2. Introduction to the Relationship between the Czech Republic and the PRC
2.3 Václav versus Václav
2.3.2. Václav Havel
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
24
2.3.2. Václav Havel
Václav Havel served in total three terms as a president – first 1989-1992 as the president of newly democratic Czechoslovakia and then two presidential terms during 1993-2003 as the president of the Czech Republic. Havel himself was persecuted during the communist rule – mainly because of his bourgeoisie family origins but later on also because of his political (= anti-communist) views. In one of the issues of the Rudé právo, the former communist press, Havel was labeled as "waging his "sacred" war with the socialist state" ("Kdo je Václav Havel" 6).
Havel was the perfect symbol of the transition of the Czechoslovakia to a democratic state and new topics that were introduced into foreign policy with the PRC. For Havel personally, topics such as human rights or social activism were very dear and became the center stone of his political activism both in terms of his national and foreign policy. His activism in this respect was showed right at the beginning of his presidential terms as the president of the Czechoslovakia.His first New Year presidential speech in the office was a clear indicator that his anti-communist past and his support for human rights are going to form main guidelines of his future policies both in respect to domestic and foreign affairs. In the speech he invited some of the biggest figures of that time spiritual life – Dalai Lama and the Pope John Paul II to visit Czechoslovakia (Havel,
"Novoroční projev prezidenta ČSSR Václava Havla"). Dalai Lama accepted this invitation, came to Czechoslovakia on February 2, 1990 and stayed for five days. During his visit he met with the president and other important figures of Czechoslovakian spiritual life. This Havel's step is by some authors believed to mark the start of a tradition of “unofficial” Dalai Lama's visits all around the world. The PRC labeled the Dalai Lama visit as rude interference in internal affairs (粗暴干涉中国内政的政治行动) ("中华人民共和国务院公报" 17) and indicated that even
‧
though the visit was officially labeled as private, the Czech Republic should avoid inviting Dalai Lama again.
Yet, the PRC resentment encouraged Havel even more and in March the same year he voiced his support for the PRC democracy movement in broadcasting from so-called French Goddess of Democracy – a ship which was at that time moving close to the PRC coast.
Surprisingly, there was no setback in the relationship between the Czech Republic and the PRC and several meetings Czechoslovakian and the PRC officials were conducted – for example the meeting between Qian Qichen, the Deputy Foreign Minister and his Czechoslovakian counterpart Martin Palouš on February 27, 1991 which confirmed the will of the two states to develop mutual relations; then Li Lanqing, PRC Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry meeting with the Prime Minister Čalfa in June 1991; and later that year, Czechoslovakian Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Marťák's visit of Beijing all showed that the relationship remained unchanged. Moreover, when the PRC Foreign Minister visited Czechoslovakia in September 15-17, 1991, he met both with President Havel and Prime Minister Čalfa and other high officials. The meeting was without conflict and in respect of Tibet, Qian Qichen even suggested to Czechoslovakian ambassador to visit Tibet.13
Havel's approach to the PRC in his following presidential years remained deeply influenced by his anti-communist past and strong belief in morals and human rights. He invited and met with Dalai Lama nine times, out of which five times while still holding the president office. These visits were for their assumed harmful effect on the relationship between the PRC and the Czech Republic and mainly on the Czech Republic's exports to the PRC harshly
13Československá zahraniční politika, Data, FMZV ČSFR, Praha, 1991, s.74, originally cited in Česko-čínské vztahy by Rudolf Fürst.
‧
supported by Havel himself who stated that after the first Dalai Lama's visit to Czechoslovakia, the ambassador of the PRC himself indicated that Czechoslovakia should not take the PRC rhetoric reaction to the visit of the Dalai Lama in the Czechoslovakia literally and that the economic ties would remain unchanged (Kalenská). Separation of the Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovak republic that happened during the presidency of Havel did not have a major impact on the relationship between the Czech Republic and the PRC. In the eyes of the PRC officials, it is clear that the reduction of the state's size that naturally came with the separation did not improve the Czech Republic's leverage. In 1994, Václav Klaus that time Prime Minister of the Czech Republic visited the PRC and the talks that followed had the tone that became later on characteristic of all talks of the Czech Republic politicians with the PRC officials – hopes for the liberalization of the PRC market and exploring opportunities for the Czech business in the PRC. As it also became a Czech tradition the delegation to the PRC was labeled as successful and the PRC market as relatively free and opened for the Czech business.15The next Prime Minister delegation to the PRC followed in 1999. It was however preceded by delegations of other Czech officials, which concerned the contract regarding the Shentou plan and the Czech and Greek Kosovo initiative which was sealed up in Beijing. Czech
14See for example Janoutová Věra. Blesk 1993/?, str. ?: Rushdie není dalajláma?1993-09-06 or V.R. Špígl 1993/?, str. ?: Další návštěva „Dalajlámy“? 1993-09-08, accesed through the digital library of Knihovna Václava Havla (Václav Havel Library).
