, religious freedom,. 政治大. sexual equality and others, as well as the rule of law and democratic accountability. Other. 立. norms would be related to international state conduct, such as non-proliferation of weapons of. ‧ 國. 學. mass destruction, respect for state sovereignty and others.21. ‧. Promoting these norms may be a reason for becoming a follower of international regimes or. y. Nat. n. er. io. al. sit. becoming a member international institutions.22. i n U. v. These normative goals can be pursued by denying arms exports to states that are to be. Ch. engchi. influenced. In a second step, on conditions of adherence to the various political norms would future approval of arms exports be suggested, as a way of influencing the importing states behavior through punishment and reward. Consequently, we would expect this kind of restrictive arms export policy towards state’s that do not presently conform to liberal norms.. 21. Morgan, “Liberalism”, 32.. 22. Morgan, “Liberalism”, 32.. 17.

(18) If states concede sovereignty decision-making to international institutions, we would expect to see close coordination on arms exports policy at the regional and international level. Examples of these international institutions would be the United Nations and the European Union. We would expect to see commitments to commonly developed policies in these institutions to override decision-making at the state level.. International institutions or other forms of international cooperation between states are. 政治大. necessary if restrictive arms export policies are to be implemented. This is because denial of. 立. arms exports, just as denial of export of other goods, is not effective if pursued on a unilateral. ‧ 國. 學. basis. Effectiveness requires international coordination with other potential suppliers of arms,. ‧. in the form of embargoes. Otherwise the importing state can import what it wants at. Nat. io. sit. y. acceptable conditions from other suppliers, resulting in no change in behavior regarding the. er. norms in question. The United Nations (UN) are the most important coordinating institution. al. n. v i n C h by Security Council today, with embargoes usually established (UNSC) resolutions. These engchi U can be enforced by sanctioning in case of violations. The European Union is as an example of a regional coordinating institution which established codes of conduct for arms export behavior of its member states. Violations are typically not punished and therefore only selectively applied by member states.. If there is no security dilemma in international politics, security is attainable with some effort, and cooperation between states is easy, then we would expect to see states that behave 18.

(19) morally, lead by positive example and care about the interests of other states. In particular, would expect to see states helping others to attain peace, security and wealth, and to cooperate closely with each other. Andrew Pierre has identified expressing commitment to the importing state’s security and improving the importing state's security as two related foreign policy goals that are affected by arms exports. 23 We would expect these goals to be pursued by approving export of defensive arms only, as it would increase the security of the importing state while decreasing the likelihood of arms races or armed conflict in the future.. 立. 政治大. Figure 2 gives an overview of the foreign policy goals that are theoretically expected from the. ‧ 國. 學. theories of realism and liberalism, as well as their relation to the three categories of arms. ‧. export behavior.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 23. Ch. engchi. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, 14-22.. 19. i n U. v.

(20) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 20. i n U. v.

(21) 4. Case study The case study is a practical application of my argument and designed to test if predictions made by theoretical frameworks for arms export and foreign policy behavior are accurate in actual cases.. 4.1 Case selection A basic requirement for case selection is that the factors of supply and demand for arms are. 政治大 present. Consequently, the exporting state must have an arms industry which is able to 立. ‧ 國. 學. produce competitive products that are in demand in the importing state. The importing state. ‧. must have enough financial resources to finance the imports. As Michael Brzoska observes,. sit. y. Nat. an active arms export policy of supplying arms to allies by using public funds is unrealistic. n. al. er. io. for most states. Therefore, the arms export policy of most states is passive. 24 This policy. Ch. i n U. v. involves the state selectively approving proposed contracts between a domestic arms 25. engchi. manufacturer and a foreign state. In order to have contracts to approve or deny, supply of an arms manufacturer and demand of a foreign state is necessary.. 24. Michael Brzoska, “Rüstungsexportpolitik” (Arms Export Policy), in Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, ed.. Siegmar Schmidt and others (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 655. 25. Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot, The International Arms Trade (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 17.. 21.

(22) I select the Federal Republic of Germany as the case of the exporting state. I further select the State of Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran as cases of the importing states, all states with significant power in the Middle East.. They are applicable cases, as the required conditions of supply and demand are present.. Germany has a large and competitive arms industry, whose products are in demand in the Middle East. Therefore the conditions of supply and demand are present. According to the. 政治大. Arms Transfer Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in. 立. the period of 2002-2013, Germany was the third largest arms exporter in the world after the. ‧ 國. 學. United States and Russia, while Saudi-Arabia and Israel have ranked within the top 20 of. ‧. worldwide arms importers. Despite demand for arms, Iran’s arms imports have fallen. y. Nat. er. io. sit. dramatically after 2007, due to the implementation of a UN arms embargo. In the period of 2002-2007 however, Iran was ranked within the top 25 of worldwide arms importers.26. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Data compiled from reports by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) shows constantly high volumes of approved arms export from Germany and fluctuating but considerable approved volumes to Saudi-Arabia and Israel in particular (see Figure 3).. 26. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “Arms Transfer Database. Top list TIV tables” published on. armstrade.sipri.org http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php. 22.

(23) Figure 3: Annual values of approved arms exports from Germany. 政治大 Data Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 立 Rüstungsexportbericht 2002-2013 (Arms Export Reports 2002-2013). and. Energy. (BMWi),. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. As will be shown in each case study, they are also valuable cases, because other scholars have. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. identified several German foreign policy goals towards each importing state which are in. i n U. v. apparent conflict with each other. By categorizing Germany’s recent arms export behavior. Ch. engchi. towards each state, my argument makes valuable claims regarding the relative importance of these goals, resolving the conflicts.. 23.

