4. Morals
4.2. Czech Republic's Attitude towards Tibet
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meanwhile acknowledge that such an influence could be present while negotiating big contracts.
Similar concerns were for example present while negotiating contracts with the US's Boeing and European Airbus. However, the only contract the Czech Republic had with the PRC on this scale was Shentou plant contract, which proved not be very beneficial for the Czech side. And hence, it seems that there are no barriers for bigger activity in the sphere of human rights.
4.2. Czech Republic's Attitude towards Tibet
Czech interest and support for Tibet stems from the connection the Czech population see between the fate of the Czechs and the Tibetans from the historic viewpoint. The support can be seen as manifested in two ways – meetings of Czech high politicians and other important personalities with Dalai Lama and general support for Tibet.
4.2.1. General Support for Tibet
One of the ways how the support of Tibet is manifested in the Czech Republic is the Days of Tibet campaign. This international campaign that culminates on March 10 each year in order to commemorate the Tibetan anti-Chinese uprising in March 1959, was introduced in 1996 and apart for the support of ordinary Czechs, it also gained a support of some politicians, celebrities and municipalities. For example, in 2008, 348 of Czech municipalities participated and hanged out Tibetan flag on its official building.
Support for Tibet culminated in 2007, after the Czech Green Party (Strana zelených) was elected to parliament for the first time in 2006. In 2007, Martin Bursík, the Green Vice-Premier and Minister of Environmental Protection became the first ever Czech minister to hang up a
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Tibetan flag on his office building. Moreover, the spokesperson of Czech diplomats also expressed support for this action. Yet, at the same time he denied that it would mean leavening the One-China policy ("Bursík přes protesty vyvěsil").
In 2008, the PRC's attention turned to the Czech Republic again when Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek announced that he will attend Olympic Games wearing a badge with the Tibetan flag. The PRC reaction to this was harsh – the Czech ambassador in Beijing, Vítězslav Grepl was asked to explain the behavior and state whether it means the change of the Czech One-China policy. Furthermore, the PRC ambassador simultaneously complained at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Buchert "Čína se zlobí"). Highly-situated Czech diplomat suggested that the reaction of the PRC stems from their fear that Topolánek could bring the badge with him to Beijing. Topolánek consequently decided to visit Beijing privately (his expenses were partly paid by the Olympic team fund and partly privately) and he did not bring the badge with him to the PRC and he did not meet with any high representatives of the PRC ("Topolánek nakonec do Pekingu vyrazí").
In the interview with one of the Czech biggest media Topolánek stated that the "Czech Republic conducts One-China policy, yet our position is clear" ("Topolánek: Vyšponovaná atmosféra"). Here, Topolánek probably referred to the Czech Republic's position on the Tibet issue. Furthermore, during the same interview he also mentioned that the ROC should be a member of the World Trade Organization and the PRC should not create obstacles to its admission. Moreover, he acknowledged that due to the size of the Czech Republic, it is relatively of small importance for the PRC and also added, that he believes that his decision to wear the badge did not influence the relations between the Czech Republic and the PRC. This interview subsequently also became a target of the PRC criticism (Buchert, "Čína si stěžuje"). In
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September of the same year, the Czech Green party unfolded Tibetan flag in front of the visiting delegation from the PRC and the PRC ambassador who was accompanying the delegation, which resulted into the delegation and ambassador leaving (Fürst, Česko-čínské vztahy po roce 1989 62).
Irritation of the PRC caused by Czech politicians' support for Tibet was clearly showed during the Shanghai Expo in 2010. Czech Prime Minister Jan Fišer, who previously supported the proposal to condemn the violence in Tibet, was indicated that none of the PRC officers is willing to meet him43 and hence, Fisher had to cancel the whole journey to the PRC in order to avoid international embarrassment. One of Czech diplomats stated that in this respect among the EU countries, the Czech Republic is at the very end of the PRC's favorite countries list (Buchert,
"Fisher na Expo do Šanghaje nejel").
Chart 9
List of cities, towns, quarters, town halls, municipalities and counties taking part in the Days for Tibet event in the period of 1996-2013
Source: Procházková, Marcela. "Vlajka pro Tibet: Seznam měst, městských částí, magistrátů, obcí a krajů z celé České republiky, které se v letech 1996 – 2013." TIBINFO. March 8 2013.
