Curb parking is never a neglected topic in the transportation research, but rarely did we think of curb parking from a land use perspective. In the literature review, we point out that on-street parking is a monopolistic good and its parking revenue is a type of Marxian monopoly rent due to the exclusive use of land. We also argue that curb parking is a land use issue as it takes up a tremendous amount of land. A plausible solution proposed by Shoup is to charge the performance prices on curb parking.
This research attempts to lay out the land use problem of curb parking. We implement a descriptive study in chapter three and empirical analysis in chapter four and five to look for potential solutions. We discover four important results as follows.
1. Curb parking is an issue of land use efficiency
In chapter three, we set out a standard to analyze the land use efficiency of curb parking.
Because the parking peak is the time when the on-street parking reaches the highest occupancy rate, we employ the full parking occupancy at peak time as a measurement of land use efficiency. If parking occupancy is low at that point of time, a significant number of curb spaces remain vacant at all times. This phenomenon indicates an inefficient use and a waste of land.
2. Current curb parking in Taipei represents an inefficient use of land Putting land into curb parking is inefficient in that enormous amount of land remain vacant at all hours and it is an unwise investment, financially speaking. In years 2016
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over NT$50 million of tax revenue unconsciously. Such a critical waste of land is a result of the all-time empty curb spaces. Additionally, in monetary terms, curb parking is not an efficient use of land because its return on investment in 2017 is 0.147 percent, far lower than any kind of land investments in Taipei.
3. Customized parking planning is warranted to improve land use
efficiency
The empirical analysis in chapter five explores the price mechanism in curb parking market. We discover that parking conditions are vastly different across districts and types of land use in Taipei. For example, curb spaces in Datong district are almost always fully occupied, but those in Nangang district often remain empty. Likewise, the parking situation in residential areas in the center of the city differs considerably from that in the industrial zones on the outskirts. Drivers may find it hard to look for a curb space in the former condition, but feel rather easy to have one space for the latter.
Naturally, the parking planning for each district should be tailored-made according to their parking situations.
In those areas which are fully packed with no empty curb spaces at all times, we suggest that the government should price curb parking dynamically. The urgent task for these neighborhoods is to give the road back to conveyance but not fully parking occupancy.
The land will be more efficiently used if the government can eliminate both the phenomenon of cruising and illegal parking. Every dollar decrease raises 1.246 cars parked on curb parking on average. Furthermore, the effect of price mechanism tends
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to be stronger and more robust when there is a higher quantity demanded of curb parking.
On the contrary, in areas filled with empty curb spaces like Nangang district, the radical solution for improving land use efficiency is to cut the quantity supplied of curb parking.
Pricing is ineffective in changing vacancy rates in these neighborhoods. It is merely a tool for the government to maximize the profit. Urban planners should reexamine the parking planning. They may reduce the vacancy rate of on-street parking by 0.0487 percent for every removal of curb spaces.
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