(24) 4.2 Arms export decision-making in Germany According to liberalist theory, an analysis of the national decision-making process in Germany with regard to arms export is required, as the interactions between different political actors determine decisions to a large extend. This analysis also helps to clarify whether or not consistency between Germany’s most important foreign policy goals and arms export decisions is likely.. 4.2.1 The legal framework. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. The laws provide a framework within which political actors can act and can gives power over. ‧. arms export decisions to certain types of political actors and not others.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. German law as it exists today assigns the executive as the sole decision-maker on arms exports. Some legal constraints on this decision-making power exist, especially with regard to. al. n. v i n C h However, inUpractice, these legal constraints are the export of war weapons into crisis regions. engchi. very limited, enabling political considerations, including foreign policy considerations to influence decision-making.. German law differentiates between war weapons Kriegswaffen and other arms sonstige Rüstungsgüter. War weapons include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, missiles, rockets, launch equipment, jet fighters and assault helicopters, with installed weapon systems combat naval vessels, submarines, small vessels with installed weapon systems, combat tanks, 24.

(25) armored combat and support vehicles, machine guns, submachine guns, assault rifles, grenade launchers, artillery weapons, RPGs, portable anti-tank weapons, flame-throwers, land mine launchers, torpedoes, mines, bombs, hand grenades explosive devices, ammunition for the above-mentioned weapons, and their parts, as well as laser weapons causing permanent blindness.27. Export of these war weapons is regulated by the War Weapons Control Act. 政治大. Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (KrWaffKontrG). It states that export of war weapons requires. 立. government approval in all cases, which must be denied if “there is a danger of the war. ‧ 國. 學. weapons being used for an act detrimental to peace”.28 This is usually the case in areas of. ‧. crises Krisenregionen, where arms conflict is likely. According to this law, there is no legal. Nat. io. sit. y. constraint on denying export of war weapons. While there is a theoretical constraint on. er. approving export of war weapons, in practice the Federal Foreign Office (AA) within the. al. n. v i n C ha possible “dangerUto peace” resulting from the arms executive makes the judgment about engchi export. The AA is at the same time involved in major arms export decisions. Therefore it is likely that the AA will be biased in its judgment and influenced by its foreign policy goals, rather than by the facts only. Furthermore, violations of this law, such as making a judgment against better knowledge would be difficult to prosecute. This is because the prosecuting. 27. Kriegswaffenliste (War Weapons List), available at. http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/legislation/export_control_cwc_p_war_weapons_list.pdf 28. Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (War Weapons Control Act), Section 6.3, available at. http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/legislation/export_control_cwc_p_war_weapons_control_act.pdf. 25.

(26) institution, the Federal Prosecutor General Generalbundesanwalt is bound by instruction weisungsgebunden of the Ministry of Justice, which usually also takes part in the decisionmaking process regarding major arms exports. Therefore, in practice, enforcement against violations by decision-makers within the executive is only thinkable by successive Ministers of Justice (implying a considerable delay in time). This small possibility has not been realized so far in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany.. 政治大. The export of other arms is covered by the Foreign Trade and Payments Act. 立. Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG). For these goods, the default legal position is approval of. ‧ 國. 學. exports. In pursuit of the goals of “German security interests”, “peace between nations”,. ‧. “preventing disturbances of foreign relations” may exports be legally denied by decision-. io. sit. y. Nat. makers (but don’t have to be).29 Another exception where denial of exports is allowed is. n. al. resolutions or EU regulations.. 30. er. through implementation of international arrangements, such as UN Security Council. v i n Ch Consequently, there are no constraints on approving the engchi U. export of other arms. Denial of exports of other arms is possible by citing ill-defined “security interests” or “prevention of disturbances of foreign relations”, which can be done selectively by decision-makers within the AA, according to foreign policy considerations, as there is no burden of proof on the government.31. 29. Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz), Section 4.1, available at. http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/legislation/export_control_awg_en.pdf 30. Foreign Trade and Payments Act, Section 4.2. 31. Davis, The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports, 164.. 26.

(27) In summary, there are no legal constraints regarding other arms, and very limited legal constraints regarding war weapons, due to weak separation of powers between the federal prosecution and decision-makers on arms exports within the executive. Furthermore, the executive by law is the main decision-maker over arms exports.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 27. i n U. v.

(28) 4.2.2 The executive as the main decision-maker As the analysis below shows, important decision-makers on arms exports within the executive either consider major foreign policy goals or are directly involved in foreign policy implementation at the same time. Therefore, a consistency between decision on arms export and Germany’s most important foreign policy goals is very likely.. Arms export decisions are made within a hierarchical structure, through which arms export. 政治大. applications of domestic arms manufacturers are processed. The exact decision-makers within. 立. the hierarchy depend on the types of arms and the importing state.. ‧ 國. 學. Exports of other arms to EU member states or NATO members (therefore having little. ‧. political significance) are typically handled by the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. Export Control Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA), an office. i n U. v. subordinated to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy Bundesministerium für. Ch. engchi. Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi). In the case of exports of other arms to non-EU or nonNATO members (third countries), the BAFA typically refers them upwards within the BMWi. The BMWi then routinely involves the Federal Foreign Office Auswärtiges Amt (AA) and the Federal Ministry of Defense Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg) in the decisionmaking process. 32 Should the ministries come to conflicting decisions regarding a specific. 32. Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie (BDSV), “Rüstungsexport - Akteure &. Verfahren“ (Arms Exports – Actors and Processes), published on ruestungsindustrie.info, 2014. http://www.ruestungsindustrie.info/ruestungsexport-akteure-verfahren. 28.

