Sources

This paper will make use of a variety of sources, primary and secondary. It must be noted, however, that due to the constantly changing and also clandestine nature of current cyber operations, official government documents are scant and in many cases third-party research groups and individual scholars are providing the bulk of useful information. For example, the United States has an official Cyber Command and issues reports and public information regarding doctrine and, rarely, capabilities²⁴. In contrast, the Russian state apparatus is much

24 "U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)." United States Strategic Command. September 30, 2016. Accessed March 27, 2018. http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-View/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/.

more tight-lipped and it falls to the aforementioned third-party research groups to provide adequate information for analysis²⁵. When analyzing Russian operations it is possible to look to past doctrines and documents for guidance. For example, because Cyber is still viewed within older paradigms, it is possible to use notes on Information Warfare and Propaganda to assist in understanding how Cyber is currently being used and may be used in the future by Russian operatives.²⁶ The United States, while being much more public in its Cyber operations, is also similar. There is a large history of intelligence operations and military doctrines that provide a framework for analyzing current Cyber operations. However, as noted earlier, as paradigms change this prior history may no longer be relevant in analyzing cyber and its affects on policy.

Outside of official documents, the secondary sources will be comprised of a variety of research groups, think tanks, and commercial groups. The author will frequently make use of analysis from The Tallinn Manual²⁷, an ongoing study on how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyber wars. The research group is composed of a variety of subject matter experts and led by Professor Michael N. Schmitt, professor at the United States Naval War College and the University of Exeter; other contributors include various academics from the United States and Europe, United Kingdom Royal Air Force officers, Canadian military officials, and United States military officials. Prior to its initial publication, the Tallinn Manual was peer-reviewed by fellow international legal scholars. The Tallinn Manual was written at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, although the study and views

25 Giles, Keir. “’Information Troops’ – a Russian Cyber Command?”

26 Heickerö, Roland. (2018). FOI Emerging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information Operations.

27Schmitt, Michael N. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2013. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139169288.

contained within are considered independent of official NATO policy. The Tallinn Manual is an important source of information because it is one of the first attempts at studying the legal dimensions of Cyber Conflict and how to apply international law to these matters. In 2017 a Tallinn Manual 2.0 was released, focusing on Cyber legality questions below the level of destructive conflict.²⁸

The author will make use of peer-reviewed articles focusing on more theoretical and less technical aspects of Cyber and its changing paradigms. Some of the journals included will be Strategic Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Security Studies, International Security, and others. These articles will offer both a broader analysis of Cyber operations and how it relates to theory and more narrow analysis and research of specific cases and events. In particular, when examining Deterrence and how it will operate in a Cyber paradigm, these articles will be extremely useful. However, because of the technical nature of Cyber operations and the generally less technically savvy nature of Political Science and International Relations, there cannot be a complete understanding of the subject without also engaging with technical experts and computer science experts. That is the primary deficiency of purely engaging with Social Science on this subject. The author will make use of more technical journals to bridge this gap. Some of these will include Network Security, Computers & Security, IEEE Security &

Privacy, amongst others. The goal will be to bridge the gap between hard and soft sciences as well as possible.

As alluded to, the author will also make use of various commercial technical reports on

28Schmitt, Michael N. Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2017. doi:10.1017/9781316822524.

hacks and various other cyber operations. One of the most cited companies will be FireEye, Inc.

FireEye is an American cybersecurity company that provides security products and services against more advanced threats. The company has also been hired to research high-profile hacks of companies such as Sony Pictures, Target, and JP Morgan Chase, amongst others. FireEye is also known for publishing Advanced Persistent Threat reports. These APT reports analyze hacking operations waged by nation states, and have exposed North Korean, Iranian, Russian, and Chinese operations.²⁹ The APT 28 report, in particular, sheds much light on current Russian cyber operations and their technical attributes.³⁰ Also of note, the FireEye researchers often collaborate with universities and governments in their assignments.