Web. 8 May 2013.
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996
467 410 403 364 363 349 326 286 274 239 187 134 90 100 56 57 20 4
43Supposedly not even the mayor of Beijing.
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It is interesting to note that there has been an increasing tendency in the participation of cities, towns, quarters, town halls, municipalities and counties (see Chart 9) in the Days for Tibet event which is continuing even despite the fact that in 2006 the PRC embassy started by a means of a letter from the PRC ambassador, ask potential participants not to hang up the flags (Fürst, Česko-čínské vztahy po roce 1989 62).
4.2.2. The Urban Legend of Dalai Lama's Harmful Effect
In the fall of 2012, Klaus together with Prime Minister Petr Nečas voiced strong support for a more pro-active and responsive PRC policy. When celebrating the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party at the PRC embassy, the Czech president stated that the Czech Republic should strengthen its relations with the PRC and avoid obstacles between these two countries. It may seem as a coincidence that not even three weeks before, on September 10, 2012, the Czech Prime Minister explained what may be perceived as "obstacles" and he particularly pointed out Dalai Lama as being harmful to the relations with the PRC and furthermore, labeled support for Dalai Lama, human rights and other touchy issues such as a "fashionable political language" ("Nečas: Dalajlamismus"). The criticism regarding Dalai Lama visits to the Czech Republic, which were quite frequent44 was mainly based on the argument provided by the article
"Paying a Visit: The Dalai Lama Effects on International Trade" in which its authors Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, ran a gravity model of exports to the PRC from 159 countries.
44Dalai Lama visited the Czech Republic in total nine times: 1990, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011.
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They concluded that receiving Dalai Lama at the highest political levels is punished through reduction of the country's exports to the PRC (by 8.1% or 16.9%) and this effect which affects mainly machinery and transport equipment disappears after two years.
In order to prove or disproved this so-called Dalai Lama effect, I conducted a case study for the particular case of the Czech Republic applying Fuch's and Klann's criteria was conducted – Dalai Lama had to be received at the highest political level within the Hu Jintao era.45 After applying these two conditions, out of the total number of nine Dalai Lama visits, only three were defined as applicable for the case study. First, the Dalai Lama June 2002 visit when he met with President Havel, next the 2008 November visit when he was received by Prime Minister Topolánek and furthermore his 2009 meeting with Prime Minister Fisher. After the first meeting, exports to the PRC within the next two year period increased for 44%. The two-year period which followed the second visit, saw an increase of 76%, and in the two years after the 2009 visit exports went up for 86%.46 Despite the fact that the Czech Republic's core export products to the PRC consist of machinery and transport equipment, and hence, the Czech Republic falls into a category of countries very sensitive to the Dalai Lama effect, its existence was for the particular case of the Czech Republic disproved.
It is interesting to note what can be also blamed on Dalai Lama – during an interview the current Czech ambassador in the PRC Libor Sečka, interviewing journalist mentioned that a prominent Beijing's diplomat said to journalists that as long as the Czech Republic will keep
45Fuch and Klann regard Hu Jintao era as the period when he hold the position of the Secretary General.
46For more details see the Attachment Chart 10 – Dalai Lama Effect.
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inviting Dalai Lama, Chinese high level visits will be avoiding Prague (Urban). Sečka in his answer emphasizes the different perception of Dalai Lama that exist in the PRC and the Czech Republic – the contrast between his perception as a person embodying certain spiritual, cultural and ethnic principles which persists in the Czech Republic, and a representation of political tendencies, which is the perception remaining in the PRC. Moreover, he also noted that the last official meeting with Dalai Lama was 2009 with Prime Minister Fisher and that members of this government had no official contact with the Dalai Lama (Urban). Therefore it seems that the claim that the PRC high officials avoid Prague because of Czech forthcoming approach to Dalai Lama, has no evidence.
There were however two periods in which Czech exports to the PRC decreased. First, during the period of 1996, 1997 and 1998 and second, in 2008. The 1996 - 1998 period saw a significant decrease of 25% whereas in 2008, there was only a slight decrease of 6%.47 In order to analyze the source of these two decreases a brief outline of the events that preceded them will be presented in the following chapter.