(29) arms export deal, the Federal Security Council Bundessicherheitsrat (BSR) is convened. It is the highest authority that deliberates on arms export deals with significant political ramifications.33 The BSR meets in secret and its deliberations and decisions are secret as well.. The BSR was originally created in 1955 to deliberate about strategic security issues in West Germany. It has only later extended its mandate to also cover arms export decisions. 34 The requirement for secrecy regarding arms export decisions is not self-evidence, but it was. 政治大. achieved by the inclusion of arms export decisions within the BSR’s mandate, which already. 立. made decisions on sensitive security issues where secrecy was certainly justified.35 Secrecy. ‧ 國. 學. regarding the decisions and deliberations of the BSR is evidence that sensitive political. ‧. considerations influence the decisions regarding arms exports to third countries.. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. As of 2014, the members of the BSR are the chancellor and eight ministers.36 Its decisions are. n. based on majority voting according to public available information. Once the BSR has made. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. its decisions, the actual implementation is delegated down to the ministerial offices again.37. 33. BDSV, „Arms Exports – Actors and Processes”. 34. Christian Behme, “Der Bundessicherheitsrat” (The Federal Security Council), published on bundestag.de, 9. May 2008. http://www.bundestag.de/blob/190224/82b0d64dd83976983f7e785ba156c11b/bundessicherheitsratdata.pdf (accessed 19 April 2015), 2. 35. Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie (BDSV),. “Bundessicherheitsrat“ (Federal Security Council), published on ruestungsindustrie.info, 2014. http://www.ruestungsindustrie.info/export/bundessicherheitsrat 36. BDSV, “Bundessicherheitsrat“ (Federal Security Council). 37. Behme, “The Federal Security Council”, 2.. 29.

(30) For exports of war weapons, the approval process is similar, but the typical decision-makers are found at the ministerial level of the BMWi, the AA and the BMVg for export of war weapons to EU/NATO members, and convention of the BSR often happens for export of war weapons to third countries. See Figure 4 for an overview of the above analysis.. Figure 4: Decision-makers in their likely behavior in arms export decisions.SD. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Data source: BDSV, “Federal Security Council”; BDSV “Arms Exports – Actors and Processes”. 30.

(31) Since we are concerned with exports to non-EU/non-NATO members (third countries), consistency with foreign policy goals depends on the decisions of the BMWi, AA and BMVg for other arms, and on the decisions of the BSR and therefore the majority of votes by the Chancellor and the 8 ministers for war weapons. It is likely that the Chancellor, the Federal Chancellery (BK), the AA and the BMVg are going to consider consistency with major foreign policy goals. The BMWi is likely to favor arms exports in general, as it represents economic interests. 38 The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. 治政大exports may hinder sustainable (BMZ) is likely to oppose arms exports in general, as arms 立 ‧ 國. 學. economic development. Considering these facts, it is likely that consistency with major foreign policy goals will be retained in decisions of both the BSR and the ministerial level. ‧. consisting of the BMWi, AA and the BMVg.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 38. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Ian Davis, The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports. Germany, Sweden and the UK (New York: Oxford. University Press, 2002), 183.. 31.

(32) 4.2.3 Influence of other political actors Even though the executive is the main bureaucratic actor in Germany, liberalist theory suggests that interactions with other political actors shape decisions. Therefore the influence of these actors is considered in the following subsections.. 4.2.3.1 The Legislative In Germany, the legislative has no direct means of influencing the executive in its decisions. 學. ‧ 國. regarding arms exports.39. 政治大 Indirectly, it can pass more restrictive legislation that would prevent 立. decision-making on a case-by-case basis, or it can request information from the executive. ‧. regarding recent arms export decisions. In practice, these constrains have not been exercised. er. io. sit. y. Nat. to a degree that would constrain decision-making within the executive.. With regard to passing restrictive legislation, the legislative in Germany has never chosen to. al. n. v i n C discipline, enforcedUby party leaders who concurrently do so. This may be due to strict party h engchi hold positions within the executive, which are involved in arms export decisions. A current example is Angela Merkel, who is head of the majority party within the legislative, as well as acting head of the executive branch as chancellor and an important actor within the BSR.. With regard to requesting information about recent arms export decisions, individual legislators by opposition parties do so. While the executive has a legal duty to answer these. 39. Davis, The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports, 173.. 32.