15Fürst cites the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic here, but does not state a source. See Fürst, Rudol. Česko-čínské vztahy po roce 1989 p.51.
‧
Prime Minister Miloš Zeman traveled to Beijing on 16 December 1999 and was received by the President of the PRC Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Zeman reaffirmed that the Czech Republic follows the One-China principle and refused interfering into the PRC's internal affairs. Yet, he also stated that "we [the Czech Republic] also does not wish anybody to lecture us."16 One of the participants reported that Zeman's behavior was self-confident and that he did not lose his posture even when he was questioned about that time anti-government demonstrations in the Czech Republic. Zeman according to this participant replied that the Czech Republic is a democratic country and that no-one would send tanks against the demonstrators, which reportedly irritated the PRC premier (Fürst, Česko-čínské vztahy po roce 1989 52). Yet, it is interesting to note that the contract for the Shentou plant was signed during this meeting. However, the next year the PRC conditioned the contract by financing of the project from the Czech or Slovak side and hence, it was postponed again.
Havel's foreign diplomacy can be generally characterized by promoting three areas – human rights, multilateralism and international dialogue. In harmony with these areas of focus, he was also a member of several organizations and groups, such as Shared Concern Initiative (with Dalai Lama), Dalai Lama's Educating the Heart Dialogue (with Dalai Lama) and Committee of 100 for Tibet. In this context, his activities could have been frowned upon by the PRC officials. Distrust of these officials may have also been increased by the fact that Havel has never visited the PRC. His participation at the United Nations conference, where when answering a journalist's question supported sovereignty of the ROC, is seemingly still unforgiven in the PRC. This is evident on their website which although does not explicitly name Havel,
16Zahraniční politika ČR, Data, NZV ČR, Praha, 1999, p. 20-21; as quoted in Fürst, Rudol. Česko-čínské vztahy po roce 1989.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
28
clearly refers to his actions which they link to the "cooling of the relations" ("Politické vztahy Čínské lidové"). Havel himself later on commented his own statements in a radio interview by saying that he "only said aloud what everybody else was thinking" (Havel). Havel often strove to include the issue of human rights into the dialogue. He stated that he mentioned human rights during his talks with the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as with the Deputy Chairman of the PRC (Kalenská).
In terms of Czech foreign policy conduct towards the PRC, Havel stated that he beliefs that as a matter of fact, the PRC appreciates when somebody small dares to say something critical, and on the other hand, despises those who are afraid of them (Kalenská).He showed his will to stretch limits of the PRC patience by (however not-realized) plan to visit the PRC and ROC within one journey.17 Yet, it must be emphasized that Havel's foreign policy towards the PRC is not identical to the Czechoslovakian (or later the Czech Republic's) official policy and moreover, that in some instances Czechoslovakian (or later the Czech Republic's) officials acted independently. For example in 1991, during the talks between Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister Čalfa, the list of imprisoned Chinese activists which was prepared by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was not handed to Chinese officials. Deputy Chairman of the Czechoslovakian government explained later on that the list is to be handed on the non-official level.
In other instances, the PRC did not show the respect that the Czech side felt that would be appropriate. To illustrate this, for example the letter that was sent by Havel to Yang Shankung,
17Another proposed variant was to visit the PRC and Tibet simultaneously.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
29
the president of the PRC was left without answer.18 It is also interesting to note that both the web page of the Czech Republic embassy in Beijing and the PRC embassy web page in the Czech Republic does, as a matter of fact, ignore the existence of Václav Havel19 and according to some of the Czech media the death of Havel in 2011, was in the PRC not given the attention it would be appropriate and in the articles reporting his death no information regarding Havel's worldviews or his attitude towards the PRC was included ("Čína Havlovu smrt zasklila").
In contrast, the Czech side was at times ready to make major concessions – such as the Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kavan's promotion of the "Czech-Greek Initiative", an alternative plan for a solution to the Kosovo conflict, which was supported by the PRC and Russia. The initiative which was against the wishes of NATO, in which the Czech Republic had just become a member state, was sealed up in Beijing. This concession is believed to help to close the contract for the Shentou plant, which however as it is discussed into economy part, was not much beneficial for the Czech side.
Throughout his presidency, Havel promoted both human rights issues and other "sensitive areas" to the PRC but at the same time was engaged in the economic diplomacy. In 1997 and 1998, he supported the resolution criticizing the PRC for human rights violations and appealing to the Czech government to emphasize the theme of human rights in the PRC. He moreover supported other events, such as Days of Tibet. In 2008, he also participated in protests and initiatives against the Olympic Games in the PRC. Yet, Havel was with no doubt also actively
18FMZV ČSFR, 1991, s. 720-726, as quoted in Fürts, Rudolf. Česko-čínské vztahy.
19See for example "Mutual relations between the Czech Republic and the People´s Republic of China - present and history", " Čínsko-české diplomatické styky" or "Politické vztahy Čínské lidové republiky a České republiky"
‧
engaged in the economic diplomacy and also supported intensifying and deepening economic ties with the PRC. His conduct of economic policy was accordingly done under the condition that it will be done in a more sophisticated way, taking into account dominantly the longer-term consequence for the Czech Republic, and not the immediate economic gains (Kalenská).
