• 沒有找到結果。

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7. Conclusion

This study uses implementation of the Labor Pension Act as the quasi-experiment to analyze the impact of severance pay on the layoff rate. In order to apply the difference in differences method, whether the LSA is applicable to an employee is the key to classification for the treatment group and the reference group.

The results show that severance pay seems to have no significant impact on the layoff rate. Although the DID estimate from the sample with the largest window (2000 to 2011) is significantly positive, it might have been caused by the effect of the improved pension system instead of the severance pay. After dropping the employees hired after the policy change and some other observations which might have affected the accuracy of the analysis, the DID estimate shows that the severance pay has had no significant impact on the layoff rate. Other control variables such as income, gender, education, job seniority and household size all have significant effects on the layoff rate. And the macroeconomic event - subprime crisis - seems to have had a significant effect on the layoff rate as well.

Since factors such as income and job seniority are directly connected with the performance of the employee, it is not surprising to see the significant effects of such kinds of factors. Besides, layoffs usually occur when the economy is facing a downturn and thus it is natural to expect layoff rate to be mainly affected by the macroeconomic related factors.

However, though one might expect the reduced severance pay to increase the layoff rate, results of the analysis refute this expectation. It seems that even if severance pay is reduced by a large amount, it has no significant effects on the layoff rate. Instead, what affect the layoff are factors which have direct connections with work performance or the macroeconomic related factors.

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Moreover, As LPA has improved the pension system and unemployment insurance has been implemented in 1999, severance pay is only expected to prevent arbitrary layoffs at present. But the results in this study suggest that severance pay does not affect layoff rate significantly. Hence, as a preventive measure against arbitrary layoffs, whether the current severance payment system should be modified or kept as it is could be discussed more in the future.

Finally, there are some constraints in this study which need to be addressed. First, the data drawn from MUQLS do not directly tell us whether an employee is covered under LSA and thus it is inevitable to make some errors when classifying the treatment group and the reference group. Second, the number of laid off employees in the reference group is much lower relative to the treatment group, which might affect the accuracy of the analysis as well.

In addition to the layoff rate, there are still many possible impacts of the severance pay such as the turn off rate, unemployment and employment. Future research could use the evidence from Taiwan to examine these corresponding effects.

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Reference

1. 吳姿慧(2005),『我國資遣費給付制度之檢討 – 以德國「勞動契約終止保護法」與「企業 組織法」之規定為參照』,中原財經法學,第 15 期,頁 267-338

2. 林振賢(2000),「也談資遣費問題 -- 兼述日本退職金制度 – 上」,中國勞工,第 1004 期,

頁 20-23

3. 郭明政(2000),「勞基法資遣費與退休金制度之改革」,政大勞動學報,第 9 期,頁 37-64 4. 張誌純(2004),「企業組織再造程序員工權益之研究 – 以資遣費為中心」,成功大學碩士

論文

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6. 『行業就業指南』,行政院勞工委員會

7. 『重要教育統計資訊』,台北市政府教育局,http://www.edunet.taipei.gov.tw/

8. 勞動基準法,行政院勞工委員會 9. 勞工退休金條例,行政院勞工委員會

10. Angrist, J., and S. Pischke (2008), “Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricists’ Companion,”

Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

11. Bassanini, A., and A. Garnero (2012), “Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in OECD Countries: Evidence from Cross-Country/Cross-industry Data,” Labour Economics, Vol.21, No.1, 25-41

12. Hofer, H., U. Schuh and D. Walch (2011), “Effects of the Austrian Severance Pay Reform,” in Reforming Severance Pay: An International Perspective, 177-194

13. Kugler, Adriana D. (1999), “The Impact of Firing Costs on Turnover and Unemployment:

Evidence from the Colombian Labour Market Reform,” International Tax and Public Finance, Vol.6, No.3, 389-410

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14. Lazear, Edward P. (1987), “Employment at Will, Job Security, and Work Incentives,” in Proceedings of the Conference on Employment, Unemployment, and Hours of Work, Science Center Berlin

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Appendix

Table A1: Employees Who Are Not Applicable to LSA (一)不適用之各業

1 農民團體

2 農會、漁會信用部

3 國際組織、外國使領館、其他外國機構 4 未分類其他餐飲業

5 家事服務業

(二)不適用之各業工作者

1 公務機構(技工、工友、駕駛人、臨時人員、清潔隊員、停車收、國會助理、地方民代助 理除外)之工作者

2 公立之各級學校及幼稚園、特殊教育事業、社育事業、職業訓練事業等(技工、工友、駕 駛人、臨時人員除外)之工作者

3 公立學術研究及服務業(技工、工友、駕駛人、臨時人員除外)之工作者 4 公立醫療院所(技工、工友、駕駛人、臨時人員除外)之工作者

5 公立社會福利機構(技工、工友、駕駛、臨時人員除外)之工作者 6 公立藝文業(技工、工友、駕駛、臨時人員除外)之工作者 7 國防事業(非軍職人員除外)之工作者

8 私立之各級之教師、職員 9 醫療保健服務業之醫師 10 法律服務業之律師

11 職業運動業之教練、球員、裁判人員

12 未分類其他組織中,國際交流基金會、教育文化基金會、社會團體、地方民意代表聘(遴)、

僱用之助理人員、依立法院通過之組織條例所設之基金會之工作者,適用勞基法。除上述 情形外,其餘皆不適用。

(三)其他不適用者 1 事業單位之雇主、委任經理人

2 技術生、養成工、見習生、建教合作班之學生

資料來源:勞工保險局全球資訊網(website of Bureau of Labor Insurance) http://www.bli.gov.tw/

Table A2: Classification Rules of Reference Group and Treatment Group

適用勞基法與否

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刷及有關工作者

是 否(公務機構)

79 其他技術工及有關工 作者

是 否(公務機構)

81 固定生產設備操作工 是 否(公務機構)

82 機械操作工 是 否(公務機構)

83 組裝工 是 否(公務機構)

84 駕駛員及移運設備操 作工

是 是(駕駛人)

91 小販及服務工 是 是(技工、工友)

92 生產體力工 是 否(公務機構)

99 其他非技術工及體力 工

是 是(技工、工友)

註:上表中,學校教師與職員規模部分,參考台北市政府教育局的『重要教育統計資訊』中之各 級學校教職員數。醫師、律師與會計師之薪資水準,則是參考行政院勞工委員會之『行業職業就 業指南』中的各職業薪資概況。

Table A3: The Variation of the Coverage of LSA and the Corresponding Classification Rules 適用勞基法之行

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Table A4: Data of Layoff Proportions from 2000 to 2011

Reference Group Treatment Group

Laid off Workers Non Laid off Works Laid off Rate Laid off Workers Non Laid off Works Laid off Rate

2000-2001 5 1,001 0.0050 129 6,040 0.0214

2001-2002 4 1,114 0.0036 134 6,879 0.0195

2002-2003 3 1,218 0.0025 142 6,909 0.0206

2003-2004 5 712 0.0070 89 7,100 0.0125

2004-2005 2 872 0.0023 89 7,235 0.0123

2005-2006 0 672 0.0000 87 7,019 0.0124

2006-2007 3 704 0.0043 69 7,954 0.0087

2007-2008 3 815 0.0037 62 7,765 0.0080

2008-2009 4 721 0.0055 142 7,435 0.0191

2009-2010 4 734 0.0054 107 7,435 0.0144

2010-2011 5 682 0.0073 57 7,469 0.0076

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