(33) requests, in practice it avoids sensitive questions by citing privacy rights of arms manufacturers or claiming that it does not have the information stored in electronic databases and is therefore unable find the relevant data in due time .40. 4.2.3.2 NGOs, the press, individual citizens NGOs and the press contribute to spreading of already published information regarding arms export decisions. However, they don’t publish information in a timely manner that would. 政治大. allow them to influence public opinion on pending decisions, either because of lack of access. 立. or editorial interest. This after-the-fact reporting poses no immediate constraint on decision-. ‧ 國. 學. makers. The democratic constraint posed by political activities of individual citizens is. ‧. significant in Germany, especially with regard to approving arms exports to states with human. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. rights problems. However, it requires timely access to information about arms deals currently. i n U. v. under considerations, which is usually not available. Within German society, pacifist 41. Ch. engchi. sentiments are common and the public is critical of arms exports, especially to states with human rights problems. 42 Advanced knowledge of approval such arms deals would incur significant political costs to the involved decision-makers, therefore constraining their ability to make decisions based on foreign policy considerations. In practice, advanced knowledge requires leakage of information from involved individuals within the executive to members of 40. As examples, see Bundestag Printmatter 17/3861 and Bundestag Printmatter 18/1422 .. 41. Akan Malici, “Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior“, Foreign Policy. Analysis, Volume 2. Issue 1. (January 2006): 38. 42. van Aken, “Waffenexport-Telegramm Nr. 4” (Arms Export Telegram No. 4). 33.

(34) the press, NGOs or other distributors of information. Usually this leakage is prevented and therefore the political pressure of individual citizens is not realized. Therefore the societal actors of NGO’s, the press and individual citizens is very limited but can become influential in cases of information leakage about pending arms export decisions.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 34. i n U. v.

(35) 4.2.3.3 Influence of International Institutions According to liberalist theory, states concede sovereignty decision-making to international institutions to reduce transactions costs. We would therefore expect to see close coordination on arms exports policy at the regional and international level. Examples of these international institutions would be the United Nations and the European Union.. As a member of the European Union (EU), Germany is influenced but not constrained by its. 政治大. regulations regarding arms exports. The EU developed a common position regarding arms. 立. export conduct in general, within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.. ‧ 國. 學. Article 2 contains eight criteria applicable to the importing state. EU member states are. ‧. supposed to check for these criteria and deny arms exports if any are present.43 The criteria. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. are presence of EU, OSCE or UN arms embargoes, risk of internal repression or violations of. n. human rights or international law, risk of aggravating existing armed conflicts, risk to regional. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. stability and peace, risk to national security of EU member states, proven support for terrorism or international crime, non-compliance with WMD non-proliferation, risk of uncontrolled re-export, risk to sustainable development.. Many of these criteria are moral and liberalist in nature, such as violation of human rights or regional conflict as criteria warranting denial of all arms exports. And as will be shown from. 43. Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of. exports of military technology and equipment, 8 December 2008, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944. 35.

(36) all three cases, these criteria are indeed cited when arms exports are denied. However, apart from criteria 1, which is applied consistently, the criteria are very selectively applied in the cases of Israel and Saudi-Arabia and therefore are unlikely to be the actual basis of decisionmaking in Germany. Therefore, while EU policy is liberalist in nature, it does not constrain Germany’s arms export behavior. Rather it is selectively referred to by Germany when convenient. Therefore Germany’s engagement within the EU’s arms export policies is not consistent with liberalist theory.. 立. 政治大. With regard to coordination of arms export denials, the EU common position on arms exports. ‧ 國. 學. includes a provision that all other member states are to be informed about denials of arms. ‧. exports.44 If these other EU states then want to approve a “similar deal” later, they have to. Nat. io. sit. y. consult the state that initially denied it. This agreement ensures basic communication between. er. EU member states about denied arms exports and the foreign policy considerations behind. al. n. v i n them. However, these consultationsC can’t any divergence of foreign policy goals and h eprevent ngchi U conflicting arms export strategies. Most importantly, the agreement only has a limited effect because other EU member states with significant arms industries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have a very permissive attitude towards arms exports. Another problem is that industry often privately consults with the German government before an official application for export is submitted. If the export is informally denied during these consultations, no official application will be issued and therefore the denial does not have to be reported to the 44. Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. 36.

(37) other EU member states. These problems can be illustrated by the German arms export report of 2013. 17280 arms deals were approved by Germany. 45 In the same year, Germany consulted other states in 21 cases (when approving a previously denied arms export by other EU members), and has been consulted 59 times (when other EU members approved arms deals previously denied by Germany).46 The difference in magnitude between these numbers illustrates the subordinate role of this EU policy in practice, which is due to the similarity of the export behavior between Germany and other major exporters such as France and the UK.. 立. 政治大. As a member of the UN, Germany is constrained by United Nations Security Council (UNSC). ‧ 國. 學. decisions but not only weakly constrained by the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).. ‧. As a member of the United Nations (UN), Germany follows arms embargoes established by. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) against particular states. Since these are. n. enforceable embargoes, they constrain German arms export behavior. This can be seen from. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. the case of Iran. Membership of Germany within the UN and adherence to its decisions on arms embargoes is evidence for Germany’s willingness to cooperate within international institutions, which is suggested by liberalist theory.. With regard to the recently signed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), it has only limited applicability to our cases. First, it falls outside of the time period under consideration (2002-2013), as it. 45. Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), Rüstungsexportbericht 2013 (Arms Export Report. 2013) (Berlin: BMWi. 2014), 20. 46. BMWi, Arms Export Report 2013, 13.. 37.

