Entanglement

In addition to Classical Deterrence, Nye also looks to Glen Snyder's definition of deterrence and recalls Broad Deterrence to provide a framework in cyberspace. Entanglement is one of the methods of deterring hostile actions in cyber space. In particular, Nye mentions again how perceptions of costs and benefits will determine whether hostile actions are undertaken. As a result of the interdependencies that have developed in the international community, many states may find ties too deep to risk severing. Nye provides a possible example of entanglement preventing a Chinese cyber attack. In his example, Chinese operatives are dissuaded from attacking the United States power grid because the economic costs to China would be extreme.⁶⁸ The Chinese Communist Party in many ways relies on continued economic growth to maintain legitimacy, and much of this growth is now driven through the internet and trade with other large states, such as the United States. However, Nye also acknowledges that closed off nations, such as North Korea, would likely not be dissuaded by entanglement mechanisms because they are not deeply connected with other states, with the exception of China.⁶⁹

British historian Nicholas Lambert draws analogies between the 19^th and early 20^th century and our current globalized world.⁷⁰ In the first age of globalization, there were attempts at waging what could be called the world's first version of cyber warfare. Undersea cables were connecting the world at the time, and financial markets were becoming more and more intertwined. In particular, grain prices became more similar around the world and would also react to news in far flung lands that previously had no bearing on domestic pricing. British

68 Nye, 58

69 Ibid.

70Lambert, Nicholas "Brits-Krieg: The Strategy of Economic Warfare." In Understanding Cyber Conflict: Fourteen Analogies.

Georgetown University Press.

strategists of the time discussed and planned a manner of economic warfare that focused on attacking these rising interdependencies. The logic followed that because the United Kingdom was the hegemon of that period, any economic fall out stemming from this strategy would be less severe than that to befall its enemies. However, Lambert notes that as the world globalized, different interest groups became more powerful domestically.⁷¹ As a result, matters of strategy would encompass many interest groups and these financial interest groups would not tolerate strategies that undermined their profits. The economic warfare strategy would only last for roughly three months before being abandoned.

This historical example has similarities to contemporary events as well, in particular with relations between the United States and China. Nye provides a 2009 example, wherein the People's Liberation Army urged the Chinese government to sell some of China's dollar reserves to punish the United States for arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese Central Bank lobbied against this action, suggesting that such a tact would impose large costs on China. The result was the government siding with the Central Bank and not imposing measures against the United States.⁷² These British and Chinese measures were also based on broader domestic fears. The British military planners of the day acknowledged that economic warfare would likely ruin the domestic economy in the blink of an eye; as a result, they were forced to consider stationing a large portion of the available army in large industrial cities to maintain order. Chinese government officials, with a preoccupation regarding mass movements and protests, would likely have the same fears if any actions were taken that negatively affected large swathes of the economy.

71 Lambert, 143

72 Nye, 58

Further, Nye considers different perceptions between groups within a united state body and how they may change over time depending on their own interests. The example given is of Cyber within the Chinese PLA versus economic units within the Chinese government, and how both groups may perceive potential cyber war and its costs as different. Again, this calls to mind British events during the early 20^th century, wherein domestic pressure groups urged strategists to call off their economic warfare plans. In the 21^st century, many new actors have emerged in the technology field around the world, and their support is considered important by governments.

While economic interdependence did not prevent World War 1, strategies that potentially undermined the global trading system further were not undertaken due to British domestic pressures. Assuming the United States has a vested interest in systemic stability, and that many other nation-states share those interests, growing interdependence and entanglement arising as a result of the Internet is likely to dissuade aggressive state-sponsored actions that risk the economy. In addition, as financially oriented pressure groups gain in power, these disparate voices will further petition to prevent anything that may harm their bottom lines or general domestic stability; as were the cases in Britain and China. However, the effectiveness of entanglement relies on the underlying support of the Internet and the international systems by participating powers. Those that do not benefit from the status quo, or those that are controlled by interest groups that do not perceive the benefits of participation as outweighing the costs, will likely not be dissuaded from aggressive actions. An earlier example given was North Korea, that is largely shut off from global society. Further, when comparing Russian interests to those of China, it is likely that entanglement would be less of a factor affecting cost/benefit analysis of

cyber incursions for the Russian parties.