Even after he left the office, Havel actively participated in public life and the support of human rights. In respect of the human rights issue in the PRC, very significant was Havel's support of Charte 08 (零八宪章), a manifesto which adopts the name and style from the anti-Soviet Charter 77 issued by dissidents in Czechoslovakia, one of which was Havel himself. The Charte 08 was signed by over 350 Chinese intellectual and human rights activities and published on 10th December 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On 6th of January 2006, Havel together with other two signatories of Charte 77 attempted to hand a letter of protest to the PRC ambassador stationed in the Czech Republic. The letter was addressed to the President of the PRC Hu Jintao and asked for a fair trial for the PRC imprisoned dissent Liu Siao-po (劉曉波) and the end of persecution of other signatories of the Charte 08. Moreover, the text clearly pointed out a link between the signatories of the Charte 08 and the Czech Charte 77.20 The delegation of three former dissidents, including the former president of the Czech Republic was not received at the embassy and had to resort to putting the letter into the embassy’s mailbox. The spokesperson of the embassy stated that such an action was interfering into the PRC's internal affairs and that the case is fully within the jurisdiction of the PRC judicial system ("Číňané Třem králům Halvlovi").
The act of ignoring the Czech Republic's former president was not well received by many Czechs. In her reaction to that act, Olga Lomová, the head of the Sinology Department at Charles University, pointed out that such an action clearly downgraded the authority of the former
20Whole text of the letter can be found at "Otevřený dopis českých ex-chartistů ." Denik Referendum. 10 Jan. 2010.
Web. 10 May 2013.
<http://denikreferendum.cz/clanek/990-otevreny-dopis-ceskych-ex-chartistu-cinskemu-prezidentovi >.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
31
president of the Czech Republic and Czechoslovakia and suggested that time President Klaus should take a clear stance on such a behavior, and address the topic in the talk with the PRC ambassador and thus, send a clear message that such a behavior is not acceptable ("Číňané Třem králům Havlovi").
In the ROC, Havel was popular and valued. Former ROC president, Chen Shuibian in November 2004 awarded him with the Order of the Brilliant Star with Special Grand Cordon which is awarded for promoting bilateral friendship with Taiwan or for advancing foreign relations with Taiwan. Havel can be regarded as having many followers among the Czech politicians, one of the most visible, both regarding his worldviews and attitude towards the PRC, is the current Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, who similarly to Havel advocates human rights and also lacks enthusiasm for the PRC and moreover, identically to Havel, he has never visited the PRC.
Havel was both during his life and after his death connected to many myths. Some originated in the communist propaganda, which emphasized his rich family background and privileged upbringing. Others were related to his conduct during his term as the president, such as the fact that his meetings with Dalai Lama had harmful effect on Czech exports to the PRC or that he significantly contributed to the demise of Czech weapons industry (Vražda). Hence, in the Czech Republic, Havel’s policies and activities were not welcomed by a considerable number of Czechs who felt his policies and actions were threatening the Czech economy and thus also, their own well-being. The chart below (Chart 2) clearly shows that the Czech Republic's exports to the PRC increased during the presidency of Václav Havel. It is interesting to note that Havel's meeting with Dalai Lama despite the widespread belief in the Czech Republic, had no harmful
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
32
effect on the Czech export to the PRC.21 The decrease in 1996, 1997 and 1998 possible source from two sources – first, too close rapprochement between the Czech Republic the ROC and second, internal problems that Czech Republic was experiencing both politically and economically.22
Chart 2
Czech export to the PRC during the presidency of Václav Havel
Source: "External Trade Database." Czech Statistical Office. Accessed on May 12. 2013., Yearbook." Czech Statistical Office. Accessed on May 12. 2013
21For concrete data please refer to the part "The Urban Legend of Dalai Lama's Harmful Effect".
22For concrete data please refer to the part "Taiwan".
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
33
The PRC import to the Czech Republic as the Chart below (Chart 3) illustrates was stably raising throughout the whole period of Havel's presidency. Even during the period of a decline in the Czech Republic's export to the PRC, the PRC import remained raising. This clearly shows that in contrast to the PRC government, the Czech government did not take any action in terms of the PRC imports to the Czech Republic.23
Chart 3
Czech import to the PRC during the presidency of Václav Havel
Source: "External Trade Database." Czech Statistical Office. Accessed on May 12. 2013.,
"Yearbook." Czech Statistical Office. Accessed on May 12. 2013
23For more information please refer to the "Money" chapter.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
34
The following Chart on trade deficit between the Czech Republic and the ROC clearly shows the rapid development of the trade deficit, which emerged as a result of the lack of regulation of PRC imports to the Czech Republic.
Chart 4
Trade deficit during the presidency of Václav Havel
Source: "External Trade Database." Czech Statistical Office. Accessed on May 12. 2013.,
"Yearbook." Czech Statistical Office. Accessed on May 12. 2013