(38) was signed by Germany in June 2013. Furthermore, two our cases, Saudi-Arabia and Iran, have not signed the treaty. The ATT establishes basic provisions for arms transfers between signatory states. The affected arms cover only part of my definition of offensive arms. 47 The provisions are rather basic and serve to legitimize arms sales from developed countries, not to constraint them.48 The provisions include the use of end-use certification and national control systems for arms exports,49 both of which have been in effect in Germany for many years.. 4.2.4 Germany’s policy to prevent arms proliferation 政治. 大. 立. According to realist theory, there is little authority to enforce agreements between states. We. ‧ 國. 學. would therefore expect that the exporting state has the capacity and political will to check. ‧. whether or not any agreements regarding the end-use of exported arms are adhered to and to. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. punish any violations swiftly. By contrast, the German government relies on end-use. i n U. v. certificates, a written declaration of the importing state that the arms will not be re-exported. Ch. engchi. without consent of the German government. 50 In response to known violations of end-use certificates, German policy is the discontinuation of arms exports to the violating state, but no. 47. Roderic Alley, “Firing Blanks? The Arms Trade Treaty”, in Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand. Discussion Papers. No 16/14. December 2014: 2. 48. Alley, “Firing Blanks? The Arms Trade Treaty”, 8.. 49. Alley, “Firing Blanks? The Arms Trade Treaty”, 11.. 50. Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/3861. Waffenexporte – Kontrolle des Endverbleibs deutscher. Kriegswaffen und Rüstungsgüter (German Bundestag Printmatter 17/3861. Arms Exports – Verification of enduse of German war weapons and other arms), 23 November 2010, available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/038/1703861.pdf, 2.. 38.

(39) further political sanctions. 51 Knowledge about violations requires pro-active and thorough investigations about possible instances of illegal re-export of arms. The German government is not burdening the importing states with regular reporting on the stock of arms imported from Germany, nor is it claiming the right to inspect the exported arms at a later date. 52 By international comparison, this is standard practice, but insufficient to prevent all instances of illegal re-exports of arms, especially in politically corrupt states such as Saudi-Arabia. 53 This means that some exported arms might eventually be used against Germany’s foreign policy. 治政大 to expectations based on goals by unintended actors. These findings are in contradiction 立 ‧ 國. 學. realist theory. The German policy also diminishes the effectiveness of approving arms exports in order to pursue foreign policy goals dependent on the use of the arms by the importing state,. ‧. such as goals related to regional security or the regional balance of power. By contrast,. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. foreign policy goals related to improving relations with the importing state might not be affected by a later uncontrolled re-export.. Ch. 51. German Bundestag Printmatter 17/3861, 6.. 52. German Bundestag Printmatter 17/3861, 3.. engchi. i n U. v. Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 18/1422. Rüstungsexporte von Kleinwaffen und leichten Waffen (German Bundestag Printmatter 18/1422. Arms exports of small and light weapons), 15 May 2014, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/014/1801422.pdf, 75. 53. Ulrike Freitag, ”Saudi-Arabia: Buying Stability?” in Protest, Revolt and Regime. Change in the Arab World, ed. Muriel Asseburg (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2012) 23.. 39.

(40) 4.3 The political situation of the Middle East Since all three importing states in our case study are located in the Middle East, an analysis of the region’s current political situation is in order before looking at Germany’s foreign policy goals and arms exports to individual importing states within it.. According to realist theory, we would expect the actions of within the Middle Eastern region result in a balance of power. This balance of power is currently held up between three states,. 政治大. which are Israel, Saudi-Arabia and Iran. They are the states in the region with the largest. 立. military power and political influence. These state also partly control the political framework. ‧ 國. 學. of less powerful states or regions in their immediate vicinity. For Israel, these are the. ‧. Palestinian territories, for Saudi-Arabia this is Bahrain and Yemen, and for Iran these have. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. been parts of Iraq prior to the Islamic State taking over political control over large parts of. n. Iraqi territory. Non-state actors and political factions also influence political reality in. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. weakened states such as Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Afghanistan.. Many states of the region are also allied with varying outside states. These alliances are predicted by realist theory. The motivation for the outside states lies in access to resources of the region at favorable conditions, such as oil and gas. The motivation for the Middle Eastern states lies in balancing against threats within the region. In the case of Saudi-Arabia, the alliance is with the United States. In the case of Iran and Syria, the alliance is with Russia. Israel’s alliance with the US and Germany is largely based on historic political and social 40.

(41) links between the these states, as predicted by liberalist theory rather than based on power or strategic interests as predicted by realist theory. Germany’s growing interest in the region is constrained by existing alliances of various Middle Eastern states with outside state which are powerful than Germany, namely the US and Russia.. Part of the political reality of these alliances is the supply of arms. The US in particular influenced political reality in Iraq, where the imported weapons are now in control of the. 政治大. Islamic State.54 This highlights the fast pace of political changes in the region which makes. 立. the long-term consequences of exporting arms into the region impossible to predict and. ‧ 國. 學. therefore makes exports of offensive arms potentially dangerous for the security of the people. ‧. in the region. The Middle East is rife with political conflicts, which become more deadly as. Nat. io. sit. y. more offensive arms are exported into it. Arms races are likely between major states that are. n. al. er. in political conflict with each other. Major conflicts exist between Israel and Iran and SaudiArabia and Iran.. 54. 55. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Guido Steinberg, “Mächte und Milizen“ (Powers and Militias), Internationale Politik 5 (September/Oktober. 2014) 18-19. 55. Guido Steinberg, Leading the Counter-Revolution. Saudi-Arabia and the Arab Spring. SWP Research Paper 7.. (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2014), 13-14.. 41.

(42) 4.4 Comments on data Data used to identify Germany’s arms export behavior is taken from the 2002-2013 Arms Export Reports Rüstungsexportberichte, published by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi).56. The data, while seemingly comprehensive by international comparison, contains several weaknesses.. 治政 The values of approved exports are usually given only for大 arbitrarily defined groups of arms. 立 ‧ 國. 學. Some groups contain offensive and defensive arms, so that when calculating aggregate export volumes for these two types, they are approximations only. Data of denied exports is rather. ‧. basic. Only the total number of denied export licenses is given for each importing state, and. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. the applicable EU criteria is cited, as well as the category of arms affected. Furthermore, some. i n U. v. denied arms exports are missing from the reports. The reason is that arms manufacturers in. Ch. engchi. Germany typically apply for arms export approval in an unofficial and secret pre-request Voranfrage. If a pre-request is denied, exporters usually refrain from sending an official application Exportantrag. In the reports, only denials of official applications are listed. Since better data is not available and I am only interested in identifying a broad category of arms export behavior, these limitations are acceptable.. 56. See References for a list of all reports.. 42.

(43) 4.5 Case One: Israel 4.5.1 German foreign policy goals towards Israel Scholars from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs have identified conflicting foreign policy goals of Germany towards Israel, and have acknowledged the contradictions.. Scholars stress that relations between Germany and Israel are special, due to the historical. 政治大 responsibility of Germany for human rights crimes in Germany before 1945. Many relatives 立. ‧ 國. 學. of the victims have become Israeli citizens after 1948. Apart from past monetary reparations. ‧. paid to the Jewish Claims Conference, leading politicians in Germany still consider support. sit. y. Nat. for Israel as a historical responsibility. Stressing this perceived responsibility should not. n. al. er. io. distract from the diversity of German foreign policy goal towards Israel. Some goals are. Ch. guided by this responsibility, while others are not. engchi. i n U. v. One foreign policy goal that follows from the historic responsibility is providing security to Israel. 57 One of the mechanisms for ensuring this security, according to Germany foreign policy strategy, is conclusion of the perpetual conflicts and wars of Israel with its neighbors.. 57. Muriel Asseburg, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, in German Middle East and North Africa Policy. Interests,. Strategies, Options, ed. Guido Steinberg (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2009), 23.. 43.

(44) Related foreign policy goals are the avoidance of refugee flows and the conditions for terrorism.58. Michael Wolfssohn explicitly identifies Germany’s permissive arms export policy towards Israel as part of this goal of providing security to Israel. This is direct evidence that arms exports are heavily coordinated with foreign policy goals in the case of Israel. The export of three submarines to Israel, two of them approved in 2005 and one in 2012, were partly funded. 政治大. by German public funds. These exports were motivated by strengthening Israel against Iran.59. 立. This is evidence for the foreign policy goal of providing security for Israel, but also for the. ‧ 國. 學. goal of influencing the balance of power in the region, since submarines are strategic and. ‧. offensive arms. The submarines act as delivery systems for nuclear warheads. 60 While. io. sit. y. Nat. allowing Israel to deter attacks with a second-strike capacity61, the policy is in conflict with. n. al. er. the German goal of promotion of the political norm of nuclear non-proliferation. The. Ch. submarines can also deliver special forces units. engchi. iv n onto U foreign. coastlines for covert. operations.62. 58. Muriel Asseburg, Jan Busse, “Deutschlands Politik gegenüber Israel“ (Germany’s Policy towards Israel), in. Deutsche Außenpolitik. Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und Normen (Second Edition), ed. Thomas Jäger and others. (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), 693-694. 59. Michael Wolffsohn, Thomas Brechenmacher, “Israel“, in Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, ed. Siegmar. Schmidt and others (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 517. 60. Wolffsohn, “Israel“, 517.. 61. Muriel Asseburg, “50 Jahre deutsch-israelische diplomatische Beziehungen“ (50 Years of German-Israeli. diplomatic Relations), SWP-Aktuell 40 (April 2015) 3. 62. Asseburg, “50 Jahre deutsch-israelische diplomatische Beziehungen“ 3.. 44.

(45) Providing security could also be realized by supplying defensive arms only, which would not pose the same risks of an arms race with Iran, which had to be prevented through embargos (see Iran case study). According to Israel’s understanding however, committing violence is a necessary part of its strategy for survival. 63 While the German government promotes nonviolent resolutions to political conflict as a political norm, it assumes that providing offensive arms increases Israel’s security, and that this sense of security creates a willingness for negotiations and reduce Israel‘s perceived need for violent retaliation of attacks. However this. 治政大has increased in recent years in assumption has not held true. For example, violence in Gaza 立 ‧ 國. 學. spite of the export of a missile defense system to Israel in 2003.. ‧. In order to facilitate peace with its neighbors, a foreign policy goals has been to influence. Nat. io. sit. y. decision-makers in Israel to adhere to international norms, especially with regard to respect of. er. sovereignty. Israel violates this norm by building settlements on occupied Palestinian territory. al. v i n C habuses against Palestinians . Human rights in the occupied territories engchi U n. in the West-Bank area. 64. are also mentioned by scholars. 65 Therefore there is a conflict between the foreign policy goals of providing security for Israel on the one hand, and the promotion of international norms on the other.. 63. Wolffsohn “Israel“, 519.. 64. Asseburg, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, 24.. 65. Asseburg, “Germany’s Policy towards Israel“, 710.. 45.

(46) Influencing Israel to support the creation of Palestinian state has been a German foreign policy goal since 1970, 66 as it would support the goal of security for both the Israeli and Palestinian people according to German reasoning. Muriel Asseburg claims that Germany’s policy towards this goal has weakened after 2007, by passively supporting Israel’s Gaza blockade, 67 the preferred strategy by Israel and the US. 68 Instead, Germany has acted to diminish the negative effects of the blockade, by doubling its annual foreign aid to Gaza, with annual aid exceeding US$ 100 million since 2010 according the OECD. 69 Germany also. 治政大 territories, as part of EU focused on improving conditions in the Palestinian West-Bank 立 ‧ 國. 學. efforts. 70 As continued conflicts between Hamas and Israel over Gaza are likely, and competing political factions are built up in Gaza and the West-Bank, there is evidence that the. ‧. goal of prevention of regional conflict is unlikely to be realized in the short-term by this. er. io. sit. y. Nat. strategy.71. al. n. v i n According to Muriel Asseburg andCJan intensifying bilateral security and economic h eBusse, ngchi U relations with Israel is another German foreign policy goal.72. 66. Wolffsohn, “Israel“, 512.. 67. Asseburg, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, 22.. 68. Asseburg, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, 24.. 69. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), “Query Wizard for International. Development” published on stats.oecd.org http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=2&y=6&f=3:51,4:1,1:10,5:3,7:1&q=3:51+4:1+1:10+5:3+7:1+2:1,134+6:1995,1 996,1997,1998,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,2009,2010,2011,2012,2013 70. Asseburg, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, 25-27.. 71. Asseburg, “Germany’s Policy towards Israel“, 709.. 72. Asseburg, “Germany’s Policy towards Israel“, 693.. 46.

(47) Since 2008, Germany and Israel have implemented government consultations, which lead to increased cooperation in military matters and civil research, as well as intelligence sharing. 73. Israeli military technology has been transferred in joint military programs, such as high-tech drones.74 Scientific cooperation has also intensified recently.75. Israel as a market for German exports is not as important. As measured by volume, Israel usually is located at rank 40-50 in the worldwide comparison of German trade partners..76. 政治大. Israel also has no natural resources critical for Germany’s economic processes.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Overall however, these developments are evidence for the goal of increased political influence and the related goals of access to resources, in particular technology and intelligence.. ‧. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. scholars.. y. Several conflicts between foreign policy goals towards Israel have been identified by other. Ch. engchi. 73. Asseburg, “Germany’s Policy towards Israel“, 704-705. 74. Asseburg, “Germany’s Policy towards Israel“, 698.. 75. Asseburg, “Germany’s Policy towards Israel“, 699-700.. 76. Asseburg, “Germany’s Policy towards Israel“, 699.. 47. i n U. v.

(48) 4.5.2 German-Israeli arms export behavior Within the period of 2002-2013, German arms export behavior towards Israel was generally permissive regarding both offensive arms and defensive arms, with only a small minority of offensive arms being denied. Therefore German arms export behavior is most consistent with category 1, less consistent with category 2, and least consistent with category 3 of arms export behavior.. 政治大. The total value of all approved exports to Israel is high, amounting to € 2.5 billion in the. 立. period of 2002-2013.77 Offensive arms made up roughly 84% of all approved exports by value,. ‧ 國. 學. defensive arms constitute roughly 12%. The remaining 4% are of unknown type.78. ‧. An overview of approved arms and their values is given in Figure 5.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 77. Own calculations based on Arms Exports Reports and press reports.. 78. Percentage values are an estimate only and may contain some error. This is due to grouping of offensive and. defense arms together in some cases in the reports.. 48.

(49) Figure 5: Details of approved arms exports to Israel, 2002-201379. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Known denials of arms exports constitute only 1.4% of all decisions,80 The denied arms have. ‧. mostly been offensive arms of various types. The most commonly cited reason for these. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. denials is that the arms could be used in violent conflict. It is not clear if this is the real reason. n. for the denials, as denials happen very rarely and selectively, while 84% of approved arms are. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. offensive in type and could be used in conflict as well. The number of denied pre-requests is not known, but it is inferred to be similarly low.. 79. Own work based on Arms Exports Reports and press reports.. 80. Own calculations based on Arms Exports Reports.. 49.

(50) 4.5.3 Implications for foreign policy goals According to my argument, the high consistency with category 1 of arms export behavior means that the related foreign policy goals are of high importance. In our case, these goals include gaining political influence, access to decision-makers, access to intelligence, access to military technology and influencing the regional balance of power in favor of Israel.. Less consistency with category 2 means that the related goals, which are to provide security. 政治大. and to express commitment to security, to prevent refugees due to war and to prevent. 立. terrorism, are of medium importance.. ‧ 國. 學. The low consistency with category 3 means that the related goal of promoting adherence to. ‧. international norms, including respect for human rights, respect for sovereignty and nuclear. sit. y. Nat. io. er. non-proliferation, is of low importance.. al. n. v i n CThe This hierarchy is shown in Figure 6. between foreign policy goals identified by h econflicts ngchi U other scholars are resolved by this hierarchy. An overview of the identified foreign policy goals in relation to categories of arms export behavior is given in Figure 7.. Figure 6: The hierarchy of foreign policy goals of Germany towards Israel.. 50.

(51) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 51. i n U. v.

(52) 4.6 Case Two: Saudi-Arabia 4.6.1 German foreign policy goals towards Saudi-Arabia Scholars from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs have identified conflicting foreign policy goals of Germany towards Saudi-Arabia, and have acknowledged the contradictions.. According to Katja Niethammer, relations between Germany and Saudi-Arabia have. 政治大 historically not been very close, and foreign policy appeared to be unstructured until 2007. 立. 81. ‧ 國. 學. By contrast, an increase in diplomatic visits since 2008 points to renewed interest of Germany. ‧. in Saudi-Arabia, according to Guido Steinberg.82. Nat. er. io. sit. y. One of Germany’s foreign policy goals is expanding trade relations with Saudi-Arabia. 83 This is evidence for the foreign policy goal of access to Saudi-Arabia as a market for German. al. n. v i n C h interested in access products. The German government is also e n g c h i U to Saudi-Arabia’s oil, in order to diversify its oil imports.84 Jens Hobohm points out that Germany has to import 97 percent of its oil and out of its current suppliers, only Russia has a potential for increasing its. 81. Katja Niethammer, “The States of the Golf Cooperation Council”, in German Middle East and North Africa. Policy. Interests, Strategies, Options, ed. Guido Steinberg (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2009), 53. 82. Guido Steinberg, “Conclusions: German Policy in the Middle East and North Africa”, in German Middle East. and North Africa Policy. Interests, Strategies, Options, ed. Guido Steinberg (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2009), 70 83. Steinberg, “Conclusions: German Policy in the Middle East and North Africa”, 70.. 84. Niethammer, “The States of the Golf Cooperation Council”, 55.. 52.

(53) exports.85 Russia however is Germany’s largest supplier of oil already, and political relations have deteriorated since the NATO-Russian conflict in the Ukraine. Diversifying oil imports is therefore important to increase supply security, and according to Jens Hobohm, Saudi-Arabia is an excellent candidate due to its large reserves. 86 He also notes that “negotiating major energy projects and supply deals” requires access to political leaders, as the monarchic state controls the energy sector. 87 Katja Niethammer also notes that personal relationships are important when dealing with Saudi-Arabia.88 This is evidence for the foreign policy goals of. 治政 access to leaders and access to natural resources for import.大立 ‧ 國. 學. Another foreign policy goal towards Saudi-Arabia is promotion of political reforms. 89. ‧. According to Guido Steinberg, power in Saudi-Arabia is shared between religious leaders and. sit. y. Nat. the royal family. There is large scale corruption in this system of government.90 So far, the. al. er. io. ruling Saudi family has refused fundamental changes to its political system.91 Many human. n. v i n C h While politicalUrights of women are increasing by rights violations occur in Saudi-Arabia. engchi 92. law, many women are reluctant to actually exercise them due to the prevailing social. 85. Jens Hobohm “Energy“. in German Middle East and North Africa Policy. Interests, Strategies, Options, ed.. Guido Steinberg (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2009), 59. 86. Hobohm “Energy“, 59.. 87. Hobohm “Energy“, 63.. 88. Niethammer, “The States of the Golf Cooperation Council”, 53.. 89. Niethammer, “The States of the Golf Cooperation Council”, 56.. 90. Freitag, ”Saudi-Arabia: Buying Stability?”, 23.. 91. Freitag, ”Saudi-Arabia: Buying Stability?”, 25.. 92. Steinberg, Leading the Counter-Revolution, 26.. 53.

(54) structures. 93 Religious repression is also in place, both with regard to non-believers and muslim minorities. While Shiites are recognized as a religion since 2003, they still have limited political rights and religious ceremonies are repressed in many places, justified by Saudi-Arabia through claims of Iranian political influence on Shiite groups, which must be resisted.94 The German government is communicating its concern about these issues and its goal of resolving them, when questioned about specific instances of violations, or when questioned about Germany’s closer cooperation with Saudi-Arabia in recent years. 95 This is. 治政 evidence that political reforms are a German foreign policy大 goal. 立 ‧ 國. 學. Another foreign policy goal for the gulf region is avoiding civil war and state failurea. One. ‧. reason is to prevent refugee flows and avoiding a climate for crime and terrorism. 96 In the. Nat. io. sit. y. case of Saudi-Arabia, a policy goal of supporting Saudi-Arabia’s politically repressive but. er. relatively stable monarchical system is a means to achieve this goal. Avoiding terrorism also. al. n. v i n requires technical cooperation withCthe security organs U of Saudi-Arabia. he ngchi. 97. This would give. Saudi-Arabia new abilities to suppress societal pressures towards political reform. Katja Niethammer therefore points to a contradiction between the German foreign policy goals of. 93. Freitag, ”Saudi-Arabia: Buying Stability?”, 24-25.. 94. Freitag, ”Saudi-Arabia: Buying Stability?”, 25.. 95. Anna-Lena Roth, “Raif Badawi: Steinmeier kritisiert Strafe für saudischen Blogger“ (Raif Badawi: Steinmeier. criticizes punishment for Saudi blogger), Spiegel Online, 24 January 2015. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/raif-badawi-steinmeier-kritisiert-strafe-fuer-saudischen-blogger-a1014810.html 96. Steinberg, “Conclusions: German Policy in the Middle East and North Africa”, 67.. 97. Niethammer, “The States of the Golf Cooperation Council”, 55.. 54.